

Standard Development Timeline

This section is maintained by the drafting team during the development of the standard and will be removed when the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees (Board).

Description of Current Draft

This is the final draft of the proposed standards for a formal 10-day comment and ballot period.

Completed Actions	Date
Standards Committee approved Standard Authorization Request (SAR) for posting	February 20, 2019
SAR posted for comment	February 25 – March 27, 2019
45-day formal comment period with ballot	January – March 2020
45-day formal comment period with additional ballot	May 7 – June 22, 2020
45-day formal comment period with second additional ballot	July 28 – September 10, 2020

Anticipated Actions	Date
10-day final ballot	October 2020
Board adoption	November 2020

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — Electronic Security Perimeter(s)
2. **Number:** CIP-005-~~67~~
3. **Purpose:** To manage electronic access to BES Cyber Systems by specifying a controlled Electronic Security Perimeter in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the BES.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. **Functional Entities:** -For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of functional entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entities.” -For requirements in this standard where a specific functional entity or subset of functional entities are the applicable entity or entities, the functional entity or entities are specified explicitly.
 - 4.1.1. **Balancing Authority**
 - 4.1.2. **Distribution Provider** that owns one or more of the following Facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the BES:
 - 4.1.2.1. Each underfrequency Load shedding (UFLS) or undervoltage Load shedding (UVLS) system that:
 - 4.1.2.1.1. is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and
 - 4.1.2.1.2. performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.
 - 4.1.2.2. Each Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) where the RAS is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - 4.1.2.3. Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
 - 4.1.2.4. Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.
 - 4.1.3. **Generator Operator**
 - 4.1.4. **Generator Owner**

~~4.1.5. Interchange Coordinator or Interchange Authority~~

~~4.1.6.4.1.5. Reliability Coordinator~~

~~4.1.7.4.1.6. Transmission Operator~~

~~4.1.8.4.1.7. Transmission Owner~~

4.2. Facilities: For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in Section 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this standard where a specific type of Facilities, system, or equipment or subset of Facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly.

4.2.1. Distribution Provider: One or more of the following Facilities, systems and equipment owned by the Distribution Provider for the protection or restoration of the BES:

4.2.1.1. Each UFLS or UVLS System that:

4.2.1.1.1. is part of a Load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard; and

4.2.1.1.2. performs automatic Load shedding under a common control system owned by the Responsible Entity, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more.

4.2.1.2. Each RAS where the RAS is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.2.1.3. Each Protection System (excluding UFLS and UVLS) that applies to Transmission where the Protection System is subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.

4.2.1.4. Each Cranking Path and group of Elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a Blackstart Resource up to and including the first interconnection point of the starting station service of the next generation unit(s) to be started.

4.2.2. Responsible Entities listed in 4.1 other than Distribution Providers: All BES Facilities.

4.2.3. Exemptions: The following are exempt from Standard CIP-005-67:

4.2.3.1. Cyber Assets at Facilities regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

- 4.2.3.2. Cyber Assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters.
 - 4.2.3.3. The systems, structures, and components that are regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under a cyber security plan pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Section 73.54.
 - 4.2.3.4. For Distribution Providers, the systems and equipment that are not included in section 4.2.1 above.
 - 4.2.3.5. Responsible Entities that identify that they have no BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact or medium impact according to the CIP-002-5 identification and categorization processes.
- 5. **Effective Date:** See Implementation Plan for Project ~~2016~~2019-03.
 - 6. **Background:** Standard CIP-005 exists as part of a suite of CIP Standards related to cyber security, which require the initial identification and categorization of BES Cyber Systems and require a minimum level of organizational, operational and procedural controls to mitigate risk to BES Cyber Systems.

Most requirements open with, “*Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented [processes, plan, etc.] that include the applicable items in [Table Reference].*” The referenced table requires the applicable items in the procedures for the requirement’s common subject matter.

The term *documented processes* refers to a set of required instructions specific to the Responsible Entity and to achieve a specific outcome. This term does not imply any particular naming or approval structure beyond what is stated in the requirements. An entity should include as much as it believes necessary in its documented processes, but it must address the applicable requirements in the table.

The terms *program* and *plan* are sometimes used in place of *documented processes* where it makes sense and is commonly understood. For example, documented processes describing a response are typically referred to as *plans* (i.e., incident response plans and recovery plans). Likewise, a security plan can describe an approach involving multiple procedures to address a broad subject matter.

Similarly, the term *program* may refer to the organization’s overall implementation of its policies, plans, and procedures involving a subject matter. Examples in the standards include the personnel risk assessment program and the personnel training program. The full implementation of the CIP Cyber Security Standards could also be referred to as a program. However, the terms *program* and *plan* do not imply any additional requirements beyond what is stated in the standards.

Responsible Entities can implement common controls that meet requirements for multiple high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems. For example, a single training program could meet the requirements for training personnel across multiple BES Cyber Systems.

Measures for the initial requirement are simply the documented processes themselves. Measures in the table rows provide examples of evidence to show documentation and implementation of applicable items in the documented processes. These measures serve to provide guidance to entities in acceptable records of compliance and should not be viewed as an all-inclusive list.

Throughout the standards, unless otherwise stated, bulleted items in the requirements and measures are items that are linked with an “or,” and numbered items are items that are linked with an “and.”

Many references in the Applicability section use a threshold of 300 MW for UFLS and UVLS. This particular threshold of 300 MW for UVLS and UFLS was provided in Version 1 of the CIP Cyber Security Standards. The threshold remains at 300 MW since it is specifically addressing UVLS and UFLS, which are last ditch efforts to save the Bulk Electric System. A review of UFLS tolerances defined within regional reliability standards for UFLS program requirements to date indicates that the historical value of 300 MW represents an adequate and reasonable threshold value for allowable UFLS operational tolerances.

“Applicable Systems” Columns in Tables:

Each table has an “Applicable Systems” column to further define the scope of systems to which a specific requirement row applies. The CSO706 SDT adapted this concept from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) Risk Management Framework as a way of applying requirements more appropriately based on impact and connectivity characteristics. The following conventions are used in the “Applicability Systems” column as described.

- **High Impact BES Cyber Systems** – Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact according to the CIP-002 identification and categorization processes.
- **High Impact BES Cyber Systems with Dial-up Connectivity** – Only applies to high impact BES Cyber Systems with Dial-up Connectivity.
- **High Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity** – Only applies to high impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity. This also excludes Cyber Assets in the BES Cyber System that cannot be directly accessed through External Routable Connectivity.
- **Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems** – Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as medium impact according to the CIP-002 identification and categorization processes.

- **Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at Control Centers** – Only applies to medium impact BES Cyber Systems located at a Control Center.
- **Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with Dial-up Connectivity** – Only applies to medium impact BES Cyber Systems with Dial-up Connectivity.
- **Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity** – Only applies to medium impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity. This also excludes Cyber Assets in the BES Cyber System that cannot be directly accessed through External Routable Connectivity.
- **Protected Cyber Assets (PCA)** – Applies to each Protected Cyber Asset associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System.
- **Electronic Access Points (EAP)** – Applies at Electronic Access Points associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System.
- **Physical Access Control Systems (PACS)** – Applies to each Physical Access Control System associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System.
- **Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS)** – Applies to each Electronic Access Control or Monitoring System associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System. Examples may include, but are not limited to, firewalls, authentication servers, and log monitoring and alerting systems.

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-005-67 Table R1 – Electronic Security Perimeter*. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning and Same Day Operations].
- M1.** Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-005-67 Table R1 – Electronic Security Perimeter* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-005-67 Table R1 – Electronic Security Perimeter			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.1	High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> PCA Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> PCA 	All applicable Cyber Assets connected to a network via a routable protocol shall reside within a defined ESP.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a list of all ESPs with all uniquely identifiable applicable Cyber Assets connected via a routable protocol within each ESP.
1.2	High Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> PCA Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> PCA 	All External Routable Connectivity must be through an identified Electronic Access Point (EAP).	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, network diagrams showing all external routable communication paths and the identified EAPs.

CIP-005-67 Table R1 – Electronic Security Perimeter			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
1.3	<p>Electronic Access Points for High Impact BES Cyber Systems</p> <p>Electronic Access Points for Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems</p>	<p>Require inbound and outbound access permissions, including the reason for granting access, and deny all other access by default.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a list of rules (firewall, access control lists, etc.) that demonstrate that only permitted access is allowed and that each access rule has a documented reason.</p>
1.4	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems with Dial-up Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with Dial-up Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA 	<p>Where technically feasible, perform authentication when establishing Dial-up Connectivity with applicable Cyber Assets.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a documented process that describes how the Responsible Entity is providing authenticated access through each dial-up connection.</p>
1.5	<p>Electronic Access Points for High Impact BES Cyber Systems</p> <p>Electronic Access Points for Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at Control Centers</p>	<p>Have one or more methods for detecting known or suspected malicious communications for both inbound and outbound communications.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, documentation that malicious communications detection methods (e.g. intrusion detection system, application layer firewall, etc.) are implemented.</p>

- R2.** Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include the applicable requirement parts, where technically feasible, in *CIP-005-67 Table R2 –Remote Access Management*. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning and Same Day Operations].
- M2.** Evidence must include the documented processes that collectively address each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-005-67 Table R2 –Remote Access Management* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-005-67 Table R2 – Remote Access Management			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.1	High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA 	For all Interactive Remote Access, utilize an Intermediate System such that the Cyber Asset initiating Interactive Remote Access does not directly access an applicable Cyber Asset.	Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, network diagrams or architecture documents.
2.2	High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA 	For all Interactive Remote Access sessions, utilize encryption that terminates at an Intermediate System.	An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, architecture documents detailing where encryption initiates and terminates.

CIP-005-67 Table R2 – Remote Access Management

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
<p>2.3</p>	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA 	<p>Require multi-factor authentication for all Interactive Remote Access sessions.</p>	<p>An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, architecture documents detailing the authentication factors used.</p> <p>Examples of authenticators may include, but are not limited to,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Something the individual knows such as passwords or PINs. This does not include User ID; • Something the individual has such as tokens, digital certificates, or smart cards; or • Something the individual is such as fingerprints, iris scans, or other biometric characteristics.

CIP-005-67 Table R2 – Remote Access Management			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.4	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA 	<p>Have one or more methods for determining active vendor remote access sessions (including Interactive Remote Access and system-to-system remote access).</p>	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, documentation of the methods used to determine active vendor remote access (including Interactive Remote Access and system-to-system remote access), such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Methods for accessing logged or monitoring information to determine active vendor remote access sessions; • Methods for monitoring activity (e.g. connection tables or rule hit counters in a firewall, or user activity monitoring) or open ports (e.g. netstat or related commands to display currently active ports) to determine active system to system remote access sessions; or • Methods that control vendor initiation of remote access such as vendors calling and requesting a second factor in order to initiate remote access.

CIP-005-67 Table R2 – Remote Access Management

Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
2.5	<p>High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA <p>Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity and their associated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCA 	<p>Have one or more method(s) to disable active vendor remote access (including Interactive Remote Access and system-to-system remote access).</p>	<p>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, documentation of the method(s) used to disable active vendor remote access (including Interactive Remote Access and system-to-system remote access), such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Methods to disable vendor remote access at the applicable Electronic Access Point for system-to-system remote access; or • Methods to disable vendor Interactive Remote Access at the applicable Intermediate System.

R3. Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-005-7 Table R3 – Vendor Remote Access Management for EACMS and PACS*. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning and Same Day Operations].

M3. Evidence must include the documented processes that collectively address each of the applicable requirement parts in *CIP-005-7 Table R3 – Vendor Remote Access Management* and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table.

CIP-005-7 Table R3 – Vendor Remote Access Management for EACMS and PACS			
Part	Applicable Systems	Requirements	Measures
3.1	<p><u>EACMS and PACS associated with High Impact BES Cyber Systems</u></p> <p><u>EACMS and PACS associated with Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity</u></p>	<p><u>Have one or more method(s) to determine authenticated vendor-initiated remote connections.</u></p>	<p><u>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, documentation of the methods used to determine authenticated vendor-initiated remote connections, such as:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <u>Methods for accessing logged or monitoring information to determine authenticated vendor-initiated remote connections.</u>
3.2	<p><u>EACMS and PACS associated with High Impact BES Cyber Systems</u></p> <p><u>EACMS and PACS associated with Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity</u></p>	<p><u>Have one or more method(s) to terminate authenticated vendor-initiated remote connections and control the ability to reconnect.</u></p>	<p><u>Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, documentation of the methods(s) used to terminate authenticated vendor-initiated remote connections to applicable systems. Examples include terminating an active vendor-initiated shell/process/session or dropping an active vendor-initiated connection in</u></p>

CIP-005-7 Table R3 – Vendor Remote Access Management for EACMS and PACS

<u>Part</u>	<u>Applicable Systems</u>	<u>Requirements</u>	<u>Measures</u>
			<p>a firewall. Methods to control the <u>ability to reconnect, if necessary, could be: disabling an Active Directory account; disabling a security token; restricting IP addresses from vendor sources in a firewall; or physically disconnecting a network cable to prevent a reconnection.</u></p>

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

- 1.1. **Compliance Enforcement Authority:** “Compliance Enforcement Authority” (CEA) means NERC or the Regional Entity, or any entity as otherwise designated by an Applicable Governmental Authority, in their respective roles of monitoring and/or enforcing compliance with mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards in their respective jurisdictions.
- 1.2. **Evidence Retention:** The following evidence retention period(s) identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the ~~Compliance Enforcement Authority~~CEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full-time period since the last audit.

The applicable entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its ~~Compliance Enforcement Authority~~CEA to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

- Each applicable entity shall retain evidence of each requirement in this standard for three calendar years.
 - If an applicable entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.
 - The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.
- 1.3. **Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program:** As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, “Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program” refers to the identification of the processes that will be used to evaluate data or information for the purpose of assessing performance or outcomes with the associated Reliability Standard.

Violation Severity Levels

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1.			The Responsible Entity did not have a method for detecting malicious communications for both inbound and outbound communications. (1.5)	<p>The Responsible Entity did not document one or more processes for <i>CIP-005-6 Table R1 – Electronic Security Perimeter</i>. (R1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not have all applicable Cyber Assets connected to a network via a routable protocol within a defined Electronic Security Perimeter (ESP). (1.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>External Routable Connectivity through the ESP was not through an identified EAP. (1.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity did not require inbound and outbound access permissions and deny all other access by default. (1.3)</p> <p>OR</p>

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				The Responsible Entity did not perform authentication when establishing dial-up connectivity with the applicable Cyber Assets, where technically feasible. (1.4)
R2.	The Responsible Entity does not have documented processes for one or more of the applicable items for Requirement Parts 2.1 through 2.3.	The Responsible Entity did not implement processes for one of the applicable items for Requirement Parts 2.1 through 2.3.	The Responsible Entity did not implement processes for two of the applicable items for Requirement Parts 2.1 through 2.3; OR The Responsible Entity did not have either: one or more method(s) for determining active vendor remote access sessions (including Interactive Remote Access and system-to-system remote access) (2.4); or one or more methods to disable active vendor remote access (including Interactive Remote Access and system-to-system remote access) (2.5).	The Responsible Entity did not implement processes for three of the applicable items for Requirement Parts 2.1 through 2.3; OR The Responsible Entity did not have one or more method(s) for determining active vendor remote access sessions (including Interactive Remote Access and system-to-system remote access) (2.4) and one or more methods to disable active vendor remote access (including Interactive Remote Access and system-to-system remote access) (2.5).

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R3.	<p><u>The Responsible Entity did not document one or more processes for CIP-005-7 Table R3 – Vendor Remote Access Management for EACMS and PACS. (R3)</u></p>	<p><u>The Responsible Entity had method(s) as required by Part 3.1 for EACMS but did not have a method to determine authenticated vendor-initiated remote connections for PACS (3.1).</u></p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p><u>The Responsible Entity had method(s) as required by Part 3.2 for EACMS but did not have a method to terminate authenticated vendor-initiated remote connections for PACS (3.2).</u></p>	<p><u>The Responsible Entity did not implement processes for either Part 3.1 or Part 3.2. (R3)</u></p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p><u>The Responsible Entity had method(s) as required by Part 3.1 for PACS but did not have a method to determine authenticated vendor-initiated remote connections for EACMS (3.1).</u></p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p><u>The Responsible Entity had method(s) as required by Part 3.2 for PACS but did not have a method to terminate authenticated vendor-initiated remote connections or control the ability to reconnect for EACMS (3.2).</u></p>	<p><u>The Responsible Entity did not implement any processes for CIP-005-7 Table R3 – Vendor Remote Access Management for EACMS and PACS. (R3)</u></p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p><u>The Responsible Entity did not have any methods as required by Parts 3.1 and 3.2 (R3).</u></p>

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Associated Documents

~~None.~~

- [Implementation Plan for Project 2019-03](#)
- [CIP-005-7 Technical Rationale](#)

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	1/16/06	R3.2 — Change “Control Center” to “control center.”	3/24/06
2	9/30/09	Modifications to clarify the requirements and to bring the compliance elements into conformance with the latest guidelines for developing compliance elements of standards. Removal of reasonable business judgment. Replaced the RRO with the RE as a responsible entity. Rewording of Effective Date. Changed compliance monitor to Compliance Enforcement Authority.	
3	12/16/09	Updated version number from -2 to -3 Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees.	
3	3/31/10	Approved by FERC.	
4	12/30/10	Modified to add specific criteria for Critical Asset identification.	Update
4	1/24/11	Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Update
5	11/26/12	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Modified to coordinate with other CIP standards and to revise format to use RBS Template.
5	11/22/13	FERC Order issued approving CIP-005-5.	
6	07/20/17	Modified to address certain directives in FERC Order No. 829.	Revised
6	08/10/17	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	
6	10/18/2018	FERC Order approving CIP-005-6. Docket No. RM17-13-000.	
<u>7</u>	<u>TBD</u>	<u>Modified to address directives in FERC Order No. 850</u>	