



Monitoring Progress Joint Steering Group (JSG)

- Who?
 - PC, OC, CIPC: Chairs and Vice-Chairs
 - NERC staff (Weatherford, Lauby, Brindley)
- Why?
 - ESCC Strategic Roadmap: “develop the appropriate coordination mechanisms”
- How?
 - At least monthly JSG conference calls
 - Monthly status reports to ESCC
 - Review of status reports are a standing ESCC agenda item
 - JSG presents to ESCC, seeks advice and support from ESCC

Critical Infrastructure Strategic Coordinated Action Plan



Task Force Coordination



- 1 – Provide assessment regarding impact of a cyber attack on essential operator tools and communications.
- 2 – Identify essential operator tools and communications .
- 3 – Model the impact of GMD, identify system conditions that operators would face.
- 4 – Provide assessment regarding value of greater advance warning to operators.
- 5 – Provide assessments regarding number and type of critical equipment damaged.
- 6 – Identify critical equipment with limited supply and long delivery times.

Approve 2 Task Force Scope Documents

- Operating Committee to approve the concept and direction described in the draft Scope for the Severe-Impact Resilience Task Force
 - PC and CIPC invited to review and provide input
- Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee to approve the concept and direction described in the draft Scope for the Cyber Attack Task Force
 - OC and PC invited to review and provide input



Question & Answer

Critical Infrastructure Strategic Initiatives Coordinated Action Plan Report

Action Required

1. Approve the scope for the Severe Impact Resilience Task Force (See Attachment SIRTf-1)

Background

1. The purpose of the Severe Impact Resilience Task Force (SIR TF) is to assess the ability of the bulk power system to withstand and recover from three severe-impact events as described in the Coordinated Action Plan.
 - Coordinated physical attack
 - Coordinated cyber attack
 - Geomagnetic disturbance

Status Report

1. NERC staff and the Joint Steering Group made up of Chairs/Vice chairs of the Planning, Operating and Critical Infrastructure Protection Committees held three conference calls to finalize the Action Plan, and provide guidance on the work plan activities.
2. On November 4, 2010, NERC's Board of Trustees approved *Critical Infrastructure Strategic Initiatives Coordinated Action Plan*¹ prepared by the Joint Steering Group made up of Chairs/Vice chairs of the Planning, Operating and Critical Infrastructure Protection Committees.
3. The technical committee leadership and NERC staff are continuing to formulate effective approaches to remain in alignment with ESCC Strategic Roadmap and the Board of Trustees guidance.
4. Individual status reports for companion task forces on Spare Equipment Database and Geomagnetic Disturbances are provided separately.
5. Work plan for the companion task forces are provided separately for each group.

¹ http://www.nerc.com/docs/ciscap/Critical_Infrastructure_Strategic_Initiatives_Coordinated_Action_Plan_BOT_Apprd_11-2010.pdf

Scope

Cyber Attack Task Force (CATF)

PART A: Required for Committee Approval

Purpose

This document defines the scope, objectives, organization, deliverables, and overall approach for the Cyber Attack Task Force (CATF).

The purpose of the CATF is to consider the impact of a coordinated cyber attack on the reliable operation of the bulk power system, and identify opportunities to enhance existing protection, resilience, and recovery capabilities.

Background

The NERC and DOE report *High Impact, Low Frequency Risk to the North American Bulk Power System* described a number of severe-impact scenarios and their potential impact on the reliability of the bulk power system. Subsequent to this report, the Electricity Sub-Sector Coordinating Council's (ESCC) *Critical Infrastructure Strategic Roadmap* identified a number of strategic initiatives to mitigate these impacts. Two of these initiatives (i.e. items I and J) identify the need to assess the current capability of the bulk power system to withstand and recover from a coordinated cyber attack scenario.

NERC staff and the leadership of the NERC technical committees (Planning, Operating, and Critical Infrastructure Protection Committees) have developed the *Critical Infrastructure Strategic Initiatives Coordinated Action Plan* (Coordinated Action Plan) to address these severe-impact scenarios. This Scope document provides clear direction to the CATF and builds on the deliverables and milestones described in the Coordinated Action Plan.

Scope

The primary intent of the CATF is to consider the impact of a coordinated cyber attack on the operation of the bulk power system, and to develop flexible options for detecting, operating, and recovering. These flexible options will enhance the bulk power system's resilience because operators should be even better prepared to recognize such an event and be ready to implement mitigation tactics that may include unique solutions tailored to the situation using approaches not typical to daily operations.

The CATF will consider what detection, response, and recovery processes will be particularly challenged through a coordinated cyber attack, and propose options to improve timely response.

