

Consideration of Comments on Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

The Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting Standard Drafting Team thanks all commenters who submitted comments on the proposed Concepts Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting. The document was posted for a 30-day public comment period from March 17, 2010 through April 16, 2010. Stakeholders were asked to provide feedback on the standards through a special Electronic Comment Form. There were 41 sets of comments, including comments from more than 95 different people from approximately 50 companies representing 8 of the 10 Industry Segments as shown in the table on the following pages.

The comments have been sorted and organized by question number in this report; the comments are shown in the original format on the following project web page:

http://www.nerc.com/filez/standards/Project2009-1_Disturbance_Sabotage_Reporting.html

Summary Consideration:

Use of “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting”

Most stakeholders agree that existing guidance should be used as the foundation for disturbance reporting. Most commenters felt that the “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting” document contains a lot of detailed information which greatly assists in determining reporting events and weaning out non important events. The most common desire was one, common form to be used for reporting and the OE-417 was considered to be a good starting point. Most respondents thought the form could be streamlined. The DSR SDT was urged to focus on applicable events and reporting timelines which are not clear now and to report items that are clearly essential to the reliability of the BES. There was some concern expressed about “over-reporting”, out of fear of non-compliance rather than the over the reliability of the BES. There was also a clear desire to separate out vandalism & copper theft from reporting requirements.

Hierarchy for Reporting Disturbances

Most stakeholders (about 2/3) agree with the concept of developing a reporting hierarchy for disturbances. Stakeholders who disagreed believed that the RC should be one of many to receive information on impact events (DOE, RRO, etc.). Such a hierarchy would lead to reporting delays (leading to lack of situational awareness), be cumbersome and complicated and clouds responsibility for who is to report what to whom. Other negative comments believed that a hierarchy would distract the RC’s focus from its primary responsibility. Those stakeholders who agreed commented that the RC should be the collection point for reports and information and take the responsibility to forward as required. This is from the concept that the RC has the “wider view” and can recognize patterns, and has the ability to “escalate” the reporting process. This would also minimize duplication of reports and information.

Single Form for All Agencies

Most stakeholders agreed with the concept of having one reporting form for all entities. Several commenters suggested that there is no need for a standard on reporting as they considered it administrative in nature. Most dissenters thought there should be a guideline, rather than an enforceable standard. There is widespread agreement that the one-size-fits-all approach would be very difficult to get agreement on, given the different countries and

agencies involved. Many stakeholders pointed out that consistency and simplification were drivers for one report form. Having multiple recipients, with different information requirements, seems to support an electronic format that would guide information only to those who need it. The concept of an electronic reporting tool will need to be further vetted and developed.

Supplements to NERC Form

Most stakeholders agreed with the concept of entities being able to use information from other sources such as the OE-417 form, to supplement the NERC report form. Some thought that duplicate reports were acceptable, as long as the information was not duplicated (if # of customers lost is required on form A, don't ask on forms B & C). Several stakeholders commented on the need for an electronic, one stop reporting tool. This would avoid duplication while ensuring that the information reported goes only to intended recipients. With an electronic, one stop reporting tool, reports can be updated/corrected instantly, without repeating previously submitted information. Some stakeholders cautioned that the OE-417 can change every three years and this should be taken into account when developing an electronic reporting tool. Again, such a reporting tool would need to be vetted and developed to meet reliability needs.

Impact Events

The majority of stakeholders agreed with the concept of "impact events." Some stakeholders felt that the introduction of impact events increased the risk that some items will go unreported. However, most felt that impact events would dramatically increase the number of reports being submitted, and it would be difficult to separate important information from background noise. Several respondents felt that the SDT ignored the FERC Directive, and did not define sabotage and provide guidance as to the triggering events that would cause an entity to report a sabotage event. Many respondents supplied the SDT with their own definition of "Sabotage". The DSR SDT believes that the concept of impact events and the specificity of what needs to be reported in the standard will be an equally efficient and effective means of address the FERC directive regarding sabotage. Some stakeholders felt that impact events add another layer of uncertainty to the reporting. Even with the switch from sabotage to impact events, several felt that "intent" was still key to determining reportability.

Regional Differences

Several commenters provided information on regional reporting. The SDT will consider whether these should be included in the continent-wide standard. These include:

1. NPCC maintains a document and reporting form (Document C-17 - Procedures for Monitoring and Reporting Critical Operating Tool Failures) that outlines the reporting requirements, responsibilities, and obligations of NPCC RCs in response to unforeseen critical operating tool failures.
2. For other events that do not meet the OE-417 and EOP-004 reporting criteria, ReliabilityFirst expects to receive notification of any events involving a sustained outage of multiple BES facilities (buses, lines, generators, and/or transformers, etc.) that are in close proximity (electrically) to one another and occur in a short time frame (such as a few minutes).
3. WECC sets its loss of load criteria for disturbance reporting at 200 MW rather than the 300 MW in the NERC reporting form.
4. SERC and RFC are developing additional requirements at this time. We suggest that reporting be based on impact to reliability, not on 'newsworthy'

events. We therefore do not agree with such regional efforts and would prefer a continent wide reporting requirements.

5. Some entities identified some in-force Regional Standards and other regional reporting requirements.

Project Scope

Some stakeholders suggested that the SDT has gone beyond its approved scope to “further define sabotage and provide guidance as to the triggering events that would cause an entity to report a sabotage event.” Further, there is no requirement to create a Reporting Standard to define sabotage. The SDT contends that the development of impact events and the reporting requirements for them will provide the clarity sought in the directive. Other stakeholders suggested that the SDT should seek to retire sanctionable requirements that require event reporting in favor of guidelines for reporting. Several commenters suggested that the introduction of impact events actually expands the reporting requirements. It should be noted that the list of impact events is expected to be explicit as to who is to report what to whom and within certain timelines.

Electronic Tool

Several stakeholders provided input as to what they believed an electronic reporting tool should contain:

- 1 If the decision is made to go to a single reporting form, it should be developed to cover any foreseeable event.
- 2 The SDT should work toward a single form, located in a central location, and submitted to one common entity (NERC)
- 3 Reports should be forwarded to the ES-ISAC, not NERC, as the infrastructure is already in place for efficient sharing with Federal agencies, with the regional entities and with neighboring asset owners. Reports should flow to all affected entities in parallel, rather than series (timing issues).

Commenters also suggested that the SDT should consider the impacts of the reporting requirements on the small and very small utilities.

If you feel that your comment has been overlooked, please let us know immediately. Our goal is to give every comment serious consideration in this process! If you feel there has been an error or omission, you can contact the Vice President and Director of Standards, Herbert Schrayshuen, at 609-452-8060 or at Herb.Schrayshuen@nerc.net. In addition, there is a NERC Reliability Standards Appeals Process.¹

¹ The appeals process is in the Reliability Standards Development Procedures: <http://www.nerc.com/standards/newstandardsprocess.html>.

Index to Questions, Comments, and Responses

1. The details of reporting requirements and criteria are in the existing EOP-004 standard and its attachments. The DSR SDT discussed the reliability needs for disturbance reporting and will consider guidance found in the document “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting” in the development of requirements. Do you agree with using the existing guidance as the foundation for disturbance reporting? Please explain your response (yes or no) in the comment area..... 12
2. The DSR SDT is considering developing a reporting hierarchy for disturbances that requires entities to submit information to the Reliability Coordinator and then for the Reliability Coordinator to submit the report. Do you agree with this hierarchy concept? Please explain your response (yes or no) in the comment area..... 24
3. The goal of the DSR SDT is to have one report form for all functional entities (US, Canada, Mexico) to submit to NERC. Do you agree with this change? Please explain your response (yes or no) in the comment area. 34
4. The goal of the DSR SDT is to eliminate the need to file duplicate reports. The standards will specify information required by NERC for reliability. To the extent that this information is also required for other reports (e.g. DOE OE-417), those reports will be allowed to supplement the NERC report in lieu of duplicating the entries in the NERC report. Do you agree with this concept? Please explain your response (yes or no) in the comment area. 42
5. In its discussion concerning sabotage, the DSR SDT has determined that the spectrum of all sabotage-type events is not well understood throughout the industry. In an effort to provide clarity and guidance, the DSR SDT developed the concept of an impact event. By developing impact events, it allows us to identify situations in the “gray area” where sabotage is not clearly defined. Other types of events may need to be reported for situational awareness and trend identification. Do you agree with this concept? Please explain your response (yes or no) in the comment area. 51
6. If you are aware of any regional reporting requirements beyond the scope of CIP-001, CIP-008 and EOP-004 please provide them here..... 61
7. If you have any other comments on the Concepts Paper that you haven’t already provided in response to the previous questions, please provide them here..... 65

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

The Industry Segments are:

- 1 — Transmission Owners
- 2 — RTOs, ISOs
- 3 — Load-serving Entities
- 4 — Transmission-dependent Utilities
- 5 — Electric Generators
- 6 — Electricity Brokers, Aggregators, and Marketers
- 7 — Large Electricity End Users
- 8 — Small Electricity End Users
- 9 — Federal, State, Provincial Regulatory or other Government Entities
- 10 — Regional Reliability Organizations, Regional Entities

		Commenter	Organization	Industry Segment										
				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
1.	Group	John Bee	Exelon	X		X		X						
	Additional Member		Additional Organization	Region					Segment Selection					
	1. Dan Brotzman		ComEd	RFC					1					
	2. Dave Weaver		PECO	RFC					1					
	3. Ron Schloendorn		PECO	RFC					1					
	4. John Garavaglia		ComEd	RFC					1					
	5. Karl Perman		Exelon	NA - Not Applicable					NA					
	6. Dave Belanger		Exelon Generation Co., LLC	RFC					5					
	7. Alison MacKellar		Exelon Generation Co., LLC	RFC					5					
	8. Tom Leeming		ComEd	RFC					1					
	9. Tom Hunt		PECO	RFC					1					
2.	Group	Guy Zito	Northeast Power Coordinating Council											X
	Additional Member		Additional Organization	Region					Segment Selection					
	1. Alan Adamson		New York State Reliability Council, LLC	NPCC					NA					
	2. Michael Schiavone		National Grid	NPCC					1					

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	Commenter	Organization	Industry Segment											
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
3.	Roger Champagne	Hydro-Quebec TransEnergie	NPCC						2					
4.	Kurtis Chong	Independent Electricity System Operator	NPCC						2					
5.	Sylvain Clermont	Hydro-Quebec TransEnergie	NPCC						1					
6.	Chris de Graffenried	Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc.	NPCC						1					
7.	Gerry Dunbar	Northeast Power Coordinating Council	NPCC						10					
8.	Ben Eng	New York Power Authority	NPCC						4					
9.	Brian Evans-Mongeon	Utility Services	NPCC						8					
10.	Mike Garton	Dominion Resources Services, Inc.	NPCC						5					
11.	Brian L. Gooder	Ontario Power Generation Incorporated	NPCC						5					
12.	Peter Yost	Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc.	NPCC						3					
13.	David Kiguel	Hydro One Networks Inc.	NPCC						1					
14.	Michael R. Lombardi	Northeast Utilities	NPCC						1					
15.	Randy MacDonald	New Brunswick System Operator	NPCC						2					
16.	Bruce Metruck	New York Power Authority	NPCC						6					
17.	Lee Pedowicz	Northeast Power Coordinating Council	NPCC						10					
18.	Robert Pellegrini	The United Illuminating Company	NPCC						1					
19.	Saurabh Saksena	National Grid	NPCC						1					
20.	Kathleen Goodman	ISO - New England	NPCC						2					
21.	Greg Campoli	New York ISO	NPCC						2					
3.	Group	Wes Davis (SERC Staff) and Steve Corbin (Chair of SERC RCS)	SERC Reliability Coordinator Sub-committee (RCS)											X
	Additional Member	Additional Organization	Region	Segment Selection										
1.	Steve Corbin	Southeastern RC	SERC											NA
2.	Joel Wise	TVA RC	SERC											NA
3.	Don Reichenbach	VACAR South RC	SERC											NA
4.	Don Shipley	ICTE RC	SERC											NA
5.	Robert Rhodes	SPP RC	SERC											NA
6.	Stan Williams	PJM RC	SERC											

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			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
7.	Tim Aliff	Midwest ISO RC	SERC					NA					
4.	Group	Mike Garton	Electric Market Policy	X		X		X	X				
Additional Member		Additional Organization		Region					Segment Selection				
1.	Michael Gildea	Dominion Resources Services, Inc.		RFC					3				
2.	Louis Slade	Dominion Resources Services, Inc.		SERC					6				
5.	Group	Carol Gerou	MRO's NERC Standards Review Subcommittee										X
Additional Member		Additional Organization		Region					Segment Selection				
1.	Chuck Lawrence	American Transmission Company		MRO					1				
2.	Tom Webb	WPS Corporation		MRO					3, 4, 5, 6				
3.	Terry Bilke	Midwest ISO Inc.		MRO					2				
4.	Jodi Jenson	Western Area Power Administration		MRO					1, 6				
5.	Ken Goldsmith	Alliant Energy		MRO					4				
6.	Dave Rudolph	Basin Electric Power Cooperative		MRO					1, 3, 5, 6				
7.	Eric Ruskamp	Lincoln Electric System		MRO					1, 3, 5, 6				
8.	Joseph Knight	Great River Energy		MRO					1, 3, 5, 6				
9.	Scott Nickels	Rochester Public Utilities		MRO					4				
10.	Terry Harbour	MidAmerican Energy Company		MRO					1, 3, 5, 6				
6.	Group	Linda Perea	Western Electricity Coordinating Council										X
Additional Member		Additional Organization		Region					Segment Selection				
1.	Steve Rueckert	WECC		WECC					10				
7.	Group	Kenneth D. Brown	Public Service Enterprise Group Companies	X		X		X	X				
Additional Member		Additional Organization		Region					Segment Selection				
1.	Ron Wharton	PSE&G		RFC					1, 3				
2.	Dave Murray	PSEG Power Connecticut		NPCC					5				
3.	Jim Hebson	PSEG Energy Resource & Trade		ERCOT					6				
4.	Jerzy Sluarz	PSEG Fossil		RFC					5				

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			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
5	Bruce Wertz	Odessa Ector Power Partners	ERCOT					5						
6	Peter Dolan	PSEG Energy Resource & Trade	RFC					6						
8.	Group	Laura Zotter	ERCOT ISO		X									X
Additional Member		Additional Organization		Region				Segment Selection						
1.	Steve Myers	ERCOT ISO	ERCOT					2, 10						
2.	Jimmy Hartmann	ERCOT ISO	ERCOT					2, 10						
3.	Christine Hasha	ERCOT ISO	ERCOT					2, 10						
9.	Group	Ben Li	ISO RTO Council Standards Review Committee		X									
Additional Member		Additional Organization		Region				Segment Selection						
1.	Al Dicaprio	PJM	RFC					2						
2.	Jame Castle	NYISO	NPCC					2						
3.	Lourdes Estrada-Salinerio	CAISO	WECC					2						
4.	Matt Goldberg	ISO-NE	NPCC					2						
5.	Steve Myers	ERCOT	ERCOT					2						
6.	Bill Phillips	MISO	RFC					2						
7.	Mark Thompson	AESO	WECC					2						
8.	Charles Yeung	SPP	SPP					2						
10.	Group	Denise Koehn	Bonneville Power Administration	X		X		X	X					
Additional Member		Additional Organization		Region				Segment Selection						
1.	Tedd Snodgrass	BPA, Transmission Dispatch	WECC					1						
2.	Jim Burns	BPA, Transmission Technical Operations	WECC					1						
3.	Jeff Millenor	BPA, Security & Emergency Response	WECC					1, 3, 5, 6						
11.	Group	Jason L. Marshall	Midwest ISO Standards Collaborators		X									
Additional Member		Additional Organization		Region				Segment Selection						

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				1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
1.		Bob Thomas	IMEA	SERC						4				
2.		Jim Cyrulewski	JDRJC Associates, LLC	RFC						8				
3.		Joe Knight	Great River Energy	MRO						1, 3, 5, 6				
4.		Randi Woodward	Minnesota Power	MRO						1				
5.		Kirit Shah	Ameren	SERC						1				
12.	Group	Sam Ciccone	FirstEnergy	X		X	X	X	X					
Additional Member		Additional Organization		Region					Segment Selection					
1.		Doug Hohlbaugh	FE	RFC						1, 3, 4, 5, 6				
2.		Dave Folk	FE	RFC						1, 3, 4, 5, 6				
13.	Individual	Thomas Glock	Arizona Public Service Company	X		X		X						
14.	Individual	Sandra Shaffer	PacifiCorp	X		X		X	X					
15.	Individual	Brent Ingebrigtsen	E.ON U.S. LLC	X		X		X	X					
16.	Individual	Steve Fisher	Lands Energy Consulting											
17.	Individual	David Kahly	Kootenai Electric Cooperative			X								
18.	Individual	Darryl Curtis	Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC	X										
19.	Individual	Edward Bedder	Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc.	X										
20.	Individual	Kasia Mihalchuk	Manitoba Hydro	X		X		X	X					
21.	Individual	Brian Bartos	Bandera Electric Cooperative, Inc.	X		X								
22.	Individual	John T. Walker	Portland General Electric	X										
23.	Individual	Gregory Miller	BGE	X										

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

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24.	Individual	Dan Roethemeyer	Dynegey Inc.					X						
25.	Individual	Rick Terrill	Luminant					X						
26.	Individual	James Stanton	SPS Consulting Group Inc.								X			
27.	Individual	Andrew Gallo	Calpine Corp.					X						
28.	Individual	Steve Alexanderson	Central Lincoln			X								
29.	Individual	Brenda Frazer	Edison Mission Marketing & Trading					X						
30.	Individual	Martin Bauer	USBR					X						
31.	Individual	John Alberts	Wolverine Power Supply Cooperative, Inc.	X		X	X	X	X					
32.	Individual	Thad Ness	American Electric Power	X		X		X	X					
33.	Individual	James McCloskey	Central Hudson Gas & Electric	X		X								
34.	Individual	Deborah Schaneman	Platte River Power Authority	X		X		X						
35.	Individual	Howard Rulf	We Energies			X	X	X						
36.	Individual	Jianmei Chai	Consumers Energy Company			X	X							
37.	Individual	Amir Hammad	Constellation Power Source Generation					X						
38.	Individual	Greg Rowland	Duke Energy	X		X		X	X					
39.	Individual	Kirit Shah	Ameren	X		X		X	X					
40.	Individual	Dan Rochester	Independent Electricity System Operator		X									

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

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41.	Individual	Roger Champagne	Hydro-Québec TransEnergie (HQT)	X										

1. The details of reporting requirements and criteria are in the existing EOP-004 standard and its attachments. The DSR SDT discussed the reliability needs for disturbance reporting and will consider guidance found in the document “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting” in the development of requirements. Do you agree with using the existing guidance as the foundation for disturbance reporting? Please explain your response (yes or no) in the comment area.

Summary Consideration: Most stakeholders agree that existing guidance should be used as the foundation for disturbance reporting. Most commenters felt that the “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting” document contains a lot of detailed information which greatly assists in determining reporting events and weaning out non important events. The most common desire expressed was to have one common form for all reporting, and the OE-417 was suggested as a good starting point. Most respondents thought the form could be streamlined. The DSR SDT was urged to focus on applicable events and reporting timelines which are not clear now and to report items that are clearly essential to the reliability of the BES. There was some concern expressed about “over-reporting”, out of fear of non-compliance rather reporting based on the reliability of the BES. There was also a clear desire to exclude vandalism & copper theft from reporting requirements.

Several specific suggestions were made to modify existing reporting requirements, and the drafting team will consider these when developing the proposed requirements.

Organization	Yes or No	Question 1 Comment
ERCOT ISO	Possible Yes	Parts of the Guideline are helpful, but the guideline goes beyond the scope of the requirements of the current standards, which could pose potential audit concerns. ERCOT ISO strongly feels this approach for reporting should be focused on physical events only and cyber event reporting should be contained within CIP-008 only. Continue to keep physical separate from cyber.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The intent was to look at the posted “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting” and ask the industry if DSR SDT should consider existing guidelines for possible inclusion into the yet to be written requirement(s). The DSR SDT has not determined at this time what bright line will be used for the yet to be drafted Standard(s). The DSR SDT will take into consideration your comment on keeping cyber and physical events separate.</p>		
Arizona Public Service Company	No Then Yes	APS supports standard revisions which streamline the reporting process for security incidents with a single form, which aligns both with EIA reporting and NERC Standards requirements, particularly those identified in the NERC Threat and Incident Reporting Guidelines. This would eliminate users issuing reports to multiple locations/government entities without a standard form or format. The DOE 417 form which is currently utilized

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

Organization	Yes or No	Question 1 Comment
		<p>for reporting purposes is out-dated and does not account for the types of incidents as identified in the NERC Threat and Incident Reporting Guidelines. The guidelines state that an entity can report security incidents to the ESISAC , through CIPIS (Critical Infrastructure Protection Information System), and or RCIS (Reliability Coordinator Information Center). CIPIS refers an entity to the NICC and to the WECC. Additionally, APS proposes that the terms and timelines of reporting security incidents be clearly identified. Events are often detected quickly or immediately. Determining whether or not the event was sabotage and/or a reportable event; however, typically takes much longer. There is no time allowance for an entity to investigate the event to determine what actually occurred. Currently, DOE 417 provides that acts of sabotage should be reported within one hour of detection if the impact could affect the reliable operation of the bulk power system. This may affect the accuracy of the information being provided by an entity on it's initial reporting. Finally, provisions should be incorporated to address the privacy of information being submitted, including handling and storage.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The intent was to look at the posted “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting” and ask the industry if DSR SDT should consider existing guidelines for possible inclusion into the yet to be written requirement(s). The DSR SDT has not determined at this time what bright line will be used for the yet to be drafted Standard(s) which should streamline the reporting process (what events and what timeline should be used). c</p>		
SPS Consulting Group Inc.	No	<p>At least not exclusively. The current standards and the guidance fail to consider that different registered entities will have different scopes of awareness for when disturbances may take place. We want to avoid the situation where a generator (for example) is cited for failure to report a disturbance of which they have way of knowing occurred.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The intent was to look at the posted “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting” and ask the industry if DSR SDT should consider existing guidelines for possible inclusion into the yet to be written requirement(s). The DSR SDT will take into consideration what Registered Entities are to be included within the yet to be written standard(s) based on the SAR and the facilities each type of Registered Entity is required to have.</p>		
Bonneville Power Administration	No Then Yes	<p>BPA likes the idea of consolidating information and eliminating duplication of reported information. In the report, don't include every detail possible found in the “Threat Guideline”. TOP's are supposed to be operating the electrical system, not doing investigative work for copper theft incidents (see comment on #5).</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The intent was to look at the posted “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting” and ask the industry if DSR SDT should consider existing guidelines for possible inclusion into the yet to be written requirement(s). The DSR SDT has not determined at this time what bright line will be used for the yet to be drafted Standard(s). We will consider your specific suggestion for not requiring reporting of incidents such as copper threat, when we develop the proposed requirements.</p>		

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

Organization	Yes or No	Question 1 Comment
Lands Energy Consulting	No	<p>My firm provides compliance consulting services to a number of smaller (50-700 MW peak load) LSE/DP registered entities. EOP-004 creates an obligation for LSEs to report "disturbances" that affect their systems. A few of the smaller of these systems receive service from Bonneville-owned transmission lines that serve only 4-6 substations. The NERC Form establishes loss of 50% of the LSE's retail customers as a reportable disturbances. One of my clients receives service from BPA at 5 substations. A single industrial customer with a substantially dedicated substation comprises 90% of the utility's MWH load. Were it not for this customer, the utility would have been well below the registration requirement for a DP/LSE. The balance of the load, about 15 MW of peak and 4000 retail customers, is served from 5 substations. Four of these substations serving 3000 customers are served from a long Bonneville 115 kV BES transmission line that runs through a heavily treed right of way. Every time this single line experiences a permanent outage (which will happen a few times a year), the utility loses less than 10 MW of load, but 75% of its retail customers. Under the disturbance reporting criteria, this outage would constitute a reportable disturbance for the utility. When the NERC disturbance reporting criteria were adopted, I doubt that anyone conceived that they would apply to cases like I just described. Reporting trivial events like I've just described constitutes a nuisance to the entity making the report and NERC/WECC for having to process the report. The outage has no earthly effect on the reliability of the BES and certainly doesn't warrant preparation of any kind of disturbance report.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The intent was to look at the posted “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting” and ask the industry if DSR SDT should consider existing guidelines for possible inclusion into the yet to be written requirement(s). The DSR SDT will take into consideration what Registered Entities are to be included within the yet to be written standard(s) based on the NERC Standards Committee approved SAR. The DSR SDT will review the Commissions concern that, an adversary might determine that a small LSE is the appropriate target when the adversary aims at a particular population or facility, as stated in FERC Order 693, paragraph 459. The intent of the proposed standard(s) is to address reporting needed for after-the-fact analyses of events as well as reporting necessary for situational awareness.</p>		
SERC Reliability Coordinator Sub-committee (RCS)	No	<p>Routine minor incidents such as copper theft and gun shots to insulators should not be reported. These types of minor events do not affect the reliability of the BPS. Existing reporting requirements are satisfactory. The focus of reporting should be on reliability related incidents and not incidents related to vandalism as such.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The intent was to look at the posted “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting” and ask the industry if DSR SDT should consider existing guidelines for possible inclusion into the yet to be written requirement(s). Reporting thresholds will be determined during the next step of the Standards Development process. The DSR SDT agrees with your comments on vandalism but a balance must be further explored to meet industry and regulatory requirements specifically under FERC Order 693.</p>		
Consumers Energy Company	No	<p>The existing guidelines ignore the fact that there are currently three overlapping and inconsistent reporting requirements for disturbances of various types: CIP-001, EOP-004, and DOE OE-417. The reporting should be such that any single event type needs to be reported only once, and to only a single agency, for any</p>

Organization	Yes or No	Question 1 Comment
		<p>disturbance. First, CIP-001 events should be reported to the ES-ISAC under one specific requirement (or set of requirements) and removed from OE-417 and EOP-004, such that all interested agencies obtain their information from only that one source. Second, OE-417 events should be reportable ONLY to DOE, and, again, other agencies should obtain their information from only that one source. If NERC wishes to make such reporting mandatory and enforceable, the NERC requirements should indicate ONLY that such reporting should be made in accordance with OE-417. Finally, EOP-004 (or similar requirements) should require reporting to NERC ONLY in the case of events that don't fit under CIP-001 or OE-417 requirements. Alternatively, OE-417 should be submitted ONLY to NERC and they should disseminate the information. EOP-004 has several issues and inconsistencies:</p> <p>a. EOP-004 requires that the entity that submits form DOE-417 to provide copies to NERC. The DOE-417 form intermixes NERC entity definitions (e.g. BA, LSE, TO) with generic terms such as "<u>Electric Utilities</u>" and "<u>Generating Entities</u>". Is it the Generator Owner or Generator Operator that is required to submit the information? There should be one form or at least well defined definitions that apply to both forms.</p> <p>b. EOP-004-1 R3.1 requires submittal within 24 hours, however Table 1-EOP-004-0 which purports to summarize the standard appears to change this requirement to 1 hour for several disturbances. Additionally, it incorrectly summarizes the reporting time for 50,000 customers, which is 6 hours in DOE-417 and summarized in Table 1-EOP-004-0 as 1-hour. An attachment to a standard should not be allowed to supersede the standard or create additional rules.</p> <p>c. EOP-004-1 R3.1 requires submittal within 24 hours, however Table 1-EOP-004-0 which purports to summarize the standard appears to change the standard. R3.1 clearly states that events are to be reported within 24 hours of identification, however Table 1-EOP-004-0 state that the events are to be reported on the basis of the start of the disturbance. An attachment to a standard should not be allowed to supersede the standard or create additional rules.</p> <p>d. EOP-004-1 R3.1 requires submittal within 24 hours, however Table 1-EOP-004-0 which purports to summarize the standard appears to change the standard. R3.1 clearly states that events are to be reported within 24 hours of identification, however Table 1-EOP-004-0 states that copies of DOE-417 are required to be submitted "simultaneously". It also states that schedules 1 and 2 are due within 24 hours of start of the event instead of 48 hours for per DOE-417 for schedule 2. An attachment to a standard should not be allowed to supersede the standard or create additional rules.</p> <p>e. The requirement of loss of customers should be scaled based on customers served. Loss of 50,000 customers to a utility that serves 100,000 customers is different than loss of 50,000 customers to a utility that serves 2,000,000 customers.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The intent was to look at the posted "NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting" and</p>		

Organization	Yes or No	Question 1 Comment
<p>ask the industry if DSR SDT should consider existing guidelines for possible inclusion into the yet to be written requirement(s). The DSR SDT agrees that present Reliability Standards can be complicated and lead to confusion when working on maintaining system reliability in the area of reporting per CIP-001-1 and EOP-004-1. We will consider the disagreements you've identified in existing reporting requirements when we develop the proposed requirements.</p>		
Central Lincoln	No	<p>The guidance document makes no distinction between entities that operate 24/7 dispatch and those that don't. The 1 hour and even the 24 hour reporting requirements in some cases will be impossible for entities without 24/7 dispatch to meet without changing business practices. These are the same entities that present little or no risk to the BES.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The intent was to look at the posted "NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting" and ask the industry if DSR SDT should consider existing guidelines for possible inclusion into the yet to be written requirement(s). The DSR SDT will take into consideration what Registered Entities are to be included within the yet to be written standard(s) based on the SAR. The DSR SDT will establish the "requirements necessary for users, owners, and operators of the Bulk-Power-System" as stated in FERC Order 693, paragraph 617 and the difference in reporting of events on the BES, as stated in the Purpose statement of EOP-004-1. The intent of the proposed standard(s) is to address reporting needed for after-the-fact analyses of events as well as reporting necessary for situational awareness.</p>		
MRO's NERC Standards Review Subcommittee	No Then Yes	<p>We agree with using the present documentation but would like just one reporting form. We are concerned that the guidelines and reporting periods specified within the DOE OE-417 report conflict with the NERC Guidelines. For example, DOE OE-417 report requires "Suspected Physical or Cyber Impairment" to be reported within 6 hours. The NERC guidelines indicate "Suspected Activities" are to be reported within 1 hour. We recommend the SDT use the DOE OE-417 report as a guiding document, and then determine additional reporting requirements using guidance from the NERC Guideline. FERC Order 693 appears to indicate conflicts and confusion with NERC reporting requirements and DOE reporting requirements should be eliminated.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The intent was to look at the posted "NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting" and ask the industry if DSR SDT should consider existing guidelines for possible inclusion into the yet to be written requirement(s). The DSR SDT is looking to streamline required reporting actions and remove any redundant reporting requirements if at all possible. The DOE Form OE-417 is currently mandatory under Public Law 93-275 for entities within the jurisdiction of the U.S Department of Energy. We will consider the disagreements you've identified in existing reporting requirements when we develop the proposed requirements.</p>		
Luminant	No Then Yes	<p>While the guidance is generally ok in the "NERC Guideline: Threat and Incidence Reporting", the reporting timelines include 1 hour, 2 hours, 4 hours, 6 hours, 8 hours, 24 hours, and 48 hours. Please simplify and reduce the variation in timelines. When it comes to Sabotage reporting, some time requirements start with detection, some start with determination of sabotage and some events do not specify the trigger for the reporting clock to start. Again, please provide clarity and consistency around the start of the timeline for</p>

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

Organization	Yes or No	Question 1 Comment
		reporting. Generally, the reporting timing should start with the recognition or determination that a suspected or known sabotage event occurred.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT is looking to streamline required reporting actions and remove any redundant reporting requirements if at all possible. The DSR SDT agrees that present Reliability Standards can be complicated and lead to confusion when working on maintaining system reliability in the area of reporting per CIP-001-1 and EOP-004-1. We will consider your specific suggestion for less variation in reporting timeframes, when we develop the proposed requirements.</p>		
We Energies	No Then Yes	While the NERC Guideline includes readily discernible information (and we would like to see that format carried forward into any future documentation), utilize OE-417 as the foundation document in order to eliminate reporting redundancies. If supplemental references are necessary for the proposed resolution, list the document as an official attachment to the standard. Minimize the need to search in multiple locations for guideline information - some may not be aware supporting documentation exists without explicit reference within the standard.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The intent was to look at the posted “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting” and ask the industry if DSR SDT should consider existing guidelines for possible inclusion into the yet to be written requirement(s). The DSR SDT is looking to streamline required reporting actions and remove any redundant reporting requirements if at all possible. The DSR SDT agrees that present Reliability Standards can be complicated and lead to confusion when working on maintaining system reliability in the area of reporting per CIP-001-1 and EOP-004-1. The DOE Form OE-417 is currently mandatory under Public Law 93-275 for entities within the jurisdiction of the U.S Department of Energy. We will consider your recommendation regarding listing supplemental references within the body of the standard when we draft the proposed standard(s).</p>		
American Electric Power	Yes	
Bandera Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Yes	
Calpine Corp.	Yes	
Duke Energy	Yes	
Edison Mission Marketing & Trading	Yes	

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

Organization	Yes or No	Question 1 Comment
Exelon	Yes	
Independent Electricity System Operator	Yes	
PacifiCorp	Yes	
Platte River Power Authority	Yes	
Central Hudson Gas & Electric	Yes	<p>Central Hudson agrees with using the “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting” in the development of requirements. Central Hudson has currently in place a NERC-DOE Threat and Incident Reporting Table developed from this NERC Guideline that allows for a quick-reference to all threat and incident reporting criteria (arranged by category) with a cross-reference to the specific reporting form (NERC Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit and Preliminary Disturbance Report, DOE Form OE-417, or NERC ES-ISAC Threat and Incident Report Form). Central Hudson recommends maintaining the option of utilizing only 1 form, the DOE Form OE-417, for incidents that require reporting to the DOE and NERC to maintain the streamlined approach to this reporting process.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT is looking to have a single reporting report form (per question 3) and streamline the reporting processes that may be developed within a yet to be written requirement(s).</p>		
E.ON U.S. LLC	Yes	<p>E.ON U.S. believe that the guidelines provide greater clarity for reporting forced outages caused by disturbances and sabotage but there remains issues that in need of further clarification. For example, there remains too much subjectivity on the reporting of forced outages when there is “identification of valuable lessons learned”</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT concurs that further clarification is required with the ambiguous statement “identification of valuable lessons learned” contained in the guideline – use of this phrase does not meet the technical writing threshold required for inclusion in a NERC Standard. The DSR SDT’s intent was to look at the posted NERC Guideline and ask the industry if DSR SDT should consider existing guidelines for possible inclusion into the yet to be written requirement(s). Recommendation of changes to the “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting” should be submitted to NERC via the Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee. I</p>		
Public Service Enterprise Group Companies	Yes	<p>EOP reportable disturbances are familiar concepts in the industry.</p>

Organization	Yes or No	Question 1 Comment
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment and support.		
Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc.	Yes	However, the SDT needs to maintain clear demarcation for the criteria for reporting events, and only those events that directly effect the reliability of the BES.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT has been directed to review all disturbance type activities and submit to the industry a well thought out set of requirements that clearly define disturbance events and what information is required to enhance an entity’ssituational awareness. Clear demarcation for the criteria for reporting will be determined in the near future based on the approved SAR and industry feedback. The intent of the proposed standard(s) is to address reporting needed for after-the-fact analyses of events as well as reporting necessary for situational awareness.		
Wolverine Power Supply Cooperative, Inc.	Yes	I agree with referencing existing guidelines - However: My concern is that, until all reportable incidents are analyzed by the parties to which they are reported, their "impact" on the BES will not be quantified. Therefore, the tendency to want to "report all events so that their impact can be determined" or "report all events because the information can be utilized for informational purposes, regardless of impact on BES" might lead to expanded reporting requirements, some of which may have questionable value from a reliability standpoint.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The intent was to look at the posted “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting” and ask the industry if the DSR SDT should consider existing guidelines for possible inclusion into the yet to be written requirement(s). The DSR SDT has been directed to review all disturbance type activities and submit to the industry a well thought out set of requirements that clearly define reportable events and what information is required to enhance an entity’s situational awareness. Clear demarcation for the criteria for reporting will be determined in the near future based on the approved SAR and industry feedback. The intent of the proposed standard(s) is to address reporting needed for after-the-fact analyses of events as well as reporting necessary for situational awareness.		
Hydro-Québec TransEnergie (HQT)	Yes	In considering guidance found in the document “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting”, the SDT should maintain focus on only those items that are absolutely necessary to maintain the reliability of the Bulk Electric System. In fact, the purpose of reporting per EOP-004 is that disturbances... need to be studied and understood to minimize the likelihood of similar events in the future.
Northeast Power Coordinating Council	Yes	In considering guidance found in the document “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting”, the SDT should maintain focus on only those items that are absolutely necessary to maintain the reliability of the Bulk Electric System. In fact, the purpose of reporting per EOP-004 is that disturbances... need to be studied and understood to minimize the likelihood of similar events in the future.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT will establish the “requirements necessary for users, owners, and operators of		

Organization	Yes or No	Question 1 Comment
<p>the Bulk-Power-System” as stated in FERC Order 693, paragraph 617 and the difference in reporting of events on the BES, as stated in the Purpose statement of EOP-004-1. The intent of the proposed standard(s) is to address reporting needed for after-the-fact analyses of events as well as reporting necessary for situational awareness.</p>		
Western Electricity Coordinating Council	Yes	It is comprehensive; however, we must keep in mind that the OE-417 is required under Public Law 93-275 and needs to be attached if applicable in the US.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.</p>		
Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC	Yes	NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting" document should be used for guidance as it identifies best practices for reporting.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.</p>		
Manitoba Hydro	Yes	The “Threat and Incident Reporting” document contains a lot of detailed information which greatly assists in determining reporting events and weaning out non important events. The document contains some examples and expected reporting time lines. Attachment 1-EOP-004, though considerably smaller and condensed it does contain some detail not mentioned in “Threat and Incident Reporting”. Integrating the “Threat and Incident Reporting” into Attachment 1-EOP-004, though large in size, has lots of information and is easy to follow would be a large improvement to existing protocol OR SEE QUESTION 3 COMMENTS. Incidences we have experienced on our system, in past were difficult to delineate as reportable, who to report to and when. An improvement to this Standard is welcome.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT is looking to streamline and remove any redundancies within the NERC Standard’s requirements.</p>		
Constellation Power Source Generation	Yes	The existing guidance is an excellent base on which to build changes to EOP-004 and CIP-001. However, the SDT must challenge each item in the different event categories and clarify or omit bullet points that are seemingly vague. For example, under System Disturbances, a forced outage report is needed when “a generation asset of 500 MW or above is on a forced outage for unknown reasons, or a forced outage of generation of 2,000 MW occurs...” Simply removing the 500 MW criteria would make this criterion less vague. There are other examples of this in the guideline.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT is looking to streamline and remove any redundancies within the NERC Standard’s requirements. It is the intent of the SDT to carefully review the different event categories and provide clarity where needed to remove ambiguity.</p>		

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

Organization	Yes or No	Question 1 Comment
ISO RTO Council Standards Review Committee	Yes	The guidelines in EOP-004 and its attachments should be retained as the foundation for reporting disturbances. One would note that such EOP Disturbances are relatively well defined reliability impacts. Thus EOP-004 disturbances are based on HOW certain events impacted the BES. [Sabotage on the other hand requires an implication of WHY an event occurred.]The original EOP-004 represents a common sense approach to defining reliability events that may be useful to analyze on a regional basis. In the current environment, Regions are not sanctionable entities but they still are valuable sources to collect, analyze and trend the few disturbances that occur in each region. To make use of Regions, however, precludes the use of sanctionable NERC standards. EOP-004 as written does not meet the NERC requirements for standards but it does meet the Industry needs for a guideline for reporting events that deserve to be reviewed. The SDT should propose deleting EOP-004 and use it as a Disturbance Reporting Guideline.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. Regions are required to comply with requirements in NERC Reliability Standards – however Regions are not sanctioned the same way as users, owners and operators of the bulk power system – if a Region fails to comply with a NERC Reliability Standard, it can be fined for failure to comply under the ERO’s Rules of Procedure.</p>		
USBR	Yes	The reporting outlined in the proposed plan does not include a clear indication of how NERC will use the information they collect from the entities. Care needs to be taken in addressing the reporting requirements to not create a more confusing or onerous reporting process.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. It is anticipated that NERC will analyze events to assess trends and identify lessons learned for industry feedback and reliability improvement.</p>		
FirstEnergy	Yes	This guideline appears to be a good starting point for developing consistency in reporting. However, we believe that after-the-fact event reporting is administrative in nature and seldom rises to the level of mandated reliability standard requirements. It is not clear what reporting would be made through this effort and how it differs from reporting made through the NERC Reliability Coordinator Information System (RCIS). With the initiative for more results-based standards being the goal of NERC, true after the fact reporting-type requirements should become administrative procedures and only be included in standards if they are truly required for preserving an Adequate Level of Reliability. If there are aspects that rise to be retained in a mandatory and enforceable reliability standard, we propose that those associated with sabotage be moved to CIP-001 and that EOP-004 be focused on operational disturbances that warrant wide-area knowledge. However, if the RCIS is the mechanism to convey real-time information and that is presently occurring outside of reliability standards, it is unclear what the delta improvement this project aims to achieve.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. As stated in FERC Order, 693, paragraph 611, “Complete and timely data is essential for analyzing system disturbances” and in paragraph 617, “the Commission directs the ERO to develop a modification to EOP-004-1 through the</p>		

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

Organization	Yes or No	Question 1 Comment
<p>Reliability Standards development process that includes any requirements necessary for users, owners, and operators of the Bulk-Power-System to provide data that will assist NERC in the investigation of a blackout or disturbance”. Some data is needed, therefore, for after-the-fact analyses. In addition, some data is needed much more quickly for situational awareness. The DSR SDT will analyze and determine what constitutes a reportable event and what information is required for situational awareness as opposed to after the fact analyses of events.</p>		
Portland General Electric	Yes	This process is in place and utilities are familiar with it. This is a good place to start.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment and support.</p>		
Ameren	Yes	We agree that it makes sense to build upon existing documentation. However, we do not believe it is necessary to require event reporting to be in an enforceable standard. Rather the drafting team should consider developing a reporting guideline document and retiring the EOP-004 standard.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. As stated in FERC Order, 693, paragraph 611, “Complete and timely data is essential for analyzing system disturbances” and in paragraph 617, “the Commission directs the ERO to develop a modification to EOP-004-1 through the Reliability Standards development process that includes any requirements necessary for users, owners, and operators of the Bulk-Power-System to provide data that will assist NERC in the investigation of a blackout or disturbance”. Some data is needed, therefore, for after-the-fact analyses. In addition, some data is needed much more quickly for situational awareness. As envisioned, the requirements developed under this project will address both types of reporting requirements.</p>		
Midwest ISO Standards Collaborators	Yes	We agree that it makes sense to build upon existing documentation. However, we do not believe it is necessary to require event reporting to be in an enforceable standard. Rather the drafting team should consider developing a reporting guideline document and retiring the EOP-004 standard. This is further supported by the fact that there is a role in the existing standard for the Regional Entities even though these requirements can’t be enforced against the Regional Entities because they are not a user, owner or operator of the system.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. As stated in FERC Order, 693, paragraph 611, “Complete and timely data is essential for analyzing system disturbances” and in paragraph 617, “the Commission directs the ERO to develop a modification to EOP-004-1 through the Reliability Standards development process that includes any requirements necessary for users, owners, and operators of the Bulk-Power-System to provide data that will assist NERC in the investigation of a blackout or disturbance”. Some data is needed, therefore, for after-the-fact analyses. In addition, some data is needed much more quickly for situational awareness. As envisioned, the requirements developed under this project will address both types of reporting requirements.</p>		
Dynergy Inc.	Yes	We agree with using the guidance; however, please consider revising the NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting document to (i) lengthen the reporting timelines related to attempted sabotage to allow for

Organization	Yes or No	Question 1 Comment
		additional time to deem the threat credible, (ii) expand the description of forced outage of generation greater than 2000 MW to include whether it is at the BA or GO level and if GO level, whether it is for one site or the combined GO's sites in a Region, and (iii) add a Responsible Party column to the Appendix A matrix.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. Recommendation of changes to the “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting” should be submitted to NERC via the Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee since that falls outside the scope of the SAR.</p> <p>We will consider your specific suggestions for revisions to reporting requirements when we develop the proposed requirements.</p>		
BGE	Yes	We have no problem with NERC using the existing guidance as the foundation for disturbance reporting; however, since this project proposes to investigate incorporation of the Cyber Incident reporting aspects of CIP-008, we feel that if adopted, this concept should be added to the NERC Guideline document "Threat and Incident Reporting".
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. Recommendation of changes to the “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting” should be submitted to NERC via the Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee since that falls outside the scope of the SAR.</p>		
Electric Market Policy	Yes	Yes; however, in considering guidance found in the document “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting” the SDT should maintain focus on only those items that are absolutely necessary to maintain the reliability of the Bulk Electric System. In fact, the purpose of reporting per EOP-004 is that disturbances... need to be studied and understood to minimize the likelihood of similar events in the future.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT will establish the “requirements necessary for users, owners, and operators of the Bulk-Power-System” as stated in FERC Order 693, paragraph 617 and the difference in reporting of events on the BES, as stated in the Purpose statement of EOP-004-1. As envisioned, the requirements developed under this project will address reporting requirements that are used for after-the-fact analyses as well as reporting requirements that are associated with situational awareness.</p>		

2. The DSR SDT is considering developing a reporting hierarchy for disturbances that requires entities to submit information to the Reliability Coordinator and then for the Reliability Coordinator to submit the report. Do you agree with this hierarchy concept? Please explain your response (yes or no) in the comment area.

Summary Consideration: Most stakeholders (about 2/3) agree with the concept of developing a reporting hierarchy for disturbances. Stakeholders who disagreed believed that the RC should be one of many to receive information on impact events (DOE, RRO, etc.). Such a hierarchy would lead to reporting delays (leading to lack of situational awareness), be cumbersome and complicated and clouds responsibility for who is to report what to whom. Other negative comments believed that a hierarchy would distract the RC’s focus from its primary responsibility. Those stakeholders who agreed commented that the RC should be the collection point for reports and information and take the responsibility to forward as required. This is from the concept that the RC has the “wider view” and can recognize patterns, and has the ability to “escalate” the reporting process. This would also minimize duplication of reports and information.

Organization	Yes or No	Question 2 Comment
BGE	No	As currently worded, BGE opposes the reporting hierarchy concept, since insufficient guidelines were proposed to prevent translation errors between the responsible entity (RE) and the RC. In addition to creating possible reporting errors, this also opens a risk that the RC could misrepresent the true intent of an RE’s report contents if called upon to explain/justify a submitted report. Reporting delays are another concern with this proposal because the RE would basically be relinquishing control of the reporting process to the RC, while ultimately retaining the responsibility for ensuring the report gets submitted within the required timeframe. However, BGE recognizes that avoiding duplication and conflicting reports as well as encouraging communication are valuable. To make the reporting hierarchy concept acceptable to BGE, the DSR SDT must develop proper controls to ensure the RE has the ability to control or approve the information submitted and/or subsequently discussed with the respective authorities, and that it is done within the permissible timeframe to satisfy compliance requirements.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. If the reporting hierarchy concept is adopted, it will include controls to ensure timely reporting, clear accountability so that risk is not transferred, and a mechanism to ensure the Responsible Entity’s reported information remains as submitted.</p>		

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

Organization		Yes or No	Question 2 Comment
Consumers Energy Company	No	It would be inefficient for RC's to accumulate ALL disturbance data and submit it, and to bifurcate the reporting based on type of disturbance above and beyond OE-417 data (which should go ONLY to DOE) would make a standard very involved for an entity to comply with. We're discussing after-event data here, not data needed for current operations - and there's no reason to make it any more complicated than necessary.	
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. In order for a reporting hierarchy concept to be adopted, it will result in real efficiency gains by eliminating duplication of reports. It will not be pursued if the result is a complicated or burdensome process for responsible entities.			
Exelon	No	Some of the DOE related reporting is driven by distribution events, i.e. outages greater than 50,000 customers, is it realistic to expect the RC, whose focus is on the transmission system to perform distribution related reporting?	
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DOE Reporting Form OE 417 is currently mandatory by Public Law and only applies to US entities and contains reporting thresholds that are not required by NERC. Our goal is to derive reporting thresholds that meet NERC's needs for information on bulk electric system disturbances and real-time events, not distribution level-only problems.			
USBR	No	The existing reporting methods collect reports of disturbances and analyze them by committees of the respective coordinating councils. The new process would introduce a duplicate layer and associated staffing. It would be better to ensure communication between the existing committees of the respective coordinating councils and the RC rather than creating a new layer of review tracking and analysis. While the layered reporting hierarchy discussed in the Disturbance Reporting section of the paper will eventually help with overall event awareness, the additional delays the hierarchical approach could result in a decrease in situational (timely) awareness. Having more comprehensive information as a result of the potential enhancements each layer adds to the chain of reporting may not be more valuable than timely and well disseminated information in an actual disturbance situation. We would suggest the SDT give careful consideration to this proposed direction. It may be appropriate to consider that expedited reporting of operational impacts would outweigh the benefit of administratively intensive reporting procedures. The events reported through the existing process have not yielded material feedback other than statistical analysis. Statistical analysis is not as sensitive to timely reporting. Operational impacts which may be the result of possible sabotage may be evident through assessment of widespread outage patterns or following event analysis. Comprehensive event analysis can take anywhere from 15 days to 90 days depending on the event.	
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We agree that reporting timeliness must be weighed against the perceived benefits of a reporting hierarchy. If the reporting hierarchy concept is adopted, it should include controls to ensure timely reporting, clear accountability so that risk of a violation of the standard is not transferred, and a process to ensure the responsible entities' reported information remains as submitted. Also it must result in real efficiency gains and support the reliability of the bulk electric system.			

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

Organization	Yes or No	Question 2 Comment
ISO RTO Council Standards Review Committee	No	<p>The idea of a reporting hierarchy provides an easy to follow pro forma approach. But disturbance reports should not always follow a common reporting path. A disturbance on the transmission system for example need not be routed through an “if applicable” Balancing Authority. To mandate that a BA be in the path is inappropriate. To leave the applicability open is to create a subjective compliance problem for the impacted BA. Copper theft is another example that should not require reporting up through the RC. It is a local issue and the Transmission Owner should be able to report this directly to the appropriate parties. How would a DP, LSE or GO know if an event is an “impact event”? The posed impact events are a series of conditions for sabotage but not for EOP-type disturbances. The aforementioned entities have no requirement to monitor and analyze the BES, which then means every event would be an impact event for those entities (not an EOP disturbance but an impact event). Thus every theft of copper is an impact event mandating a Disturbance Report even though the SDT notes the RC only has to send it to the “local authorities”. This seems to be a misuse of the RC resources; every train derailment is an impact event requiring a Disturbance report (is that a commercial train, regional rail line a local trolley car); every teenage prank would also generate an impact event mandating a disturbance report. The SDT defined impact events are not appropriate for use in defining disturbances. There is a big difference from creating a set of guidelines to follow as opposed to creating sanctionable standards</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. Furthermore, impact events should not include copper theft or other conditions that pose no threat to the reliability of the BES. A train derailment is only an impact event if it threatens some element of the bulk electric system such as a transmission line corridor - the derailment in itself is not an impact event. See more on impact events under the responses to Question 3.</p>		
Bonneville Power Administration	No	<p>The RC is made aware of these type of incidents and goes right back to incorporating that in their awareness and to focusing on system reliability. If the RC is the recipient for further distribution of information of this type they will be forever going back for more information. Eliminate the middleman in whatever concept you propose, folks have plenty to do now. Let people make good judgments with the direct field people on the seriousness of the breach with their security personnel contacting the appropriate law enforcement agency. (Or are you looking to do a simple RE reports to the RC who marks various category items on a secure website Yes/No category item indicator that can be rolled up in ES-ISAC map board?)</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The Reliability Coordinator’s suggested role in this is to allow them to incorporate the relevant data from responsible entities in their footprint for further analysis.</p>		
Duke Energy	No	<p>The RC should not be responsible for submitting the report to FERC, NERC or the RRO. The RC may not have the necessary first hand information concerning the facts of the event. Situation awareness can be maintained by including the RC in the distribution of any sabotage related reporting.</p>

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

Organization		Yes or No	Question 2 Comment
SERC Reliability Coordinator Sub-committee (RCS)	No	The RC should not be responsible for submitting the report to FERC, NERC or the RRO. The RC may not have the necessary first hand information concerning the facts of the event. Situation awareness can be maintained by including the RC in the distribution of any sabotage related reporting.	
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. If the reporting hierarchy concept is adopted, it will include controls to ensure timely reporting, clear accountability so that risk of a violation of the standard is not transferred, and a process to ensure the responsible entities' reported information remains as submitted. Also it must result in real efficiency gains and support the reliability of the bulk electric system.			
ERCOT ISO	No	There are some events that are truly local and should be handled by local entities and reported to local authorities (i.e. theft). If there is an impact or potential to have an impact to the BES or to the region, then hierarchical reporting would be appropriate.	
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We agree - a clearly defined impact event criteria would do just as you suggest - leave local issues on the local level.			
Northeast Power Coordinating Council	No	This is not a standards issue, and NERC should not dictate the reporting structure. It should be left to the RCs and their members.	
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. In defining a disturbance reporting hierarchy we sought to realize efficiencies. If the reporting hierarchy concept is adopted, it must result in real efficiency gains and support the reliability of the bulk electric system. It will not be adopted if the result in a complicated or burdensome process for responsible entities.			
MRO's NERC Standards Review Subcommittee	No	We agree a coordinated reporting process is beneficial for the entity and the Reliability Coordinator (RC). However, a hierarchy would likely lengthen the reporting timeframe, or reduce the allotted time for each entity to provide notification to the RC in order to meet DOE or NERC timelines. Communication and coordination with the RC would likely provide more accurate and complete data submissions within a timely process and create shared accountability for the report being submitted.	
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. If the reporting hierarchy concept is adopted, it will include controls to ensure timely reporting, clear accountability so that risk of a violation of the standard is not transferred, and some mechanism to ensure the responsible entities' reported information remains as submitted.			

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

Organization		Yes or No	Question 2 Comment
Midwest ISO Standards Collaborators	No	We do not agree with developing a hierarchy for reporting for all disturbances and impacting events. For instance, copper theft is an example of an item that should be reported to the appropriate entities directly by the Transmission Owner. The RC does not need to be made aware of every copper theft unless it has a direct impact on reliability (affects rating, protection system, etc.) and the RC should not be burdened with expending resources for this reporting. A further example in which the hierarchy is not needed would be the case in which only one entity is impacted. If a significant event occurs on one TOP's system, then the TOP should be able to handle the reporting of all entities under its purview. If more than one TOP is involved, then it would be necessary to involve the RC in the reporting.	
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The reporting hierarchy concept is meant to apply only to disturbance reporting. We agree that copper theft and other situations that do not pose a direct threat to reliability shouldn't be reported to NERC through this standard.			
FirstEnergy	No	While we appreciate the team's effort to serialize the reporting process, with the electronic communication methods available today, it seems that reporting can be accomplished simultaneously to multiple entities without shifting the burden of reporting to others along the communications path. This is particularly true if the reporting format is standardized to a one-size-fits-all report. Additionally, it would be a great burden to the Reliability Coordinator to review all events perceived by entities to be malicious sabotage events.	
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The reporting hierarchy concept would only apply to disturbance reporting, not impact events. The Reliability Coordinator's suggested role in this to allow them to incorporate the relevant data from responsible entities in their footprint for further analysis. We will consider your suggestion of simultaneous submissions as a means to effectively notify the necessary parties.			
Edison Mission Marketing & Trading	Yes		
PacifiCorp	Yes		
SPS Consulting Group Inc.	Yes		
Calpine Corp.	Yes	A Functional Entity such as a Generator Owner/Operator is not always aware that an event, such as a plant trip, is part of a wider system disturbance that rises to the level of a reportable event under EOP-004. A reporting hierarchy that allows a Generator to report the facts to its Transmission Operator and have that entity take a wider view to determine whether there is a disturbance should facilitate the reporting of actual disturbances. The SDT needs to ensure that some thought goes into the flow of information within the hierarchy and what triggers are needed to drive the reporting up the hierarchy.	

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

Organization	Yes or No	Question 2 Comment
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. A reporting hierarchy process must include clear triggers for reporting and provide an efficient, well-defined information flow.</p>		
We Energies	Yes	<p>A hierarchical approach in conjunction with a single, electronic form would provide consistent reporting timelines, provide clarity in the reporting process, and provide more accurate and meaningful data submissions while having shared accountability. Confusion in the current method could be alleviated while providing more consistency in the reporting of an "impact event".</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.</p>		
Arizona Public Service Company	Yes	<p>All disturbance reporting should go through the RC.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.</p>		
Constellation Power Source Generation	Yes	<p>As stated in the concept paper, a hierarchy ensures proper communications, but it has the added benefit of reducing redundancy on the Registered Entities, so long as responsibilities and accountability are clearly established.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.</p>		
Central Hudson Gas & Electric	Yes	<p>Central Hudson agrees with this reporting hierarchy for disturbances given the "wider-view" of the Reliability Coordinator as opposed to an entity such as a Transmission Owner or Load-Serving Entity. While, based on past experience, the current process works if reports are filed to the DOE, RRO, and RC simultaneously via email for example. However, the RC is in a better position to identify multi-site incidents and escalate the reporting process if necessary.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.</p>		
Wolverine Power Supply Cooperative, Inc.	Yes	<p>From the perspective of a TOP, this seems to alleviate reporting burden and move it up line. I can understand the logic in wanting the reporting to flow through the RC for awareness purposes, but I can understand the RC's reluctance to bear the additional potential burden. Again, a focused effort to minimize the necessary reporting to "true impact events" should be kept in mind, regardless of who has to report. Collecting reams of data and figuring out what impact it has later should not be the goal.</p>

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

Organization	Yes or No	Question 2 Comment
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We agree that regardless of any reporting hierarchy, the goal is to report on disturbances and events with meaningful impact on the bulk electric system. See Question 3 responses for more information on how we view impact events.</p>		
Electric Market Policy	Yes	Having the reporting flow through the Reliability Coordinator supports the reliability objective of assessing, monitoring, and maintaining a wide-area view of the reliability of the Bulk Electric System.
Hydro-Québec TransEnergie (HQT)	Yes	Having the reporting flow through the Reliability Coordinator supports the reliability objective of assessing, monitoring, and maintaining a wide-area view of the reliability of the Bulk Electric System. The reporting hierarchy should be to submit the information to the Reliability Coordinator, and to have the RC submit the report. This would eliminate the duplication of information.
Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc.	Yes	Having the reporting flow through the Reliability Coordinator supports the reliability objective of assessing, monitoring, and maintaining a wide-area view of the reliability of the Bulk Electric System. The reporting hierarchy should be to submit the information to the Reliability Coordinator, and to have the RC submit the report. This would eliminate the duplication of information.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.</p>		
Lands Energy Consulting	Yes	I would give the RC the authority to establish impact thresholds for reporting. Consistent with my earlier comment, I would set the materiality threshold for disturbance reporting purposes at LSEs (or a combination of LSEs in the case of BPA) serving at least 90,000 customers.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. Reporting thresholds in the standard will meet NERC requirements: Reliability Coordinator's may have different reporting criteria to meet Regional requirements, but they will not appear in this yet to be written Standard.</p>		
Central Lincoln	Yes	<p>In the west at least, this hierarchy should be extended to include BA's as indicated in the Concepts Paper. See: http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/business/reliability/Docs/2007/PNSC_RE_Data_Letter_2_070723.pdf</p> <p>for the RC's policy on which entities it chooses to communicate with.</p>

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

Organization	Yes or No	Question 2 Comment
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The hierarchy concept includes BAs as appropriate in the reporting structure.		
Luminant	Yes	Luminant believes that one report should be filed with the Reliability Coordinator or one responsible entity, who then files the report with all applicable entities.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC	Yes	Oncor agrees that with this reporting hierarchy, in that dual reporting should be eliminated
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
Portland General Electric	Yes	PGE is familiar with and works closely with WECC today so the hierarchial consideration makes sense.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
Platte River Power Authority	Yes	Situational awareness would be enhanced. All affected entities would be aware of the disturbance and relevant information. Also, the flow of information between entities would be enhanced and a more comprehensive report could be developed.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
Ameren	Yes	The hierarchy is appealing in the fact that the TOP/BA will be kept in the loop and receive critical information from the Generators, Distribution, LSE, etc. But there will be an inherent delay in reporting due to the fact that at every hand-off of information there will be questions for additional and/or clarified information, and there is always a possibility for the loss of information due to the transfer from one entity to the next. Further, this reporting through a hierarchy could also take away from the operators ability to respond to system events due to being tied to an information transfer ladder.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. If the reporting hierarchy concept is adopted, it will include controls to ensure timely reporting, clear accountability so that risk of a violation of the standard is not transferred, and some process to ensure the responsible entities' reported information remains as submitted. It must also ensure that it does not place any extra burden on operators that could create an additional risk to reliability.		

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

Organization		Yes or No	Question 2 Comment
E.ON U.S. LLC	Yes	The hierarchy will simplify reporting from the entity in that the RC is always notified and then the RC notifies other parties as required, (with the exception of OE-417, which still has to be filled out per law) E.ON U.S. recommends that the drafting team pay particular attention to the report process to make sure that duplicate reports are not being required. Currently information on forced outages is already communicated to the RC so formalizing a requirement to provide data to the RC may represent duplication to reports already provided.	
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. Avoiding duplication is a key goal of the drafting team.			
Public Service Enterprise Group Companies	Yes	The PSEG Companies believe that all entities with a reportable disturbance should report to the RC. The RC is best positioned to evaluate the impact of the event and forward the information to the appropriate entities. There should not be any intermediate entities to relay information to the RC as that can introduce delay and has the potential to introduce transcription errors. Sabotage events should be reported to the RC as well as to law enforcement. CIP-008 reporting is highly specialized and should be retained in the set of cyber security standards, not merged with CIP-001 and EOP-004.	
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. Detection of cyber events may be specialized but report of them is not. Threats to reliability must be reported no matter what the cause. The DSR SDT proposes using the thresholds found in CIP-008 - this standard would provide a one stop form to submit the information. Note that the current CIP-008 has a reporting requirement to the ES-ISAC only.			
Manitoba Hydro	Yes	The Reporting Concept states that the new hierarchy is, "Affected entity to TOP/ BA to RC. Then the RC will then submit to NERC and DOE (if required)". This will enhance the existing requirement EOP-004-1 R4 which states that the RC shall assist the affected entity by providing representatives to assist in the investigation (this is also all reiterated in Attachment 1-EOP-004) .In an disturbance, the local resources would be tied up in the rectification of the problem. Analyzing and reporting the event (is it reportable, who to report to, what is the timeline) is distracting and time consuming. By leaving the final upper level steps of reporting to NERC/DOE by the RC would be efficient.	
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.			
Western Electricity Coordinating Council	Yes	There should be an established time sequence that allows the RC to review the entities material prior to forwarding to NERC. By channeling all reports through the RC situational awareness will be enhanced. Instead of "submit information", it should be clarified that entities submit complete written reports to RC in electronic format.	
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. If the reporting hierarchy concept is adopted, it will include controls to ensure timely reporting, clear accountability so that risk of a violation of the standard is not transferred, and a process to ensure the responsible entities' reported information remains as submitted.			

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Organization		Yes or No	Question 2 Comment
American Electric Power	Yes	This approach may work as long as there is a uniform process across all of the Reliability Coordinators. AEP owns and operates BES facilities under three separate RCs and having differing rules and processes would create confusion and additional burdens. There are some concerns about the time lag of reporting the information and this might not work well in all cases especially if the information and knowledge are at the local level. AEP recommends that the standard could have a default hierarchy, but this should not prohibit any entity from reporting directly.	
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. Our goal is uniform reporting criteria to meet specified requirements. We will consider the risks and benefits of allowing a default hierarchical reporting structure with the ability for responsible entities to report directly to NERC.			
Bandera Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Yes	This approach, while I suspect will not be universally agreed to, should provide some definitive guidance in reporting.	
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.			
Dynegy Inc.	Yes	This seems to be straightforward approach in that the RC is the best judge of threats to the overall system and could eliminate multiple reports of a single event.	
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.			
Independent Electricity System Operator	Yes	We do not agree with the need of such a hierarchy setup solely for the purpose of making reports to the need-to-know entities. All responsible entities (RC, BA, TOP, etc.) need to file a report. With the proposed set up noted under Q3, which we support, these reports should go directly to NERC. The RC should not be held responsible for forwarding other entities' reports to NERC, and in doing so subject itself to potential non-compliance.	
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. If the reporting hierarchy concept is adopted, it will include controls to ensure timely reporting, clear accountability so that risk of a violation of the standard is not transferred, and a process to ensure the responsible entities' reported information remains as submitted.			

3. The goal of the DSR SDT is to have one report form for all functional entities (US, Canada, Mexico) to submit to NERC. Do you agree with this change? Please explain your response (yes or no) in the comment area.

Summary Consideration: Most stakeholders agreed with the concept of having one reporting form for all entities. Several commenters suggested that there is no need for a standard on reporting as they considered it administrative in nature. Most thought it should be a guideline, rather than an enforceable standard. There is widespread agreement that the one-size-fits-all approach would be very difficult to get agreement on, given the different countries and agencies involved. Many stakeholders pointed out that consistency and simplification were drivers for one report form. Having multiple recipients, with different information requirements, seem to support an electronic format that would guide information only to those who need it. The concept of an electronic reporting tool would need to be further vetted and developed.

Organization	Yes or No	Question 3 Comment
Bandera Electric Cooperative, Inc.		No preference in this area.
ISO RTO Council Standards Review Committee	No	The SRC supports NERC’s initiative for Results Based Standards. The SRC understood RBS to mean the results were reliability based quantities not administrative quantities. There is no need for a NERC Reliability standard on reporting. The idea that all functional entities in each of the said countries will use one form would be a good idea if and only if all the countries and all of their agencies were willing to accept that form. The SRC does not believe that those agencies will be willing to cede what information they ask for to NERC; nor that NERC will be able to create a single form that all such agencies will accept.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT acknowledges the difficulty in attempting to present a single form. However, the DSR SDT believes it may be possible to achieve consolidation since the various reports ask repetitive questions. For example, having to provide contact names, telephone numbers, email addresses on multiple forms is not an effective use of time or resources. Similarly, answering the question “Describe the event” or “What steps did you take” on multiple reporting forms is also not effective. The DSR SDT does recognize that it may not be possible to eliminate reporting to multiple jurisdictional agencies due to legislative or regulatory requirements. The set of results-based standards is intended to provide a ‘defense-in-depth’ approach to protecting reliability of the bulk power system. While many reports are administrative and are only used to assess compliance with specific requirements, the reporting addressed in this project is focused on providing data needed to support</p>		

Organization	Yes or No	Question 3 Comment
<p>after-the-fact analyses of events, and reporting information needed to maintain situational awareness. As such, the SDT believes that these reporting requirements do need to be enforceable.</p>		
FirstEnergy	No	<p>While one consistent form for reporting may simplify reporting requirements, it would be very difficult to get all governmental agencies to agree to a one-size-fits all approach.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT acknowledges the difficulty in attempting to present a single form. However, the DSR SDT believes it may be possible to achieve consolidation since the various reports ask repetitive questions. For example, having to provide contact names, telephone numbers, email addresses on multiple forms is not an effective use of time or resources. Similarly, answering the question “Describe the event” or “What steps did you take” on multiple reporting forms is also not effective. The DSR SDT does recongnize that it may not be possible to eliminate reporting to multiple jurisdictional agencies due to legislative or regulatory requirements.</p>		
Public Service Enterprise Group Companies	No	<p>While simplification and consistency is a laudable goal, it should not be applied to different governmental agencies (USA, Canada, Mexico) which may have different structures and processes. Moreover, results based standards should not include administrative matters such as reporting forms.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT acknowledges the difficulty in attempting to present a single form. However, the DSR SDT believes it may be possible to achieve consolidation since the various reports ask repetitive questions. For example, having to provide contact names, telephone numbers, email addresses on multiple forms is not an effective use of time or resources. Similarly, answering the question “Describe the event” or “What steps did you take” on multiple reporting forms is also not effective. The DSR SDT does recongnize that it may not be possible to eliminate reporting to multiple jurisdictional agencies due to legislative or regulatory requirements. The set of results-based standards is intended to provide a ‘defense-in-depth’ approach to protecting reliability of the bulk power system. While many reports are administrative and are only used to assess compliance with specific requirements, the reporting addressed in this project is focused on providing data needed to support after-the-fact analyses of events, and reporting information needed to maintain situational awareness. As such, the SDT believes that these reporting requirements do need to be enforceable.</p>		
American Electric Power	Yes	
Constellation Power Source Generation	Yes	
Exelon	Yes	
PacifiCorp	Yes	
Platte River Power Authority	Yes	

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

Organization	Yes or No	Question 3 Comment
Calpine Corp.	Yes	A single approach is desirable, particularly for those entities that find themselves in multiple regions or countries.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
We Energies	Yes	Agree in conjunction with proposed concept that DOE OE-417 will be allowed to supplement the NERC report in lieu of duplicating entries.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT acknowledges the difficulty in attempting to present a single form. However, the DSR SDT believes it may be possible to achieve consolidation since the various reports ask repetitive questions. For example, having to provide contact names, telephone numbers, email addresses on multiple forms is not an effective use of time or resources. Similarly, answering the question “Describe the event” or “What steps did you take” on multiple reporting forms is also not effective. The DSR SDT does recongnize that it may not be possible to eliminate reporting to multiple jurisdictional agencies due to legislative or regulatory requirements.		
Consumers Energy Company	Yes	Agreed - to the extent that it’s consistent with the concept that any specific type of data is submitted to ONLY one entity.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT acknowledges the difficulty in attempting to present a single form. However, the DSR SDT believes it may be possible to achieve consolidation since the various reports ask repetitive questions. For example, having to provide contact names, telephone numbers, email addresses on multiple forms is not an effective use of time or resources. Similarly, answering the question “Describe the event” or “What steps did you take” on multiple reporting forms is also not effective. The DSR SDT does recongnize that it may not be possible to eliminate reporting to multiple jurisdictional agencies due to legislative or regulatory requirements.		
Arizona Public Service Company	Yes	APS supports the standardization of the form for consistency and format.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
Bonneville Power Administration	Yes	As long as we don’t make one form that requires extraneous information for the sake of having agreement.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT acknowledges the difficulty in attempting to present a single form. However, the DSR SDT believes it may be possible to achieve consolidation since the various reports ask repetitive questions. For example, having to provide contact names, telephone numbers, email addresses on multiple forms is not an effective use of time or resources. Similarly, answering the question “Describe the event” or “What steps did you take” on multiple reporting forms is also not effective. The DSR SDT does recongnize that it may not be possible to eliminate reporting to multiple jurisdictional agencies due to legislative or regulatory requirements.		

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Organization	Yes or No	Question 3 Comment
Western Electricity Coordinating Council	Yes	Canadian and Mexican entities should be consulted on content of report form to assure their "buy in".
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. It is DSR SDT’s intent to discuss the need for information with appropriate jurisdictional agencies.</p>		
Central Hudson Gas & Electric	Yes	Central Hudson agrees with this goal if the intent is to develop and implement an electronic version that would meet DOE requirements as well.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT acknowledges the difficulty in attempting to present a single form. However, the DSR SDT believes it may be possible to achieve consolidation since the various reports ask repetitive questions. For example, having to provide contact names, telephone numbers, email addresses on multiple forms is not an effective use of time or resources. Similarly, answering the question “Describe the event” or “What steps did you take” on multiple reporting forms is also not effective. The DSR SDT does recongnize that it may not be possible to eliminate reporting to multiple jurisdictional agencies due to legislative or regulatory requirements.</p>		
E.ON U.S. LLC	Yes	E.ON U.S. supports the proposal.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.</p>		
MRO's NERC Standards Review Subcommittee	Yes	However, We believe the primary goal should focus on “each entity” being able to submit one report for all functional requirements. Entities in the US that are required to submit the DOE OE-417 form should not be required to submit an additional form developed for other entities (Canada & Mexico). One approach to satisfy this goal is for NERC to require all entities (US, Canada, & Mexico) to complete the DOE OE-417 form as their report.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.</p>		
Wolverine Power Supply Cooperative, Inc.	Yes	I can't see how anyone would disagree with this concept - However - I question how practical it will be to implement, since various agencies would have to collaborate and coordinate to accomplish this task.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT acknowledges the difficulty in attempting to present a single form. However, the DSR SDT believes it may be possible to achieve consolidation since the various reports ask repetitive questions. For example, having to provide contact names, telephone numbers, email addresses on multiple forms is not an effective use of time or resources. Similarly, answering the question “Describe the event” or “What steps did you take” on multiple reporting forms is also not effective. The DSR SDT does recongnize that it may not be possible to eliminate reporting to multiple jurisdictional agencies due to legislative or regulatory requirements.</p>		

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

Organization	Yes or No	Question 3 Comment
Lands Energy Consulting	Yes	I think that the impact approach makes sense and that EOP-004 and CIP-001 are logically connected. Many entities of which I am aware link Sabotage Reporting Training to Disturbance Reporting obligation awareness already.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC	Yes	Oncor agrees that by using the same type reporting format, there should be consistency in regard to each functional entity's expectations.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
BGE	Yes	One form makes sense to us; less is better is the sense that it makes filing reports easier by not creating unnecessary complications.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
Ameren	Yes	One report would be great for this standard. While this standard needs simplification and automation, we strongly suggest developing a guideline for reporting rather than enforceable standards.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT acknowledges the difficulty in attempting to present a single form. However, the DSR SDT believes it may be possible to achieve consolidation since the various reports ask repetitive questions. For example, having to provide contact names, telephone numbers, email addresses on multiple forms is not an effective use of time or resources. Similarly, answering the question "Describe the event" or "What steps did you take" on multiple reporting forms is also not effective. The DSR SDT does recongnize that it may not be possible to eliminate reporting to multiple jurisdictional agencies due to legislative or regulatory requirements. The set of results-based standards is intended to provide a 'defense-in-depth' approach to protecting reliability of the bulk power system. While many reports are administrative and are only used to assess compliance with specific requirements, the reporting addressed in this project is focused on providing data needed to support after-the-fact analyses of events, and reporting information needed to maintain situational awareness. As such, the SDT believes that these reporting requirements do need to be enforceable.		
Portland General Electric	Yes	PGE supports the efforts of the Standards Drafting Team on the SAR for Project 2009-01 to consolidate the disturbance and sabotage reporting processes as outlined in the concept paper.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
Dynegy Inc.	Yes	Please keep it short and simple.

Organization	Yes or No	Question 3 Comment
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
ERCOT ISO	Yes	Standardization ensures consistency and relevance of the information received.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
USBR	Yes	The Bureau of Reclamation utilizes a form for tracking unexpected events. This form contains information which the agency considers important for its one reliability improvement program. The form is also used to meet NERC standard requirements for protection system operations analysis. This form contains most of information required by DOE. The SDT should consider requiring the submission of specific information rather than lock responses in one specific form. In this manner the agency would be avoid duplicate forms, one for NERC, the other for agency purposes.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
Central Lincoln	Yes	The existing reporting is needlessly complex. We appreciate the SDT's goal.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
SPS Consulting Group Inc.	Yes	There should have probably been one report all along.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
Duke Energy	Yes	There should only be one report for all functional entities to submit to NERC.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
SERC Reliability Coordinator Sub-committee (RCS)	Yes	There should only be one report for all functional entities.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
Manitoba Hydro	Yes	This is a promising idea, though there would be different requirements for the three countries, this could easily be rectified with "drop down menus". This electronic form could contain a lot of information without distracting clutter as you "tree" down the menu depending on the event that occurred. This could also contain electronic

Organization	Yes or No	Question 3 Comment
		references to information located in Attachment 1-EOP-004 and Threat and Incident Reporting.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We will consider your specific suggestions when we develop the reporting requirements.		
Hydro-Québec TransEnergie (HQT)	Yes	We agree with the concept that there should be one report form for all functional entities (whether located in the US, Canada, Mexico) for use in reporting to NERC. This would provide for a consistent reporting format across the continent.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
Northeast Power Coordinating Council	Yes	We agree with the concept that there should be one report form for all functional entities (whether located in the US, Canada, Mexico) for use in reporting to NERC. This would provide for a consistent reporting format across the continent.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc.	Yes	We agree with the concept that there should be one report form for all functional entities (whether located in the US, Canada, Mexico) for use in reporting to NERC. This would provide for a consistent reporting format across the continent.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
Midwest ISO Standards Collaborators	Yes	We agree with the goal of having a single report form but believe there will be a significant challenge to get varying governmental agencies to agree on single report format.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT acknowledges the difficulty in attempting to present a single form. However, the DSR SDT believes it may be possible to achieve consolidation since the various reports ask repetitive questions. For example, having to provide contact names, telephone numbers, email addresses on multiple forms is not an effective use of time or resources. Similarly, answering the question “Describe the event” or “What steps did you take” on multiple reporting forms is also not effective. The DSR SDT does recongnize that it may not be possible to eliminate reporting to multiple jurisdictional agencies due to legislative or regulatory requirements.		
Edison Mission Marketing & Trading	Yes	With the realization that having a common report form may be difficult to coordinate between differen agencies.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT acknowledges the difficulty in attempting to present a single form. However, the DSR SDT believes it may be possible to achieve consolidation since the various reports ask repetitive questions. For example, having to provide		

Organization	Yes or No	Question 3 Comment
<p>contact names, telephone numbers, email addresses on multiple forms is not an effective use of time or resources. Similarly, answering the question “Describe the event” or “What steps did you take” on multiple reporting forms is also not effective. The DSR SDT does recognize that it may not be possible to eliminate reporting to multiple jurisdictional agencies due to legislative or regulatory requirements.</p>		
Independent Electricity System Operator	Yes	Yes, this will simplify the reporting effort. NERC may forward the reports to the other need-to-know entities.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.</p>		
Electric Market Policy	Yes	Yes, we agree with the concept that there should be one report form for all functional entities (whether located in the US, Canada, Mexico) for use in reporting to NERC.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.</p>		

4. The goal of the DSR SDT is to eliminate the need to file duplicate reports. The standards will specify information required by NERC for reliability. To the extent that this information is also required for other reports (e.g. DOE OE-417), those reports will be allowed to supplement the NERC report in lieu of duplicating the entries in the NERC report. Do you agree with this concept? Please explain your response (yes or no) in the comment area.

Summary Consideration: Most stakeholders agreed with the concept of entities being able to use information from other sources such as the OE-417 form, to supplement the NERC report form. Some thought that duplicate reports were acceptable, as long as the information was not duplicated (if # of customers lost is required on form A, don't ask on forms B & C). Several stakeholders commented on the need for an electronic, one stop reporting tool. This would avoid duplication while ensuring that the information reported goes only to intended recipients. With an electronic, one stop reporting tool, reports can be updated/corrected instantly, without repeating previously submitted information. Some stakeholders cautioned that the OE-417 can change every three years and this should be taken into account when developing an electronic reporting tool. Again, such a reporting tool would need to be vetted and developed to meet reliability needs.

Organization	Yes or No	Question 4 Comment
ERCOT ISO		ERCOT ISO agrees with the concept of eliminating the need to file duplicate reports, but as stated in the Concept Paper, the DOE form (OE-417) is required by law. Based on this, the elimination of EOP-004 (after the fact reporting) is essential, since the OE-417 is mandatory and all-inclusive.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We agree that the OE-417 compiles a baseline set of information for disturbances, however, it does not function as an all-inclusive report of sabotage and cyber security incidents. The DSR SDT certainly seeks to gain efficiencies through the modification of EOP-004 and CIP-001, which may include the elimination of one or both. Further, the OE-417 is only mandatory for US entities.</p>		
Midwest ISO Standards Collaborators	No	It certainly makes sense to eliminate duplication in reporting and to allow supplemental information to be submitted in other reports. However, it does not make sense to require reporting to other governmental agencies through NERC enforceable NERC standards. Those governmental agencies already have legal authority to compel reporting. Again, we support developing a guideline for reporting rather than enforceable standards. The guideline could certainly explain the various reporting requirements and supplemental reporting requirements mentioned in the question without causing the issues we have identified in our comments.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT does not envision a NERC standard mandating submission of reports to DOE, which is mandatory under Public Law for US entities. If the DSR SDT is able to develop a one-stop-shopping electronic form, we plan to develop an</p>		

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

Organization	Yes or No	Question 4 Comment
<p>option to have the report submitted to NERC, DOE and FERC simultaneously. If an entity chooses to submit the report manually, they will then also be responsible for following DOE regulations and other mandatory requirements.</p>		
Consumers Energy Company	No	NERC should either coordinate with DOE for a single reporting process or simply adopt the DOE's standard.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT does not envision a NERC standard mandating submission of reports to DOE, which is mandatory under Public Law for US entities. If the DSR SDT is able to develop a one-stop-shopping electronic form, we plan to develop an option to have the report submitted to NERC, DOE and FERC simultaneously. If an entity chooses to submit the report manually, they will then also be responsible for following DOE regulations and other mandatory requirements. The DOE report does not collect all the information that NERC needs.</p>		
E.ON U.S. LLC	No	<p>Reliability standards are federal law enforced by fines that can reach up to \$1,000,000 per day of violation. There is no reason to deliberately include ambiguity, i.e. "gray areas," in requirements such that registered entities are left unable to determine what it is they must do or refrain from doing to remain compliant. "Sabotage" for the purposes of these standards must be defined.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The intent of the DSR SDT is to develop requirements for reporting that will be clear and unambiguous with respect to compliance issues. Sabotage will be included in the reporting for "impact events", but may not be called 'sabotage' as there are many different interpretations of "sabotage".</p>		
ISO RTO Council Standards Review Committee	No	<p>The concept of eliminating duplication is laudable, but the idea of writing a standard to mandate reporting that involves reporting to governmental areas does not make sense unless NERC will do all of the reporting for the Industry. A governmental agency is as likely as not to change the forms they require which would then mean two different reports (one for NERC and one for the given agency) or that the standard would have to be re-written every time there is a change.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT does not envision a NERC standard mandating submission of reports to DOE, which is mandatory under Public Law for US entities. If the DSR SDT is able to develop a one-stop-shopping electronic form, we plan to develop an option to have the report submitted to NERC, DOE and FERC simultaneously. If an entity chooses to submit the report manually, they will then also be responsible for following DOE regulations and other mandatory requirements.</p>		
Ameren	No	<p>The DOE OE-417 report should not supplement the NERC report due to the fact that the majority of reportable events are defined in/come from the OE-417 report. The NERC reporting form should be based on the OE-417 report and then include additional reporting requirements defined by NERC. However, it does not make sense to require reporting to the governmental agencies through enforceable NERC standards. The governmental agencies already have legal authority to compel reporting.</p>

Organization	Yes or No	Question 4 Comment
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT does not envision a NERC standard mandating submission of reports to DOE, which is mandatory under Public Law for US entities. If the DSR SDT is able to develop a one-stop-shopping electronic form, we plan to develop an option to have the report submitted to NERC, DOE and FERC simultaneously. If an entity chooses to submit the report manually, they will then also be responsible for following DOE regulations and other mandatory requirements.</p>		
SERC Reliability Coordinator Sub-committee (RCS)	No	The requirement should be a single report that satisfies the need for all US governmental agencies as well as NERC and the RRO's.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The intent of the DSR SDT is to develop standards to address the reliability needs for NERC and not governmental agency reporting criteria.</p>		
Western Electricity Coordinating Council	No	This will work well for the USA entities to save us time in re-entering the same information. We believe that FERC and NERC and the Regions should have one common reporting form for North America. The OE-417 is not required by law outside of the United States. Canadian and Mexican entities may feel that US DOE has no jurisdiction in these countries, and therefore no right to required reporting as is stated on the OE-417.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We agree that the OE-417 report is not required for Canadian or Mexican entities. The DSR SDT does not envision a NERC standard mandating submission of reports to DOE. If the DSR SDT is able to develop a one-stop-shopping electronic form, we plan to develop an option to have the report submitted (or not) to NERC, DOE and FERC simultaneously. If an entity chooses to submit the report manually, they will then also be responsible for following DOE regulations and other mandatory requirements.</p>		
American Electric Power	Yes	
Edison Mission Marketing & Trading	Yes	
Exelon	Yes	
Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc.	Yes	
PacifiCorp	Yes	
Platte River Power Authority	Yes	

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting – Project 2009-01

Organization	Yes or No	Question 4 Comment
Arizona Public Service Company	Yes	APS supports eliminating the need to file duplicate reports. This standardized form should generate and send the DOE OE-417 report, totally eliminating duplicate work. Streamline the process.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
Central Hudson Gas & Electric	Yes	Central Hudson agrees with this concept and, as stated in a previous response, recommends that the ability of utilizing the DOE OE-417 to supplement the NERC report be maintained.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
Calpine Corp.	Yes	Clarification, simplicity and the removal of duplicate reporting is beneficial.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
Constellation Power Source Generation	Yes	Constellation agrees with the concept of eliminating the need to file duplicate reports. If the single NERC reporting form is both comprehensive and easy to use, then using a single report should not be an issue. It is essential that all elements of DOE OE-417, and any similar documents, be incorporated into this single report. Not incorporating all elements will result in gaps in reporting for all Registered Entities.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
SPS Consulting Group Inc.	Yes	Duplication is inefficient and casts the whole reporting mechanism in a questionable light.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
We Energies	Yes	However, also evaluate whether or not DOE OE-417 is sufficient in lieu of a NERC report. If additional information is required, duplicate format of DOE-OE-417 with additional NERC information listed at the end of the form.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
Wolverine Power Supply Cooperative, Inc.	Yes	I agree with the concept of minimizing duplication - See previous question 3 for concerns.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

Organization	Yes or No	Question 4 Comment
USBR	Yes	It should be clear what information is to be supplemented. The fewer times the information has to be handled the more efficient the process becomes. If the information exists on a required form, that legal form should be allowed. Also, if the form is already submitted, then reference to it should be sufficient rather than requiring resubmission of the form. That would require handling the information again. As explained in the previous answer, the SDT should recognize that responsible entities have already developed internal reporting processes which utilize forms for consistent responses. Those forms may contain more information than is needed by the new standard to be proposed. The entity should be allowed to submit the internal form or else duplication would be created, which may reduce the effectiveness of an entities reliability improvement program.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT envisions a one-stop-shopping form that allows reports to be saved, revised and resubmitted at a later date without re-entry of data or information. However, as a caution the DSR SDT cannot guarantee the possibility to submit custom forms.</p>		
Lands Energy Consulting	Yes	Less paperwork and fewer requirements to keep in mind during what may be once in a lifetime events are always good.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.</p>		
Luminant	Yes	Luminant agrees with the concept of reducing reporting requirements, but asks the SDT to go even further. In the concept paper, the SDT discussed that information would not be duplicated on the NERC report and the DOE OE-417 report. The concept paper described a process where one report would simply supplement the other, but two reports would still be filed when required. Can the NERC SDT work with the DOE to develop one report to meet the needs of NERC and the DOE?
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We will consult with the DOE to see if one report will meet the reporting needs for NERC and the DOE. NERC reliability needs will take precedence.</p>		
Bonneville Power Administration	Yes	Minimizing the number of reports is a good thing. The concept of actually sharing information should be utilized as much as practical.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.</p>		
Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC	Yes	Oncor agrees that this effort should eliminate file duplication

Organization	Yes or No	Question 4 Comment
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
Bandera Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Yes	One can only assume the number of reports required in this area will continue to increase in terms of scope and to which agency wants this data. The SDT is encouraged to attempt to find a reporting format and scope that does not needlessly duplicate or complicate overall reporting obligations.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We will consult with the DOE and FERC to see if it one report will meet the reporting needs for NERC, FERC and the DOE. NERC reliability needs will take precedence.		
Portland General Electric	Yes	PGE supports reducing the duplication of reporting.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
Dynegy Inc.	Yes	Short and simple should be the goal.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
Duke Energy	Yes	Since the OE-417 is a DOE required report, it must be submitted. Including the OE-417 as part of the NERC electronic form will facilitate reporting to NERC.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We will consult with the DOE to see if it one report will meet the reporting needs for NERC and the DOE. NERC reliability needs will take precedence.		
Central Lincoln	Yes	The existing reporting is needlessly complex. We appreciate the SDT's goal.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
Public Service Enterprise Group Companies	Yes	The PSEG Companies agree with the avoidance of duplicate reports. NERC report forms should not include anything in the DOE form, and NERC Regional report forms should not include anything in the DOE or NERC forms. Hence, a DOE report should not "supplement" a NERC form, but rather replace it unless the NERC form calls for other information for the same reportable incident, and likewise for the DOE - NERC - Regional form structure. DOE forms would be filed with DOE, NERC and the Regional Entity where the event originated. NERC forms would be filed with NERC and the region where the event originated and the Regional form filed only with the Region. In designing the NERC and Regional forms, the need to file multiple reports should be minimized, and in no event should any of the three (DOE, NERC, Region) forms contain

Organization	Yes or No	Question 4 Comment
		duplicative information requests.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We will consider your comment in the development of the reporting structure / forms.		
Manitoba Hydro	Yes	This could be easily incorporated into the electronic form. You could be prompted for information required immediately, and notified for information that could be entered later. This form could contain all the enterable data that all agencies could require. If the form is live and on line, all entities could be notified (depending on the entries) of an going event immediately. Form could be web based similar to ARS program or even integrated into the ARS program.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We will consider your comment in the development of the reporting structure / forms.		
FirstEnergy	Yes	We agree that the simplification and consistency of reporting will improve the reporting of this information. We support the drafting team's efforts in this area and hope that all regulatory agencies will as well. However, as we have mentioned in our other comments, the reporting requirements should not be in a reliability standard unless they are proven to be necessary to maintain an Adequate Level of Reliability of the BES. Reporting of these events should be required by NERC in arenas outside of the standards.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The information provided in the reports is either used after the fact for analyses or used to maintain situational awareness, and is needed for reliability.		
MRO's NERC Standards Review Subcommittee	Yes	We agree with the concept to eliminate duplicate reports. However, we are concerned with the reference of the DOE OE-417 report being a "supplement" of the NERC report rather than "accepted" as the NERC report.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. Future NERC reliability reporting needs may not totally align with DOE report information. Therefore, the OE-417 report would not necessarily substitute for the NERC report. The DOE Reporting Form OE 417 is currently mandatory by Public for US entities.		
Hydro-Québec TransEnergie (HQT)	Yes	We agree with the objective of eliminating duplicate reporting. However, EOP-004 currently allows substitution of DOE OE-417 in place of the NERC Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit and Preliminary Disturbance Report. As suggested in the Concept Paper, entities meeting the criteria of OE-417 are still obligated to file a report with DOE. Given that and the fact that CIP-001 requires no actual reporting, it is not clear where duplication exists today. We agree with the recommendation to eliminate the need for filing duplicate reports such as the DOE form OE-417. There is no benefit with regard to CIP-001 in filing separate reports. Duplicate reports introduce the potential for incomplete information to be supplied to responsible parties.

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

Organization	Yes or No	Question 4 Comment
		Removing jurisdictional agencies from the Standard, and having NERC provide either query or situational awareness to those agencies being considered, might not be easy to achieve. There is an obligation under law to require entities to report to the DOE on the OE-417 form as amended or modified. This might drive the “omitted” agencies to have reporting laws enacted as well.
Northeast Power Coordinating Council	Yes	<p>We agree with the objective of eliminating duplicate reporting. However, EOP-004 currently allows substitution of DOE OE-417 in place of the NERC Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit and Preliminary Disturbance Report. As suggested in the Concept Paper, entities meeting the criteria of OE-417 are still obligated to file a report with DOE. Given that and the fact that CIP-001 requires no actual reporting, it is not clear where duplication exists today. We agree with the recommendation to eliminate the need for filing duplicate reports such as the DOE form OE-417. There is no benefit with regard to CIP-001 in filing separate reports. Duplicate reports introduce the potential for incomplete information to be supplied to responsible parties.</p> <p>Removing jurisdictional agencies from the Standard, and having NERC provide either query or situational awareness to those agencies being considered, might not be easy to achieve. There is an obligation under law to require entities to report to the DOE on the OE-417 form as amended or modified. This might drive the “omitted” agencies to have reporting laws enacted as well.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT has discussed the possibility of consolidating CIP-001 and EOP-004 to create a single reporting standard. FERC directives require modifications to the standards which also may impose additional reporting requirements (see paragraph 470 of Order 693).</p> <p>We concur with your comments regarding the legal obligations to submit certain reports. The DSR SDT is attempting to consult with appropriate governmental agencies to address this.</p>		
BGE	Yes	We agree with this approach, as long as the latest version of the DOE OE-417 form is fully incorporated in the new single-reporting form, so that it maintains its credibility with the DOE.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The intent is to maintain credibility with the DOE reporting requirements.</p>		
Independent Electricity System Operator	Yes	We support this concept since it works well for those entities that are not required to file reports with the US agencies, e.g. the DOE.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.</p>		
Electric Market Policy	Yes	Yes, we agree with the objective of eliminating duplicate reporting; however, EOP-004 currently allows

Organization	Yes or No	Question 4 Comment
		substitution of DOE OE-417 in place of the NERC Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit and Preliminary Disturbance Report. As suggested in the Concept Paper, entities meeting the criteria of OE-417 are still obligated to file a report with DOE. Given that and the fact that CIP-001 requires no actual reporting, it is not clear where duplication exists today.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT has discussed the possibility of consolidating CIP-001 and EOP-004 to create a single reporting standard. FERC directives require modifications to the standards which also may impose additional reporting requirements (see paragraph 470 of Order 693).</p>		

5. In its discussion concerning sabotage, the DSR SDT has determined that the spectrum of all sabotage-type events is not well understood throughout the industry. In an effort to provide clarity and guidance, the DSR SDT developed the concept of an impact event. By developing impact events, it allows us to identify situations in the “gray area” where sabotage is not clearly defined. Other types of events may need to be reported for situational awareness and trend identification. Do you agree with this concept? Please explain your response (yes or no) in the comment area.

Summary Consideration: The majority of stakeholders agreed with the concept of impact events. Some stakeholders felt that the introduction of impact events increased the risk that some items will go unreported. However, most felt that impact events would dramatically increase the number of reports being submitted, and it would be difficult to separate important information from background noise. Several respondents felt that the SDT ignored the FERC Directive, and did not define sabotage and provide guidance as to the triggering events that would cause an entity to report a sabotage event. Many respondents supplied the SDT with their own definition of “Sabotage”. The DSR SDT believes that the concept of impact events and the specificity of what needs to be reported in the standard will be an equally efficient and effective means of addressing the FERC directive regarding sabotage. Some stakeholders felt that impact events add another layer of uncertainty to the reporting. Even with the switch from sabotage to impact events, several felt that “intent” was still key to determining reportability.

Organization	Yes or No	Question 5 Comment
ERCOT ISO		ERCOT ISO recognizes the risks associated with “gray areas” not being clarified. While “gray areas” pose compliance risk due to differing interpretations, a risk remains that some items will go unreported. A more prescriptive approach raises an even greater risk of events not being reported. People will not report events that are not specifically listed, and will not use judgment in determining the need for reporting.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We agree that a more prescriptive approach could pose greater risks but we will attempt to clarify and define an approach to assist the industry and stakeholders for reporting impact events.</p>		
Constellation Power Source Generation	No	Although defining an impact event would bring clarity to defining sabotage events, adding another situation would further complicate things. Furthermore, the examples of impact events used all fall under the Sabotage category in the Threat and Incident Reporting Guideline. Constellation Power Generation suggests the SDT further clarifies the items in the Sabotage category to ensure all grey area situations are included. Clarification is also needed in how a Cyber Security Incident (CIP-008) would map into the categories of Disturbance/Impact Events (CIP-001). To that point, Constellation Power Generation questions whether cyber related incidents should fall under the spectrum of sabotage type events, or remain separate and be incorporated in the CIP revisions. Having cyber related incidents separate from other sabotage events would

Organization	Yes or No	Question 5 Comment
		provide the clarity and guidance that the DSR SDT is striving to achieve.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We are suggesting the term “Impact Event” be substituted to include all events that would impact the reliability of the BES. Events now included in reporting requirements that do not impact the reliability of the BES would be excluded from the reporting unless the DSR SDT clarifies why it should be included and under what specific instances or examples.</p>		
Duke Energy	No	As FERC ordered in Order No. 693, the drafting team should further define sabotage and provide guidance as to the triggering events that would cause an entity to report a sabotage event. Suggested definition: “Sabotage - the malicious destruction of, or damage to assets of the electric industry, with the intention of disrupting or adversely affecting the reliability of the electric grid for the purposes of weakening the critical infrastructure of our nation.”
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The SDR SDT struggles with terms that deal with deterring “intent” which may not be determined until after a lengthy investigation. We will continue to discuss for inclusion in a future draft of this project. The DSR SDT believes that the concept of impact events and the specificity of what needs to be reported in the standard will be an equally efficient and effective means of addressing the FERC directive regarding sabotage.</p>		
Kootenai Electric Cooperative	No	Impact events seems to add another layer of uncertainty to the reporting. Define a transmission line. Our transmission lines have very little impact on the grid. It is possible for our lines to cause a local area outage on our transmission provider - but neither is of national security interest or even regional interest. There is no power flow going on across the lines other than local power delivery supply. It seems you run more risk of losing the important reports in the snow of reporting - similar to what we have to avoid on our SCADA systems for our operators to see the key information.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT understands your concern and this was discussed a great deal. It is our belief that criteria of the “impact events” to be reported will be properly defined and discriminated from local events that have no impact on the reliability of the BES.</p>		
SERC Reliability Coordinator Sub-committee (RCS)	No	Impact events that do not affect reliability should not be reported.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT agrees but a balance must be further explored to meet industry and regulatory requirements specifically under FERC Order 693.</p>		
Luminant	No	Luminant would prefer to report disturbances and sabotage events. The reporting of impact events could lead to unnecessary reporting. A definition of an “impact event” may be even more confusing than sabotage

Organization	Yes or No	Question 5 Comment
		events.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT understands your concern and this was discussed a great deal. It is our belief that criteria of the “impact events” to be reported will be properly defined and discriminated from local events that have no impact on the reliability of the BES. We are suggesting the term “Impact Event” be substituted to include only events that would impact the reliability of the BES. Events now included in reporting requirements that do not impact reliability of the BES would be excluded from the reporting unless the DSR SDT clarifies why it should be included and under what specific instances or examples.</p>		
Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc.	No	<p>Physical and cyber events must be investigated before a determination of sabotage or impact event can be made. Impact events should define or clarify the circumstances that would or could affect reliability. Reportable items should be based on impact to reliability, not on ‘newsworthy’ events or to gather information for trending. It is the law enforcement industry’s responsibility to make a determination of “sabotage” or other. This determination cannot definitively be made by industry (operating) personnel. If NERC's definition is expanded for CIP-001 and/or EOP-004, responsibility and timing of reporting needs to be addressed so that appropriate agencies conduct the investigation and assessment. Operating personnel need to remain focused on the primary responsibility of mitigating the effects.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT struggles with terms that deal with determining “intent” which may not be determined until after a lengthy investigation. We will continue to discuss these ideas for inclusion in a future draft of this project. Timing of the reporting process will be further clarified based upon your comments and those in the industry that have voiced similar concerns.</p>		
MRO's NERC Standards Review Subcommittee	No	<p>Rather than attempting to define a new term (impact event), we suggest that the concept of impact event be replaced with further defining sabotage and providing guidance on trigger events (impact event) that would cause an entity to report.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We will continue to discuss the FERC “Clarification of sabotage” directive and seek further guidance to meet this directive. The term sabotage has created conflict in its meaning among stakeholders as to when it is determined and by whom and how long an investigation would take to make that call on the intent of the saboteur. The DSR SDT is reviewing what a reportable disturbance actually is and sabotage may be a sub component of a reportable disturbance event.</p>		
Lands Energy Consulting	No	<p>The level of complexity described will overwhelm the 20-200 employee utilities that have yet to see - and will never see - the kind of sabotage event that scares the Department of Homeland Security.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT does not intend for the reporting of impact events to overwhelm smaller entities. If events do not affect the reliability of the BES, then it is our intent that they will be excluded from reporting requirements under our proposal. We will attempt to clarify and define an approach to assist the industry and stakeholders for reporting impact events. FERC cautioned the</p>		

Organization	Yes or No	Question 5 Comment
industry that acts of sabotage may be “tested” on smaller entities and ultimately on larger entities.		
ISO RTO Council Standards Review Committee	No	The nature of the fact that “gray areas” exists preclude the idea of using a standard to report; particularly a standard for the vague topic of motivation such as sabotage events and the more defined disturbance events.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We will attempt to clarify and define an approach to assist the industry and stakeholders for reporting impact events.		
Edison Mission Marketing & Trading	No	There are too many special circumstances to try and capture. I feel this would be best delivered as a guideline.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We are suggesting the term “Impact Event” be substituted to include only events that would impact the reliability of the BES. Events now included in reporting requirements that do not impact reliability of the BES would be excluded from the reporting unless the DSR SDT clarifies why it should be included and under what specific instances or examples.		
Exelon	No	We agree with the direction to identify impact events examples that would trigger reporting and not be limited to sabotage reporting only. It is important to note that when an incident occurs, some level of investigation is required before a determination can be made as to the event is sabotage or not. The focus should be on reporting events when they occur and allow follow-up investigations to make the sabotage determination. That being said, care must be taken in the development of any list of impact events so that it doesn't become or is misinterpreted to be a definitive list. Therefore if it is not on the list, it is not reportable.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We concur and plan to allow reports to be submitted, edited and re-submitted in the one-stop-shopping reporting tool. We are suggesting the term “Impact Event” be substituted for sabotage and include only events that would impact the reliability of the BES. Events now included in reporting requirements that do not impact reliability of the BES would be excluded from the reporting unless the DSR SDT clarifies why it should be included and under what specific instances or examples.		
Midwest ISO Standards Collaborators	No	We agree with the idea of identifying impact events but do not support the requirement for these to be always reported through the hierarchical structure identified in question 2. If an impact event only affects one entity, that entity should have the reporting requirement.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSRSDT will continue to explore the benefits and weaknesses of the hierarchy reporting structure.		
Hydro-Québec TransEnergie (HQT)	No	We believe that physical and cyber events must be investigated before a determination of sabotage or impact event can be made. The purpose of the NERC Standards is to maintain the reliability of the BES. Therefore,

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

Organization	Yes or No	Question 5 Comment
		<p>impact events should define or clarify the circumstances that would or could affect reliability. Reportable items should be based on impact to reliability, not on 'newsworthy' events or to gather information for trending. It is the law enforcement industry's responsibility to make a determination of "sabotage" or other. This determination cannot definitively be made by industry personnel, there is no expertise or time to investigate causes. It is the industry's job to mitigate effects. Examples would help provide for better guidance/direction. Industry examples would be welcomed to help reinforce developed internal processes for compliance.</p>
Northeast Power Coordinating Council	No	<p>We believe that physical and cyber events must be investigated before a determination of sabotage or impact event can be made. The purpose of the NERC Standards is to maintain the reliability of the BES. Therefore, impact events should define or clarify the circumstances that would or could affect reliability. Reportable items should be based on impact to reliability, not on 'newsworthy' events or to gather information for trending. It is the law enforcement industry's responsibility to make a determination of "sabotage" or other. This determination cannot definitively be made by industry personnel, there is no expertise or time to investigate causes. It is the industry's job to mitigate effects. Examples would help provide for better guidance/direction. Industry examples would be welcomed to help reinforce developed internal processes for compliance.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The SDR SDT struggles with terms that deal with determining "intent" which may not be determined until after a lengthy investigation. We will continue to discuss issues with sabotage for inclusion in a future draft of this project. Timing of the reporting process will be further clarified based upon your comments and those in the industry that have voiced similar concerns.</p>		
American Electric Power	Yes	
Calpine Corp.	Yes	
PacifiCorp	Yes	
Platte River Power Authority	Yes	
Central Lincoln	Yes	<p>An act of vandalism may have impact. An act of sabotage may not be impactful alone, but may be part of a wider coordinated attack. Dictionary definitions speaking of "intent" are not helpful in this regard, since acts of vandalism and sabotage are both generally committed intentionally. Saboteurs, though, work for a higher cause. That cause may be political, social, environmental, etc. We ask that the SDT look beyond dictionary definitions in developing a definition of sabotage.</p>

Organization	Yes or No	Question 5 Comment
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The SDR SDT struggles with terms that deal with determining “intent”. The term sabotage has created conflict in its meaning among stakeholders as to when its determined and by whom and how long an investigation would take to make that call on the intent of the saboteur. We will strive to meet this challenge with the input on the right language from government agencies and industry experience expertise.</p>		
Bonneville Power Administration	Yes	BPA agrees with providing an industry-wide definition and guideline. We do NOT agree with requiring reports for every instance of every activity. If your definition is good, you'll get what is needed and not much chaff.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.</p>		
Central Hudson Gas & Electric	Yes	Central Hudson agrees with this concept, particularly if the reporting hierarchy through the RC is implemented in order to better identify trends.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSRSDT will continue to explore the benefits and weaknesses of the hierarchy reporting structure.</p>		
Wolverine Power Supply Cooperative, Inc.	Yes	I agree with the concept of focusing on impact instead of the type of event (sabotage, accident, vandalism, etc.)I hope that the reporting proposal that comes out of this project will clearly make a separation between true impact events that must be reported per the standards (enforceable), vs. "other" information that may be (electively - not enforceable) reported, per some set of guidelines.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We agree reportable items should be based on impact to reliability and with other commenters that expressed a desire to avoid reporting on ‘newsworthy’ events but to gather meaningful information for trending. We are suggesting the term “Impact Event” be substituted for sabotage to include only events that would impact the reliability of the BES.</p>		
Bandera Electric Cooperative, Inc.	Yes	In principle, I agree with this concept. Would like for the SDT to pursue this further and seek additional comments at that time.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We will seek further comments on the concept and will prepare the beginnings of the first draft soon.</p>		
Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC	Yes	Oncor agrees that there are no broadly used guidance documents that detail how an event may be accurately defined.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We agree that further industry guidance of a clear and understandable standard should be sought under the new Results Based approach. We will attempt to clarify and define an approach to assist the industry and stakeholders in reporting</p>		

Organization	Yes or No	Question 5 Comment
impact events.		
Portland General Electric	Yes	PGE supports the DSR SDT's efforts to bring clarity and guidance to the spectrum of sabotage-type events.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.		
FirstEnergy	Yes	The concept paper makes good progress in this area and the drafting team is on the right track, and agree that better clarity needs to be developed surrounding sabotage events. However, some of the examples stated in the paper are too vague and do not address extenuating circumstances or reasons for the events. One example sighted in the paper is "Bolts removed from transmission line structures." This statement may be too broad. For instance, if the bolts are removed from the tower and the organization is not experiencing a labor dispute, it could be considered a sabotage event with wide area implications. However, if the organization is in the middle of a labor dispute, this would be vandalism and would most likely not be of a wide area concern. Also, the number and location of towers affected could be an important determination related to the risk the event imposes on the Bulk Electric System.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We concur with your comments that the number and location of the towers affected may have a "local" vs "wide area" concern. However, under the "impact event" reporting that we are proposing, both scenarios above should be reported as impact events as long as it affects the BES.		
Public Service Enterprise Group Companies	Yes	The PSEG Companies agree with the concept, but reserve judgment on the descriptions of the impacts. There is clearly a need to better define what constitutes a sabotage incident versus common theft or vandalism. Moreover, where it may be impossible to determine if any given incident (e.g., several loose bolts on a transmission tower cross brace could be sabotage or could be human error in construction) falls within sabotage, a registered entity should not be second guessed in an audit if the registered entity determines not to report. Excessive unnecessary reporting can mask real incidents.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT agrees with clearly defining a reportable impact versus common theft. Concern over reporting an incident and the audit process are within the discussions of the DSR SDT and will be fully explored to assist with the 1st Draft. The ability to identify trends could be very important compared to isolated incidents that do not impact the BES. Every effort to explore this balance of reporting will be taken into account.		
SPS Consulting Group Inc.	Yes	The term sabotage was always too narrow a concept for the standards. At times, questionable activities are not confirmed as sabotage events until well after the fact, forcing the registered entity to speculate on whether or not to report an activity that may not be a confirmed sabotage event at the time, and hence encounter another silly violation based on imprecise terminology.

Organization	Yes or No	Question 5 Comment
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We are suggesting the term “Impact Event” be substituted to include all events that would impact the reliability of the BES. Events now included in reporting requirements that do not impact reliability of the BES would be excluded from the reporting unless the DSR SDT clarifies why it should be included and under what specific instances or examples. Tightening the reporting criteria of impact events could possibly address the concern expressed by a “violation based on imprecise terminology.”</p>		
USBR	Yes	<p>There should be a clear distinction between a cyber event and a cyber event that has a material impact on the reliability of the bulk electric system. Not all CIP-008 events will carry such a distinction. That being said, CIP 008 cannot be completely incorporated in this process. Denying access to a cyber asset is noteworthy under CIP008 but may not pose a threat to the reliability of the bulk electric system. Consider recognizing the impact on the bulk electric system when modifying definitions of adding the bulk electric system description to the definitions. This will help to clarify that disturbances, as discussed in this effort, are situations that produce an abnormal condition on the electric power system, not necessarily on ancillary or supporting systems, such as SCADA systems or the water-related systems at hydroelectric dams.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We are suggesting in our discusssion to consolidate the location of reporting into one standard. The industry has demonstrated by comments that it favors streamlining the reporting process to achieve a “one stop shop” approach. We will continue to explore the possibilities to achieve the best results for all stakeholders. A discussion of advantages /disadvantages will continue to discover options and alternatives with input from all stakeholders.</p>		
Western Electricity Coordinating Council	Yes	<p>This will help eliminate regional differences in sabotage reporting. The definition should be broad enough so it covers new types of sabotage that may evolve. Event analysis facilitates situational awareness and if it requires further investigation regarding developing patterns and severity, it should be handled by law enforcement if need be.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT will continue to explore the “Impact Event” definition to allow for new types of events. Event analysis is clearly a goal of reporting as is situational awareness and hopefully this project will enhance the understanding and clearly define obligations to all stakeholders.</p>		
Manitoba Hydro	Yes	<p>Though there are some specific events already included in this new definition, more could be added to dissolve specific “gray areas” and as new ones come up. Again these examples could be added into the electronic form and could contain a large data base which would be available depending on the event that occurred.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.</p>		

Consideration of Comments on Concept Paper for Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting — Project 2009-01

Organization	Yes or No	Question 5 Comment
BGE	Yes	We agree that "the spectrum of all sabotage-type events is not well understood throughout the industry"; however, we feel that the proposed concept of an "Impact Event" falls short of clarifying what constitutes such events. We believe that "Impact Events" needs further clarification to eliminate "gray areas" and to provide more reporting consistency between entities.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT will continue to clarify the impact events concept and eliminate “gray areas” while including language to give clarity to the reporting process.</p>		
Dynergy Inc.	Yes	We agree with the concept but please provide specific examples. Also, please consider whether there are any penalties for misinterpreting an incident, who would determine if an event was a threat, and whether this could result in over reporting non-threats.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT may include specific examples of impact events and types of reportable events in the 1st draft of the standard (or in supplemental guidance) to help illustrate reportable criteria.</p>		
Consumers Energy Company	Yes	We agree with the concept, however, based on the information provided, it may be too vague to be of value. Terms such as “potential” and “significant” can be subjective and therefore provide little direction. We would like to see something more specific. Also, inclusion of the destruction of BES assets may be too inclusive and needs to be restricted to BES assets that will cause a specific level of impact on reliability.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The SDR SDT struggles with terms that deal with determining “potential” and “significant”. Specific examples of criteria is being explored and discussed. We will strive to meet this challenge with the input on the right language from government agencies and industry experience expertise. Your suggestion of restricting to BES assets that will cause a specific level of impact on reliability will be discussed with the DSR SDT.</p>		
Independent Electricity System Operator	Yes	We agree with the general concept. However, we suggest that the classification of “events” to be compatible if not identical to those which need to be reported in real time as required in CIP-001, for otherwise it will create confusion and unnecessary, extra work. Also, this proposal appears to focus on the sabotage-type events only but the SAR deals with both sabotage and other disturbances (e.g. emergency type of events) reporting. A parallel type of “impact event” is needed for non-sabotage-type of events.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT notes that impacts events include both sabotage and non-sabotage types of events and these events include CIP-001 events.</p>		
Electric Market Policy	Yes	We believe that physical and cyber events must be investigated before a determination of sabotage or impact

Organization	Yes or No	Question 5 Comment
		event can be made.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We agree that sabotage requires investigation. The term “impact event” was developed to allow immediate reporting of events based on impact to the BES rather than intent.</p>		
We Energies	Yes	We would prefer to refer to all sabotage, vandalism, cyber attacks, and other criminal behavior as impact events. Focusing more on the event's impact on reliability and its ramifications on the systems seems to be more useful than to try to determine the intent of the perpetrator.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT agrees with your assessment and will pursue the clarity and criteria examples to achieve reporting.</p>		

6. If you are aware of any regional reporting requirements beyond the scope of CIP-001, CIP-008 and EOP-004 please provide them here.

Summary Consideration: Several commenters provided information on regional reporting. The SDT will consider whether these should be included in the continent-wide standard. These include:

1. NPCC maintains a document and reporting form (Document C-17 - Procedures for Monitoring and Reporting Critical Operating Tool Failures) that outlines the reporting requirements, responsibilities, and obligations of NPCC Reliability Coordinators in response to unforeseen critical operating tool failures.
2. For other events that do not meet the OE-417 and EOP-004 reporting criteria, ReliabilityFirst expects to receive notification of any events involving a sustained outage of multiple BES facilities (buses, lines, generators, and/or transformers, etc.) that are in close proximity (electrically) to one another and occur in a short time frame (such as a few minutes).
3. WECC sets its loss of load criteria for disturbance reporting at 200 MW rather than the 300 MW in the NERC reporting form.
4. SERC and RFC are developing additional requirements at this time.
5. We suggest that reporting be based on impact to reliability, not on 'newsworthy' events. We therefore do not agree with such regional efforts and would prefer a continent wide reporting requirements.
6. MISO RC (MISO OP-023) and RFC (PRC-002-RFC-01).

Organization	Question 6 Comment
Central Hudson Gas & Electric	Although not beyond the scope of these standards, NPCC maintains a document and reporting form (Document C-17 - Procedures for Monitoring and Reporting Critical Operating Tool Failures) that outlines the reporting requirements, responsibilities, and obligations of NPCC RCs in response to unforeseen critical operating tool failures.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT will examine regional reporting criteria and requirements to determine whether it should be included in a continent wide standard.</p>	
Exelon	At the 2010 RFC Spring Workshop the following disturbance reporting Criteria was rolled out: All events that are required to be reported by the OE-417 and EOP-004 criteria will use those published procedures. For other events that do not meet the OE-417 and EOP-004 reporting criteria, ReliabilityFirst expects to receive notification of any events involving a sustained outage of multiple BES facilities (buses, lines, generators, and/or transformers, etc.) that are in close proximity (electrically) to one another and occur in a short time frame (such as a few minutes).

Organization	Question 6 Comment
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT will examine regional reporting criteria and requirements to determine whether it should be included in a continent wide standard.</p>	
Lands Energy Consulting	I believe WECC sets its loss of load criteria for disturbance reporting at 200 MW rather than the 300 MW in the NERC reporting form.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT will consider regional criteria when developing reporting thresholds.</p>	
Edison Mission Marketing & Trading	I don't know of any.
Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc.	NERC's SDT effort requires a clear, consistent, and comprehensive continent-wide approach, thus mitigating any need for regional reporting requirements.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The SDR SDT feels in many instances that region specific standards may be needed. However, the SDT will provide a clear reporting standard that can be consistently followed continent-wide.</p>	
MRO's NERC Standards Review Subcommittee	No Comment.
Duke Energy	None
Bandera Electric Cooperative, Inc.	No.
Manitoba Hydro	No.CIP-001 contains references to NERC and the DOE.CIP-008 makes exclusions for facilities regulated by US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. It also contains references to ES ISAC (Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center).EOP-004 contains reference to NERC and DOE. There is no reference to Homeland Security, FBI, etc or to Canadian equivalent references in any of these Standards. When NERC is notified of an event, it is likely other organizations will have to be notified. There should be some sort of consistency to cover all these Standards and all notifiable parties at a NERC Standards level.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT absolutely understands your provided comment and have had detailed conversations surrounding “who” should be notified and “when”. Most importantly, a level of consistency should exist when reporting disturbances and sabotage events negatively impacting the BES.</p>	

Organization	Question 6 Comment
Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC	Oncor is not aware of any regional reporting requirements beyond the scope of CIP-001, CIP-008 and EOP-004.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.	
Dynergy Inc.	Please consider MISO RTO-OP-023.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT will examine regional reporting criteria and requirements to determine whether it should be included in a continent wide standard. Please provide a copy of the subject document.	
Electric Market Policy	SERC and RFC are developing additional requirements at this time. We suggest that reporting be based on impact to reliability, not on 'newsworthy' events. We therefore do not agree with such regional efforts and would prefer a continent wide reporting requirements.
Hydro-Québec TransEnergie (HQT)	
Northeast Power Coordinating Council	
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT will examine regional reporting criteria and requirements to determine whether it should be included in a continent wide standard.	
Public Service Enterprise Group Companies	The PSEG Companies believe that RFC is developing a regional disturbance reporting requirement for events not meeting the criteria of current DOE and NERC reports.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT will examine regional reporting criteria and requirements to determine whether it should be included in a continent wide standard.	
Western Electricity Coordinating Council	There is a need to learn what reporting requirements are required by the Mexican and Canadian entities.
Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT is comprised of international members and we are currently researching requirements that Mexico and Canada may have.	
SERC Reliability Coordinator Sub-committee (RCS)	We are not aware of any regional reporting requirements beyond the requirements of CIP-001, CIP-008 and EOP-004. However, the SERC RRO has shared a list of events of interest that it would like to be made aware of to maintain situation

Organization	Question 6 Comment
	awareness.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The SDR SDT feels there will always be a need for the Regional Entities to be kept aware of certain “hot topic” issues. However, it is the SDT’s intent to provide clear and concise reporting requirements for events impacting the BES.</p>	
BGE	We are not aware of any regional requirements beyond the scope of CIP-001, CIP-008 and EOP-004.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.</p>	
We Energies	What is meant by beyond the scope of the referenced standards? We Energies also has reporting obligations with the MISO RC (MISO OP-023), RFC (PRC-002-RFC-01), and the Wisconsin and Michigan Public Service Commissions.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT will examine regional reporting criteria and requirements to determine whether it should be included in a continent wide standard. Please provide a copy of the subject reporting requirements for the SDT to review.</p>	

7. If you have any other comments on the Concepts Paper that you haven't already provided in response to the previous questions, please provide them here.

Summary Consideration: Several stakeholders provided comments in this section. Some stakeholders suggested that the SDT has gone beyond its approved scope to “further define sabotage and provide guidance as to the triggering events that would cause an entity to report a sabotage event.” Further, there is no requirement to create a Reporting Standard to define sabotage. The SDT contends that the development of impact events and the reporting requirements for them will provide the clarity sought in the directive.

Other stakeholders suggested that the SDT should seek to retire sanctionable requirements that require event reporting in favor of guidelines for reporting.

Several commenters suggested that the introduction of impact events actually expands the reporting requirements. It should be noted that the list of impact events is expected to be explicit as to who is to report what to whom and within certain timelines.

Several stakeholders provided input as to what they believed an electronic reporting tool should contain:

- 1 If the decision is made to go to a single reporting form, it should be developed to cover any foreseeable event.
- 2 The SDT should work toward a single form, located in a central location, and submitted to one common entity (NERC)
- 3 Reports should be forwarded to the ES-ISAC, not NERC, as the infrastructure is already in place for efficient sharing with Federal agencies, with the regional entities and with neighboring asset owners. Reports should flow to all affected entities in parallel, rather than series (timing issues).

Commenters also suggested that the SDT should consider the impacts of the reporting requirements on the small, and very small utilities.

Organization	Question 7 Comment
BGE	<p>1. If we move to a "one size fits all" single reporting form, it is important that the form be properly developed to cover any foreseeable event, which appears to be the intent of the DSR SDT, as outlined on page 4 of the concept document. Such an approach should also incorporate a single point of contact for reporting information, to avoid any confusion.</p> <p>2. We would like clarification that any proposed CIP-008-related reporting requirement (including any linked reporting requirement between CIP-008 and CIP-001) is only applicable in situations where the incident/event involves a registered entity's Critical Cyber Asset.</p>

Organization	Question 7 Comment
	<p>Response (Questions 3&6): The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The drafting team will explore clarification that any proposed CIP-008 related reporting requirement between CIP-008 and CIP-001 is only applicable where the incident/event involves a registered entity’s CCA. Note that CIP-002 through CIP-009 are undergoing revision under project 2008-06 – Order 706 SDT. Note that the current CIP-008 has a reporting requirement to the ES-ISAC only.</p>
Electric Market Policy	<p>a. NERC should focus efforts on developing <u>specific event reporting criteria</u> and not base the requirement on the definition of the term ‘sabotage’ but on the reporting criteria itself.</p> <p>b. The “opportunities for efficiency” discussed in the Concept Paper would be best achieved by focusing on those items that are necessary to <u>maintain the reliability of the Bulk Electric System</u>. If there are elements that need to be reported that, do not support this objective, than that reporting should not be required in reliability standards.</p>
Hydro-Québec TransEnergie (HQT)	<p>a. NERC should focus efforts on developing specific event reporting criteria and not base the requirement on the definition of the term ‘sabotage’, but on the reporting criteria itself. See comments above.</p> <p>b. The “opportunities for efficiency” discussed in the Concept Paper would be best achieved by focusing on those items that are necessary to maintain the reliability of the Bulk Electric System. If there are elements that need to be reported that do not support this objective, then that reporting should not be required in reliability standards. Consider making NERC the distributor of reports to other agencies. We recognize that the key is to simplify reporting to a single form, and to the extent possible, to one agency. “Front line” reliability personnel must have the “timely” knowledge to know when a situation warrants local, area, regional, or national involvement. Finally, the SDT should keep in mind the fact that Canadian stakeholders might have some difference in the way reports are made to Security Agencies.</p>
Northeast Power Coordinating Council	<p>a. NERC should focus efforts on developing specific event reporting criteria and <u>not</u> base the requirement on the definition of the term ‘sabotage’, but on the reporting criteria itself. See comments above</p> <p>b. The “opportunities for efficiency” discussed in the Concept Paper would be best achieved by focusing on those items that are absolutely necessary to maintain the reliability of the Bulk Electric System. If there are elements that need to be reported that do not support this objective, then that reporting should not be required in reliability standards. Consider making NERC the distributor of reports to other agencies. We recognize that the key is to simplify reporting to a single form, and to the extent possible, to one agency. “Front line” reliability personnel must have the “timely” knowledge to know when a situation warrants local, area, regional, or national involvement.</p>
	<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT agrees to focus efforts to specific event reporting criteria. SDT believes that by reporting material risks to the Bulk Electrical System using the impact event categorization it will be easier to get the relevant information for mitigation, awareness, and tracking, not based on the requirement of defining “sabotage”. The SDT believes that it is the submitter’s responsibility to submit OE-417 forms to the DOE, as stated by Public Law for US entities. The DSR SDT does recognize that it may not be possible to eliminate</p>

Organization	Question 7 Comment
<p>reporting to multiple jurisdictional agencies due to legislative or regulatory requirements.</p>	
<p>SPS Consulting Group Inc.</p>	<p>Again, please consider the unique scope of the entities to which these standards are to comply. Don't dump all the requirements on all the applicable entities and perpetuate the current practice of forcing them to parse the requirements into what is logical or illogical from their perspective. The drafting team should have the expertise to do this. Identify which requirements apply to which applicable entity.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT will take into consideration what registered entities and thresholds are to be included in the revised standard(s) based on the SAR. The DSR SDT will establish the “requirements necessary for users, owners, and operators of the Bulk-Power-System” as stated in FERC Order 693 and the difference in reporting of events on the BES, as stated in the Purpose statement of EOP-004-1.</p>	
<p>ERCOT ISO</p>	<p>All references to CIP-008 should be removed and we reassert that physical and cyber reporting should be separate. There is documentation available from the CIPC that the drafting team considered CIP-001 related physical sabotage reporting and specified cyber incident reporting requirements in CIP-008.ERCOT ISO requests the DSR SDT to continue to improve its guidelines and to post those guidelines for all to use, but not to create sanctionable standards whose good intentions could result in unintended adverse consequences for the Industry. ERCOT ISO also suggests that all reporting forms and guidance should be located in a central, easily accessible location, eliminating confusion and simplify reporting for system operators thereby directly enhancing reliability during system events. The industry would benefit from a central location or link on the NERC website containing all reporting forms.</p>
<p>Response: The intent was to look at the posted “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting” and ask the industry if the DSR SDT should consider existing guidelines for possible inclusion into the yet to be written requirement(s). The DSR SDT has not determined at this time what bright line will be used for the yet to be drafted Standard(s). The DSR SDT will take into consideration your comment on keeping cyber and physical events separate. We are suggesting in our discussion to consolidate the location of reporting into one standard. The industry has demonstrated by its comments that it prefers that the reporting process be streamlined to achieve a “one stop shop” approach. We will continue to explore the possibilities to achieve the best results for all stakeholders. A discussion of advantages /disadvantages will continue to discover options and alternatives with input from all stakeholders.</p>	
<p>Western Electricity Coordinating Council</p>	<p>As stated previously, for "One stop shopping" we need "buy in" from the foreign nationals. The way to do this is to engage their opinions and respect their jurisdictional agencies as well.</p>
<p>Response (Question 6): The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT does recognize that it may not be possible to eliminate reporting to multiple jurisdictional agencies due to legislative or regulatory requirements. The SDT acknowledges that it is possible to consolidate various reports that ask repetitive questions and through this process can work with foreign nationals to receive their “buy in” for a one report form for all functional entities to submit to NERC.</p>	

Organization	Question 7 Comment
<p>MRO's NERC Standards Review Subcommittee</p>	<p>Confusion often arises in the industry between the CIP standards and other reliability standards based on CIP-001 naming convention. We would suggest the SDT retire CIP-001 and incorporate requirements within the EOP-004 standard or a new EOP-xxx standard to avoid confusion arising from CIP and other NERC Reliability Standards. Additionally, we assume the SDT has been created to specifically address FERC Order 693 directives to the ERO which appears to include the following items:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applicability - “possible revisions to CIP-001-1 that address our concerns regarding the need for wider application of the Reliability Standard... the ERO should consider whether separate, less burdensome requirements for smaller entities may be appropriate” (FERC, 2007, para. 460). 2. Definition of Sabotage - “we direct that the ERO further define the term and provide guidance on triggering events that would cause an entity to report an event... we believe the term sabotage is commonly understood and that common understanding should suffice in most instances... the ERO should consider FirstEnergy’s suggestions to differentiate between cyber and physical sabotage and develop a threshold of materiality.” (FERC, 2007, para. 461-462) 3. Periodic Review and Testing - “directs the ERO to incorporate a periodic review or updating of the sabotage reporting procedures and for the periodic testing of the sabotage reporting procedures.” (FERC, 2007, para. 466) 4. Redundant Reporting - “now direct the ERO to address our underlying concern regarding mandatory reporting of a sabotage event... Regarding the potential for redundant reporting under CIP-001-1 and other government reporting standards, and the need for greater coordination... We direct the ERO to explore ways to address these concerns - including central coordination of sabotage reports and a uniform reporting format... with the appropriate governmental agencies that have levied the reporting requirements.” (FERC, 2007, para. 468-469) 5. Specified Time - “the Commission directs the ERO to modify CIP-001-1 to require an applicable entity to contact appropriate governmental authorities in the event of sabotage within a specified period of time... the ERO should consider suggestions raised... to define the specified period for reporting an incident beginning from when an event is discovered or suspected to be sabotage” (FERC, 2007, para. 470). 6. Summary of CIP-001-1 - “the Commission directs the ERO to develop the following modifications... (1) further define sabotage and provide guidance as to the triggering events... (2) specify baseline requirements regarding... procedures for recognizing sabotage events... (3) incorporate a periodic review... and for the periodic testing... (4) require an applicable specified period of time. In addition... address our concerns regarding applicability to smaller entities... consolidation of the sabotage reporting forms and the sabotage reporting channels with the appropriate governmental authorities to minimize the impact of these reporting requirements on all entities.” (FERC, 2007, para. 471) 7. Analyze Performance - “at a minimum, generator operators and LSEs should analyze the performance of their equipment and provide the data... The Commission directs the ERO to consider this concern in future revisions... that includes any Requirements necessary for users, owners and operators... to provide data that will assist NERC” (FERC,

Organization	Question 7 Comment
	<p>2007, para. 613, 617).</p> <p>8. Reporting Time Frames - "The Commission directs the ERO to change its Rules of Procedures to assure that the Commission also receives these reports within the same time frames as the DOE." (FERC, 2007, para. 618)</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT agrees with your comments to specifically address FERC Order 693 directives to the ERO and will determine a prudent course of action with respect to these standards and pursue the suggestion to retire CIP-001 and incorporate requirements within the EOP-004 standard to avoid confusion rising from CIP and other NERC Reliability Standards.</p>	
<p>Constellation Power Source Generation</p>	<p>Constellation Power Generation would like clarification that any proposed CIP-008-related reporting requirement (including any linked reporting requirement between CIP-008 and CIP-001) is only applicable in situations where the incident/event involves a registered entity's Critical Cyber Asset. In that vein, we want to emphasize the importance of the DSR SDT working with the CIP SDT on the cyber related events. If the DSR SDT is going to be adding clarity to cyber related events, then coordination with the CIP SDT is needed to ensure the same verbiage is being used. Furthermore, having any duplication of requirements will cause a double jeopardy scenario which would go against the SAR for the DSR SDT. As stated earlier, Constellation Power Generation also questions whether cyber related incidents should fall under the spectrum of sabotage type events, or remain separate and be incorporated in the CIP revisions.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The intent was to look at the posted "NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting" and ask the industry if DSR SDT should consider existing guidelines for possible inclusion into the yet to be written requirement(s). The DSR SDT has not determined at this time what bright line will be used for the yet to be drafted Standard(s). Note that CIP-002 through CIP-009 are undergoing revision under project 2008-06 – Order 706 SDT.</p>	
<p>We Energies</p>	<p>Give consideration to combining CIP-001 and EOP-004-1 through a common categorization. For example, "System Risk Reporting" could encompass both actual and potential events and would minimize the need to cross reference both standards, and provide one location for event and potential-event reporting. Much of the challenge in this project is in achieving a common understanding of the words sabotage and terrorism. There are nuances of meaning in the words that imply a relationship between the attacker and the victim, or a motive other than simple profit or mischief. This nuance of meaning requires the victim of the damage to discern a relationship or motive which may not be discoverable in the relatively brief time window during which the entity must report the event. In fact, they may never be known. Consequently, We Energies recommends elimination of the words sabotage and terrorism from these standards. We also recommend elimination of the word vandalism since it also implies an ability and duty to discern whether a particular act (barbed wire thrown over transformer bushings) was done out of pure mischief (vandalism) or with intent to destroy equipment for a political purpose (terrorism). And if the act was committed by a disgruntled employee, it becomes sabotage. No wonder there is confusion and indecision. Instead, We Energies recommends using the simple words "criminal damage". One need not be a prosecuting attorney or FBI Special Agent to know what this means. Simply ask, "Does it look like somebody damaged it (or hacked in) intentionally?" and, "Did we give consent?" and you're done. With</p>

Organization	Question 7 Comment
	<p>elimination of sabotage, terrorism and vandalism, and all of their baggage, comes the ability to integrate both CIP 001 and EOP 004. We now have criminal damage (or cyber attack) as just another event to be evaluated against certain pre-defined impact measures. No value judgments, no speculation. Another benefit of using these simple words and tests is that operating personnel, whether in the field or at the console, will not require special awareness training in discerning these nuances of meaning. They already have experience with the equipment or cyber systems and its normal performance. Operating personnel can readily assess whether an impact event is due to equipment failure, weather or animal contact vs. intentionally caused by a person. If it appears to be criminal damage, call the local police agency. Report the event and the impact. Cooperate with the investigation. Share your knowledge of the normal condition of the equipment or performance of the system. Share your experience with similar events. It will be important to highlight that the theft of all the grounding pigtailes in a substation is different from the act of simply snipping each of them to leave the equipment electrically floating. The technical condition is the same, but this allows the police to make an inference with respect to motive, suspect profile, sophistication, etc. That's their job. They may ask us to speculate on the motive or skills of the attacker. That's okay. But at least we don't have to know or guess at it for the purpose of determining whether to report the event. No training required. With respect to notification to the FBI, We Energies recommends that the standard merely state that the owner of the damaged asset ensure the local office of the FBI is notified. The standard should permit documentation of either a direct phone call by the asset owner or obtaining an assurance from the local police that they will do so. There should be no need to prove earlier establishment of a relationship with the FBI. There should be no expectation that the entity have a signed letter from the FBI Special Agent in Charge acknowledging his agency's duty. This document means nothing. With respect to reporting within the industry, We Energies recommends that the only events to be reported "up the chain" are those that we choose to characterize as "impact events". That is, the events that meet some measurable threshold with respect to BES impact. We should describe these efficiently to avoid over-reporting of trivial events. It is apparent that we are already over-reporting since DHS HITRAC recently fed back to the industry that copper thieves attacked a substation in San Bernardino, CA taking some of the grounding conductors. The industry should have the option to report non-impact events that are unusual in some respect and which may have some mutual industry benefit in terms of prevention, awareness or recovery. Attack attempts with no impact, or observations of suspicious activity could fall into this optional category. These optional reports could be aggregated by the entity for the purpose of detecting patterns or trends, or be reported ad hoc. The ES-ISAC should be the recipient of the reports. It should be the single point of contact since it has the industry insight, engineering expertise and cross-sector relationships to analyze and return valuable intelligence to the industry. With the ES-ISAC as the recipient of the reports, efficient sharing with Federal agencies, with the regional entities and with neighboring asset owners could be automated and rapid. There is much benefit to be gained from this project, primarily in the area of creating clarity and uniformity. There is some risk that the reporting requirements will become onerous and prescriptive.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT is proposing to consolidate disturbance and event reporting under a single standard. The DSR SDT believes that reporting material risks to the Bulk Electrical System by using the impact event categorization, it will be easier to get the relevant information for mitigation, awareness, and tracking, while removing the distracting element of motivation by the elimination of the term "sabotage". The intent is to allow potentially impacted parties to prepare for and possibly mitigate the reliability risk. The NERC Rules of</p>	

Organization	Question 7 Comment
	<p>Procedure (section 800) provides an overview of the responsibilities of the ERO in regards to analysis and dissemination of information for reliability. The SDT is proposing that the new standard specify who has access to reported information and who should be notified about impact events, because agencies such as the DHS and FBI have other duties and responsibilities - an impact event that is related to copper theft may only need to be reported to the local law enforcement authorities. The goal of the DSR SDT is create clarity and uniformity by developing a single reporting form for all functional entities without regard to nationality (US, Canada, Mexico) to submit to NERC with guidance. Ideally, entities would complete a single form, which could then be distributed to jurisdictional agencies and functional entities as appropriate. The DSR SDT agrees with your assessment that there should be no expectation that the entity have a signed letter from the FBI Special Agent.</p>
<p>Bandera Electric Cooperative, Inc.</p>	<p>I commend the SDT for working on this effort and wish them success.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment.</p>	
<p>Public Service Enterprise Group Companies</p>	<p>If reporting does become the responsibility of the Reliability Coordinators, the RCIS should be made available view-only to registered entities with a notification when RC's have posted new entries. That will enhance the situational awareness of registered entities.</p> <p>The PSEG Companies disagree with inclusion of CIP-008 reporting requirements as part of the CIP-001 and EOP-004 initiative. CIP-008 reporting as part of the cyber security set of NERC standards is usually managed by specialized corporate organizations separate from those involved with the other NERC standards, and with highly specialized cyber skill sets. CIP-008 reporting requirements should remain where they are, and any perceived need for improvement addressed in the ongoing CIP Version 4 development process.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The RCIS is a real-time communication and reporting tool and is outside the scope of the SDT. The goal of the DSR SDT is to develop a form to expedite report completion, sharing and storage. Ideally, entities would complete a single form, which could then be distributed to jurisdictional agencies and functional entities as appropriate. Functional entities may include the RC, TOP, and BA for situational awareness. The DSR SDT will take into consideration your comment with inclusion to CIP-008 reporting. However, the drafting team will explore clarification that any proposed CIP-008-related reporting requirement between CIP-008 and CIP-001 is only applicable where the incident/event involves a registered entity's CCA. Note that CIP-002 through CIP-009 are undergoing revision under project 2008-06 – Order 706 SDT.</p>	
<p>Independent Electricity System Operator</p>	<p>In the Background Section of the comment form, it is indicated that the SDT "...is NOT seeking input or guidance on the definition of physical or cyber sabotage, what type of disturbances should be reported, who should do reporting, or to whom or what organizations will be receiving the reports." <u>Yet there are proposed definitions, with examples, in the concept paper.</u> The SDT should make it absolutely clear that by supporting the general concept as described in the paper, the commenting entities are not endorsing the proposed definitions, nor the examples as elements to be included in the standard.</p>

Organization	Question 7 Comment
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT will continue to clarify the impact events concept and eliminate “gray areas” while including language to give clarity to the reporting process. Standards developed under this project will be posted for comment on specific content.</p>	
Luminant	Luminant disagrees with the direction of utilizing impact events, as this is an expansion in scope beyond the simplification of sabotage and disturbance reporting.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We are suggesting the term “Impact Event” be substituted to include only events that would impact the reliability of the BES. The DSR SDT has reviewed the existing standards, the SAR; issues from the NERC database and FERC Order 693 Directives and determine this was a prudent course of action with respect to these standards to provide clear criteria for reporting.</p>	
Dynergy Inc.	N/A
Manitoba Hydro	No
Edison Mission Marketing & Trading	No other comments.
SERC Reliability Coordinator Sub-committee (RCS)	None.
USBR	The concept of "threat" evaluation criteria is somewhat vague and a great care is needed to ensure it is clear enough that the most individuals would be able to analyze an event and end up at the same threat. Otherwise it would be almost impossible to ensure compliance with a requirement which cannot accurately describe criteria to be used to ensure that proper evaluation has occurred.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. We are suggesting the term “Impact Event” be substituted to include only events that would impact the reliability of the BES as opposed to requiring a threat evaluation. The DSR SDT intends to develop criteria that will assist entities in determining which events should be reported.</p>	
Wolverine Power Supply Cooperative, Inc.	The concepts of removing duplication, consolidation, and focusing on "impact events" sound logical. I am concerned that the focus may drift to expanded reporting, not reduced reporting.
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DST SDT discussed the reporting of “impact events” and will consider guidance found in the document, “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting” which will include clear criteria to eliminate erroneous or expanded reporting.</p>	

Organization	Question 7 Comment
ISO RTO Council Standards Review Committee	<p>The FERC Order merely asked NERC to “further define sabotage and provide guidance as to the triggering events that would cause an entity to report a sabotage event.” There is no requirement to create a Reporting Standard and no mention of Disturbance events. There is a strong need to avoid heavy-handed use of NERC standards particularly for such post event reporting guidelines. The SRC would urge the DSR SDT to continue to improve its guidelines and to post those guidelines for all to use, but not to create sanctionable standards whose good intentions will inevitably result in many unintended adverse consequences for the Industry. Rather, the SDT should seek to retire sanctionable requirements that require event reporting in favor of guidelines for reporting.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The intent was to look at the posted “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting” and ask the industry if the DSR SDT should consider existing guidelines for possible inclusion into the yet to be written requirement(s). The DSR SDT has not determined at this time what bright line will be used for the yet to be drafted Standard(s). The DSR SDT will take into consideration your comment on keeping cyber and physical events separate. We are suggesting in our discussion to consolidate the location of reporting into one standard. The industry has demonstrated by its comments that the reporting process be streamlined to achieve a “one stop shop” approach. We will continue to explore the possibilities to achieve the best results for all stakeholders. A discussion of advantages /disadvantages will continue to discover options and alternatives with input from all stakeholders.</p>	
Lands Energy Consulting	<p>The lack of common sense that leads to a 15 MW loss of load resulting from a 115 kV line outage being categorized as a "reportable disturbance" really hurts the credibility of the entire NERC Compliance Program. The smaller utilities look at application of EOP-004 in particular to their operation and conclude that either the EO/RRO is: a. stupid; or b. Out to persecute the smaller utilities. In reality, EOP-004 was drafted for application to Southern California Edison, where loss of 50% of customers would be 2-3 million customers. Now that's really disturbing!</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT intends to develop criteria that will assist entities in determining which events should be reported. Acts of sabotage may be “tested” on smaller entities before the saboteurs move on the larger entities.</p>	
Central Hudson Gas & Electric	<p>The NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting Attachment A matrix is an extremely beneficial document that organizes reporting criteria. However, it identifies communications systems failure sub-category under the Equipment And/Or Systems Failure category as reportable with a reference to OE-417 - Schedule 1, Item 10. Item 10 on Schedule 1 addresses only failures due to attacks (not failures for other reasons).</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The intent was to look at the posted “NERC Guideline: Threat and Incident Reporting” and ask the industry if the DSR SDT should consider existing guidelines for possible inclusion into the yet to be written requirement(s). The DSR SDT has not determined at this time what bright line will be used for the yet to be drafted Standard(s). Loss of communications would be considered an impact event. The reason for the loss of communications is irrelevant.</p>	

Organization	Question 7 Comment
Duke Energy	<p>We don't think CIP-001, EOP-004 and cyber incident reporting aspects of CIP-008 should all be combined into one standard, because of the significant differences between sabotage and disturbances. We have suggested that the drafting team further define sabotage, and we have included a suggested definition in our response to question #5 above. Sabotage is very specific due to the intent (for the purpose of weakening the critical infrastructure), and the potential impact to the BES. We believe that sabotage and cyber incident reporting should remain a part of the CIP Standards due to the emphasis placed on the criticality and vulnerability of the assets needed to support reliable operation of the BES. Cyber Security and Physical Security could be placed together in the same standard (remain in CIP) and other disturbances (i.e., accidental, natural) in a separate standard. "One stop shopping" for reporting is still possible as long as the OE-417 form is included as part of the NERC electronic form. And while we agree with the need for additional clarity in sabotage and disturbance reporting, we believe that the Standards Drafting Team should carefully consider whether there is a reliability-related need for each requirement. Some disturbance reporting requirements are triggered not just to assist in real-time reliability but also to identify lessons-learned opportunities. If disturbance and sabotage reporting continue to be reliability standards, we believe that all linkages to lessons-learned/improvements need to be stripped out. We have other forums to identify lessons-learned opportunities and to follow-up on those opportunities.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT is still evaluating inclusion of CIP-008 reporting requirements with CIP-001 and EOP-004 requirements, Note that the current CIP-008 has a reporting requirement to the ES-ISAC only. The DSR SDT developed the more inclusive term "impact events" to eliminate using more confusing terms like sabotage (which is not likely to be determined until after a lengthy investigation). These standards may be combined to have all reporting requirements in a single standard, not because the items to be reported are necessarily related.</p>	
FirstEnergy	<p>We fully agree that sabotage events need to be more clearly defined and reporting requirements need to be better coordinated. But as we have stated in previous comments, the drafting team needs to determine if standard requirements need to be developed for this type of reporting or if this is better left to administrative requirements outside the standards arena. Also, while we appreciate the team's effort to simplify reporting requirements for entities, we are concerned with the serial communication offered by the concept paper. As an example, the team proposes to have LSE report the incident to the BA and/or TOP and then have the BA and/or TOP report it to the RC and the RC to report it to NERC and the NERC report to the regulatory agencies. While this simplifies it for each individual organization, this method introduces many opportunities for errors and miscommunications. Since this is after-the-fact reporting, it is difficult to defend this type of communication path when one consistent report could be sent simultaneously to all agencies at the same time from the originating location.</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The Reliability Coordinator's suggested role in this is to allow them to incorporate the relevant data from responsible entities in their footprint for further analysis. We will consider your suggestion of simultaneous submissions as a means to effectively notify the necessary parties. The SDT believes that it is the submitter's responsibility to submit OE-417 forms to the DOE. The DSR SDT does recognize that it may not be possible to eliminate reporting to multiple jurisdictional agencies due to legislative or regulatory</p>	

Organization	Question 7 Comment
requirements.	
Ameren	<p>While we are not opposed to the concept of identifying impact events, we are concerned that the drafting team may actually be expanding reporting requirements. We do not support expansion of reporting requirements unless a clear reliability or legal need is identified. Some of the impact events are almost never sabotage and do not warrant reporting for reliability needs and should not be included. For example, copper theft should not require reporting, in general, because it is almost never sabotage and rarely impacts reliability. If it does, impact reliability because, for example, the protection system is impacted and causes more significant potential contingencies, then reporting could be required. Why is a train derailment near a transmission right of way significant? It would only be significant if an investigation identified sabotage as the reason. Furthermore, what is considered near?</p>
Midwest ISO Standards Collaborators	<p>While we are <u>not</u> opposed to the concept of identifying impact events, we are concerned that the drafting team may actually be expanding reporting requirements. We do not support expansion of reporting requirements unless a clear reliability or legal need is identified. Some of the impact events are almost never sabotage and do not warrant reporting for reliability needs and should not be included. For example, copper theft should not require reporting, in general, because it is almost never sabotage and rarely impacts reliability. If it does impact reliability because, for example, the protection system is impacted and causes more significant potential contingencies, then reporting could be required. Why is a train derailment near a transmission right of way significant? It would only be significant if an investigation identified sabotage as the reason. Furthermore, what is considered near?</p>
<p>Response: The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. It is not the intent of the DSR SDT to expand reporting requirements but rather to attempt to clarify and define an approach to assist the industry and stakeholders in reporting impact events. Furthermore, impact events should not include copper theft or other conditions that pose no threat to the reliability of the BES. A train derailment is only an impact event if it threatens some element of the power system such as a transmission line corridor - the derailment in itself is not an impact event.</p>	
Exelon	<p>You should consider providing clear and concise instructions as to the expectation on submitting forms, i.e. the DOE 417. There should be no guessing as to when and how reports should be submitted and who should receive them. Specific details on reporting criteria should be included.</p>
<p>Response : The DSR SDT thanks you for your comment. The DSR SDT intends to develop criteria for reporting impact events.</p>	