

# Project 2016-02 CIP Modifications

Webinar on Revisions in Response to LERC Directive August 16, 2016





### • NERC Antitrust Guidelines

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### Notice of Open Meeting

 Participants are reminded that this webinar is public. The access number was widely distributed. Speakers on the call should keep in mind that the listening audience may include members of the press and representatives of various governmental authorities, in addition to the expected participation by industry stakeholders.



### The CIP Standard Drafting Team

	Name	Entity		
Chair	Margaret Powell	Exelon		
Vice Chair	Christine Hasha	Electric Reliability Council of Texas		
Vice Chair	David Revill	Georgia Transmission Corporation		
Members	Steven Brain	Dominion		
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	Jennifer Flandermeyer	Kansas City Power and Light		
	Tom Foster	PJM Interconnection		
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	Zach Trublood	Sacramento Municipal Utility District		



- Introductions
- Opening Remarks
- Approach to the Revisions
- LERC Definition Update and Retirement of LEAP
- CIP-003-7, Attachment 1 Requirements
- CIP-003-7, Attachment 2 Measures
- Guidelines and Technical Basis, Reference Models
- Implementation Plan
- Next Steps



- The SDT considered two approaches to address the directive to clarify 'direct'.
  - Option 1 Revise the LERC definition to enable a security control external to the BES Cyber Asset (such as an application break) to indicate the absence of LERC
  - Option 2 Revise the LERC definition to identify all routable protocol communications crossing the asset boundary without regard to 'direct vs. indirect' access. Also, revise the CIP-003 requirements to implement electronic access controls and update and expand the Guidelines and Technical Basis.
- Both options meet the same security objective.
- The SDT selected Option 2 to revise the definition, requirement language, and guidelines and technical basis.



- Changed Low Impact External Routable Connectivity to Low Impact External Routable Communication (LERC) to focus on the communication that occurs crossing the boundary of the asset containing the low impact BES Cyber Systems to more cleanly align with the output of CIP-002-5.1 R1, Part 1.3.
- Removed from the definition the word 'direct' thus expanding the LERC definition to be inclusive of both direct and indirect connections.
- Simplified LERC as an attribute of a BES asset concerning whether there is routable protocol communications across the asset boundary.
- Removed the dependency between the electronic access controls that may be in place and having those controls determine whether LERC exists or not.



- Revised Definition: Low Impact External Routable Communication (LERC): Routable protocol communication that crosses the boundary of an asset containing one or more low impact BES Cyber System(s), excluding communications between intelligent electronic devices used for time-sensitive protection or control functions between non-Control Center BES assets containing low impact BES Cyber Systems including, but not limited to, IEC 61850 GOOSE or vendor proprietary protocols.
- Current Definition: Low Impact External Routable Connectivity (LERC): Direct userinitiated interactive access or a direct device-to-device connection to a low impact BES Cyber System(s) from a Cyber Asset outside the asset containing those low impact BES Cyber System(s) via a bi-directional routable protocol connection. Pointto-point communications between intelligent electronic devices that use routable communication protocols for time-sensitive protection or control functions between Transmission station or substation assets containing low impact BES Cyber Systems are excluded from this definition (examples of this communication include, but are not limited to, IEC 61850 GOOSE or vendor proprietary protocols).



- The changes to LERC changed the focus of the CIP-003 requirements and no longer emphasized the "interface" that controlled the connectivity.
  - Current Term: Low Impact BES Cyber System Electronic Access Point" (LEAP): A Cyber Asset interface that controls Low Impact External Routable Connectivity. The Cyber Asset containing the LEAP may reside at a location external to the asset or assets containing low impact BES Cyber Systems.
- As a result, the SDT removed use of the term "LEAP" and proposed its retirement.



- For those BES assets that have LERC, the SDT changed the requirement to requiring electronic access controls to "permit only necessary electronic access to low impact BES Cyber Systems."
- The SDT also revised CIP-003-6, Attachment 1, Section 2 to accommodate the retirement of LEAP in the physical security section and to provide for the physical security of the Cyber Assets performing the electronic access controls required in Section 3.



Section 2. <u>Physical Security Controls</u>: Each Responsible Entity shall control physical access, based on need as determined by the Responsible Entity, to (1) the asset or the locations of the low impact BES Cyber Systems within the asset and (2) the Low Impact BES Cyber System Electronic Access Points (LEAPs), the Cyber Asset(s), as specified by the Responsible Entity, that provide electronic access control(s) implemented for Section 3.1, if any.

### Section 3. <u>Electronic Access Controls</u>: Each Responsible Entity shall:

**3.1** Implement electronic access control(s) for LERC, if any, implement a LEAP to permit only necessary inbound and outbound bi-directional routable protocol access; and electronic access to low impact BES Cyber System(s).

**3.2** Implement authentication for all Dial-up Connectivity, if any, that provides access to low impact BES Cyber Systems, per Cyber Asset capability.



• The SDT revised CIP-003-6, Attachment 2, Sections 2 and 3 to make the Measures consistent with the revised requirement language.

**Section 2.** <u>Physical Security Controls</u>: Examples of evidence for Section 2 may include, but are not limited to:

- Documentation of the selected access control(s) (e.g., card key, locks, perimeter controls), monitoring controls (e.g., alarm systems, human observation), or other operational, procedural, or technical physical security controls that control physical access to both:
  - a. The asset, if any, or the locations of the low impact BES Cyber Systems within the asset; and
  - b. The Cyber Asset <u>specified by the Responsible Entity that provides</u> <u>electronic access controls implemented for Section 3.1</u>, if any<del>, containing</del> <del>a LEAP</del>.



- <u>Section 3</u>. Electronic Access Controls: Examples of evidence for Section 3 may include, but are not limited to:
- Documentation, such as representative diagrams or lists of implemented electronic access controls (e.g., restricting IP addresses, ports, or services; authenticating users; air-gapping networks; terminating routable protocol sessions on a non-BES Cyber Asset; implementing unidirectional gateways) showing that inbound and outbound connections for any LEAP(s) are LERC at each asset or group of assets containing low impact BES Cyber Systems, is confined to only those to that access the Responsible Entity deems necessary (e.g., by restricting IP addresses, ports, or services); and
- 2. Documentation of authentication for Dial-up Connectivity (e.g., dial out only to a preprogrammed number to deliver data, dial-back modems, modems that must be remotely controlled by the control center or control room, or access control on the BES Cyber System).



- Removes ambiguity of *where* routable protocol must exist in current definition ("via a bi-directional routable protocol connection")
- Used for determining which routable protocol communications and networks are *internal* or *inside* or *local* to the BES asset and which are *external* to or *outside* the BES asset.
- Not an Electronic Security Perimeter or Physical Security Perimeter









































- The Implementation Plan does not modify the effective date for CIP-003-6 or any of the phased-in compliance dates in the CIP-003-6 Implementation Plan.
- Provides a single compliance date for the newly revised sections (Sections 2 and 3) in CIP-003-7, Attachment 1.
- The enforcement deadline will be the later of September 1, 2018 or the first day of the first calendar quarter that is nine (9) calendar months after the effective date of the order providing applicable regulatory approval.
- Carries forward by reference the provisions for planned or unplanned changes.



### **Implementation Plan**

	NERC Board Adoption	Order 822 Effective Date: March 31, 2016	V5 Enforcement	If effective date of the FERC approval, then LERC revisions become effective:			
Standard/Requirement		Compliance Deadline	Date***	3Q17	4Q17	1Q18	
CIP-002-5		1-Jul-16	July 1, 2016 - CIP V5 Approved Compliance				
CIP-003-6		1-Jul-16		1-Jul-16	1-Jul-16	1-Jul-16	
CIP-003-6, R1, part 1.1*		1-Jul-16		1-Jul-16	1-Jul-16	1-Jul-16	
CIP-003-6, R1, part 1.2		1-Apr-17		1-Apr-17	1-Apr-17	1-Apr-17	
CIP-003-6, R2		1-Apr-17		1-Apr-17	1-Apr-17	1-Apr-17	
CIP-003-6, Att 1, Sect. 1	_	1-Apr-17		1-Apr-17	1-Apr-17	1-Apr-17	
CIP-003-7, Att 1, Sect. 2	,= Ā	1-Sep-18		1-Sep-18	1-Oct-18	1-Jan-19	
CIP-003-7, Att 1, Sect. 3	52	1-Sep-18		1-Sep-18	1-Oct-18	1-Jan-19	
CIP-003-6, Att 1, Sect. 4	revisi	1-Apr-17		1-Apr-17	1-Apr-17	1-Apr-17	
CIP-004-6		1-Jul-16		All dates and deadlines remain active under CIP V6 implementation plan			
CIP-005-5	Suc Suc	1-Jul-16					
CIP-006-6	- Nove - Febru	1-Jul-16					
CIP-006-6, R1, part 1.10**		1-Apr-17					
CIP-007-6	ary	1-Jul-16					
CIP-007-6, R1, part 1.2**	er 1 12,	1-Apr-17					
CIP-008-5	3, 2	1-Jul-16					
CIP-009-6	014 15	1-Jul-16					
CIP-010-2	P-010-2 P-010-2, R4 P-011-2		Date				
CIP-010-2, R4							
CIP-011-2							
TCA, RM Glossary Terms		1-Apr-17					
BCA, PCA Glossary Terms		1-Apr-17					
LERC, LEAP Glossary Terms		1-Apr-17					



"Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required, Reliability Standard CIP-003-7 and the NERC Glossary term Low Impact External Routable Communication (LERC) shall become **effective on the later of September 1, 2018 or the first day of the first calendar quarter that is nine (9) calendar months after the effective date** of the applicable governmental authority's order approving the standard and NERC Glossary term, or as otherwise provided for by the applicable governmental authority.

Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, Reliability Standard CIP-003-7 and the NERC Glossary term Low Impact External Routable Communication (LERC) shall become **effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is nine (9) calendar months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees**, or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction."



### LERC

- July 21 August 19 Join the Ballot Pools
- July 21 September 6 Planned 45 day Comment Period
- August 10 September 6 RSAW Comment Period
- August 26 September 6 Ballot Period

**REMINDER:** 

CIP-002-5.1 Interpretation

- July 27 August 25 Join Ballot Pool
- July 27 September 12 Planned 45 day Comment Period
- August 30 September 12 Ballot Period



 This slide deck and other information relative to the CIP Modifications SDT may be found on the Project 2016-02 Project Page under Related Files:

http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project%202016-

02%20Modifications%20to%20CIP%20Standards.aspx

• The Project 2015-INT-01 Interpretation of CIP-002-5.1 for Energy Sector Security Consortium (EnergySec) may be found:

http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2015-INT-01-Interpretation-of-CIP-002-5-1-for-EnergySec.aspx





## **Questions and Answers**

