

March 30, 2011

Ms. Kimberly D. Bose Secretary Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 888 First Street, N.E. Washington, DC 20426

Re: NERC Abbreviated Notice of Penalty regarding Unidentified Registered Entity, FERC Docket No. NP11-__-000

Dear Ms. Bose:

The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) hereby provides this Abbreviated Notice of Penalty (NOP) regarding Unidentified Registered Entity (URE) with information and details regarding the nature and resolution of the violations discussed in detail in the Settlement Agreement (Attachment b) and the Disposition Document (Attachment c), in accordance with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (Commission or FERC) rules, regulations and orders, as well as NERC Rules of Procedure including Appendix 4C (NERC Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program (CMEP)).

This NOP is being filed with the Commission because Reliability *First* Corporation (Reliability *First*) and URE have entered into a Settlement Agreement to resolve all outstanding issues arising from Reliability *First*'s determination and findings of the enforceable violations of CIP-006-1 Requirement (R)1.6 and R4. According to the Settlement Agreement, URE neither admits nor denies the violation, but has agreed to the assessed penalty of twenty thousand dollars (\$20,000), in addition to other remedies and actions to mitigate the instant violations and facilitate future compliance under the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement. Accordingly, the violations identified as NERC Violation Tracking Identification Numbers

¹ For purposes of this document, each violation at issue is described as a "violation," regardless of its procedural

posture and whether it was a possible, alleged or confirmed violation.

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² Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability Organization; and Procedures for the Establishment, Approval, and Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards (Order No. 672), III FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,204 (2006); Notice of New Docket Prefix "NP" for Notices of Penalty Filed by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, Docket No. RM05-30-000 (February 7, 2008). See also 18 C.F.R. Part 39 (2010). Mandatory Reliability Standards for the Bulk-Power System, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,242 (2007) (Order No. 693), reh'g denied, 120 FERC ¶ 61,053 (2007) (Order No. 693-A). See 18 C.F.R § 39.7(c)(2).

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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS PUBLIC VERSION

RFC200900183 and RFC200900184 are being filed in accordance with the NERC Rules of Procedure and the CMEP.

Statement of Findings Underlying the Violations

This NOP incorporates the findings and justifications set forth in the Settlement Agreement executed on October 20, 2010, by and between Reliability *First* and URE. The details of the findings and the basis for the penalty are set forth in the Disposition Document. This NOP filing contains the basis for approval of the Settlement Agreement by the NERC Board of Trustees Compliance Committee (NERC BOTCC). In accordance with Section 39.7 of the Commission's regulations, 18 C.F.R. § 39.7, NERC provides the following summary table identifying each violation of a Reliability Standard resolved by the Settlement Agreement, as discussed in greater detail below.

NOC ID	NERC Violation ID	Reliability Std.	Req. (R)	VRF	Duration	Total Penalty (\$)	
NOC 606	RFC200900183	CIP-006-1	1.6	Medium ³	9/9/09 and 9/15/09 ⁴	20,000	
NOC-696	RFC200900184	CIP-006-1	4	Medium	9/15/09 ⁵		

The text of the Reliability Standards at issue and further information on the subject violations are set forth in the Disposition Documents.

CIP-006-1 R1.6 - OVERVIEW

On September 24, 2009, URE notified Reliability *First* of this violation in a conference call and submitted a Self-Report on October 2, 2009. Reliability *First* determined that URE, as a Responsible Entity, ⁶ failed to follow its procedures for providing escorted access within the Physical Security Perimeter for personnel not authorized for unescorted access on September 9, 2009 and September 15, 2009.

CIP-006-1 R4 - OVERVIEW

On September 24, 2009, URE notified Reliability *First* of this violation in a conference call and submitted a Self-Report on October 2, 2009. Reliability *First* determined that URE, as a Responsible Entity, failed to properly log physical access to the Physical Security Perimeter on September 15, 2009.

³ CIP-006-1 R1, R1.1, R1.2, R1.3, R1.4, R1.5 and R1.6 each have a "Medium" VRF and CIP-006 R1.7, R1.8 and R1.9 each have a "Lower" VRF.

⁴ Although the Settlement Agreement provides this duration for purposes of penalty determination, the duration of the violation is from September 9, 2009 through December 7, 2009, when the Mitigation Plan was completed.
⁵ Although the Settlement Agreement provides this duration for purposes of penalty determination, the duration of

the violation is from September 15, 2009 through December 7, 2009, when the Mitigation Plan was completed.

⁶ Within the text of Standard CIP-006, "Responsible Entity" shall mean Reliability Coordinator, Balancing Authority, Interchange Authority, Transmission Service Provider, Transmission Owner, Transmission Operator, Generator Owner, Generator Operator, Load Serving Entity, NERC, and Regional Reliability Organizations.

Statement Describing the Assessed Penalty, Sanction or Enforcement Action Imposed⁷

Basis for Determination

Taking into consideration the Commission's direction in Order No. 693, the NERC Sanction Guidelines, the Commission's July 3, 2008, October 26, 2009 and August 27, 2010 Guidance Orders, the NERC BOTCC reviewed the Settlement Agreement and supporting documentation on January 10, 2011. The NERC BOTCC approved the Settlement Agreement, including Reliability *First*'s assessment of a twenty thousand dollar (\$20,000) financial penalty against URE and other actions to facilitate future compliance required under the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement. In approving the Settlement Agreement, the NERC BOTCC reviewed the applicable requirements of the Commission-approved Reliability Standards and the underlying facts and circumstances of the violations at issue.

In reaching this determination, the NERC BOTCC considered the following factors:

- 1. URE self-reported the violations;
- 2. Reliability *First* reported that URE was cooperative throughout the compliance enforcement process;
- 3. URE had a compliance program at the time of the violation which Reliability *First* considered a mitigating factor, as discussed in the Disposition Documents;
- 4. there was no evidence of any attempt to conceal a violation nor evidence of intent to do so;
- 5. Reliability *First* determined that the violations did not pose a serious or substantial risk to the reliability of the bulk power system (BPS), as discussed in the Disposition Documents; and
- 6. Reliability *First* reported that there were no other mitigating or aggravating factors or extenuating circumstances that would affect the assessed penalty.

For the foregoing reasons, the NERC BOTCC approved the Settlement Agreement. The NERC BOTCC believes that the assessed penalty of twenty thousand dollars (\$20,000) is appropriate for the violations and circumstances at issue, and is consistent with NERC's goal to promote and ensure reliability of the BPS.

Pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 39.7(e), the penalty will be effective upon expiration of the 30 day period following the filing of this NOP with FERC, or, if FERC decides to review the penalty, upon final determination by FERC.

⁷ See 18 C.F.R. § 39.7(d)(4).

⁸ North American Electric Reliability Corporation, "Guidance Order on Reliability Notices of Penalty," 124 FERC ¶ 61,015 (2008); North American Electric Reliability Corporation, "Further Guidance Order on Reliability Notices of Penalty," 129 FERC ¶ 61,069 (2009); North American Electric Reliability Corporation, "Notice of No Further Review and Guidance Order," 132 FERC ¶ 61,182 (2010).

Request for Confidential Treatment

Information in and certain attachments to the instant NOP include confidential information as defined by the Commission's regulations at 18 C.F.R. Part 388 and orders, as well as NERC Rules of Procedure including the NERC CMEP Appendix 4C to the Rules of Procedure. This includes non-public information related to certain Reliability Standard violations, certain Regional Entity investigative files, Registered Entity sensitive business information and confidential information regarding critical energy infrastructure.

In accordance with the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 C.F.R. § 388.112, a non-public version of the information redacted from the public filing is being provided under separate cover.

Because certain of the attached documents are deemed confidential by NERC, Registered Entities and Regional Entities, NERC requests that the confidential, non-public information be provided special treatment in accordance with the above regulation.

Attachments to be included as Part of this Notice of Penalty

The attachments to be included as parts of this NOP are the following documents:

- a) URE's Self-Report for CIP-006-1 R1.6 and R4 dated October 2, 2009, included as Attachment a:
- b) Settlement Agreement by and between Reliability *First* and URE executed October 20, 2010, included as Attachment b;
 - i. URE's Mitigation Plan submitted December 10, 2009, included as Attachment a to the Settlement Agreement;
 - ii. URE's Certification of Mitigation Plan Completion dated January 11, 2010, included as Attachment b to the Settlement Agreement;
 - iii. Reliability *First*'s Verification of Mitigation Plan Completion dated January 27, 2010, included as Attachment c to the Settlement Agreement; and
- c) Disposition Documents included as Attachment c;

A Form of Notice Suitable for Publication⁹

A copy of a notice suitable for publication is included in Attachment d.

⁹ See 18 C.F.R. § 39.7(d)(6).

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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS PUBLIC VERSION

Notices and Communications

Notices and communications with respect to this filing may be addressed to the following:

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President and Chief Executive Officer

David N. Cook*

Sr. Vice President and General Counsel

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*Persons to be included on the Commission's service list are indicated with an asterisk.

NERC requests waiver of the Commission's rules and regulations to permit the inclusion of more than two people on the service list.

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Conclusion

Accordingly, NERC respectfully requests that the Commission accept this Abbreviated NOP as compliant with its rules, regulations and orders.

Respectfully submitted,

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President and Chief Executive Officer
David N. Cook
Sr. Vice President and General Counsel
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cc: Unidentified Registered Entity Reliability *First* Corporation

Attachments



Disposition Document

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS PUBLIC VERSION

DISPOSITION OF VIOLATION¹ Dated January 10, 2011

24004 54114415 10, 2011

NERC TRACKING REGIONAL ENTITY TRACKING NOC#

NO. NO.

RFC200900183 RFC200900183 NOC-696

RFC200900184 RFC200900184

REGISTERED ENTITY NERC REGISTRY ID

Unidentified Registered Entity (URE) NCRXXXXX

REGIONAL ENTITY

Reliability First Corporation (Reliability First)

I. VIOLATION INFORMATION

RELIABILITY	REQUIREMENT(S)	SUB-	VRF(S)	VSL(S)
STANDARD		REQUIREMENT(S)		
CIP-006-1	1	1.6	Medium ²	N/A ³
CIP-006-1	4		Medium	N/A ⁴

PURPOSE OF THE RELIABILITY STANDARD AND TEXT OF RELIABILITY STANDARD AND REQUIREMENT(S)/SUB-REQUIREMENT(S)

The purpose statement of CIP-006-1 provides in pertinent part: "Standard CIP-006 is intended to ensure the implementation of a physical security program for the protection of Critical Cyber Assets. Standard CIP-006 should be read as part of a group of standards numbered Standards CIP-002 through CIP-009...."

¹ For purposes of this document and attachments hereto, each violation at issue is described as a "violation," regardless of its procedural posture and whether it was a possible, alleged or confirmed violation.

² The Mitigation Plan incorrectly states that the VRF for this violation is Lower. The Settlement Agreement correctly states that the VRF for this violation is Medium. CIP-006-1 R1, R1.1, R1.2, R1.3, R1.4, R1.5 and R1.6 each have a "Medium" VRF and CIP-006 R1.7, R1.8 and R1.9 each have a "Lower" VRF.

³ At the time of the violation, no VSLs were in effect for CIP-006-1. On June 30, 2009, NERC submitted VSLs for the CIP-002-1 through CIP-009-1 Reliability Standards. On March 18, 2010, the Commission approved the VSLs as filed, but directed NERC to submit modifications. Modifications were filed by NERC on May 17, 2010 and approved by FERC on September 18, 2010.

⁴ *Id*.

CIP-006-1 provides in pertinent part:

R1. Physical Security Plan — The Responsible Entity^[5] shall create and maintain a physical security plan, approved by a senior manager or delegate(s) that shall address, at a minimum, the following:

•••

R1.6. Procedures for escorted access within the physical security perimeter of personnel not authorized for unescorted access.

••

- R4. Logging Physical Access Logging shall record sufficient information to uniquely identify individuals and the time of access twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. The Responsible Entity shall implement and document the technical and procedural mechanisms for logging physical entry at all access points to the Physical Security Perimeter(s) using one or more of the following logging methods or their equivalent:
 - R4.1. Computerized Logging: Electronic logs produced by the Responsible Entity's selected access control and monitoring method.
 - R4.2. Video Recording: Electronic capture of video images of sufficient quality to determine identity.
 - R4.3. Manual Logging: A log book or sign-in sheet, or other record of physical access maintained by security or other personnel authorized to control and monitor physical access as specified in Requirement R2.3.

(Footnote added)

VIOLATION DESCRIPTION

On October 2, 2009, URE self-reported a violation of CIP-006-1, R1.6, which stemmed from two incidents that occurred on September 9, 2009 and September 15, 2009. URE also self-reported a violation of CIP-006-1 R4, which stemmed from the incident that occurred on September 15, 2009.

On September 9, 2009, an URE security guard escorted an HVAC service technician into URE's back-up control center. The security guard and the HVAC service technician followed the proper log-in procedure. Additionally, the security guard had completed training and had a clear background check. However, URE had not granted the security guard unescorted access rights to the back-up Transmission

⁵ Within the text of Standard CIP-006, "Responsible Entity" shall mean Reliability Coordinator, Balancing Authority, Interchange Authority, Transmission Service Provider, Transmission Owner, Transmission Operator, Generator Owner, Generator Operator, Load Serving Entity, NERC, and Regional Reliability Organizations.

⁶ URE first notified Reliability *First* of these occurrences in a conference call on September 24, 2009.

Control Center. Therefore, URE failed to escort the security guard and the HVAC service technician by an employee authorized for unescorted access while the security guard and the HVAC service technician were within the physical security perimeter, in violation of CIP-006-1 R1.6.

On September 15, 2009, an URE employee allowed a contract telecommunications service technician (service technician), without unescorted access rights, unescorted access into a CIP Critical Asset facility for 22 minutes while he performed a service visit, which is in violation of CIP-006-1 R1.6. The CIP Critical Asset facility was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) telecommunication hub facility located in a URE distribution service center. URE discovered this incident when the service technician could not exit the secured room without assistance. He used the emergency exit button, which automatically alarmed the URE security and initiated an investigation. Following the incident, URE inspected the facility and systems and confirmed that no damage or other sabotage had been done to the CIP Critical Asset facility or to any affiliated equipment.

In the September 15, 2009 incident, before allowing the service technician unescorted access into the CIP Critical Asset facility, a URE employee failed to properly log in the service technician, in violation of CIP-006-1 R4.

URE has two internal documents, to ensure that the physical environments housing URE's Critical Cyber Assets have adequate physical security controls in place to assist in protecting the Critical Cyber Assets essential to the bulk power system (BPS) from compromise. These documents address CIP-006-1, Requirements R1 through R6. Therefore, while URE has a documented Physical Security Plan in place, the September 9, 2009 and September 15, 2009 incidents indicate that URE failed to follow its procedures for providing escorted access within the Physical Security Perimeter for personnel not authorized for unescorted access as required by CIP-006-1 R1.6. The September 15, 2009 incident also indicated that URE failed to properly log physical access to the physical security perimeter as required by CIP-006-1 R4.

RELIABILITY IMPACT STATEMENT- POTENTIAL AND ACTUAL

Reliability First determined that the impact on the BPS was moderate but not serious or substantial because, in the September 9, 2009 incident, the security guard's continuous monitoring of the HVAC service technician ensured that no damage or other sabotage was done to the back-up Transmission Control Center. Additionally, URE inspected the facility and systems and confirmed that no damage or other sabotage had been done to the CIP Critical Asset facility or to any affiliated equipment. Both the security guard and the service technician had followed the

⁷ A URE employee granted the security guard and the HVAC service technician access to the back-up control center after requiring them to log in. The URE employee mistakenly thought that the security guard was allowed unescorted access and could act as an escort.

proper log-in procedure in this instance. The security guard had completed training and had a clear background check. In addition, the area in which the September 9, 2009 incident occurred is a backup facility.

For the September 15, 2009 incident, the duration of the incident was 22 minutes, and URE was promptly notified of the incident via alarm. The service technician could not exit the secured room without assistance. He used the emergency exit button, which automatically alarmed the URE security and initiated an investigation. Following the incident, URE inspected the facility and systems and confirmed that no damage or other sabotage had been done to the CIP Critical Asset facility or to any affiliated equipment. URE performed a physical inspection of the facility and reviewed all logs associated with the affiliated equipment and sites to ensure that no malicious activity had occurred.

The service technician had access to a SCADA telecommunication hub facility located in an URE distribution service center, and could have attempted to stop communications to a subset of Remote Terminal Units or to exercise control of the breakers at substations. However, URE has multiple SCADA telecommunication hub facilities and access to the SCADA telecommunication hub facility in question would not have allowed the service technician access to the SCADA computer room assets or to other SCADA telecommunication hub facilities and their associated Remote Terminal Units. The SCADA telecommunication hub facility involved in the September 15, 2009 incident has a provision for automatic failover to a backup system, as well as alarms for loss of servers and loss of data.

IS THERE A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT YES	N(\Box
WITH RESPECT TO THE VIOLATION(S), REGISTERED ENTITY		
NEITHER ADMITS NOR DENIES IT (SETTLEMENT ONLY) ADMITS TO IT DOES NOT CONTEST IT (INCLUDING WITHIN 30 DAYS)	YES YES YES	
WITH RESPECT TO THE ASSESSED PENALTY OR SANCTION, RE ENTITY	GISTE	RED
ACCEPTS IT/ DOES NOT CONTEST IT	YES	\boxtimes

III. <u>DISCOVERY INFORMATION</u>

IDENTIFY AND EXPLAIN ALL PRIOR VERSIONS THAT WERE ACCEPTED OR REJECTED, IF APPLICABLE N/A

⁸ The duration end dates are the dates that preventive measures were implemented; the Mitigation Plan was completed as of December 7, 2009. Additionally, the incident that occurred on September 9, 2009 occurred for less than one day and the incident on September 15, 2009 occurred for 22 minutes.

⁹ URE first notified Reliability *First* of these occurrences in a conference call on September 24, 2009 and submitted the Self-Report on October 2, 2009.

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS PUBLIC VERSION

MITIGATION PLAN COMPLETED	YES	\boxtimes	NO		
EXPECTED COMPLETION DATE EXTENSIONS GRANTED ACTUAL COMPLETION DATE			Sub	mitted a	as complete N/A 12/7/09
DATE OF CERTIFICATION LE CERTIFIED COMPLETE BY RE		ED EN	TITY A	AS OF	1/11/10 12/7/09
DATE OF VERIFICATION LET VERIFIED COMPLETE BY REC		ENTIT	Y AS C)F	1/27/10 12/7/09

ACTIONS TAKEN TO MITIGATE THE ISSUE AND PREVENT RECURRENCE

URE completed detailed investigations of the September 9, 2009 and September 15, 2009 incidents. For the September 15, 2009 incident, URE conducted a detailed check of the facility and systems to confirm no damage or compromise to CIP assets occurred. For the September 9, 2009 incident, the continuous presence of a trained security guard (who had completed CIP-004-1 training and a background check) provided assurance that no damage or compromise to CIP assets had occurred.

URE management communicated directly to the employees who failed to perform logging and escorting duties, ensuring their understanding of the failure and expectations going forward. URE management also communicated the importance of CIP-006-1 requirements to all employees with CIP responsibilities. URE's CEO issued a memo to all URE staff concerning the need for heightened awareness of NERC compliance requirements.

LIST OF EVIDENCE REVIEWED BY REGIONAL ENTITY TO EVALUATE COMPLETION OF MITIGATION PLAN (FOR CASES IN WHICH MITIGATION IS NOT YET COMPLETED, LIST EVIDENCE REVIEWED FOR COMPLETED MILESTONES)

URE provided the investigation report for both incidents

URE submitted e-mails whereby on September 29, 2009, the IT technician confirmed that he checked the equipment at the service center and found nothing out of the ordinary. For the other facility, a security guard was present the entire time during the incident, which provided assurance of no damage or compromise to CIP Critical Assets.

URE submitted documentation of multiple e-mails to demonstrate URE management's communications with URE employees following the two incidents. For the September 9, 2009 incident, URE submitted an email from URE to the staff involved in the September 9, 2009 incident. For the September 15, 2009 incident, URE submitted an e-mail dated November 23, 2009 describing the discussions held with the staff involved in the September 15, 2009 incident. These discussions occurred in the week following the September 15, 2009 incident.

E-mail to all employees and contractors. In addition, URE gave directions to post the email on bulletin boards in locations where employees do not have computer access, and directed each supervisor to review the email with their employees in face-to-face meetings by the end of October, 2009.

E-mails from management that meetings to discuss the October 19, 2009 email took place by the end of October 2009 as directed.

Compliance bulletin that URE posted on URE bulletin boards, which described the violations and provided a refresher on what should have been done.

E-mail dated September 11, 2009 directing all security officers to read the email and sign it as an indication that they have read it and understand it. The body of the e-mail describes areas designated as NERC CIP where no security officer has authorized access and states that security officers must not enter without authorized escort. All security officers signed the email between September 11, 2009 and September 28, 2009 and returned the signed email.

E-mail dated December 7, 2009 stating that all members of the IT department must attend meetings concerning the violations. This was confirmed in an email stating each manager communicated to all IT employees and further stating all managers had submitted written confirmation that they had communicated with their direct reports.

URE submitted an e-mail from URE President and CEO to all URE employees and contractors dated October 21, 2009, which discussed the violations and the potential consequences. He also stressed the need to be "vigilant on our responsibilities to NERC compliance."

II. PENALTY INFORMATION

TOTAL ASSESSED PENALTY OR SANCTION OF \$20,000 FOR TWO VIOLATIONS OF RELIABILITY STANDARDS.

(1) REGISTERED ENTITY'S COMPLIANCE HISTORY
PREVIOUSLY FILED VIOLATIONS OF ANY OF THE INSTANT RELIABILITY STANDARD(S) OR REQUIREMENT(S) THEREUNDER YES \(\bigcap \) NO \(\bigcap \)
LIST VIOLATIONS AND STATUS
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS
PREVIOUSLY FILED VIOLATIONS OF OTHER RELIABILITY STANDARD(S) OR REQUIREMENTS THEREUNDER YES NO
LIST VIOLATIONS AND STATUS
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS
(2) THE DEGREE AND QUALITY OF COOPERATION BY THE REGISTERED ENTITY (IF THE RESPONSE TO FULL COOPERATION IS "NO," THE ABBREVIATED NOP FORM MAY NOT BE USED.)
FULL COOPERATION YES NO IF NO, EXPLAIN
(3) THE PRESENCE AND QUALITY OF THE REGISTERED ENTITY'S COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
IS THERE A DOCUMENTED COMPLIANCE PROGRAM YES NO UNDETERMINED EXPLAIN
Reliability First considered URE's compliance program, which was in place at the time of the violations, as a mitigating factor in determining the penalty amount.

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS PUBLIC VERSION

EXPLAIN SENIOR MANAGEMENT'S ROLE AND INVOLVEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE REGISTERED ENTITY'S COMPLIANCE PROGRAM, INCLUDING WHETHER SENIOR MANAGEMENT TAKES ACTIONS THAT SUPPORT THE COMPLIANCE PROGRAM, SUCH AS TRAINING, COMPLIANCE AS A FACTOR IN EMPLOYEE EVALUATIONS, OR OTHERWISE.

	STERED ENTITY TO CONCEAL THE ON NEEDED TO REVIEW, EVALUATE OR
	TION(S) WERE INTENTIONAL (IF THE EVIATED NOP FORM MAY NOT BE USED.)
(6) ANY OTHER MITIGATING FA YES NO IF YES, EXPLAIN	CTORS FOR CONSIDERATION
(7) ANY OTHER AGGRAVATING YES NO IF YES, EXPLAIN	FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION
(8) ANY OTHER EXTENUATING YES NO IF YES, EXPLAIN	CIRCUMSTANCES

EXHIBITS:

SOURCE DOCUMENT URE's Self-Report dated October 2, 2009 **MITIGATION PLAN** URE's Mitigation Plan, MIT-09-2270, submitted December 10, 2009 CERTIFICATION BY REGISTERED ENTITY URE's Certification of Mitigation Plan Completion submitted January 11, 2010 VERIFICATION BY REGIONAL ENTITY Reliability First's Summary and Review of Mitigation Plan dated January 27, 2010 OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION: NOTICE OF ALLEGED VIOLATION AND PROPOSED PENALTY OR **SANCTION ISSUED** DATE: OR N/A SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS COMMENCED DATE: **3/5/10** OR N/A NOTICE OF CONFIRMED VIOLATION ISSUED DATE: OR N/A \boxtimes SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD INFORMATION DATE(S) OR N/A \boxtimes REGISTERED ENTITY RESPONSE CONTESTED FINDINGS PENALTY BOTH NO CONTEST **HEARING REQUESTED** YES NO DATE **OUTCOME** APPEAL REQUESTED