

NERC

NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC
RELIABILITY CORPORATION

Open Source and Unsupported Software

George Masters, Lead Product Engineer, Secure Engineering
Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc
March 23, 2020

RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY



- Introduction: Open Source and Unsupported Software
 - *What is* Open Source and Types of users
 - How Open Source and *Unsupported* are related
- Assessing Operational Risk (this includes “pilot error”)
 - Threat Modeling
- Evaluating Trustworthiness
 - Authenticity and Reputation
- Case Studies
- The Problem of Unsupported Software
- Conclusion
- Q&A

“Open source software is software with source code that anyone can inspect, modify, and enhance.”

For users, no contractual relationship with a supplier → *Self-Service Support*

- Mozilla Firefox
- Google Chrome
- Linux
- Git

Reference: <https://opensource.com/resources/what-open-source>

https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Developer_guide/Source_Code/Downloading_Source_Archives




The screenshot shows a Mozilla Firefox browser window displaying the MDN web docs page titled "Downloading Source Archives". The browser's address bar shows the URL https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Developer_guide/Source_Code/Downloading_Source_Archives. The page features the MDN logo, navigation links for "Technologies", "References & Guides", and "Feedback", and a "Sign in" button. The main heading is "Downloading Source Archives", with options for "Languages", "Edit", and a settings icon. Below the heading is a "Jump to:" section with links for "License", "Download", and "Unpack". The main content area contains a paragraph explaining that Mozilla source code can be obtained by downloading a source archive or using Mercurial, and another paragraph advising to review system requirements and build instructions before attempting a build.

The Mozilla source code can be obtained either by downloading a source archive or by using a Mercurial (source control) client. If you are just starting out or you want to build a particular Mozilla product release, downloading a source archive is recommended. Otherwise, get the [Mozilla Source Code using Mercurial \(for Firefox\)](#) or [Getting Comm-central Source Code \(for Thunderbird, SeaMonkey and Firefox\)](#). If you want to browse the source instead of downloading it, read [Viewing and searching Mozilla source code online](#).


Before attempting a build, please review the [system requirements and build instructions](#).

<https://github.com/openssl/openssl>



<https://github.com/microsoft/AttackSurfaceAnalyzer>

(Sponsored Open Source)



The Skills Required and Availability of Documentation and Support Varies Widely

- User types
 - Downloader
 - Builder
 - Developer
- Things Users are responsible for
 - Installation
 - Configuration
 - Security maintenance
 - Watching out for dependencies and install-alongs

“... identify and assess cyber security risk(s) to the Bulk Electric System from vendor products or services resulting from: (i) procuring and installing vendor equipment and software; and (ii) transitions from one vendor(s) to another vendor(s)”

- R1.1 risk assessment revolves around procuring and installing
- Procurement is a pretty broad term that includes selection
- A *threat model* is a good way to describe operational risk for a process, including how it might go wrong, the likelihood and impact of those possibilities, and what you plan to do about it.

Expanding the threat model idea a bit...

It describes the **things that affect the system**, the **things the system can affect**, and the **criticality** of those things. It also describes **what can go wrong**, either **accidentally** or **deliberately** induced by an attacker, how likely those are, and ways threats can be reduced.

A threat model evaluates each threat for importance and prioritizes mitigation. It concludes with **residual risks** that are accepted.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Threat_model

Some things to look for:

- *Is this software authentic and unmodified?*
- *What are the risks?*
 - Internet connection (how can an attacker get access?)
 - Operating as privileged user (administrator, Local System, etc.)
 - What are the inputs and how trustworthy are they?
 - Inauthentic? Malicious?
 - What are the output and what happens if inappropriate?
 - What can this system reach via the network?
 - **How trustworthy is the software?**

Evaluating trustworthiness of software is not unique to Open Source, but the problem is especially acute, because usually no contractual relationship exists with a supplier - you're on your own, so you look for evidence.

Things to look for:

- Visible community activity
- Visible defect and commit (and revision) history
- Security defects being identified
- Security defects being handled quickly
- Possibility of a sponsoring organization
- Reputation and Internet chatter

- Internet Searches
 - “chatter”
 - User groups
 - Project Web page
 - Release distribution
 - Bugs and Issues
 - Information mailing lists
- <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search?execution=e2s1>
- <https://scan.coverity.com/projects>
- <https://www.openhub.net>

GitHub provides a convenient view into issues and activity

The screenshot shows the GitHub repository page for `openssl / openssl`. The repository has 850 Watchers, 10,444 Stars, and 4,572 Forks. The Issues tab is selected, showing 639 issues. The search bar contains the query `is:issue is:open`. There are 22 Labels and 4 Milestones. A green "New issue" button is visible. The list of issues includes:

Issue Title	Author	Comments
Building openssl/crypto with `no-stdio` still builds `libcrypto` with `stdin` and `stderr` #9037 opened a day ago by jbitbit	jbitbit	4
no-dso was not useless #9036 opened a day ago by benjaminp	benjaminp	7
TLS 1.3 disabling ciphers and sign algos failed #9025 opened a day ago by wolftobias	wolftobias	2
1.1.1b SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL occurs when SSL_accept is invoked in a thread #9024 opened a day ago by hufenghuanyu1989	hufenghuanyu1989	2
OPENSSL cleanup core		1

- <https://github.com/Microsoft/ApplicationInspector>

Introduction

Microsoft Application Inspector is a software source code analysis tool that helps identify and surface well-known features and other interesting characteristics of source code to aid in determining **what the software is** or **what it does**. It has received attention on [ZDNet](#), [SecurityWeek](#), [CSOOnline](#), [Linux.com/news](#), [HelpNetSecurity](#), Twitter and more and was first featured on [Microsoft.com](#).

Application Inspector is different from traditional static analysis tools in that it doesn't attempt to identify "good" or "bad" patterns; it simply reports what it finds against a set of over 400 rule patterns for feature detection including features that impact security such as the use of cryptography and more. This can be extremely helpful in reducing the time needed to determine what Open Source or other components do by examining the source directly rather than trusting to limited documentation or recommendations.

The tool supports scanning various programming languages including C, C++, C#, Java, JavaScript, HTML, Python, Objective-C, Go, Ruby, PowerShell and [more](#) and can scan projects with mixed language files. It also includes HTML, JSON and text output formats with the default being an HTML report similar to the one shown here.

Havex

- Compromised point of distribution
- Countermeasure: Digital Signatures or Hash Values

Heartbleed

- Severe defect compromising confidential data
- In the wild from March 2012 to April 2014
- Fixed about 4 days after disclosure to the OpenSSL maintainers
- Countermeasure: Monitor for security announcements

There is no support available

- **No developer community, commercial or otherwise**
- **If security vulnerabilities are found, they will not be patched**
- **... and you may never know, *but attackers might***

The security risk is UNKNOWN

If you must use Unsupported Software, mitigate risks

- **Reduce Attack Surface**
- **Control Access**
- **Isolate**
- **Monitor**

The Takeaways

- Make sure the distribution point is *authentic*
- Make sure the software is *currently supported*
- Know *where security notices and updates will appear* and monitor for them
- Always apply what *mitigations* you can
 - Reduce attack surface (turn off unused stuff, disable phone-home, etc.)
 - Control access (limit use to qualified users with need)
 - Isolate (isolated network, bastion host, air-gap)
 - Monitor (host computer and network logs)
- *An unsupported product is unknown risk*

Additional resources related to Supply Chain Security can be found at <https://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/Pages/Supply-Chain-Risk-Mitigation-Program.aspx>.



Questions and Answers