### Request for an Interpretation of a Reliability Standard

**Date submitted:** December 12, 2011

**Contact information for person requesting the interpretation.**

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Identify the Standard (include version number, e.g., PRC-001-1) that needs clarification and its associated title.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPL-003-0a</td>
<td>System Performance Following Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category C)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPL-004-0</td>
<td>System Performance Following Extreme Events Resulting in the Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category D)</td>
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**Identify specifically what Requirement needs clarification.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Requirement (and text)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPL-003-0a</td>
<td><strong>R1.3.1</strong> Be performed and evaluated only for those Category C contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. An explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system</td>
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results shall be available as supporting information.

TPL-003-0a  **R1.3.10.** Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems.

TPL-003-0a  **R1.5.** Consider all contingencies applicable to Category C.

TPL-004-0  **R1.3.1.** Be performed and evaluated only for those Category D contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. An explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results shall be available as supporting information.

TPL-004-0  **R1.3.7.** Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems.

TPL-004-0  **R1.4.** Consider all contingencies applicable to Category D.

**Identify the nature of clarification that is requested (Check as many as applicable).**

- [ ] Clarify the required performance
- [ ] Clarify the conditions under which the performance is required
- [ ] Clarify which functional entity is responsible for performing an action in a requirement
- [ ] Clarify the reliability outcome the requirement is intended to produce

**Please explain the clarification needed.**

This interpretation request has been developed to address Commission concerns related to the term “Single Point of Failure” and how it relates to system performance and contingency planning clarification regarding the following questions about the listed standards, requirements and terms. More specifically, clarification is needed about the comprehensive study of system performance relating to Table 1’s, Category C and D contingency of a “protection system failure” and specifically the impact of failed components (i.e., “Single Point of Failure”). It is not entirely clear whether a valid assessment of a protection system failure includes evaluation of shared or non-redundant protection system components. Protection systems that have a shared protection system component are not two independent protection systems, because both protection systems will be mutually impacted for a failure of a single shared component. A protection system component evaluation would include the evaluation of the consequences on system performance for the failure of any protection system component that is integral to the operation of the protection system being evaluated and to the operation of another protection system.
On March 30, 2009, NERC issued an Industry Advisory — Protection System Single Point of Failure \(^1\) (i.e., NERC Alert) for three significant events. One of which, the Westwing outage (June 14, 2004) was caused by failure of a single auxiliary relay that initiated both breaker tripping and the breaker failure protection. Since breaker tripping and breaker failure protection both shared the same auxiliary relay, there was no independence between breaker tripping and breaker failure protection systems, therefore causing both protection systems to not operate for the single component failure of the auxiliary relay. The failure of this auxiliary relay is known as a “single point of failure.” It is not clear whether this situation is comprehensively addressed by the applicable entities when making a valid assessment of system performance for both Category C and D contingencies.

**Question 1:** For the parenthetical “(stuck breaker or protection system failure)” in TPL-003-0a (Category C contingencies 6-9) and TPL-004-0 (Category D contingencies 1-4), does an entity have the option of evaluating the effects\(^2\) of either “stuck breaker” or “protection system failure” contingency\(^3\), or does an applicable entity have to evaluate the contingency that produces the more severe system results or impacts as identified in R1.3.1 of both standards?

There is a lack of clarity whether R1.3.1\(^4\) requires an entity to assess which contingency causes the most severe system results or impacts (R1.3.1) and this ambiguity could result in a potential reliability gap. Whether the simulation of a stuck breaker or protection system failure will produce the worst result depends on the protection system design. For example when a protection system is fully redundant, a protection system failure will not affect fault clearing; therefore, a stuck breaker would result in more severe system results or impacts. However, when a protection system failure affects fault clearing, the fault clearing time may be longer than the breaker failure protection clearing time for a stuck breaker contingency and may result in tripping of additional system elements, resulting in a more severe system response.

**Question 2:** For the phrase “Delayed Clearing\(^5\)” used in Category C\(^6\) contingencies 6-9 and Category D\(^7\) contingencies 1-4, to what extent does the description in Table 1, footnote (e)\(^8\) require an entity to model a single point of failure of a protection system component that may prevent correct operation of a protection system, including other protection systems impacted by that failed component based on

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\(^2\) As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.3.10. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.3.7.

\(^3\) As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

\(^4\) “Be performed and evaluated only for those Category (TPL-003-0a Category C and TPL-004-0 Category D) contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts.”

\(^5\) As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

\(^6\) As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5.

\(^7\) As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

\(^8\) Footnote (e) Delayed Clearing: “failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay,”
the as-built design of that protection system?

There is a lack of clarity whether footnote (e) in Table 1 requires the study and/or simulation of a failure of a protection system component (i.e., single point of failure) that may prevent correct operation of the protection system(s) impacted by the component failure. Protection systems that share a protection system component are fully dependent upon the correct operation of that single shared component and do not perform as two independent protection systems. This lack of clarity may result in a potential reliability gap.

Clarity is necessary as to whether (1) a valid assessment should include evaluation of delayed clearing due to failure of the protection system component (i.e., single point of failure), such as the failure of a shared protection system component, that produces the more severe system results or impacts; and (2) the study and/or simulation of the fault clearing sequence and protection system(s) operation should be based on the protection system(s) as-built design.

The lack of clarity is compounded by the similarity between the phrase “Delayed Clearing” used in TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0, footnote (e), and the NERC glossary term “Delayed Fault Clearing.” While TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0 do not use the glossary term, the similarity may lead to confusion and inconsistency in how entities apply footnote (e) to “stuck breaker” or “protection system failure” contingency assessments.

Identify the material impact to your organization or others, if known, caused by the lack of clarity or an incorrect interpretation of this standard.

There is a material impact to the entities required to perform transmission planning assessments and to the entities that may rely on these assessments. The lack of clarity in defining the required studies impacts entities by:

- Potential non-compliance if the correct contingencies are not studied
- Inefficient use of resources if contingencies are studied that are not required and mitigation plans are implemented that are not required
- Potential negative impact to grid reliability if the correct contingencies are not assessed