Standard Development Timeline

This section is maintained by the drafting team during the development of the standard and will be removed when the standard becomes effective.

Development Steps Completed

1. Nominations for the Standard Drafting Team (SDT) for Project 2014-04 Physical Security were solicited March 13-18, 2014, and the SDT was appointed by the Standards Committee on March 21, 2014.

2. Technical Conference was held April 1, 2014.

Description of Current Draft

This is the first draft of the proposed Reliability Standard, and it is being posted for stakeholder comment and initial ballot. This draft includes proposed requirements to meet the directives issued in the FERC order issued March 7, 2014, in Docket No. RD14-6-000, Reliability Standards for Physical Security Measures, 146 FERC ¶ 61,166 (2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anticipated Actions</th>
<th>Anticipated Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-day Formal Comment Period with a 5-day Initial Ballot, pursuant to a Standards Committee authorized waiver.</td>
<td>April 10, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-day Formal Comment Period with a 5-day Additional Ballot (if necessary), pursuant to a Standards Committee authorized waiver.</td>
<td>May 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-day Final Ballot, pursuant to a Standards Committee authorized waiver.</td>
<td>May 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOT Adoption.</td>
<td>May 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>File with applicable Regulatory Authorities.</td>
<td>No later than June 5, 2014</td>
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## Version History

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<th>Version</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Change Tracking</th>
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<td>1.0</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Effective Date</td>
<td>New</td>
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</table>

April 9, 2014
Definitions of Terms Used in Standard

This section includes all newly defined or revised terms used in the proposed standard. Terms already defined in the NERC Glossary of Terms used in Reliability Standards (Glossary) are not repeated here. New or revised definitions listed below become approved when the proposed standard is approved. When the standard becomes effective, these defined terms will be removed from the individual standard and added to the Glossary.

None
A. Introduction

1. Title: Physical Security
2. Number: CIP-014-1
3. Purpose: To identify and protect Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

4. Applicability:

4.1. Functional Entities:

4.1.1 Transmission Owner that owns any of the following:

4.1.1.1 Transmission Facilities operated at 500 kV or higher. For the purpose of this criterion, the collector bus for a generation plant is not considered a Transmission Facility, but is part of the generation interconnection Facility.

4.1.1.2 Transmission Facilities that are operating between 200 kV and 499 kV at a single station or substation, where the station or substation is connected at 200 kV or higher voltages to three or more other Transmission stations or substations and has an "aggregate weighted value" exceeding 3000 according to the table below. The "aggregate weighted value" for a single station or substation is determined by summing the "weight value per line" shown in the table below for each incoming and each outgoing BES Transmission Line that is connected to another Transmission station or substation. For the purpose of this criterion, the collector bus for a generation plant is not considered a Transmission Facility, but is part of the generation interconnection Facility.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voltage Value of a Line</th>
<th>Weight Value per Line</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>less than 200 kV (not applicable)</td>
<td>(not applicable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 kV to 299 kV</td>
<td>700</td>
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<tr>
<td>300 kV to 499 kV</td>
<td>1300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 kV and above</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1.1.3 Transmission Facilities at a single station or substation location that are identified by its Reliability Coordinator, Planning Coordinator, or Transmission Planner as critical to the derivation of Interconnection
Reliability Operating Limits (IROLs) and their associated contingencies.

4.1.1.4 Transmission Facilities identified as essential to meeting Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements.

4.1.2 Transmission Operator.

Exemption: Facilities within the scope of a security plan approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission are not subject to this Standard.

5. Effective Dates:

CIP-014-1 is effective the first day of the first calendar quarter that is six months beyond the date that this standard is approved by applicable regulatory authorities, or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. In those jurisdictions where regulatory approval is not required, CIP-014-1 shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is six months beyond the date this standard is approved by the NERC Board of Trustees, or as otherwise made effective pursuant to the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities.

6. Background:

This Reliability Standard addresses the directives from the FERC order issued March 7, 2014, *Reliability Standards for Physical Security Measures*, 146 FERC ¶ 61,166 (2014), which required NERC to develop a physical security reliability standard(s) to identify and protect facilities that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.
B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Transmission Owner shall perform an initial risk assessment and subsequent risk assessments of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria specified in Applicability Section 4.1.1. The initial and subsequent risk assessments shall consist of a transmission analysis or transmission analyses designed to identify any Transmission station(s) and Transmission substation(s) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. [VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]

1.1. Subsequent risk assessments shall be performed:

- At least once every 30 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection; or

- At least once every 60 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.

1.2. The Transmission Owner shall identify the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment.

M1. Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of the risk assessment of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in service within 24 months) that meet the criteria in Applicability Section 4.1.1 as specified in Requirement R1.

Rationale for Requirement R1:
This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 6 in the order on physical security to perform a risk assessment to identify which facilities if rendered inoperable or damaged could impact an Interconnection through widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures. It also meets the portion of the directive from paragraph 11 for periodic reevaluation by requiring the risk assessment to be performed every 30 months (or 60 months for an entity that has not identified in a previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in
R2. Each Transmission Owner shall have an unaffiliated third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. The verification may occur concurrent with or after the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1. [VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]

2.1. Each Transmission Owner shall select an unaffiliated verifying entity that is either:

- A registered Planning Coordinator, Transmission Planner, or Reliability Coordinator; or
- An entity that has transmission planning or analysis experience.

2.2. The unaffiliated verifying entity shall either verify the Transmission Owner’s risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 or recommend the addition or deletion of a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s). The Transmission Owner shall ensure the verification is completed within 90 calendar days following the completion of the Requirement R1 risk assessment.

2.3. If the unaffiliated verifying entity recommends that the Transmission Owner add a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) to, or remove a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) from, its identification under Requirement R1, the Transmission Owner shall either, within 60 calendar days of completion of the verification, for each recommended addition or removal of a Transmission station or Transmission substation:

- Modify its identification under Requirement R1 consistent with the recommendation; or
- Document the technical basis for not modifying the identification in accordance with the recommendation.

2.4. Each Transmission Owner shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information exchanged with the unaffiliated verifying entity.
M2. Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or 
electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner completed an unaffiliated 
third party verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment and satisfied all of the 
applicable provisions of Requirement R2, including, if applicable, documenting the 
technical basis for not modifying the Requirement R1 identification as specified under 
Part 2.3.

Rationale for Requirement R2:

This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 11 in the order on 
physical security requiring verification by an entity other than the owner or 
operator of the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1.

This requirement provides the flexibility for a Transmission Owner to select 
registered and non-registered entities with transmission planning or analysis 
experience to perform the verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment. The 
term “unaffiliated” means that the selected verifying entity cannot be a corporate 
affiliate (i.e., the verifying entity cannot be an entity that controls, is controlled by, 
or is under common control with, the Transmission owner). The verifying entity 
also cannot be a division of the Transmission Owner that operates as a functional 
unit.

Requirement R2 also provides the Transmission Owner the flexibility to work with 
the verifying entity throughout the Requirement R1 risk assessment, which for 
some Transmission Owners may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a 
Transmission Owner could coordinate with their unaffiliated verifying entity to 
perform a Requirement R1 risk assessment to satisfy both Requirement R1 and 
Requirement R2 concurrently.

R3. For a primary control center(s) identified by the Transmission Owner according to 
Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 that is not under the 
operational control of the Transmission Owner, the Transmission Owner shall, within 
seven calendar days following completion of Requirement R2, notify the Transmission 
Operator that has operational control of the primary control center of such 
identification and the date of completion of Requirement R2. [VRF: Lower; Time-
Horizon: Long-term Planning]

3.1. If a Transmission station or Transmission substation previously identified under 
Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 is removed from the 
identification during a subsequent risk assessment performed according to 
Requirement R1 or a verification according to Requirement R2, then the 
Transmission Owner shall, within seven calendar days following the verification 
or the subsequent risk assessment, notify the Transmission Operator that has 
operational control of the primary control center of the removal.
M3. Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic communications that the Transmission Owner notified each Transmission Operator, as applicable, according to Requirement R3.

Rationale for Requirement R3:
Some Transmission Operators will have obligations under this standard for certain primary control centers. Those obligations, however, are contingent upon a Transmission Owner first identifying which Transmission stations and Transmission substations meet the criteria specified by Requirement R1, as verified according to Requirement R2. This requirement is intended to ensure that a Transmission Operator that has operational control of a primary control center identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2 receives notice of such identification so that the Transmission Operator may timely fulfill its resulting obligations under Requirements R4 through R6. Since the timing obligations in Requirements R4 through R6 are based upon completion of Requirement R2, the Transmission Owner must also include notice of the date of completion of Requirement R2. Similarly, the Transmission Owner must notify the Transmission Operator of any removals from identification that result from a subsequent risk assessment under Requirement R1 or the verification process under Requirement R2.

R4. Each Transmission Owner that owns or operates a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3 that the Transmission Operator’s primary control center has operational control of an identified Transmission station or Transmission substation, shall conduct an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2. The evaluation shall consider the following: [VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Operations Planning, Long-term Planning]

4.1. Unique characteristics of the identified and verified Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s);

4.2. Prior history or attack on similar facilities taking into account the frequency, geographic proximity, and severity of past physical security related events; and

4.3. Intelligence or threat warnings from sources such as law enforcement, the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC), U.S. federal and/or Canadian governmental agencies, or their successors.
M4. Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator conducted an evaluation of the potential threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s) and primary control center(s) as specified in Requirement R4.

Rationale for Requirement R4:
This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 8 in the order on physical security that the reliability standard must require tailored evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities to facilities identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2. Threats and vulnerabilities may vary from facility to facility based on factors such as the facility’s location, size, function, existing protections, and attractiveness of the target. As such, the requirement does not mandate a one-size-fits-all approach but requires entities to account for the unique characteristics of their facilities.

Requirement R4 does not explicitly state when the evaluation of threats and vulnerabilities must occur or be completed. However, Requirement R5 requires that the entity’s security plan(s), which is dependent on the Requirement R4 evaluation, must be completed within 120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R2. Thus, an entity has the flexibility when to complete the Requirement R4 evaluation, provided that it is completed in time to comply with the requirement in Requirement R5 to develop a physical security plan 120 calendar days following completion of Requirement R2.

R5. Each Transmission Owner that owns or has operational control of a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3 that the Transmission Operator’s primary control center has operational control of an identified Transmission station or Transmission substation, shall develop and implement a documented physical security plan(s) that covers their respective Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) within 120 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2. The physical security plan(s) shall include the following attributes: [VRF: High; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]

5.1. Resiliency or security measures designed to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities based on the results of the evaluation conducted in Requirement R4.

5.2. Law enforcement contact and coordination information.
5.3. A timeline for implementing the physical security enhancements and modifications specified in the physical security plan.

5.4. Provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to the Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), or primary control center(s).

M5. Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation of its physical security plan(s) that covers their respective identified and verified Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) as specified in Requirement R5, and additional evidence demonstrating implementation of the physical security plan.

Rationale for Requirement R5:
This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 9 in the order on physical security requiring the development and implementation of a security plan(s) designed to protect against attacks to the facilities identified in Requirement R1 based on the assessment performed under Requirement R4.

R6. Each Transmission Owner that owns or operates a Transmission station, Transmission substation, or primary control center identified in Requirement R1 and verified according to Requirement R2, and each Transmission Operator notified by a Transmission Owner according to Requirement R3 that the Transmission Operator’s primary control center has operational control of an identified Transmission station or Transmission substation, shall have an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5. The review may occur concurrently with or after completion of the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan development under Requirement R5. [VRF: Medium; Time-Horizon: Long-term Planning]

6.1. Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall select an unaffiliated third party reviewer from the following:

6.1.1. An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification.

6.1.2. An entity or organization approved by the ERO.

6.1.3. A governmental agency with physical security expertise.

6.1.4. An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise.
6.2. The Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator, respectively, shall ensure that the unaffiliated third party review is completed within 90 calendar days of completing the security plan(s) developed in Requirement R5. The unaffiliated third party review may, but is not required to, include recommended changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5.

6.3. If the unaffiliated reviewing entity recommends changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5, the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator shall, within 60 calendar days of the completion of the unaffiliated third party review, for each recommendation:

- Modify its evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation; or
- Document the reason(s) for not modifying the evaluation or security plan(s) consistent with the recommendation.

6.4. Each Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall implement procedures, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements, for protecting sensitive or confidential information exchanged with the unaffiliated reviewing entity.

M6. Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, written or electronic documentation that the Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator had an unaffiliated third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 as specified in Requirement R6 including, if applicable, documenting the reasons for not modifying the evaluation or security plan(s) in accordance with a recommendation under Part 6.3.

Rationale for Requirement R6:
This requirement meets the FERC directive from paragraph 11 in the order on physical security requiring review by an entity other than the owner or operator with appropriate expertise of the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5.

As with the verification required by Requirement R2, Requirement R6 provides Transmission Owners and Transmission Operators the flexibility to work with the reviewing entity throughout the Requirement R4 evaluation and the development of the Requirement R5 security plan(s). This would allow entities to satisfy their obligations under Requirement R6 concurrent with the satisfaction of their obligations under Requirements R4 and R5.
C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, “Compliance Enforcement Authority” (CEA) means NERC or the Regional Entity in their respective roles of monitoring and enforcing compliance with the NERC Reliability Standards.

1.2. Evidence Retention

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the CEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence during an on-site visit to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Transmission Owner and Transmission Operator shall keep data or evidence to show compliance, as identified below, unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority (CEA) to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

The responsible entities shall retain documentation as evidence for three years.

If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved, or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records, subject to the confidentiality provisions of Section 1500 of the Rules of Procedure and the provisions of Section 1.4 below.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes:

- Compliance Audits
- Self-Certifications
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Violation Investigations
- Self-Reporting
- Complaints Text

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

Confidentiality: To protect the confidentiality and sensitive nature of the evidence for demonstrating compliance with this standard, all evidence will be retained at the Transmission Owner’s and Transmission Operator’s facilities.
## Table of Compliance Elements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R #</th>
<th>Time Horizon</th>
<th>VRF</th>
<th>Lower VSL</th>
<th>Moderate VSL</th>
<th>High VSL</th>
<th>Severe VSL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R1</td>
<td>Long-term Planning</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to two calendar months after that date; OR The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread</td>
<td>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than two calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to four calendar months after that date; OR The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread</td>
<td>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than four calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment but less than or equal to six calendar months after that date; OR The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread</td>
<td>The Transmission Owner performed an initial risk assessment but did so more than six calendar months after the date specified in the implementation plan for performing the initial risk assessment; OR The Transmission Owner failed to perform an initial risk assessment; OR The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R #</th>
<th>Time Horizon</th>
<th>VRF</th>
<th>Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Lower VSL</td>
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<td>result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 30 calendar months but less than or equal to 32 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection</td>
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<td>Moderate VSL</td>
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<td>instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 32 calendar months but less than or equal to 34 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection</td>
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<td>High VSL</td>
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<td>instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 34 calendar months but less than or equal to 36 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection</td>
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<td>Severe VSL</td>
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<td>Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 36 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner that has identified in its previous risk assessment one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection</td>
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<td>R #</td>
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<td>Lower VSL</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 60 calendar months but less than or equal to 62 calendar months.</td>
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<td>Moderate VSL</td>
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<td>Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 62 calendar months but less than or equal to 64 calendar months.</td>
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<td>High VSL</td>
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<td>performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after 64 calendar months but less than or equal to 66 calendar months; OR The Transmission Owner performed a risk assessment but failed to include Part 1.2.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Severe VSL</td>
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<td>uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a risk assessment; OR The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection performed a subsequent risk assessment but did so after more than 66 calendar months;</td>
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</table>
## Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R #</th>
<th>Time Horizon</th>
<th>VRF</th>
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<th>Moderate VSL</th>
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<th>Severe VSL</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>R2</td>
<td>Long-term Planning</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>The Transmission Owner had a third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to</td>
<td>The Transmission Owner had a third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 100 calendar days but less than or equal to</td>
<td>The Transmission Owner had a third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 110 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days following</td>
<td>The Transmission Owner had a third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar days following</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Transmission Owner that has not identified in its previous risk assessment any Transmission station and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection failed to perform a subsequent risk assessment.
<table>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower VSL</td>
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<td>100 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had a third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under R1 as required by part 2.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days from completion of the third party verification.</td>
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<td>110 calendar days following completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had a third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under R1 as required by part 2.3 but did so more than 70 calendar days and less than or equal to 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification.</td>
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<td>following completion of Requirement R1; OR The Transmission Owner had a third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 and modified or documented the technical basis for not modifying its identification under R1 as required by part 2.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification; OR The Transmission Owner had a third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but failed to modify or document the technical basis for not modifying its identification under R1 as required by part 2.3 but did so more than 80 calendar days from completion of the third party verification; OR The Transmission Owner had a third party verify the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 but failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 2.4.</td>
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<td><strong>Severe VSL</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>R3</td>
<td>Long-term Planning</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center as specified in Requirement R3 but did so more than seven calendar days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2; OR The Transmission Owner notified the Transmission Operator that operates the primary control center of the removal from the identification in Requirement R1 but did so more than 11 calendar days following the completion of Requirement R2; OR The Transmission Owner failed to notify the Transmission Operator that it operates a control center identified in Requirement R1; OR</td>
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<td>modifying its identification under R1 as required by part 2.3.</td>
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<tr>
<td>R4</td>
<td>Operations Planning,</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Requirement R1 but did so more than seven calendar days and less than or equal to nine calendar days following the verification or the subsequent risk assessment.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The Responsible Entity conducted an investigation into the deficiencies and the recommended corrective actions were implemented. The Responsible Entity provided a detailed report outlining the findings, corrective actions, and timeline for their implementation. The report was reviewed by the Transmission Operator, who provided feedback and assurance of compliance with the CIP-014-1 requirements.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>R #</th>
<th>Time Horizon</th>
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<th>Violation Severity Levels (CIP-014-1)</th>
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<td>evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider one of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.</td>
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<td>evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider two of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.</td>
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<td>conduct an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1; OR The Responsible Entity conducted an evaluation of the potential physical threats and vulnerabilities to each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to consider two of Parts 4.1 through 4.3 in the evaluation.</td>
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<td>High</td>
<td>The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers each of its Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but did so more than 120 calendar days but less than or equal to 130 calendar days after completing Requirement R2; OR The Responsible Entity developed and implemented a documented physical security plan(s) that covers its</td>
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<td>R6</td>
<td>Long-term Planning</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), and primary control center(s) identified in Requirement R1 but failed to include one of Parts 5.1 through 5.4 in the plan.</td>
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<td>evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did so in more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 100 calendar days; OR The Responsible Entity had a third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 and modified or documented the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3 but did so more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 70 calendar days following completion</td>
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<td>of the third party review.</td>
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<td>following completion of the third party review.</td>
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<td>The Responsible Entity had a third party review the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5 but did not and modify or document the reason for not modifying the security plan(s) as specified in Part 6.3.</td>
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<td>failed to implement procedures for protecting information per Part 6.3.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
D. Regional Variances
   None.

E. Interpretations
   None.

F. Associated Documents
   None.
Guidelines and Technical Basis

Section 4 Applicability

The purpose of Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 is to protect Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. To properly include those entities that own or operate such Facilities, the Reliability Standard CIP-014-1 first applies to Transmission Owners (TO) that own Transmission Facilities that meet the specific criteria in Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4. The Facilities described in Applicability Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4 mirror those Transmission Facilities that meet the bright line criteria for “Medium Impact” Transmission Facilities under Attachment 1 of Reliability Standard CIP-002-5.1. Each TO that owns Transmission Facilities that meet the criteria in Section 4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.4 is required to perform a risk assessment as specified in Requirement R1 to identify its Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. The Standard Drafting Team (SDT) expects this population will be small and that many TOs that meet the applicability of this standard will not actually identify any such Facilities. Only those TOs with Transmission stations or Transmission substations identified in the risk assessment (and verified under Requirement R2) have performance obligations under Requirements R3 through R6.

This standard also applies to Transmission Operators (TOP). A TOP’s obligations under the standard, however, are only triggered if the TOP is notified by an applicable TO under Requirement R3 that the TOP operates a primary control center that operationally controls a Transmission station(s) or Transmission substation(s) identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment. A primary control center operationally controls a Transmission station or Transmission substation when the control center’s electronic actions can cause direct physical action at the identified Transmission station or Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker, as opposed to a control center that only has information from the Transmission station or Transmission substation and must coordinate direct action through another entity. Only TOPs who are notified that they have primary control centers under this standard have performance obligations under Requirements R4 through R6.

The drafting team considered several options for bright line criteria that could be used to determine applicability and provide an initial threshold that defines the set of Transmission stations and Transmission substations that would meet the directives of the FERC order on physical security (i.e., those that could cause widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection). The SDT determined that using the criteria for Medium Impact Transmission Facilities in Attachment 1 of CIP-002-5.1 would provide a conservative threshold for defining which Transmission stations and Transmission substations must be included in the risk assessment in Requirement R1 of CIP-014-1. Additionally, the SDT concluded that using the CIP-002-5.1 Medium Impact criteria was appropriate because it has been approved by stakeholders, NERC, and FERC, and its use provides a technically sound basis
to determine which Transmission Owners should conduct the risk assessment. As described in CIP-002-5.1, the failure of a Transmission station or Transmission substation that meets the Medium Impact criteria could have the capability to result in exceeding one or more Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (IROLs). The SDT understands that using this bright line criteria to determine applicability may require some Transmission Owners to perform risk assessments under Requirement R1 that will result in a finding that none of their Transmission stations or Transmission substations would pose a risk of widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. However, the SDT determined that higher bright lines could not be technically justified to ensure inclusion of all Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. Further guidance and technical basis for the bright line criteria for Medium Impact Facilities can be found in the Guidelines and Technical Basis section of CIP-002-5.1.

Additionally, the SDT determined that it was not necessary to include Generator Operators and Generator Owners in the Reliability Standard. First, the transmission analysis or analyses conducted under Requirement R1 will take into account the impact of the loss of generation connected to applicable Transmission stations or Transmission substations. Additionally, the FERC order does not explicitly mention generation assets and is reasonably understood to focus on the most critical Transmission Facilities.

**Requirement R1**

In performing the risk assessment under Requirement R1, the Transmission Owner should first identify their population of Transmission stations and Transmission substations that meet the criteria contained in Applicability Section 4.1.1. Requirement R1 then requires the Transmission Owner to perform a risk assessment, consisting of a transmission analysis, to determine which of those Transmission stations and Transmission Substations if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. The standard does not mandate the specific analytical method for performing the risk assessment. The Transmission Owner has the discretion to choose the specific method that best suites its needs. As an example, an entity may perform a Power Flow analysis and stability analysis at a variety of load levels.

**Performing Risk Assessments**

The following is guidance on how a Transmission Owner may perform a traditional power flow and stability analysis to identify those Transmission stations and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. An entity could remove all lines to a single Transmission station or Transmission substation and review the simulation results to assess system behavior to determine if Cascading of Transmission Facilities, uncontrolled separation, or voltage or frequency instability is likely to occur over a wide area. Using engineering judgment, the Transmission Owner should develop criteria to identify a contingency resulting in potential widespread instability, uncontrolled separation or Cascading within an Interconnection. For example, the criteria could include post-contingency
facilities loadings above a certain emergency rating or failure of a power flow case to converge. Available remedial action schemes (RAS) or special protection systems (SPS), if any, could be applied to determine if the system experiences any additional instability which may result in uncontrolled separation.

**Periodicity**

A TO who identifies one or more Transmission stations or Transmission substations (as verified under Requirement R2) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection is required to conduct a risk assessment at least once every 30 months. This period ensures that the risk assessment remains current with projected conditions and configurations in the planned system.

TOs who have not identified any Transmission stations or Transmission substations (as verified under Requirement R2) that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection are unlikely to see changes to their risk assessment in the Near-Term Planning Horizon. Consequently, a 60 month periodicity for completing a subsequent risk assessment is specified.

**Identification of Primary Control Centers**

After completing the risk assessment specified in Requirement R1, it is important to additionally identify the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission station or Transmission substation that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection. A primary control center “operationally controls” a Transmission station or Transmission substation when the control center’s electronic actions can cause direct physical actions at the identified Transmission station and Transmission substation, such as opening a breaker.

**Requirement R2**

This requirement specifies verification of the risk assessment performed under Requirement R1 by an entity other than the owner or operator of the Requirement R1 risk assessment.

A verification of the risk assessment by an unaffiliated third party, as specified in Requirement R2, could consist of:

1. Certifying that the Requirement R1 risk assessment considers the Transmission stations and Transmission substations identified in Applicability Section 4.1.1.
2. Review of the model used to conduct the risk assessment to ensure it contains sufficient system topology to identify Transmission stations and Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could cause widespread instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.
3. Review of the Requirement R1 risk assessment method, which may include, for example, consideration of factors such as the following system performance criteria:
   a. Thermal overloads beyond facility emergency ratings;
   b. Voltage deviation exceeding ± 10%,
c. Cascading outage/Voltage collapse,
d. Frequency below under-frequency load shed points.

This requirement provides the flexibility for a Transmission Owner to select from unaffiliated registered and non-registered entities with transmission planning or analysis experience to perform the verification of the Requirement R1 risk assessment. The term unaffiliated means that the selected verifying entity cannot be a corporate affiliate (i.e., the verifying or reviewing entity cannot be an entity that corporately controls, is controlled by or is under common control with, the Transmission Owner). The verifying entity also cannot be a division of the Transmission Owner that operates as a functional unit.

Requirement R2 also provides the Transmission Owner the flexibility to work with the verifying entity throughout (i.e., concurrent with) the risk assessment, which for some Transmission Owners may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a Transmission Owner could coordinate with their unaffiliated verifying entity to perform the risk assessment under Requirement R1 such that both Requirement R1 and Requirement R2 are satisfied concurrently.

Characteristics to consider in selecting a reviewing entity could include:

- Registered Entity with applicable planning and reliability functions.
- Experience in power system studies and planning.
- The entity’s understanding of the MOD standards, TPL standards, and facility ratings as they pertain to planning studies.
- The entity’s familiarity with the Interconnection within which the transmission owner is located.

With respect to the requirement that Transmission owners develop and implement procedures for protecting confidential and sensitive information, the Transmission Owner could have a method for identifying documents that require confidential treatment. One mechanism for protecting confidential or sensitive information is to prohibit removal of sensitive or confidential information from the TO’s site. Transmission Owners could include such a prohibition in a non-disclosure agreement with the verifying entity.

**Requirement R3**

Some Transmission Operators will have obligations under this standard for certain primary control centers. Those obligations, however, are contingent upon a Transmission Owner first completing the risk assessment specified by Requirement R1 and the verification specified by Requirement R2. Requirement R3 is intended to ensure that a Transmission Operator that has operational control of a primary control center identified in Requirement R1 receive notice so that the Transmission Operator may fulfill the rest of the obligations required in Requirements R4 through R6. Since the timing obligations in Requirements R4 through R6 are based upon completion of Requirement R2, the Transmission Owner must also include within the notice the date of completion of Requirement R2. Similarly, the Transmission Owner must notify the Transmission Operator of any removals from identification that result from a subsequent risk
assessment under Requirement R1 or as a result of the verification process under Requirement R2.

**Requirement R4**

This requirement requires owners and operators of facilities identified by the Requirement R1 risk assessment and that are verified under Requirement R2 to conduct an assessment of potential threats and vulnerabilities to those Transmission stations, Transmission substations, and primary control centers using a tailored evaluation process. Threats and vulnerabilities may vary from facility to facility based on any number of factors that include, but are not limited to, location, size, function, existing physical security protections, and attractiveness as a target.

In order to effectively conduct a threat and vulnerability assessment, the asset owner may be the best source to determine specific site vulnerabilities, but current and evolving threats may best be determined by others in the intelligence or law enforcement communities. A number of resources have been identified in the standard, but many others exist and asset owners are not limited to where they may turn for assistance. Additional resources may include state or local fusion centers, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Public Safety Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and InfraGard chapters coordinated by the FBI.

The Responsible Entity is required to take a number of factors into account in Parts 4.1 to 4.3 in order to make a risk-based evaluation under Requirement R4.

To assist in determining the current threat for a facility, the prior history of attacks on similarly protected facilities should be considered when assessing probability and likelihood of occurrence at the facility in question.

Resources that may be useful in conducting threat and vulnerability assessments include:

- ASIS International General Risk Assessment Guidelines.

**Requirement R5**

This requirement specifies development and implementation of a security plan(s) designed to protect against attacks to the facilities identified in Requirement R1 based on the assessment performed under Requirement R4.

Requirement R5 specifies the following attributes for the physical security plan:

- *Resiliency or security measures designed to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate, and respond to potential physical threats and vulnerabilities based on the results of the assessment conducted in Requirement R4.*
While most security measures will work together to collectively harden the entire site, some may be allocated to protect specific critical components. For example, if protection from gunfire is considered necessary, the entity may only install ballistic protection for critical components, not the entire site.

- **Law enforcement contact and coordination information.**

Examples of such information may be posting 9-1-1 for emergency calls and providing substation safety and familiarization training for local and federal law enforcement, fire department, and EMS.

- **A timeline for implementing physical security resiliency or security measures specified in the physical security plan.**

Entities have the flexibility to prioritize the implementation of the various resiliency or security measures in their security plan according to risk, resources, or other factors.

- **Provisions to evaluate evolving physical threats, and their corresponding security measures, to the Transmission station(s), Transmission substation(s), or primary control center(s).**

A registered entity’s physical security plan should include processes and responsibilities for obtaining and handling alerts, intelligence, and threat warnings from various sources. Some of these sources could include the ERO, ES-ISAC, and US and/or Canadian federal agencies. This information should be used to reevaluate or consider changes in the security plan and corresponding security measures of the security plan found in R5.

### Requirement R6

This requirement specifies review by an entity other than the TO or TOP with appropriate expertise for the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5. As with Requirement R2, the term unaffiliated means that the selected reviewing entity cannot be a corporate affiliate (i.e., the reviewing entity cannot be an entity that corporately controls, is controlled by or is under common control with, the Transmission Operator). A reviewing entity also cannot be a division of the Transmission Operator that operates as a functional unit.

The Responsible Entity can select from several possible entities to perform the review:

- **An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification.**

In selecting CPP and PSP for use in this standard, the drafting team believed it was important that if a private entity such as a consulting or security firm was engaged to conduct the third party review, they must tangibly demonstrate competence to conduct the review. This includes electric industry physical security experience and either of the premier security industry certifications sponsored by ASIS International. The ASIS certification program was initiated in 1977, and those that hold the CPP certification program.
certification are board certified in security management. Those that hold the PSP certification are board certified in physical security.

- An entity or organization approved by the ERO.
- A governmental agency with physical security expertise.
- An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical security expertise.

A third party that contributes to the threat assessment and development of the security plan may also serve as the reviewer. As with Requirement R2, the Responsible Entity has the flexibility to work with the reviewing entity throughout (i.e., concurrent with) the evaluation performed according to Requirement R4 and the security plan(s) developed according to Requirement R5, which for some Responsible Entities may be more efficient and effective. In other words, a TO or TOP could coordinate with their unaffiliated reviewing entity to perform an evaluation of potential threats and vulnerabilities (Requirement R4) and develop a security plan (Requirement R5) concurrently with review to satisfy Requirements R4 through R6 simultaneously.