

Meeting Notes for Project 2006-02 Assess Transmission Future Needs SDT

March 24, 2009

1. Administrative Items

a. Introductions and Quorum

A meeting of the ATFNSDT Chair with FERC staff was called to order at 9 a.m. EDT on Tuesday, March 24, 2009 at the FERC offices in Washington, DC.

Meeting participants were:

John Odom, SDT Chair	Keith O'Neal, FERC	Bob Snow, FERC
Frank Macedo, FERC	Chris Mak, FERC	Stuart Hansen, FERC
Gerry Adamski, NERC	Dave Taylor, NERC	Ed Dobrowolski, NERC

2. Comments from FERC Staff

Staff felt that the existing TPL standards include specific requirements as to what needed to be in a base case. They don't feel that this was adequately carried over to the revisions.

R1: The terms 'valid assessment', 'at all demand levels' and 'cover critical system conditions and study years' have not been included in this draft standard. They were replaced with new wording in R1 to 'simulate projected System conditions'. After some discussion this seemed to be acceptable but then the issue was raised as to where the requirements to cover the deleted R9 through R14 are. The feeling was that these requirements identified gaps in modeling data that the planners needed to complete their work. The TPL revision puts the onus on the TP/PC to get the data but there is no corresponding requirement in MOD standards for the appropriate entity to supply the necessary data. The information in R9 through R14 needs to be entered into the NERC issues database so that it can be captured and passed on to the eventual MOD SDT for inclusion in their project. It was noted that planners don't see a gap as they are presently getting the data they need to compile their models and Assessments, even without the explicit requirements in the MOD standards. This information should be included in the eventual TPL fling.

R1: Staff expressed some concerns over the wording 'other legal obligations' but after it was explained what was intended those objections disappeared.

R1.1.1: The requirement needs to be expanded to specifically cite Protection Systems. It also needs to explicitly include maintenance outages. Everything must be maintained and the plans should include any item that has a maintenance cycle that will come up in the time period in question for the Assessment. The MISO/Ameren interpretations may show guidance in this area. Protection System maintenance must be included.

R1.1.6: The requirement cites network resources. What does that mean? The SDT used this generic term to provide flexibility and not to tie this requirement to a specific type of unit. Staff feels that this must be tied to the specific type of unit. They feel that energy only units are the only ones allowed in the old category 'b'. Capacity units don't come into play until category 'c'. Tripping capacity units at category 'b' was seen as promoting a less reliable system. Planning models were described as generation rich, since the planning reserve requirements are greater than the operating reserve requirements and thus a handoff to operators based on such a plan could give the operator a system that cannot be reliably operated since significantly more units will be unavailable in the operating timeframes. Staff felt that a ceiling on the amount of generation that may be tripped might be in order or a better solution would be not to allow generators to be tripped for single Contingencies. You need to factor in reserves – base cases have all planning reserves available.

R2.1.3: It seems that you don't really have to do anything for sensitivities and this is seen as skirting the Order 693 directives. The SDT didn't feel that any fix was required for a problem found with a single sensitivity and that 'bigger' issues would be fleshed out in the newly required peer reviews. However, it is clear that there is no formal requirement associated with fixing problems associated with peer review findings. So, how do you include fixes found in multiple sensitivities or repeated sensitivity runs? It was suggested that this could be fixed by adding language in R1 to require consideration of sensitivity results from previous studies.

R2.1.3.6: The use of the word 'effectiveness' was questioned. It was suggested that 'range' might be a better choice.

R2.1.5: Staff didn't seem to feel that this requirement really stated that the lack of a spare was only allowed if you can ride through the worst case scenario while maintaining performance as per Order 693. However, R2.1.5 is part of R2.1 which is covered in R3. But then does P6 say what the SDT intended? Does this imply that the spare is in the base case so that P6 is a second transformer plus a third element? Or, is the spare the first transformer cited? John felt that it was the former (which would satisfy staff) but he will need to check this with the SDT.

R2.2: Why doesn't this require the worst year to be studied? The existing standard has language that addresses this issue (see comments in R1).

R2.3: Maximum short circuit duty rating implies that the largest magnitude of short circuit current should be evaluated. Is this what was really meant for this requirement? Is transient recovery voltage included for this requirement?

R2.4: Why isn't there any long-term requirement for Stability? If you have a new nuclear unit going into service, the transmission requirements will certainly extend into the long-term horizon and should be studied as they will almost certainly affect reliability and Stability.

R2.6.2: Why isn't Load levels included as a variable in the sensitivity section? It was suggested that specificity would be a good idea here so as not to leave things to the judgment of an auditor.

We need to clean up references to the old TPL standards in other standards such as FAC. This should be cited in the Implementation Plan.

R3.3.3: There doesn't seem to be a corresponding element requiring consideration of relay loadability for Stability analysis in R5.

Header note 'b': Why were Supplemental Load Loss and Load Reduction added? This seems to allow more Load to be dropped than was intended in the order. Staff felt that Supplemental Load Loss was really Non-Consequential. After some discussion, staff seemed to understand the concept but then questioned why supplemental load could be used to resolve a Stability concern. We will need to check with the SDT on this.

Header note 'c': High speed reclosing should be considered for Stability analysis. If this is allowed for in the design, then it should be included in the note as the order wants everything that will really happen to be modeled. This may spill over to R5.3.3.

P5: Staff doesn't feel that this adequately addresses the old R1.3.10 for category 'b'.

Table 1, footnote 6: As written, the note appears to totally exclude generator step-up transformers and that was not the intent of the SDT. The wording needs to be cleaned up.

We should look at the recent FAC order for guidance on VRF and VSL. We may want to use bullets for list items.

3. Next Steps

A conference call of the SDT will be added to the schedule to discuss the issues raised in this meeting. The goal is to submit the documents to NERC staff for the third posting in April.

4. Next Meetings

There will be a conference call and WebEx on Tuesday, April 7, 2009 from 1–4 p.m. EDT.

5. Adjourn

The meeting was adjourned at 1 p.m. EDT.