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NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC  
RELIABILITY CORPORATION

DRAFT Implementation Guidance pending  
submission for ERO Enterprise Endorsement

# **DRAFT**

# **Cyber Security — Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments**

Implementation Guidance for Reliability Standard  
CIP-010-4

May 2020

**RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY**



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
## Preface

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Electricity is a key component of the fabric of modern society and the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) Enterprise serves to strengthen that fabric. The vision for the ERO Enterprise, which is comprised of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and the six Regional Entities (REs), is a highly reliable and secure North American bulk power system (BPS). Our mission is to assure the effective and efficient reduction of risks to the reliability and security of the grid.

Reliability | Resilience | Security  
*Because nearly 400 million citizens in North America are counting on us*

The North American BPS is divided into six RE boundaries as shown in the map and corresponding table below. The multicolored area denotes overlap as some load-serving entities participate in one Region while associated Transmission Owners/Operators participate in another.



<b>MRO</b>	Midwest Reliability Organization
<b>NPCC</b>	Northeast Power Coordinating Council
<b>RF</b>	ReliabilityFirst
<b>SERC</b>	SERC Reliability Corporation
<b>Texas RE</b>	Texas Reliability Entity
<b>WECC</b>	Western Electricity Coordinating Council

# Introduction

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This Implementation Guidance was prepared to provide example approaches for compliance with CIP-010-4. Implementation Guidance does not prescribe the only approach but highlights one or more approaches that could be effective in achieving compliance with the standard. Because Implementation Guidance only provides one or more examples, entities may choose alternative approaches that better fit their individual situations.<sup>1</sup> This Implementation Guidance for CIP-010-4 is not a Reliability Standard and should not be considered mandatory and enforceable.

Responsible entities may find it useful to consider this Implementation Guidance document along with the additional context and background provided in the SDT-developed Technical Rationale and Justification for the modifications to CIP-010-4.

This document is composed of approaches written by previous drafting teams, relevant to previous versions of CIP-010, as well as additions by the Standards Project 2019-03 – Cyber Security Supply Chain Risks Standards Drafting Team (SDT) related to the modifications. Anything relevant to version 4 of this standard that was written by previous SDT's is included in this document.

Project 2019-03 was initiated due to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (the Commission) issuing Order No. 850<sup>2</sup> on October 18, 2018, in which the summary on page 1 states, "...the Commission directs NERC to develop and submit modifications to the supply chain risk management Reliability Standards so that the scope of the Reliability Standards include Electronic Access Control and Monitoring Systems." In addition, NERC also recommended revising the Supply Chain Standards in its May 17, 2019 NERC Cyber Security Supply Chain Risk Report, Staff Report and Recommended Actions<sup>3</sup>, to address Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) that provide physical access control to high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems.

The Project 2019-03 SDT modified Reliability Standard CIP-010-4 to require responsible entities to meet the directives set forth in the Commission's Order No. 850 and the NERC Cyber Security Supply Chain Risk Report.

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<sup>1</sup> [NERC's Compliance Guidance Policy](#)

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2018/101818/E-1.pdf>

<sup>3</sup> [https://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/SupplyChainRiskMitigationProgramDL/NERC%20Supply%20Chain%20Final%20Report%20\(20190517\).pdf](https://www.nerc.com/pa/comp/SupplyChainRiskMitigationProgramDL/NERC%20Supply%20Chain%20Final%20Report%20(20190517).pdf)

# Requirement R1

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## General Considerations for Requirement R1

FERC Order 850, Paragraph 5 and Paragraph 30 directed modifications to Reliability Standard CIP-010-3 Requirement R1 to address supply chain risk management for Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS) for high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems. In addition, NERC also recommended revising the Supply Chain Standards to address PACS that provide physical access control (excluding alarming and logging) to high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems, and modifications were addressed by the 2019-03 SDT.

## General Considerations for Requirement R1 Part 1.5

### Test Environment

The Responsible Entity should note that wherever a test environment (or the test is performed in production in a manner that minimizes adverse effects) is mentioned, entities are required to “model” the baseline configuration and not duplicate it exactly.

The language for use of a testing environment for deviations from baseline configuration was chosen deliberately in order to allow for individual elements of a BES Cyber System at a Control Center to be modeled that may not otherwise be able to be replicated or duplicated exactly; such as, but not limited to, a legacy map-board controller or the numerous data communication links from the field or to other Control Centers (such as by ICCP).

## General Considerations for Requirement R1 Part 1.6

### Software Verification

NIST SP-800-161 includes a number of security controls, which together reduce the probability of a successful “Watering Hole” or similar cyber-attack in the industrial control system environment and thus could assist in addressing this objective. For example, in the System and Information Integrity (SI) control family, control SI-7 suggests users obtain software directly from the developer and verify the integrity of the software using controls such as digital signatures. In the Configuration Management (CM) control family, control CM-5(3) requires information systems prevent the installation of firmware or software without digital signature verification so genuine and valid hardware and software components are used. NIST SP-800-161, while not meant to be definitive, provides examples of controls for addressing this objective. Other controls also could meet this objective.

In implementing Requirement R1 Part 1.6, the responsible entity should consider their existing CIP cyber security policies and controls in addition to the following:

- Processes used to deliver software and appropriate control(s) that will verify the identity of the software source and the integrity of the software delivered through these processes. To the extent that the responsible entity utilizes automated systems such as a subscription service to download and distribute software including updates, consider how software verification can be performed through those processes.
- Coordination of the responsible entity’s software verification control(s) with other cyber security policies and controls, including change management and patching processes, and procurement controls.
- Use of a secure central software repository after the identity of the software source and the integrity of the software have been validated, so that verifications do not need to be performed repeatedly before each installation.
- Additional controls such as examples outlined in the Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity (SI-7) section of NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4, or similar guidance.
- Additional controls such as those defined in FIPS-140-2, FIPS 180-4, or similar guidance, to ensure the cryptographic methods used are acceptable to the Responsible Entity.

Responsible entities may use various methods to verify the integrity of software obtained from the software source. Examples include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Verify and validate digital signature on the software to detect modifications indication compromise of the software's integrity.
- Use public key infrastructure (PKI) with encryption as a method to prevent software modification in transit by enabling only intended recipients to decrypt the software.
- Require fingerprints or cipher hashes from software sources for all software and compare the values to the authoritative source prior to installation on a BES Cyber System as verification of the integrity of the software. Consider using a method for receiving the verification values that is different from the method used to receive the software from the software source.
- Use trusted/controlled distribution and delivery options to reduce supply chain risk (e.g., requiring tamper-evident packaging of software during shipping.)

Even after verification is completed, it is still recommended that software testing is performed. If the integrity and authenticity checks are only performed at vendor point of origin, there is no guarantee that the product being retrieved is untainted prior to availability at the point of origin. The vendor checks performed do not detect embedded malicious code in the software, firmware or patch between the vendor applying the integrity method and the implementation of the software by the Registered Entity on a high or medium impact BES Cyber System and its associated EACMS or PACS.

### **Implementation Guidance for R1**

Refer to ERO Enterprise Endorsed Implementation Guidance document [CIP-010-3 R1.6 Software Integrity and Authenticity](#) for additional compliance guidance and examples etc.

# Implementation Guidance for CIP-010-3

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This section contains a “cut and paste” of the Implementation Guidance components of the former Guidelines and Technical Basis (GTB) as-is of from CIP-010-3 standard to preserve any historical references. Similarly, former GTB content providing SDT intent and technical rationale can be found in a separate Technical Rational document for this standard.

## **Section 4 – Scope of Applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Standards:**

None

### **Requirement R1:**

#### **Baseline Configuration**

Further guidance can be understood with the following example that details the baseline configuration for a serial-only microprocessor relay:

Asset #051028 at Substation Alpha

- R1.1.1 – Firmware: [MANUFACTURER]-[MODEL]-XYZ-1234567890-ABC
- R1.1.2 – Not Applicable
- R1.1.3 – Not Applicable
- R1.1.4 – Not Applicable
- R1.1.5 – Patch 12345, Patch 67890, Patch 34567, Patch 437823

Also, for a typical IT system, the baseline configuration could reference an IT standard that includes configuration details. An entity would be expected to provide that IT standard as part of their compliance evidence.

#### **Cyber Security Controls**

None

#### **Test Environment**

The Control Center test environment (or production environment where the test is performed in a manner that minimizes adverse effects) should model the baseline configuration, but may have a different set of components. For instance, an entity may have a BES Cyber System that runs a database on one component and a web server on another component. The test environment may have the same operating system, security patches, network accessible ports, and software, but have both the database and web server running on a single component instead of multiple components.

This language was chosen deliberately in order to allow for individual elements of a BES Cyber System at a Control Center to be modeled that may not otherwise be able to be replicated or duplicated exactly; such as, but not limited to, a legacy map-board controller or the numerous data communication links from the field or to other Control Centers (such as by ICCP).

#### **Software Verification**

NIST SP-800-161 includes a number of security controls, which, when taken together, reduce the probability of a successful “Watering Hole” or similar cyber attack in the industrial control system environment and thus could assist in addressing this objective. For example, in the System and Information Integrity (SI) control family, control SI-7 suggests users obtain software directly from the developer and verify the integrity of the software using controls such as digital signatures. In the Configuration Management (CM) control family, control CM-5(3) requires that the

information system prevent the installation of firmware or software without the verification that the component has been digitally signed to ensure that the hardware and software components are genuine and valid. NIST SP-800-161, while not meant to be definitive, provides examples of controls for addressing this objective. Other controls also could meet this objective.

In implementing Requirement R1 Part 1.6, the responsible entity should consider their existing CIP cyber security policies and controls in addition to the following:

- Processes used to deliver software and appropriate control(s) that will verify the identity of the software source and the integrity of the software delivered through these processes. To the extent that the responsible entity utilizes automated systems such as a subscription service to download and distribute software including updates, consider how software verification can be performed through those processes.
- Coordination of the responsible entity's software verification control(s) with other cyber security policies and controls, including change management and patching processes, and procurement controls.
- Use of a secure central software repository after the identity of the software source and the integrity of the software have been validated, so that verifications do not need to be performed repeatedly before each installation.
- Additional controls such as examples outlined in the Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity (SI-7) section of NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4, or similar guidance.
- Additional controls such as those defined in FIPS-140-2, FIPS 180-4, or similar guidance, to ensure the cryptographic methods used are acceptable to the Responsible Entity.

Responsible entities may use various methods to verify the integrity of software obtained from the software source. Examples include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Verify that the software has been digitally signed and validate the signature to ensure that the software's integrity has not been compromised.
- Use public key infrastructure (PKI) with encryption to ensure that the software is not modified in transit by enabling only intended recipients to decrypt the software.
- Require software sources to provide fingerprints or cipher hashes for all software and verify the values prior to installation on a BES Cyber System to ensure the integrity of the software. Consider using a method for receiving the verification values that is different from the method used to receive the software from the software source.
- Use trusted/controlled distribution and delivery options to reduce supply chain risk (e.g., requiring tamper-evident packaging of software during shipping.)

### **Requirement R2:**

However, the SDT understands that there may be some Cyber Assets where automated monitoring may not be possible (such as a GPS time clock). For that reason, automated technical monitoring was not explicitly required, and a Responsible Entity may choose to accomplish this requirement through manual procedural controls.

**Requirement R3:**

In developing their vulnerability assessment processes, Responsible Entities are strongly encouraged to include at least the following elements, several of which are referenced in CIP-005 and CIP-007:

Paper Vulnerability Assessment:

1. Network Discovery - A review of network connectivity to identify all Electronic Access Points to the Electronic Security Perimeter.
2. Network Port and Service Identification - A review to verify that all enabled ports and services have an appropriate business justification.
3. Vulnerability Review - A review of security rule-sets and configurations including controls for default accounts, passwords, and network management community strings.
4. Wireless Review - Identification of common types of wireless networks (such as 802.11a/b/g/n) and a review of their controls if they are in any way used for BES Cyber System communications.

Active Vulnerability Assessment:

1. Network Discovery - Use of active discovery tools to discover active devices and identify communication paths in order to verify that the discovered network architecture matches the documented architecture.
2. Network Port and Service Identification – Use of active discovery tools (such as Nmap) to discover open ports and services.
3. Vulnerability Scanning – Use of a vulnerability scanning tool to identify network accessible ports and services along with the identification of known vulnerabilities associated with services running on those ports.
4. Wireless Scanning – Use of a wireless scanning tool to discover wireless signals and networks in the physical perimeter of a BES Cyber System. Serves to identify unauthorized wireless devices within the range of the wireless scanning tool.

In addition, Responsible Entities are strongly encouraged to review NIST SP800-115 for additional guidance on how to conduct a vulnerability assessment.

**Requirement R4:**

Examples of these temporarily connected devices include, but are not limited to:

- Diagnostic test equipment;
- Packet sniffers;
- Equipment used for BES Cyber System maintenance;
- Equipment used for BES Cyber System configuration; or
- Equipment used to perform vulnerability assessments.

The entity should avoid implementing a security function that jeopardizes reliability by taking actions that would negatively impact the performance or support of the Transient Cyber Asset, BES Cyber Asset, or Protected Cyber Asset.

Per Transient Cyber Asset Capability

For example, for malicious code, many types of appliances are not capable of implementing antivirus software; therefore, because it is not a capability of those types of devices, implementation of the antivirus software would not be required for those devices.

## Requirement R4, Attachment 1, Section 1 - Transient Cyber Asset(s) Managed by the Responsible Entity

Section 1.2: To meet this requirement part, the entity is to document the following:

- 1.2.1 User(s), individually or by group/role, allowed to use the Transient Cyber Asset(s). This can be done by listing a specific person, department, or job function. Caution: consider whether these user(s) must also have authorized electronic access to the applicable system in accordance with CIP-004.
- 1.2.2 Locations where the Transient Cyber Assets may be used. This can be done by listing a specific location or a group of locations.
- 1.2.3 The intended or approved use of each individual, type, or group of Transient Cyber Asset. This should also include the software or application packages that are authorized with the purpose of performing defined business functions or tasks (e.g., used for data transfer, vulnerability assessment, maintenance, or troubleshooting purposes), and approved network interfaces (e.g., wireless, including near field communication or Bluetooth, and wired connections). Activities, and software or application packages, not specifically listed as acceptable should be considered as prohibited. It may be beneficial to educate individuals through the CIP-004 Security Awareness Program and Cyber Security Training Program about authorized and unauthorized activities or uses (e.g., using the device to browse the Internet or to check email or using the device to access wireless networks in hotels or retail locations).

Entities should exercise caution when using Transient Cyber Assets and ensure they do not have features enabled (e.g., wireless or Bluetooth features) in a manner that would allow the device to bridge an outside network to an applicable system. Doing so would cause the Transient Cyber Asset to become an unauthorized Electronic Access Point in violation of CIP-005, Requirement R1.

Attention should be paid to Transient Cyber Assets that may be used for assets in differing impact areas (i.e., high impact, medium impact, and low impact). These impact areas have differing levels of protection under the CIP requirements, and measures should be taken to prevent the introduction of malicious code from a lower impact area. An entity may want to consider the need to have separate Transient Cyber Assets for each impact level.

Section 1.3: Options are listed that include the alternative for the entity to use a technology or process that effectively mitigates vulnerabilities.

- Security patching, including manual or managed updates provides flexibility to the Responsible Entity to determine how its Transient Cyber Asset(s) will be used. It is possible for an entity to have its Transient Cyber Asset be part of an enterprise patch process and receive security patches on a regular schedule or the entity can verify and apply security patches prior to connecting the Transient Cyber Asset to an applicable Cyber Asset. Unlike CIP-007, Requirement R2, there is no expectation of creating dated mitigation plans or other documentation other than what is necessary to identify that the Transient Cyber Asset is receiving appropriate security patches.
- Live operating system and software executable only from read-only media is provided to allow a protected operating system that cannot be modified to deliver malicious software. When entities are creating custom live operating systems, they should check the image during the build to ensure that there is not malicious software on the image.
- System hardening, also called operating system hardening, helps minimize security vulnerabilities by removing all non-essential software programs and utilities and only installing the bare necessities that the computer needs to function. While other programs may provide useful features, they can provide "back-door" access to the system, and should be removed to harden the system.

- When selecting to use other methods that mitigate software vulnerabilities to those listed, entities need to have documentation that identifies how the other method(s) meet the software vulnerability mitigation objective.

Section 1.4: Entities should also consider whether the detected malicious code is a Cyber Security Incident.

- Antivirus software, including manual or managed updates of signatures or patterns, provides flexibility just as with security patching, to manage Transient Cyber Asset(s) by deploying antivirus or endpoint security tools that maintain a scheduled update of the signatures or patterns. Also, for devices that do not regularly connect to receive scheduled updates, entities may choose to scan the Transient Cyber Asset prior to connection to ensure no malicious software is present.
- Application whitelisting is a method of authorizing only the applications and processes that are necessary on the Transient Cyber Asset. This reduces the opportunity that malicious software could become resident, much less propagate, from the Transient Cyber Asset to the BES Cyber Asset or BES Cyber System.
- Restricted communication to limit the exchange of data to only the Transient Cyber Asset and the Cyber Assets to which it is connected by restricting or disabling serial or network (including wireless) communications on a managed Transient Cyber Asset can be used to minimize the opportunity to introduce malicious code onto the Transient Cyber Asset while it is not connected to BES Cyber Systems. This renders the device unable to communicate with devices other than the one to which it is connected.
- When selecting to use other methods that mitigate the introduction of malicious code to those listed, entities need to have documentation that identifies how the other method(s) meet the mitigation of the introduction of malicious code objective.

Section 1.5: The bulleted list of example protections provides some suggested alternatives.

- For restricted physical access, the intent is that the Transient Cyber Asset is maintained within a Physical Security Perimeter or other physical location or enclosure that uses physical access controls to protect the Transient Cyber Asset.
- Full disk encryption with authentication is an option that can be employed to protect a Transient Cyber Asset from unauthorized use. However, it is important that authentication be required to decrypt the device. For example, pre-boot authentication, or power-on authentication, provides a secure, tamper-proof environment external to the operating system as a trusted authentication layer. Authentication prevents data from being read from the hard disk until the user has confirmed they have the correct password or other credentials. By performing the authentication prior to the system decrypting and booting, the risk that an unauthorized person may manipulate the Transient Cyber Asset is mitigated.
- Multi-factor authentication is used to ensure the identity of the person accessing the device. Multi-factor authentication also mitigates the risk that an unauthorized person may manipulate the Transient Cyber Asset.
- In addition to authentication and pure physical security methods, other alternatives are available that an entity may choose to employ. Certain theft recovery solutions can be used to locate the Transient Cyber Asset, detect access, remotely wipe, and lockout the system, thereby mitigating the potential threat from unauthorized use if the Transient Cyber Asset was later connected to a BES Cyber Asset. Other low tech solutions may also be effective to mitigate the risk of using a maliciously-manipulated Transient Cyber Asset, such as tamper evident tags or seals, and executing procedural controls to verify the integrity of the tamper evident tag or seal prior to use.

- When selecting to use other methods that mitigate the risk of unauthorized use to those listed, entities need to have documentation that identifies how the other method(s) meet the mitigation of the risk of unauthorized use objective.

### **Requirement R4, Attachment 1, Section 2 - Transient Cyber Asset(s) Managed by a Party Other than the Responsible Entity**

To facilitate these controls, Responsible Entities may choose to execute agreements with other parties to provide support services to BES Cyber Systems and BES Cyber Assets that may involve the use of Transient Cyber Assets. Entities may consider using the Department of Energy Cybersecurity Procurement Language for Energy Delivery dated April 2014<sup>4</sup>. Procurement language may unify the other party and entity actions supporting the BES Cyber Systems and BES Cyber Assets. CIP program attributes may be considered including roles and responsibilities, access controls, monitoring, logging, vulnerability, and patch management along with incident response and back up recovery may be part of the other party's support. Entities should consider the "General Cybersecurity Procurement Language" and "The Supplier's Life Cycle Security Program" when drafting Master Service Agreements, Contracts, and the CIP program processes and controls.

Section 2.1: Entities are to document and implement their process(es) to mitigate software vulnerabilities through the use of one or more of the protective measures listed.

- Conduct a review of the Transient Cyber Asset managed by a party other than the Responsible Entity to determine whether the security patch level of the device is adequate to mitigate the risk of software vulnerabilities before connecting the Transient Cyber Asset to an applicable system.
- Conduct a review of the other party's security patching process. This can be done either at the time of contracting but no later than prior to connecting the Transient Cyber Asset to an applicable system. Just as with reviewing the security patch level of the device, selecting to use this approach aims to ensure that the Responsible Entity has mitigated the risk of software vulnerabilities to applicable systems.
- Conduct a review of other processes that the other party uses to mitigate the risk of software vulnerabilities. This can be reviewing system hardening, application whitelisting, virtual machines, etc.
- When selecting to use other methods to mitigate software vulnerabilities to those listed, entities need to have documentation that identifies how the other method(s) meet mitigation of the risk of software vulnerabilities.

Section 2.2: Entities are to document and implement their process(es) to mitigate the introduction of malicious code through the use of one or more of the protective measures listed.

- Review the use of antivirus software and signature or pattern levels to ensure that the level is adequate to the Responsible Entity to mitigate the risk of malicious software being introduced to an applicable system.
- Review the antivirus or endpoint security processes of the other party to ensure that their processes are adequate to the Responsible Entity to mitigate the risk of introducing malicious software to an applicable system.
- Review the use of application whitelisting used by the other party to mitigate the risk of introducing malicious software to an applicable system.

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.energy.gov/oe/downloads/cybersecurity-procurement-language-energy-delivery-april-2014>

- Review the use of live operating systems or software executable only from read-only media to ensure that the media is free from malicious software itself. Entities should review the processes to build the read-only media as well as the media itself.
- Review system hardening practices used by the other party to ensure that unnecessary ports, services, applications, etc. have been disabled or removed. This will limit the chance of introducing malicious software to an applicable system.

### **Requirement R4, Attachment 1, Section 3 - Removable Media**

Section 3.1: Entities are to document and implement their process(es) to authorize the use of Removable Media. The Removable Media may be listed individually or by type.

- Document the user(s), individually or by group/role, allowed to use the Removable Media. This can be done by listing a specific person, department, or job function. Authorization includes vendors and the entity's personnel. Caution: consider whether these user(s) must have authorized electronic access to the applicable system in accordance with CIP-004.
- Locations where the Removable Media may be used. This can be done by listing a specific location or a group/role of locations.

Entities should also consider whether the detected malicious code is a Cyber Security Incident.

As a method to detect malicious code, entities may choose to use Removable Media with on-board malicious code detection tools. For these tools, the Removable Media are still used in conjunction with a Cyber Asset to perform the detection