

# WECC-0142 BAL-002-WECC-3

Contingency Reserve Request to Retire

WECC-0142 Drafting Team 01/21/2025

#### **Executive Summary**

This document supports and requests full retirement of WECC Regional Reliability Standard (RRS) BAL-002-WECC-3, Contingency Reserve.

In FERC Order No. 672, when considering approval of RRSs, FERC agreed to accept two kinds of regional differences: (1) a regional difference that is more stringent than the continent-wide Reliability Standard, including a regional difference that addresses matters that the continent-wide Reliability Standard does not; and (2) an RRS that is necessitated by a physical difference in the Bulk-Power System.<sup>1</sup>

Order 672 also provides authority to retire an RRS.

Since the start of BAL-002-WECC-3 and its predecessors (2007), the original standard and each subsequent iteration have continued as more stringent than the continent-wide equivalent, NERC BAL-002-X, Disturbance Control Standard. Among other things, WECC's BAL-002-WECC has always required most WECC entities to hold more reserves than the continent-wide equivalent. Specifically, BAL-002-WECC-3, Requirement R1.1.1 requires the applicable entity to hold the greater of, either the amount of Contingency Reserve equal to the loss of the most severe single contingency or the amount of Contingency Reserve equal to the sum of 3% of hourly integrated load and 3% of hourly integrated generation.

Though Requirement R1.1.1 was approved in BAL-002-WECC-1, that approval was predicated on distributing burden and the availability of deliverability.<sup>2</sup> There has never been a technical study proving that holding reserves more than required under NERC BAL-002-X enhances the reliability of the Western Interconnection.

By contrast, as variable generation is added to the Interconnection, there is increasing evidence that holding excess reserves may be inhibiting reliability across the interconnection. FERC's recent Order 901 echoes these concerns, addressing operational and performance concerns for variable resources.

Restated, within the Western Interconnection, applicable entities are holding more reserves than the rest of the continent, even though there is no technical basis for doing so. In FERC Order 693, in which NERC BAL-002-1 was first approved, at P341, FERC states:

341. We believe a continent-wide contingency reserves policy would assure [sic] that there are adequate magnitude and frequency responsive contingency reserves in each Balancing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> FERC Order 740, Remand.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Order No. 672 at P 331. See also FERC Order 740, P 4 and P 23.

https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Resources/Documents/FERC'S Criteria for Approving Reliability Standards from Order 672.pdf

Authority. This will improve performance so that no Balancing Authority will be doing *less than its fair share."* (Emphasis added.)

By extension, retiring BAL-002-WECC-3 in favor of NERC BAL-002-3, ensures that no Balancing Authority will be doing **more** than its fair share.

Further, requiring Balancing Authorities to hold that excess may be inhibiting the integration and use of variable generation. As a result, BAL-002-WECC-3 creates a mandated scenario in which reserves are used inefficiently and withheld from the marketplace.



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## Introduction

Per the Standard Authorization Request (SAR) for WECC-0142,<sup>3</sup> this document explores the full retirement of WECC RRS BAL-002-WECC-3, Contingency Reserve.

The following will show that, if the standard is retired, reliability will continue to be maintained through NERC BAL-002-3, and may be enhanced as resources being held for contingency reserves may be used more efficiently to support variable generation.

By retiring BAL-002-WECC-3 in favor of NERC BAL-002-3:

- Dispatchable resources can be used to support variable generation, addressing issues raised by FERC in Order 901.
- A more efficient use of resources should negate any current negative impacts on the market, thereby enhancing vital public interests.

As the Procedural History and Development History sections note, BAL-002-WECC-3 is an evolution of pre-standards originating in the 1990s. Never during the estimated 30 years of its existence has there been a technical justification for the values and procedures required in the standard. Rather, the stated values and procedures are the result of generalized negotiations taking place between the parties. Because these values and procedures are negotiated, the content of BAL-002-WECC-3 is the lowest common denominator and does not meet the requirements of FERC Order 672.4

Because BAL-002-WECC-2a, Contingency Reserve, Request to Retire Requirement R2 provided the technical support for retiring Requirement R2, arguments in that filing are not revisited here.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees on August 15, 2019, filed with FERC on September 9, 2019.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See WECC-0142 BAL-002-WECC-3, Contingency Reserve, Request to Retire, home page, at the SAR accordion.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> FERC Order 672, P329 and P330.

#### Standard of Review

While the Commission may approve an RRS that is more stringent than a parallel continent-wide standard, the Commission may also retire such a standard.<sup>6</sup>

"While a Regional Entity may propose regional Reliability Standards that address specific, unique regional conditions and circumstances, *such regional Reliability Standards can be retired if those justifications are no longer relevant*. Accordingly, the Commission may approve retirement of a more stringent regional requirement "if the Regional Entity demonstrates that the continent-wide Reliability Standard is sufficient to ensure the reliability of that region." (Emphasis added.)

In doing so, the Commission must give due weight to the technical expertise of a Regional Entity, like WECC, that is organized on an interconnection-wide basis with respect to the regional differences applicable to the Western Interconnection.

The technical qualifications of the subject matter experts compiling this paper are provided with this filing, as presented and approved by the WECC Standards Committee (WSC).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Version One Regional Reliability Standard for Resource and Demand Balancing, Order No. 740, 75 FR 65964 (Oct. 27, 2010), 133 FERC ¶ 61,063, P 30 (2010). See also: FERC, 18 CFR Part 40, Docket No. RM19-20-000, WECC Regional Reliability Standard BAL-002-WECC-3 (Contingency Reserve), p.5



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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The Commission approves regional differences proposed by Regional Entities, such as Regional Reliability Standards and Variances, if the regional difference is just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest. 16 U.S.C. § 824o(d)(2) and 18 C.F.R. § 39.5(a). (See also) Additionally, Commission Order No. 672 requires further criteria for regional differences. A regional difference from a continent-wide Reliability Standard must either be:

<sup>(1)</sup> more stringent than the continent-wide Reliability Standard, including a regional difference that addresses matters that the continent-wide Reliability Standard does not; or is,

<sup>(2)</sup> necessitated by a physical difference in the Bulk-Power System.

## **Procedural History**

In 1996, the Western Systems Coordinating Council (WSCC)<sup>8</sup> adopted the WSCC Reliability Criteria, Minimum Operating Reliability Criteria (MORC). The MORC prescribed levels of reserves that became BAL-002-WECC-3, effective 2021.

In 1999, the MORC became the WECC Reliability Management System (RMS), a contract-based system of accountability that pre-dated mandatory standards.

As the industry approached the onset of mandatory standards (2007) and memorialization of legacy operating practices, the content of the RMS was adapted and approved as BAL-STD-002-0, Operating Reserves (2007). That standard was an attempt to translate the substantive content of the RMS into the sought-after NERC/FERC format of today's reliability standards. The *content* was accepted "as is" with its origins in the 1996 MORC; albeit, the early standard was remanded for remediation, largely on *format* and structural grounds.

In 2013, FERC accepted remediations to BAL-002-WECC-2.

In 2017, an interpretation was added (BAL-002-WECC-2a) and later incorporated into BAL-002-WECC-3, in which Requirement R2 was approved for retirement, with an effective date of August 15, 2019.

In 2025, the Western Interconnection still adheres to similar levels of reserves as it did in 1996. This means that, for over 28 years, the Western Interconnection has held more reserves than the rest of the continent (NERC BAL-002-3) even though there has never been technical justification to do so.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The Western Systems Coordinating Council (WSCC) was formed in 1967 by 40 power systems to coordinate the planning and operations of the electric system in western North America. The WSCC's goal was to provide reliable power to the public.



## **Development History (Before 1996 to 2024)**

Before 1996, members of the WSCC voluntarily operated the Western Interconnection according to the MORC. Although the MORC contained provisions for generation control, generation performance, and Contingency Reserve, the MORC provided no technical support for the reserve thresholds and characteristics it set. Rather, the operating thresholds were established by negotiation—not technical analysis. If this approach were adopted today, FERC would likely deny approval of the standard as contrary to FERC Order 672, P329.

In July and August of 1996, the Western Interconnection experienced two widespread outages resulting from improper vegetation management. The resulting outage reports<sup>12</sup> <sup>13</sup> made several recommendations that would later be adopted in the 1999 WECC RMS.<sup>14</sup> <sup>15</sup> The WECC Operating Committee's recommendation produced portions of the RMS that later evolved into WECC Standard BAL-STD-002-0, Operating Reserves and, ultimately, BAL-002-WECC-3. Like the other initial

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> "The majority of these standards were specifically developed to address and mitigate main causes of the two major system outages that occurred in the Western Interconnection in July and August of 1996." Agenda Item 3, Board of Trustees Meeting, March 12, 2007, page 4



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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> MORC, Maintenance Coordination: 1. Sharing information. The security and reliability of the interconnected power system depends upon periodic inspection and adequate maintenance of generators, transmission lines and associated equipment, control equipment, communication equipment, relaying equipment, and other system facilities. Entities and coordinated groups of entities must establish procedures and responsibility for disseminating information on scheduled outages and for coordinating scheduled outages of major facilities which affect the security and reliability of the interconnected power system.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Minimum Operating Reliability Criterion, Section 1, Generation Control and Performance

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> FERC Order 672. P329. The proposed Reliability Standard must not simply reflect a compromise in the ERO's Reliability Standard development process based on the least effective North American practice—the so-called "lowest common denominator"—if such practice does not adequately protect Bulk-Power System reliability. Although the Commission will give due weight to the technical expertise of the ERO, we will not hesitate to remand a proposed Reliability Standard if we are convinced it is not adequate to protect reliability.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> The outage reports are available upon request. Western Systems Coordinating Council (WSCC) Disturbance Report for the Power System Outage that Occurred on the Western Interconnection August 10, 1996, as approved by the WSCC Operations Committee on October 18, 1996

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> "f. The WSCC Operations Committee shall assess whether the levels and allocation of operating reserves contributed to the severity of this disturbance and implement corrective measures as appropriate." Western System Coordinating Council Disturbance Report, For the Power System Outages that Occurred on the Western Interconnection on 2 JUL 1996. Approved by the WSCC Operations Committee on September 19, 1996. RMS Outage Report, page 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The RMS was approved 1 SEP 1999. WECC Comment Report – WECC Tier 1- RMS Standard – (BAL-STD-002-0) Question 4, Attachment 2, page 9.

standards, the language of the original standard was a translation of the language contained in the RMS.<sup>16</sup>

In March 1997, noting that federal remedial legislation could take years to enact, the WSCC trustees created the WSCC RMS Policy Group<sup>17</sup> establishing a contract-based operational system known as the RMS.<sup>18</sup> In establishing the RMS, the WSCC RMS Policy Group reviewed all NERC and WECC reliability criteria, identified specific criteria deemed critical for reliability management, then moved those criteria into the RMS through a three-phase implementation plan.<sup>20</sup>

On April 14, 1999, FERC asserted jurisdiction over the RMS.

Between September 1998 and February 2000 (phase two of the three-phase RMS implementation), the WSCC turned the content of the RMS into the first mandatory reliability standards (aka Version Zero, 2007). BAL-SDT-002-0, Contingency Reserve was part of that translation.

On December 22, 2006, WECC submitted a request to NERC to approve, and send to FERC for approval, eight proposed RRSs. WECC referred to the eight proposed standards as its Tier One

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Hearing



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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> WECC states that the proposed regional Reliability Standards, which are exact translations of existing regional criteria, either address matters not addressed in the Commission-approved ERO Reliability Standards or contain more stringent requirements than the ERO standards. (FERC accepted Tier One standards evolving from the RMS. AKA: Tier One Order.) FERC, 119 FERC ¶ 61,260 United States of America, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Order Approving Regional Reliability Standards for the Western Interconnection and Directing Modifications (Issued June 8, 2007), page 19.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Following the enactment of EPAct 2005 and the establishment of mandatory Reliability Standards applicable to all owners, operators, and users of the BPS, WECC sought to translate certain of its existing practices under its RMS reliability criteria into regional Reliability Standards to supplement the continent-wide Reliability Standards the Commission approved in Order No. 693. To that end, WECC established a task force to identify criteria in the RMS that should be binding on all BPS users, owners, and operators in the Western Interconnection, not just the Transmission Operators subject to the RMS. The task force chose eight of the identified criteria, which had the highest priority and could be implemented in the near term for translation into regional Reliability Standards. United States of America Before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), Docket No. RM16-10-000, Supplemental Information for Petition of the NERC and WECC for Approval of retirement of Regional Reliability Standard TOP-007-WECC-1a, page 5.

<sup>18</sup> Hearing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Electric Reliability Corporation, Helping Owners, Operators, and Users of the Bulk Power System Assure Reliability and Security for More Than 50 Years, By David Nevius, Senior Vice President 1979–2012, Page 40-41.

standards originating from the RMS because the proposed standards were translations of standards that were already mandatory within the Western Interconnection as part of the RMS.<sup>21</sup>

Those eight standards—that included Tier One WECC-BAL-STD-002-0 (Operating Reserves)—were near-exact translations of existing WECC criteria that FERC earlier accepted as part of the WECC RMS program.<sup>22</sup> Because the content was a near-exact translation, the format did not match that required by NERC/FERC. This would later lead to a remand of BAL-002-WECC-1 to ensure conformity.

On January 9, 2007, NERC provided WECC with a report of its preliminary findings about the request from December 22, 2006, and provided WECC with a list of required remediations.<sup>23</sup> The request largely addressed styles, formats, and corrections to compliance sections. The NERC Board of Trustees approved the Tier One request subject to remediation and sent the eight proposed standards to FERC with a request for approval.

In June 2007, FERC approved WECC's submittal of eight reliability-crucial Tier One standards, thereby transitioning from the RMS system to that of FERC-approved NERC Reliability Standards.<sup>24</sup> Although earlier versions lacked technical support, FERC agreed with

"WECC, WIRAB [Western Interconnection Regional Advisory Board] and NERC that approval of [WECC's early BAL] under section 215 would enhance reliability in the Western Interconnection by making WECC's current practices binding on all relevant entities in the region and by strengthening WECC's compliance and enforcement authority."<sup>25</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Tier One Order, p. 43. See also, "The proposed regional Reliability Standards would make eight of those RMS criteria binding on the applicable subset of users, owners and operators of the Bulk-Power System in the United States portion of the Western Interconnection, as identified in each proposed standard. The regional Reliability Standards would supplement rather than replace the Commission-approved Reliability Standards developed by the ERO that will take effect in June 2007. Tier One, p. 10.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> North American Electric Reliability Corporation, Docket No. RR07-\_\_\_-000, III. BACKGROUND ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WECC REGIONAL RELIABILITY STANDARDS, Debra A. Palmer of Schiff/Hardin (1666 K STREET N.W., SUITE 300, WASHINGTON, DC 20006) on March 26, 2007.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Loc. Cit. IV. Overview of the Proposed WECC Regional Reliability Standards, page 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> NERC DECISION APPROVING, WITH CONDITIONS, RELIABILITY STANDARDS PROPOSED BY WESTERN ELECTRICITY COORDINATING COUNCIL, page 2. (Approved by Board of Trustees March 12, 2007)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>FERC Order Approving Regional Reliability Standards for the Western Interconnection and Directing Modifications, Docket No. RR07-11-000, (Issued June 8, 2007)

#### Structural Overview of BAL-002-WECC-3

## **Purpose**

The Purpose of currently effective RRS BAL-002-WECC-3—Contingency Reserve is to provide an RRS specifying "the quantity and types of Contingency Reserve required to ensure reliability under normal and abnormal conditions."<sup>26</sup>

The NERC Glossary defines Contingency Reserve as:

"The provision of capacity that may be deployed by the Balancing Authority to respond to a Balancing Contingency Event and other contingency requirements (such as Energy Emergency Alerts as specified in the associated EOP standard). A Balancing Authority may include in its restoration of Contingency Reserve readiness to reduce Firm Demand and include it if, and only if, the Balancing Authority:

- is experiencing a Reliability Coordinator declared Energy Emergency Alert level and is utilizing
  its Contingency Reserve to mitigate an operating emergency in accordance with its emergency
  Operating Plan.
- is utilizing its Contingency Reserve to mitigate an operating emergency in accordance with its emergency Operating Plan."

## **Applicability**

BAL-002-WECC-3 applies to Balancing Authorities (BA), unless the BA is a member of a Reserve Sharing Group (RSG), in which case the RSG becomes the applicable entity.

#### Requirements

The standard consists of four requirements.

#### Requirement R1

 Provides that each BA and RSG must maintain a minimum amount of Contingency Reserve, except within the first sixty minutes following an event requiring the activation of Contingency Reserves, and that the Contingency Reserve must consist of any combination of a list of specified reserve types.

## Requirement R2

Reserved. Retired, subject to cyclical field tests.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> BAL-002-WECC-3, Contingency Reserve, Purpose.



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#### Requirement R3

Each Sink BA and RSG must maintain an amount of Operating Reserve, in addition to the
minimum Contingency Reserve in Requirement R1, equal to the amount of Operating Reserve—
Supplemental for any Interchange Transaction designated as part of the Source Balancing
Authority's Operating Reserve—Supplemental or source Reserve Sharing Group's Operating
Reserve—Supplemental, except within the first sixty minutes following an event requiring the
activation of Contingency Reserve.

#### Requirement R4

 Each Source BA and RSG must maintain an amount of Operating Reserve, in addition to the minimum Contingency Reserve amounts identified in Requirement R1, equal to the amount and type of Operating Reserves for any Operating Reserve transactions for which it is the Source BA or RSG.



# Reliability will be Maintained

Upon retirement of BAL-002-WECC-3, reliability will be maintained by NERC BAL-002-3, Disturbance Control Standard—Contingency Reserve for Recovery from a Balancing Contingency Event, reinforced by the enhanced availability of resources currently unavailable under BAL-002-WECC-3.

# Replacing BAL-002-WECC-3 with NERC BAL-002-3 Mitigates Reliability Gaps associated with Variable Generation

As highlighted by FERC in its Order 901, with the growing amount of variable generation replacing more responsive and dispatchable resources, the industry faces the dilemma of how to support these new resources.<sup>27</sup> Unlike traditional resources, much of the new variable generation cannot be quickly dispatched, thus creating a gap in reliability. FERC acknowledged that gap, noting that neither business as usual nor existing reliability standards will remedy this concern. Finally, FERC also recognizes the value that steps taken must apply on a continent-wide basis.<sup>28</sup>


Replacing BAL-002-WECC-3 with the continent-wide NERC BAL-002-3 takes immediate steps towards meeting FERC's concerns.

In Order 901, FERC states:

"[W]e continue to find that as the resource mix trends towards higher penetrations of IBRs, the need to reliably integrate these resources into the Bulk-Power System is expected to grow, and that the currently effective Reliability Standards do not adequately address IBR reliability risks. The continuing risks that the increasing penetration of IBRs pose to the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System underscore the need for mandatory Reliability Standards to address these issues on a nationwide basis." (Emphasis added.) Order 901, P24.

When BAL-002-WECC-3 is retired and replaced with NERC BAL-002-3, the amount and type of reserves required to be held back within the Western Interconnection will decrease. That frees those resources to be plied against load. Within the Western Interconnection, a vast majority of these sequestered resources are immediately dispatchable (such as hydro), thus serving as the perfect resource to match the less predictable response of variable generation.

 $<sup>^{27}</sup>$  FERC Order 901, P11-15, 185 FERC ¶ 61,042, United States of America, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), 18 CFR Part 40, Docket No. RM22-12-000; Reliability Standards to Address Inverter-Based Resources, October 19, 2023. Hereafter: Order 901





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By making these dispatchable resources more operationally available, the secondary benefits may be to bolster the supply of generation to the market. This potential secondary benefit directly addresses vital public interests.<sup>29</sup>

## Dispatchable Resources Contribute Significantly to Essential Reliability Services (ERS) 30

ERSs consist of frequency control, ramping capability, and voltage control.

Frequency control is necessary because the electric grid is designed to operate at a frequency of 60 hertz (Hz). Deviations from 60 Hz can have destructive effects on generators, motors, and equipment of all sizes and types. It is critical to maintain and restore frequency after a disturbance such as the loss of generation. This requires an instantaneous (inertial) response from some resources and a fast response from other resources to slow the rate of fall during the arresting period, a fast increase in power output during the rebound period to stabilize the frequency, and a more prolonged contribution of additional power to compensate for lost resources and bring system frequency back to the normal level. Two NERC Reliability Standards address this:

- BAL-002-3 Disturbance Control Standard—Contingency Reserve from a Balancing Contingency Event
- BAL-003-2 Frequency Response and Frequency Bias Setting

Adequate ramping capability (the ability to match load and generation at all times) is necessary to maintain system frequency. Changes to the generation mix or the system operator's ability to adjust resource output can impact the ability of the operator to keep the system in balance. NERC Reliability Standard BAL-001-2 (Real Power Balancing Control Performance) addresses this issue.

Voltage must be controlled to protect system reliability and move power where it is needed in both normal operations and following a disturbance. Voltage issues tend to be local in nature, such as in sub-areas of the transmission and distribution systems. Reactive power is needed to keep electricity flowing and maintain necessary voltage levels. Several NERC Reliability Standards address voltage control.

Restated, replacing BAL-002-WECC-3 with NERC BAL-002-3 frees dispatchable resources to address FERC-identified reliability gaps created by variable generation, and may bolster vital public interests.

 $<sup>^{30}</sup>$  "Essential Reliability Services (ERS) are the elemental 'reliability building blocks' from resources (generation and demand) necessary to maintain Bulk Power System (BPS) reliability." NERC ERS Task Force – Scope – 2014.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> "335. Finally, we understand that at times development of a proposed Reliability Standard may require that a particular reliability goal must be balanced against other vital public interests, such as environmental, social, and other goals. We expect the ERO to explain any such balancing in its application for approval of a proposed Reliability Standard." (Emphasis added.) Order 693, P35.

Because adequate levels of reserves are established in NERC BAL-002-3, and supported by BAL-003-2, BAL-002-WECC-3, Requirements R1 through R4 are not needed.

# Replacing BAL-002-WECC-3 With NERC BAL-002-3 Provides Sufficient Reserves at a Continent-Wide Level

In the earliest stages of the Western Interconnection's strides to establish adequate Contingency Reserves, the applicable entity's reserves were established by BAL-STD-002-0, Operating Reserves, at 5% of hydro generation and 7% thermal generation (50% spinning and 50% non-spinning).<sup>31</sup> These thresholds were not technically supported; they were the result of contractual negotiations. Today, such a standard would likely not be approved by FERC as violative of the principles established in FERC Order 672. (See foot note 2.)

As BAL-STD-0-2 was replaced with later iterations of that standard, the result was today's BAL-002-WECC-3, in which the Responsible Entity's reserves are set at:

#### R1.1.1 "The greater of either:

- The amount of Contingency Reserve equal to the loss of the most severe single contingency;<sup>32</sup> (or)
- The amount of Contingency Reserve equal to the sum of three percent of hourly integrated Load plus three percent of hourly integrated generation."

Bullet one of BAL-002-WECC-3 describes the Most Severe Single Contingency, or MSSC.

The MSSC ensures that all entities can recover Area Control Error (ACE) within 15 minutes. The MSSC serves as the upper Contingency Reserve threshold for all interconnections, except the Western Interconnection. Within the Western Interconnection, the levels of reserve set by BAL-002-WECC-3 can exceed that of the rest of the continent that is protected by FERC-approved BAL-002-3. As a result, the Western Interconnection carries an excess of reserve that exacerbates concerns raised by FERC in Order 901 wherein FERC addresses the need for continent-wide standards to backstop the operational performance of variable generation. Comparing NERC BAL-002-3 with BAL-002-WECC-3 illustrates this outcome.

NERC BAL-002-3 states that the BA and the RSG are not subject to compliance with BAL-002-3, R1 for multiple events that exceed the MSSC. NERC BAL-002-3 requires the applicable entity to deploy Contingency Reserve *up to its MSSC*; however, it does not require Contingency Reserve deployment *beyond MSSC*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> See Attachment - Transition from 5-7 to 3-3, as described in 2005 by Merrill Schultz; see also Attachment - History of WECC Reserve 5-7 Spin Merrill Schultz, March 3, 2005; see also BAL-STD-002-0, Operating Reserves. <sup>32</sup> Also known as the Most Severe Single Contingency (MSSC).



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By contrast, BAL-002-WECC-3 requires the applicable entity to maintain a level of Contingency Reserves *exceeding that required under NERC BAL-002-3*, as approved by FERC. Specifically, BAL-002-WECC-3, Requirement R1 requires the applicable entity to carry reserves that equal or exceed the entity's MSSC—beyond that required by BAL-002-3 that adequately serves the balance of the continent. Among other things, this means these valuable dispatchable resources in excess of the MSSC cannot be used to meet FERC's goal of backstopping variable resources as identified in FERC Order 901.

While the application of BAL-002-3 could free resources to enhance reliability, the application of BAL-002-WECC-3 can inhibit reliability when resources are withheld that could otherwise serve load and backstop variable resources.

#### For example:

Using historical data from January 2020 - May 2024, comparison of the hourly Contingency Reserve Requirement (calculated using 3% generation and 3% load) to the Most Severe Single Contingency (MSSC), the results identified there was more than 5,000 MW of capacity available during the summertime peak hours and between 2,000-2,500 MW during the remaining hours of the year. See figure below.




Figure 1: Reserves in excess of MSSC

# The Shortened Execution Time of BAL-002-WECC-3 Inhibits Reliability Due to Market Rules in the Western Interconnection

BAL-002-WECC-3, Requirements R3 and R4 require the applicable entity to restore Contingency Reserve within 60 minutes of the initiating event. By contrast, BAL-002-3 requires the applicable entity to achieve the same task in 105 minutes. As a result, BAL-002-WECC-3 requires the performance of the same task 45 minutes earlier than its continent-wide counterpart. This shortened period inhibits reliability in that it forces the applicable entities into transactions agreed upon during an arbitrarily shortened time window. Like BAL-002-3, Requirement R1., there is no technical support suggesting



that rushing this transaction enhances reliability—yet it remains in force 28 years after its inception, still lacking any technical support.

Further, the restoration of reserves in a 60-minute timeframe is restrictive on the entity's ability to secure additional resources within the established business practices in the region. The NERC Standard of up to 105 minutes (90 minutes after the 15 minutes Contingency Recovery Period) after the event has less commercial impact and is acceptable from both a commercial standpoint as well as an operational standpoint.

The WECC requirement of 60 minutes from start of a DCS event restricts the deficient entity from rescheduling resources to replace those that were lost during the event. Western market practices require schedules to be submitted and approved well in advance to ensure reliability, and once the schedule windows close, it is difficult to make last-minute changes. Before markets, when transactions were bilateral, a recovery of generation resources was more flexible, and could be more quickly executed.

The NERC BAL-002-3 Contingency Reserve Restoration Period of up to 105 minutes allows applicable entities to use normal market scheduling practices to replace lost generation. FERC's approval of NERC BAL-002-3 shows its belief that the NERC standard of 105 minutes (90 plus 15) is adequate and does not degrade reliability.

In attempting to meet the 60-minute restoration requirement, the applicable entity has two options.

First, the BA must carry significantly more Contingency Reserve than is required to maintain an adequate level of reliability, or second, be prepared to enter an Energy Emergency Alert 3 which allows the BA to deploy Contingency Reserves to serve load. By definition, entering into an Energy Emergency Alert is an indication of reduced reliability. Given normal scheduling practices, a 90-minute restoration time allows a Responsible Entity to restore Contingency Reserve using normal established market scheduling practices.

In addition, many entities own BES equipment in more than one interconnection. Having a single standard enhances these entities' ability to stay in compliance with the standard using consistent business practices across the interconnections.

#### Reserve Thresholds do Not Reflect Resource Mix

Due to the changing resource mix and the proliferation of renewable generation, battery storage, and retirements of conventional synchronous generation, resource adequacy has become a serious concern. The BAL-002-WECC standard unnecessarily ties up significant generation which is dispatchable, frequency responsive and fast ramping. Generation that could be used to meet ramps, follow variable resources, or simply meet expected loads, is committed to contingency reserve capacity that is not available to serve load. For example, Western Power Pool's Northwest Power Pool Reserve Sharing Group Northwest-Montana zone typically has a 1,200 MW MSSC, yet routinely has over 3,000 MW of



reserves being held under the 3/3 requirement. That available capacity, usually in excess 1,800 MW, could be used to meet other reliability related services obligations. The existing 3/3 contingency reserve requirement results in the construction of at least 1800 MW of excess generation in the Northwest-Montana zone. The ability to use this generation capacity exceeding the MSSC will also allow entities to efficiently operate their facilities. Idled excess capacity will be reduced and productive generation increased.

Under NERC standard NERC BAL-002-3, the Eastern, Texas and Quebec Interconnections operate without the additional reserve requirement (3% load and 3% generation), and they are allowed to restore their reserves within 90 minutes. The changing market structure in the Western Interconnection has made it difficult to fully restore the required reserves within 60 minutes due to market scheduling timelines. This can lead to implementation of emergency procedures, typically Energy Emergency Alert 3 conditions, due to an energy shortfall precipitated by the 60-minute recovery period. When the Western markets were mostly bilateral, the 60-minute recovery was consistent with energy scheduling protocols. Market integration has altered energy scheduling protocols making it very difficult to modify schedules within 60 minutes of a generation contingency. For these reasons BAL-002-WECC-3 has become obsolete, while not enhancing reliability.

Reserves are unused or unloaded generation that are in a state of readiness in case there is sudden loss of loaded generation. When reserves are held above the MSSC, as they are in the Western Interconnection, excess capacity must be built that has no other reliability benefit. Every energy customer in the West absorbs this excess cost. Retirement of BAL-002-WECC-3 reallocates these excess resources to the benefit of the interconnection in the form of dispatchable, responsive, and available resources to reliably integrate future variable resources, such as wind, solar, and other renewable resources.

#### Vital Public Interests will be Enhanced<sup>33 34</sup>

## **Market Timing Issues**

The emergence of organized markets in WECC, since the inception of BAL-002-WECC-1 has brought a new dynamic in the timing and means by which the reserves are procured. The number of participants in the California ISO Energy Imbalance Market (AKA: Western Energy Imbalance Market, or WEIM)

<sup>34 &</sup>quot;The proposed Reliability Standard does not necessarily have to reflect the optimal method, or "best practice," for achieving its reliability goal without regard to implementation cost or historical regional infrastructure design. It should however achieve its reliability goal effectively and efficiently." FERC Order No. 672 at P 328.



<sup>33 &</sup>quot;Finally, we understand that at times development of a proposed Reliability Standard may require that a particular reliability goal must be balanced against other vital public interests, such as environmental, social, and other goals. We expect the ERO to explain any such balancing in its application for approval of a proposed Reliability Standard." FERC Order No. 672 at P 335.

has grown significantly in the past several years. CAISO EIM market rules require a participating BA to balance its resources and loads 75 minutes before the next operating hour (T-75). Failure to do this can result in financial penalties to the participating BA. This rule has had the effect of discouraging any bilateral energy trading after T-75 and does not align well with a 60-minute reserve recovery time limit. No bilateral trading for replacement energy reserve is possible for the next operational hour because participating WEIM BAs cannot participate in trades within T-75.

This leaves the contingent BA in a resource short position when the 60-minute contingency restoration time expires. At this point, the contingent BA must activate emergency operating procedures up to asking the Reliability Coordinator to declare an EEA3, including load shedding to balance the contingent BA. By extending the contingency restoration time to 105 minutes (15-minute recovery plus 90-minute restoration), the contingent BA has at least 30 minutes to arrange replacement energy in a bilateral manner from other BAs or schedule their own resource in the WEIM. The additional contingency reserve recovery time allows the contingent BA to make orderly and planned adjustments and continue to serve firm load without the implementation of emergency operating procedures, up to and including shedding firm load.

FERC and the industry have determined that 90 minutes from the end of the recovery period (up to 15 minutes) is sufficient to maintain an adequate level of reliability. The shorter restoration period in the WECC creates artificial reliability issues as the applicable entity tries to rebalance supply and demand in an arbitrarily shorter period than that required in the NERC BAL-002-3.

To give a clear understanding of the impact of either option, the following example is provided.

Assume the NWPP RSG's MSSC is approximately 1,200 MW. Under BAL-002-WECC-3, the NWPP RSG would normally carry approximately 2,200-4,000 MW of Contingency Reserves depending on the time of year. Assuming the MSSC occurs, the NWPP RSG would activate 1,200 MW of its reserves and restore the ACE to the pre-event level. Members now have approximately 60 minutes to restore 1,200 MW of reserves while still carrying more than 1,000–2,800 MW, which is greater than the MSSC, assuming it was not reduced with the loss of the 1,180 MW event. See figure below.






Figure 2: Reserves in excess of MSSC; January 1, 2020, through May 1, 2024

As discussed earlier, due to market rules related to the WEIM in which most entities are taking part, new resources cannot be added to an entity's reserves for the next hour (minimum time to add a resource under the WEIM (75 minutes), or other emerging markets. If a resource is not already in the WEIM, it cannot count toward the reserves needed. So, an entity must have already been carrying reserves greater than required under the WECC standard, or it must reduce load to balance its resources and loads including reserves. (It can be argued that by reducing loads, you are putting the interconnection at greater risk because you have removed one available resource, the load, from being an option for the next event.) To avoid the declaration of an EEA, the NWPP would need to carry an additional 1,000 MW above the required reserves or declare an EEA any time the reserves need to be restored within 60 minutes of the event.

When entities withhold extra reserves to avoid the EEA, this paradigm keeps 2,500 to 4,000 MW from serving load due to the WECC current standard, which has no technical merit, as compared to the NERC Standard. These additional resources could be used to help integrate more inverter-based resources and serve loads more efficiently if it were available for load service.

Entering an Energy Emergency Alert indicates reduced reliability. Given normal scheduling practices, which require bilateral schedules to be completed and approved 75 minutes before the hour, a 60-minute restoration time does not allow adequate time for a Responsible Entity to restore Contingency Reserve in less than 60 minutes from the initiating event, potentially resulting in an Energy Emergency Alert situation.

# Capacity Could be Better Used than Simply Holding Reserve

FERC and the industry have determined that the amount of Contingency Reserve needed to maintain an adequate level of reliability is the amount of Contingency Reserve needed to replace the MSSC resource. Holding Contingency Reserve more than MSSC precludes using operating reserve for other purposes, particularly load and resource balancing in real-time. As the grid transitions from



conventional synchronous generation to more variable renewable resources, increasing capacity will be needed to manage the variability and faster ramping requirement of these resources. Allocating reserves in excess of that needed to maintain an adequate level of reliability, or MSSC, ultimately detracts from reliability.



## **Conclusion**

Retirement of BAL-002-WECC-3 Contingency Reserve would reduce required reserves in WECC without diminishing the ability to meet the deployment requirement. Freeing up reserves from the Contingency Reserve requirement would increase the resources available to manage variable resources and accommodate increased renewable resource integration.

The existing BAL-002-WECC-3 Contingency Reserve sets a BA's or RSG's Contingency Reserve requirement to the greater of the MSSC or 3% of the applicable entity's generation and 3% of its load. This 3/3 requirement exceeds MSSC for most responsible entities.

By contrast, NERC Standard BAL-002-3 Disturbance Control Standard—Contingency Reserve for Recovery from a Balancing Contingency Event, Requirement R1.3.2 states that the BA/RSG is not subject to compliance with Requirement R1 for multiple events that exceed the MSSC. NERC BAL-002-3 requires the applicable entity to deploy Contingency Reserve up to the MSSC but does not require Contingency Reserve deployment beyond the MSSC.

In BAL-002-3, FERC and the industry have determined that the amount of Contingency Reserve needed to maintain an adequate level of reliability is the amount of Contingency Reserve needed to replace the MSSC resource.

Holding Contingency Reserve more than MSSC precludes using operating reserve for other purposes, particularly load and resource balancing in real time. As the grid transitions from conventional synchronous generation to more variable renewable resources, increasing capacity will be needed to manage the variability and faster ramping requirement of these resources. Allocating reserve in excess of that needed to maintain an adequate level of reliability, or MSSC, ultimately detracts from reliability.

BAL-002-WECC-3 requires an applicable entity to restore Contingency Reserve within 60 minutes of the initiating event (as opposed to up to 105 minutes in BAL-002-3), or 45 minutes sooner than required by BAL-002-3. With respect to impacts to the time to restore Contingency Reserve, FERC and the industry have determined that 90 minutes from the end of the recovery period (up to 15 minutes) is sufficient to maintain an adequate level of reliability. By contrast, the 60-minute requirement within BAL-002-WECC-3 creates potential reliability issues as an applicable entity tries to rebalance in an arbitrarily shorter period than that required in the NERC BAL-002-3. In attempting to meet the 60-minute restoration requirement, an applicable entity has two options. First, the BA must carry significantly more Contingency Reserve than is required to maintain an adequate level of reliability, or second, be prepared to enter an Energy Emergency Alert 3 and deploy Contingency Reserve to serve load. Given normal scheduling practices, a 90-minute restoration time allows an applicable entity to restore Contingency Reserve without employing emergency procedures.

Retirement of BAL-002-WECC-3 will enhance the reliable operation of the Western Interconnection by allowing resources that are presently used for overprotecting above the MSSC to be available to meet



the immediate balancing needs of the Interconnection. This will free those resources to be used as needed in a rapidly changing system to maintain overall reliability.

