

NERC

NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC
RELIABILITY CORPORATION

Preparing Breakers for Cold Weather with Failure Modes and Mechanisms

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Winter Weather Preparation Webinar
September 6, 2018

RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY



Lesson Learned

Preparing Circuit Breakers for Operation in Cold Weather

Primary Interest Groups

Generator Owners (GOs)
Generator Operators (GOPs)
Transmission Owners (TOs)
Transmission Operators (TOPs)

Problem Statement

After two sequential line faults, an entire substation and a 1,150 MW nuclear plant tripped off-line due to consecutive breaker failures during cold weather (4°F).

Details

Two sequential B-phase faults occurred on a 500 kV line, apparently due to icing. Three breakers subsequently experienced breaker failure (failure-to-trip) events, de-energizing an entire substation and tripping a large generating unit off-line. The first breaker (Breaker 1, a SF₆ breaker with hydraulic mechanism) opened properly for the first fault, but did not reclose correctly. Breaker 1 experienced a hydraulic mechanism malfunction and correctly reclosed on only two of its three phases. As a result, Breaker 1 was unable to respond to the second fault. After that, two other breakers (Breakers 2 and 3, SF₆ breakers with pneumatic trip/spring close mechanisms) were very slow to trip on B-phase. For Breakers 2 and 3, there was a failure of the center pole to clear the fault quickly enough due to cold temperatures.

Corrective Actions

For Breaker 1, a defective motor contactor was discovered and replaced and a full hydraulic service was performed on all three phases. A diagnostic service was also performed to ensure that the breaker was ready to be returned to service.

- There was no cost effective way identified to foretell or prevent the issues discovered with Breaker 1. This type of failure has not been a systemic problem at other locations. The entity is still evaluating counter-measures based on these findings and will continue to monitor the condition of this breaker using existing preventive maintenance guidelines.

For Breakers 2 and 3, the manufacturer engineered a fix consisting of additional thermostatically-controlled cabinet heaters that prevent moisture from freezing inside the pneumatic (air) control valve during cold-weather conditions. One breaker also needed repair to the trip-coil circuitry. The engineered fix and repairs were completed for both breakers. A diagnostic service was also performed to ensure that both breakers were ready to be returned to service.

- Application of the engineered short-term fix to Breakers 2 and 3 prevents future operational issues on B-phase pneumatic control valve during low-temperature conditions. The manufacturer is developing a long-term fix.



The screenshot shows the NERC website interface. On the left, a sidebar contains a menu with 'Lessons Learned' highlighted in a yellow box. A yellow arrow points from this link to the main content area. The main content area shows the breadcrumb trail: Home > Program Areas & Departments > Reliability Risk Management > Event Analysis > Event Analysis > Lessons Learned. Below this is a 'Lessons Learned' table with columns for Type, LL#, Title, Category, and Date. The first row, 'LL20180802 Firewall Failure After Time Limit Exceeded', is highlighted in a yellow box. The table lists various incidents from 2018, including communication issues, transmission facility problems, and equipment failures.


Type	LL#	Title	Category	Date
📄	LL20180802	Firewall Failure After Time Limit Exceeded	Transmission Facilities	8/7/2018
📄	LL20180801	Loss of Substation Data Circuits to SCADA	Communications	8/7/2018
📄	LL20180702	Preparing Circuit Breakers for Operation in Cold Weather	Transmission Facilities	7/24/2018
📄	LL20180701	Risk of Internet Accessible Cyber Assets	Transmission Facilities	7/24/2018
📄	LL20180603	Back Office EMS Support Tools Impact Real-Time Situational Awareness	Communications	6/5/2018
📄	LL20180602	External Model Data Causing State Estimator to Not Converge	Communications	6/5/2018
📄	LL20180601	Loss of Communication to Multiple SCADA RTUs at a Switching Center	Transmission Facilities	6/5/2018
📄	LL20180302	Breaker Failure Due to Trip Coil Polarity	Transmission Facilities	3/6/2018
📄	LL20180301	State Estimator Outages Requiring Tuning/Calibrating EMS Settings	Communications	3/6/2018
📄	LL20180101	Inadequate Battery Configuration Management Damaged a Generating Station and Tripped an HVDC Conversion Station	Communications	1/3/2018


<https://www.nerc.com/pa/rm/ea/Pages/Lessons-Learned.aspx>

Failure Modes and Mechanisms (FMMs)

- Failure Modes are what gets your attention
- Failure Mechanisms are how the equipment gets going on the path to a failure
- Equipment Failures have logical cause-and-effect relationships behind them.
- Physical Evidence Examination and Root Cause Analysis can reveal what Failure Mechanisms were involved.
- Aging is not a 'cause.' It is just a catch-all term for slow moving Failure Mechanisms.
- Failure Mechanisms are detectable. Many can be stopped, or at least slowed down so they can be corrected before


Failed Equipment Type






SF6 Breaker Failure Modes & Mechanisms

Generic SF6 Breaker Failure Modes & Mechanisms




Send Failure Modes and Mechanisms, Improvement Comments, Corrections, Additions, Lessons Learned, Diagnostics / Symptom Monitoring Ideas, & Failed Equipment Photos to:
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
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
SF6 Breaker Failure Mechanisms




SF6 Breaker Failure Mechanisms




SF6 Breaker Failure Mechanisms



SF6 Breaker Failure Mechanisms




SF6 Breaker Failure Mechanisms



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- Application of the engineered short-term fix to Breakers 2 and 3 prevents future operational issues on B-phase pneumatic control valve during low-temperature conditions. The manufacturer is developing a long-term fix.

- There were two additional breakers from the same manufacturer at the same substation. The same short-term fix was also applied to those breakers.

Lessons Learned

Breakers have several cold-temperature-related failure mechanisms. A good practice is to annually (prior to first frost date for the location) perform pre-cold weather checks (seal condition, lubrication, pressures, dielectric, dryers, and adequate functioning heaters or heat tracing) for cold-sensitive components.

Other Cold Weather Breaker Issues

Hydraulic

- Sections that are normally at air pressure may pull contaminants in past seals as cooling pulls a vacuum there. If contaminated with water - ice gets in the works - can plug ports.
- If oil is breaking down, sludge may form that can also harden at cold temperatures.
- Hydraulic oil becomes more viscous as it gets colder; ensure oil used is rated for conditions colder than expected.
- Seals may shrink, harden or crack and leak, losing oil and pressure.
- If the design uses belt-driven pumps, belts may embrittle/crack. Belt shrinkage may cause axles to pull into misalignment (rubbing, dragging, seizing, belt coming off, belt failure, axle bearing failure, axle seal failure).

Gas / Air pressure operated

- Extreme cold reduces pressure (Ideal Gas Law $PV = nRT$). If pressure was already close to low end of operability, the cold will take it below (the compressor should cycle on to make up for that). Reduced pressure reduces the capacity of the breaker to interrupt an arc. Extra margin is needed for extreme cold.
- Seals may shrink, harden or crack and leak, losing gas and pressure. Sections that are normally at air pressure may pull contaminants, (including moisture which can freeze) in past seals as cold pulls a vacuum there.
- Compressor belts may embrittle and crack. Belt shrinkage may cause axles to pull into misalignment (e.g., rubbing, dragging, seizing, belt coming off, belt failure, axle bearing failure, axle seal failure). Air compressors need intakes that are protected from the elements (water and dust ingestion, freezing over) and the air water separator/dryer maintained (desiccant monitoring and replacement).
- SF₆ gas condenses to liquid at temperatures encountered in northern winters (-10°F/-23.3°C to -30°F/34.4°C depending on pressure, - generally between 95 and 70psig). This requires heaters to keep the SF₆ in a gaseous state.
- Heaters (and insulation) that do not provide complete coverage of the SF₆ volume (and tubing) may allow cold pockets for SF₆ condensation.

General/Mechanical

- Exposed mechanisms can be frozen over, requiring more force to break free and move initially.
- Differential expansion coefficients of materials can cause sliding surfaces to become tighter or seize if the outer material shrinks faster with cold than the inner surface. It is worse if lubrication is less than adequate or if grit has gotten in between surfaces.
- Lubricants thicken as they get colder. There is a viscosity limit; ensure the lubricant used is rated for more than the expected temperature range (cold and hot) since temperature records are broken in both directions eventually. If lubricant component separation occurs (reference other slow breaker LL), lubrication becomes less than adequate.

Cold weather impacts other substation, transmission, and generation equipment too. [NERC Event Analysis](#) is developing substation equipment Failure Modes and Mechanism (FMM) information that includes cold weather impacts. NERC conducts annual webinars on [Winter Weather Preparedness](#) for the industry.

Click here for: [Lesson Learned Comment Form](#)

For more information please contact:

[NERC – Lessons Learned](#) (via email)

[WECC Event Analysis](#)

Source of Lesson Learned:

Western Electric Coordinating Council

Lesson Learned #:

20180702

Date Published:

July 24, 2018

Category:

Transmission Facilities

This document is designed to convey lessons learned from NERC's various activities. It is not intended to establish new requirements under NERC's Reliability Standards or to modify the requirements in any existing Reliability Standards. Compliance will continue to be determined based on language in the NERC Reliability Standards as they may be amended from time to time. Implementation of this lesson learned is not a substitute for compliance with requirements in NERC's Reliability Standards.

Preparing Breakers for Cold Weather

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Learn more about Failure Modes & Mechanisms at: <https://vimeopro.com/nerclearning/cause-coding/video/208745179>



Questions and Answers