

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — Critical Cyber Asset Identification
2. **Number:** CIP-002-3(X)
3. **Purpose:** NERC Standards CIP-002-3(X) through CIP-009-3(X) provide a cyber security framework for the identification and protection of Critical Cyber Assets to support reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System.

These standards recognize the differing roles of each entity in the operation of the Bulk Electric System, the criticality and vulnerability of the assets needed to manage Bulk Electric System reliability, and the risks to which they are exposed.

Business and operational demands for managing and maintaining a reliable Bulk Electric System increasingly rely on Cyber Assets supporting critical reliability functions and processes to communicate with each other, across functions and organizations, for services and data. This results in increased risks to these Cyber Assets.

Standard CIP-002-3(X) requires the identification and documentation of the Critical Cyber Assets associated with the Critical Assets that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System. These Critical Assets are to be identified through the application of a risk-based assessment.

4. Applicability:

4.1. Within the text of Standard CIP-002-3(X), “Responsible Entity” shall mean:

- 4.1.1 Reliability Coordinator.
- 4.1.2 Balancing Authority.
- 4.1.3 Interchange Authority.
- 4.1.4 Transmission Service Provider.
- 4.1.5 Transmission Owner.
- 4.1.6 Transmission Operator.
- 4.1.7 Generator Owner.
- 4.1.8 Generator Operator.
- 4.1.9 Load Serving Entity.
- 4.1.10 NERC.
- 4.1.11 Regional Entity.

4.2. The following are exempt from Standard CIP-002-3(X):

- 4.2.1 Facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.
- 4.2.2 Cyber Assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters.

5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on

the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1.** Critical Asset Identification Method — The Responsible Entity shall identify and document a risk-based assessment methodology to use to identify its Critical Assets.
 - R1.1.** The Responsible Entity shall maintain documentation describing its risk-based assessment methodology that includes procedures and evaluation criteria.
 - R1.2.** The risk-based assessment shall consider the following assets:
 - R1.2.1.** Control centers and backup control centers performing the functions of the entities listed in the Applicability section of this standard.
 - R1.2.2.** Transmission substations that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System.
 - R1.2.3.** Generation resources that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System.
 - R1.2.4.** Systems and facilities critical to system restoration, including blackstart generators and substations in the electrical path of transmission lines used for initial system restoration.
 - R1.2.5.** Systems and facilities critical to automatic load shedding under a common control system capable of shedding 300 MW or more.
 - R1.2.6.** Remedial Action Schemes that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System.
 - R1.2.7.** Any additional assets that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System that the Responsible Entity deems appropriate to include in its assessment.
- R2.** Critical Asset Identification — The Responsible Entity shall develop a list of its identified Critical Assets determined through an annual application of the risk-based assessment methodology required in R1. The Responsible Entity shall review this list at least annually, and update it as necessary.
- R3.** Critical Cyber Asset Identification — Using the list of Critical Assets developed pursuant to Requirement R2, the Responsible Entity shall develop a list of associated Critical Cyber Assets essential to the operation of the Critical Asset. Examples at control centers and backup control centers include systems and facilities at master and remote sites that provide monitoring and control, automatic generation control, real-time power system modeling, and real-time inter-utility data exchange. The Responsible Entity shall review this list at least annually, and update it as necessary. For the purpose of Standard CIP-002-3(X), Critical Cyber Assets are further qualified to be those having at least one of the following characteristics:
 - R3.1.** The Cyber Asset uses a routable protocol to communicate outside the Electronic Security Perimeter; or,
 - R3.2.** The Cyber Asset uses a routable protocol within a control center; or,
 - R3.3.** The Cyber Asset is dial-up accessible.
- R4.** Annual Approval — The senior manager or delegate(s) shall approve annually the risk-based assessment methodology, the list of Critical Assets and the list of Critical Cyber Assets. Based on Requirements R1, R2, and R3 the Responsible Entity may determine that it has no Critical

Assets or Critical Cyber Assets. The Responsible Entity shall keep a signed and dated record of the senior manager or delegate(s)'s approval of the risk-based assessment methodology, the list of Critical Assets and the list of Critical Cyber Assets (even if such lists are null.)

C. Measures

- M1.** The Responsible Entity shall make available its current risk-based assessment methodology documentation as specified in Requirement R1.
- M2.** The Responsible Entity shall make available its list of Critical Assets as specified in Requirement R2.
- M3.** The Responsible Entity shall make available its list of Critical Cyber Assets as specified in Requirement R3.
- M4.** The Responsible Entity shall make available its approval records of annual approvals as specified in Requirement R4.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

- 1.1.1** Regional Entity for Responsible Entities that do not perform delegated tasks for their Regional Entity.
- 1.1.2** ERO for Regional Entity.
- 1.1.3** Third-party monitor without vested interest in the outcome for NERC.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame

Not applicable.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Processes

- Compliance Audits
- Self-Certifications
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Violation Investigations
- Self-Reporting
- Complaints

1.4. Data Retention

- 1.4.1** The Responsible Entity shall keep documentation required by Standard CIP-002-3(X) from the previous full calendar year unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.
- 1.4.2** The Compliance Enforcement Authority in conjunction with the Registered Entity shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.5. Additional Compliance Information

- 1.5.1** None.

2. Violation Severity Levels (To be developed later.)

E. Regional Variances

None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|-------------------|---|--|
| 1 | January 16, 2006 | R3.2 — Change “Control Center” to “control center” | Errata |
| 2 | | Modifications to clarify the requirements and to bring the compliance elements into conformance with the latest guidelines for developing compliance elements of standards. Removal of reasonable business judgment. Replaced the RRO with the RE as a responsible entity. Rewording of Effective Date. Changed compliance monitor to Compliance Enforcement Authority. | |
| 3 | | Updated version number from -2 to -3 | |
| 3 | December 16, 2009 | Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees | Update |
| 3(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

Standard CIP-002-3(X) — Cyber Security — Critical Cyber Asset Identification

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — Critical Cyber Asset Identification
2. **Number:** CIP-002-3(X)
3. **Purpose:** NERC Standards CIP-002-3(X) through CIP-009-3(X) provide a cyber security framework for the identification and protection of Critical Cyber Assets to support reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System.

These standards recognize the differing roles of each entity in the operation of the Bulk Electric System, the criticality and vulnerability of the assets needed to manage Bulk Electric System reliability, and the risks to which they are exposed.

Business and operational demands for managing and maintaining a reliable Bulk Electric System increasingly rely on Cyber Assets supporting critical reliability functions and processes to communicate with each other, across functions and organizations, for services and data. This results in increased risks to these Cyber Assets.

Standard CIP-002-3(X) requires the identification and documentation of the Critical Cyber Assets associated with the Critical Assets that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System. These Critical Assets are to be identified through the application of a risk-based assessment.

4. Applicability:

4.1. Within the text of Standard CIP-002-3(X), “Responsible Entity” shall mean:

- 4.1.1 Reliability Coordinator.
- 4.1.2 Balancing Authority.
- 4.1.3 Interchange Authority.
- 4.1.4 Transmission Service Provider.
- 4.1.5 Transmission Owner.
- 4.1.6 Transmission Operator.
- 4.1.7 Generator Owner.
- 4.1.8 Generator Operator.
- 4.1.9 Load Serving Entity.
- 4.1.10 NERC.
- 4.1.11 Regional Entity.

4.2. The following are exempt from Standard CIP-002-3(X):

- 4.2.1 Facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.
- 4.2.2 Cyber Assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters.

5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on

Deleted: The first day of the third calendar quarter after applicable regulatory approvals[¶]
<#>have been received (or the Reliability Standard otherwise becomes effective the first day of the[¶]
<#>third calendar quarter after BOT adoption in those jurisdictions where regulatory approval is[¶]
not required)

Deleted: Approved by Board of Trustees: December 16, 2009

Standard CIP-002-3(X) — Cyber Security — Critical Cyber Asset Identification

the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1.** Critical Asset Identification Method — The Responsible Entity shall identify and document a risk-based assessment methodology to use to identify its Critical Assets.
 - R1.1.** The Responsible Entity shall maintain documentation describing its risk-based assessment methodology that includes procedures and evaluation criteria.
 - R1.2.** The risk-based assessment shall consider the following assets:
 - R1.2.1.** Control centers and backup control centers performing the functions of the entities listed in the Applicability section of this standard.
 - R1.2.2.** Transmission substations that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System.
 - R1.2.3.** Generation resources that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System.
 - R1.2.4.** Systems and facilities critical to system restoration, including blackstart generators and substations in the electrical path of transmission lines used for initial system restoration.
 - R1.2.5.** Systems and facilities critical to automatic load shedding under a common control system capable of shedding 300 MW or more.
 - R1.2.6.** Remedial Action Schemes that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System.
 - R1.2.7.** Any additional assets that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System that the Responsible Entity deems appropriate to include in its assessment.
- R2.** Critical Asset Identification — The Responsible Entity shall develop a list of its identified Critical Assets determined through an annual application of the risk-based assessment methodology required in R1. The Responsible Entity shall review this list at least annually, and update it as necessary.
- R3.** Critical Cyber Asset Identification — Using the list of Critical Assets developed pursuant to Requirement R2, the Responsible Entity shall develop a list of associated Critical Cyber Assets essential to the operation of the Critical Asset. Examples at control centers and backup control centers include systems and facilities at master and remote sites that provide monitoring and control, automatic generation control, real-time power system modeling, and real-time inter-utility data exchange. The Responsible Entity shall review this list at least annually, and update it as necessary. For the purpose of Standard CIP-002-3(X), Critical Cyber Assets are further qualified to be those having at least one of the following characteristics:
 - R3.1.** The Cyber Asset uses a routable protocol to communicate outside the Electronic Security Perimeter; or,
 - R3.2.** The Cyber Asset uses a routable protocol within a control center; or,
 - R3.3.** The Cyber Asset is dial-up accessible.
- R4.** Annual Approval — The senior manager or delegate(s) shall approve annually the risk-based assessment methodology, the list of Critical Assets and the list of Critical Cyber Assets. Based on Requirements R1, R2, and R3 the Responsible Entity may determine that it has no Critical

Deleted: Special Protection Systems

Deleted: Approved by Board of Trustees: December 16, 2009

Standard CIP-002-3(X) — Cyber Security — Critical Cyber Asset Identification

Assets or Critical Cyber Assets. The Responsible Entity shall keep a signed and dated record of the senior manager or delegate(s)'s approval of the risk-based assessment methodology, the list of Critical Assets and the list of Critical Cyber Assets (even if such lists are null.)

C. Measures

- M1.** The Responsible Entity shall make available its current risk-based assessment methodology documentation as specified in Requirement R1.
- M2.** The Responsible Entity shall make available its list of Critical Assets as specified in Requirement R2.
- M3.** The Responsible Entity shall make available its list of Critical Cyber Assets as specified in Requirement R3.
- M4.** The Responsible Entity shall make available its approval records of annual approvals as specified in Requirement R4.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

- 1.1.1** Regional Entity for Responsible Entities that do not perform delegated tasks for their Regional Entity.
- 1.1.2** ERO for Regional Entity.
- 1.1.3** Third-party monitor without vested interest in the outcome for NERC.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame

Not applicable.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Processes

- Compliance Audits
- Self-Certifications
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Violation Investigations
- Self-Reporting
- Complaints

1.4. Data Retention

- 1.4.1** The Responsible Entity shall keep documentation required by Standard CIP-002-3(X) from the previous full calendar year unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.
- 1.4.2** The Compliance Enforcement Authority in conjunction with the Registered Entity shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.5. Additional Compliance Information

- 1.5.1** None.

Deleted: Approved by Board of Trustees: December 16, 2009

Standard CIP-002-3(X) — Cyber Security — Critical Cyber Asset Identification

2. Violation Severity Levels (To be developed later.)

E. Regional Variances

None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|-------------|-------------------|---|---|
| 1 | January 16, 2006 | R3.2 — Change “Control Center” to “control center” | Errata |
| 2 | | Modifications to clarify the requirements and to bring the compliance elements into conformance with the latest guidelines for developing compliance elements of standards. Removal of reasonable business judgment. Replaced the RRO with the RE as a responsible entity. Rewording of Effective Date. Changed compliance monitor to Compliance Enforcement Authority. | |
| 3 | | Updated version number from -2 to -3 | |
| 3 | December 16, 2009 | Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees | Update |
| <u>3(X)</u> | <u>TBD</u> | <u>Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees</u> | <u>Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS</u> |

Deleted: Approved by Board of Trustees: December 16, 2009

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — Critical Cyber Asset Identification
2. **Number:** CIP-002-3b(X)
3. **Purpose:** NERC Standards CIP-002-3b(X) through CIP-009-3 provide a cyber security framework for the identification and protection of Critical Cyber Assets to support reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System.

These standards recognize the differing roles of each entity in the operation of the Bulk Electric System, the criticality and vulnerability of the assets needed to manage Bulk Electric System reliability, and the risks to which they are exposed.

Business and operational demands for managing and maintaining a reliable Bulk Electric System increasingly rely on Cyber Assets supporting critical reliability functions and processes to communicate with each other, across functions and organizations, for services and data. This results in increased risks to these Cyber Assets.

Standard CIP-002-3b(X) requires the identification and documentation of the Critical Cyber Assets associated with the Critical Assets that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System. These Critical Assets are to be identified through the application of a risk-based assessment.

4. Applicability:

4.1. Within the text of Standard CIP-002-3b(X), “Responsible Entity” shall mean:

- 4.1.1 Reliability Coordinator.
- 4.1.2 Balancing Authority.
- 4.1.3 Interchange Authority.
- 4.1.4 Transmission Service Provider.
- 4.1.5 Transmission Owner.
- 4.1.6 Transmission Operator.
- 4.1.7 Generator Owner.
- 4.1.8 Generator Operator.
- 4.1.9 Load Serving Entity.
- 4.1.10 NERC.
- 4.1.11 Regional Entity.

4.2. The following are exempt from Standard CIP-002-3b(X):

- 4.2.1 Facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.
- 4.2.2 Cyber Assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters.

5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval

by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1. Critical Asset Identification Method** — The Responsible Entity shall identify and document a risk-based assessment methodology to use to identify its Critical Assets.
- R1.1.** The Responsible Entity shall maintain documentation describing its risk-based assessment methodology that includes procedures and evaluation criteria.
- R1.2.** The risk-based assessment shall consider the following assets:
- R1.2.1.** Control centers and backup control centers performing the functions of the entities listed in the Applicability section of this standard.
 - R1.2.2.** Transmission substations that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System.
 - R1.2.3.** Generation resources that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System.
 - R1.2.4.** Systems and facilities critical to system restoration, including blackstart generators and substations in the electrical path of transmission lines used for initial system restoration.
 - R1.2.5.** Systems and facilities critical to automatic load shedding under a common control system capable of shedding 300 MW or more.
 - R1.2.6.** Remedial Action Schemes that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System.
 - R1.2.7.** Any additional assets that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System that the Responsible Entity deems appropriate to include in its assessment.
- R2. Critical Asset Identification** — The Responsible Entity shall develop a list of its identified Critical Assets determined through an annual application of the risk-based assessment methodology required in R1. The Responsible Entity shall review this list at least annually, and update it as necessary.
- R3. Critical Cyber Asset Identification** — Using the list of Critical Assets developed pursuant to Requirement R2, the Responsible Entity shall develop a list of associated Critical Cyber Assets essential to the operation of the Critical Asset. Examples at control centers and backup control centers include systems and facilities at master and remote sites that provide monitoring and control, automatic generation control, real-time power system modeling, and real-time inter-utility data exchange. The Responsible Entity shall review this list at least annually, and update it as necessary. For the purpose of Standard CIP-002-3b(X), Critical Cyber Assets are further qualified to be those having at least one of the following characteristics:

- R3.1.** The Cyber Asset uses a routable protocol to communicate outside the Electronic Security Perimeter; or,
- R3.2.** The Cyber Asset uses a routable protocol within a control center; or,
- R3.3.** The Cyber Asset is dial-up accessible.
- R4.** Annual Approval — The senior manager or delegate(s) shall approve annually the risk-based assessment methodology, the list of Critical Assets and the list of Critical Cyber Assets. Based on Requirements R1, R2, and R3 the Responsible Entity may determine that it has no Critical Assets or Critical Cyber Assets. The Responsible Entity shall keep a signed and dated record of the senior manager or delegate(s)'s approval of the risk-based assessment methodology, the list of Critical Assets and the list of Critical Cyber Assets (even if such lists are null.)

C. Measures

- M1.** The Responsible Entity shall make available its current risk-based assessment methodology documentation as specified in Requirement R1.
- M2.** The Responsible Entity shall make available its list of Critical Assets as specified in Requirement R2.
- M3.** The Responsible Entity shall make available its list of Critical Cyber Assets as specified in Requirement R3.
- M4.** The Responsible Entity shall make available its approval records of annual approvals as specified in Requirement R4.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

- 1.1.1** Regional Entity for Responsible Entities that do not perform delegated tasks for their Regional Entity.
- 1.1.2** ERO for Regional Entity.
- 1.1.3** Third-party monitor without vested interest in the outcome for NERC.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame

Not applicable.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Processes

- Compliance Audits
- Self-Certifications
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Violation Investigations
- Self-Reporting
- Complaints

1.4. Data Retention

1.4.1 The Responsible Entity shall keep documentation required by Standard CIP-002-3b(X) from the previous full calendar year unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

1.4.2 The Compliance Enforcement Authority in conjunction with the Registered Entity shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.5. Additional Compliance Information

1.5.1 None.

2. Violation Severity Levels

| Requirement | VRF | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-------------|--------|-----------|---|---|--|
| R1. | MEDIUM | N/A | N/A | N/A | The responsible entity has not documented a risk-based assessment methodology to use to identify its Critical Assets as specified in R1. |
| R1.1. | LOWER | N/A | The Responsible Entity maintained documentation describing its risk-based assessment methodology which includes evaluation criteria, but does not include procedures. | The Responsible Entity maintained documentation describing its risk-based assessment methodology that includes procedures but does not include evaluation criteria. | The Responsible Entity did not maintain documentation describing its risk-based assessment methodology that includes procedures and evaluation criteria. |
| R1.2. | MEDIUM | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Responsible Entity did not consider all of the asset types listed in R1.2.1 through R1.2.7 in its risk-based assessment. |
| R1.2.1. | LOWER | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.2.2. | LOWER | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.2.3. | LOWER | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.2.4. | LOWER | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.2.5. | LOWER | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |

Standard CIP-002-3b(X) — Cyber Security — Critical Cyber Asset Identification

| Requirement | VRF | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-------------|-------|-----------|---|--|--|
| R1.2.6. | LOWER | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.2.7. | LOWER | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R2. | HIGH | N/A | N/A | The Responsible Entity has developed a list of Critical Assets but the list has not been reviewed and updated annually as required. | The Responsible Entity did not develop a list of its identified Critical Assets even if such list is null. |
| R3. | HIGH | N/A | N/A | The Responsible Entity has developed a list of associated Critical Cyber Assets essential to the operation of the Critical Asset list as per requirement R2 but the list has not been reviewed and updated annually as required. | The Responsible Entity did not develop a list of associated Critical Cyber Assets essential to the operation of the Critical Asset list as per requirement R2 even if such list is null. |
| R3.1. | LOWER | N/A | N/A | N/A | A Cyber Asset essential to the operation of the Critical Asset was identified that met the criteria in this requirement but was not included in the Critical Cyber Asset List. |
| R3.2. | LOWER | N/A | N/A | N/A | A Cyber Asset essential to the operation of the Critical Asset was identified that met the criteria in this requirement but was not included in the Critical Cyber Asset List. |
| R3.3. | LOWER | N/A | N/A | N/A | A Cyber Asset essential to the operation of the Critical Asset was identified that met the criteria in this requirement but was not included in the Critical Cyber Asset List. |
| R4. | LOWER | N/A | The Responsible Entity does not have a signed and dated | The Responsible Entity does not have a signed and dated record of the senior manager or delegate(s)'s annual | The Responsible Entity does not have a signed and dated record of the senior manager or delegate(s) annual approval of |

Standard CIP-002-3b(X) — Cyber Security — Critical Cyber Asset Identification

| Requirement | VRF | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-------------|-----|-----------|--|--|---|
| | | | record of the senior manager or delegate(s)'s annual approval of the risk-based assessment methodology, the list of Critical Assets or the list of Critical Cyber Assets (even if such lists are null.) | approval of two of the following: the risk-based assessment methodology, the list of Critical Assets or the list of Critical Cyber Assets (even if such lists are null.) | 1) A risk based assessment methodology for identification of Critical Assets, 2) a signed and dated approval of the list of Critical Assets, nor 3) a signed and dated approval of the list of Critical Cyber Assets (even if such lists are null.) |

E. Regional Variances

None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|-------------------|---|--|
| 1 | January 16, 2006 | R3.2 — Change “Control Center” to “control center” | Errata |
| 2 | | Modifications to clarify the requirements and to bring the compliance elements into conformance with the latest guidelines for developing compliance elements of standards. Removal of reasonable business judgment. Replaced the RRO with the RE as a responsible entity. Rewording of Effective Date. Changed compliance monitor to Compliance Enforcement Authority. | |
| 3 | | Updated version number from -2 to -3 | |
| 3 | December 16, 2009 | Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees | Update |
| 3a | May 9, 2012 | Interpretation of R3 for Duke Energy adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | |
| 3b | February 7, 2013 | Interpretation of R1.2.5 for OGE adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | |
| 3b | March 21, 2013 | FERC Order issued remanding interpretation of R3 for Duke Energy; interpretation removed from standard (previously Appendix 1) | |
| 3b(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

Appendix 1

Project 2012-INT-05: Response to Request for an Interpretation of NERC Standard CIP-002-3 for the OGE Energy Corporation

Date submitted: 2/24/11

The following interpretation of NERC Standard CIP-002-3 Cyber Security — Critical Cyber Asset Identification, Requirement R1.2.5, was developed by a project team from the CIP Interpretation Drafting Team.

Requirement Number and Text of Requirement

R1. Critical Asset Identification Method — The Responsible Entity shall identify and document a risk-based assessment methodology to use to identify its Critical Assets.

R1.2. The risk-based assessment shall consider the following assets:

R1.2.5. Systems and facilities critical to automatic load shedding under a common control system capable of shedding 300 MW or more.

Identify specifically what requirement needs clarification (as submitted):

Requirement Number and Text of Requirement:

CIP-002-3 R1.2.5 - Systems and facilities critical to automatic load shedding under a common control system capable of shedding 300 MW or more.

Clarification needed: Based on the text above, an auditor could apply this standard to the Smart Grid Advanced Meter Infrastructure (AMI) remote connect/disconnect functionality. While the AMI system is not designed to perform automatic load shedding of 300 MW it could be repurposed to shed an aggregate load of 300 MW or more. However, it is important to note that the AMI remote disconnect function is not used for under-voltage load shedding or under-frequency load shedding as a part of the region's load shedding program.

The primary purpose of the AMI remote connect/disconnect function is to connect and disconnect individual retail electric customers from a central location rather than at the meter itself to enable substantial efficiency gains.

OGE would like NERC to clarify that a company's SmartGrid AMI functionality, which may be able to disconnect 300+ MW of load, is not considered a system or facility critical to automatic load shedding

under a common control system capable of shedding 300 mw and therefore it should not be included in the Company's risk based methodology. OGE believes this clarification is appropriate because CIP-002-3 R1.2.5 was written to address under-voltage and under-frequency load shedding systems; SmartGrid AMI disconnect functionality pertains to neither.

Question Summary

OGE Energy Corporation seeks clarification on the meaning of CIP-002-3, Requirement R1.2.5 as it relates to “SmartGrid Advanced Meter Infrastructure (AMI) remote connect/disconnect functionality.”

In its response, the Interpretation Drafting Team will answer whether a company’s SmartGrid AMI functionality, which may be able to disconnect more than 300 MW of load, is considered a system or facility critical to automatic load shedding under a common control system capable of shedding 300 MW or more under CIP-002-3, Requirement 1.2.5.

Response

In evaluating OGE’s request, the Interpretation Drafting Team (IDT) clarifies the meaning of CIP-002-3, Requirement R1.2.5 as it relates and applies to new technologies such as AMI. CIP-002-3, Requirement R1.2.5, along with the context of the standard as a whole, informed development of this interpretation.

CIP-002-3, Requirement R1.2 specifies that the Responsible Entity’s risk-based assessment methodology (“RBAM”) “shall consider” the assets described in Requirement R1.2.5.

During the identification and documentation of the RBAM, a Responsible Entity shall consider “Systems and facilities critical to automatic load shedding under a common control system capable of shedding 300 MW or more” as specified in Requirement R1.2.5. Requirement R2 then requires the entity to apply this RBAM annually to identify Critical Assets. If a system or facility does not meet the specifications of Requirement R1.2.5, the RBAM is not required to consider that asset.

The Critical Asset identification method under CIP-002-3, Requirement R1 is based on a facts and circumstance-driven analysis and is not dependent exclusively on specific technology or specific types of systems or facilities. For instance, systems or facilities such as AMI may have the potential or capability to be set up to automatically shed load, but having that potential or capability does not necessarily mean that the system or facility performs the function as described in Requirement R1.2.5. Therefore, an AMI system specifically built and configured to perform the Remote Disconnect function that does not automatically shed load without human operator initiation would not meet the criteria found in CIP-002-3, Requirement R1.2.5.

Standard CIP-002-3b(X) — Cyber Security — Critical Cyber Asset Identification

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Cyber Security — Critical Cyber Asset Identification
2. **Number:** CIP-002-3b(X)
3. **Purpose:** NERC Standards CIP-002-3b(X) through CIP-009-3 provide a cyber security framework for the identification and protection of Critical Cyber Assets to support reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System.

These standards recognize the differing roles of each entity in the operation of the Bulk Electric System, the criticality and vulnerability of the assets needed to manage Bulk Electric System reliability, and the risks to which they are exposed.

Business and operational demands for managing and maintaining a reliable Bulk Electric System increasingly rely on Cyber Assets supporting critical reliability functions and processes to communicate with each other, across functions and organizations, for services and data. This results in increased risks to these Cyber Assets.

Standard CIP-002-3b(X) requires the identification and documentation of the Critical Cyber Assets associated with the Critical Assets that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System. These Critical Assets are to be identified through the application of a risk-based assessment.

4. **Applicability:**

4.1. Within the text of Standard CIP-002-3b(X), “Responsible Entity” shall mean:

- 4.1.1 Reliability Coordinator.
- 4.1.2 Balancing Authority.
- 4.1.3 Interchange Authority.
- 4.1.4 Transmission Service Provider.
- 4.1.5 Transmission Owner.
- 4.1.6 Transmission Operator.
- 4.1.7 Generator Owner.
- 4.1.8 Generator Operator.
- 4.1.9 Load Serving Entity.
- 4.1.10 NERC.
- 4.1.11 Regional Entity.

4.2. The following are exempt from Standard CIP-002-3b(X):

- 4.2.1 Facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.
- 4.2.2 Cyber Assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete Electronic Security Perimeters.

5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval

Standard CIP-002-3b(X) — Cyber Security — Critical Cyber Asset Identification

by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1.** Critical Asset Identification Method — The Responsible Entity shall identify and document a risk-based assessment methodology to use to identify its Critical Assets.
 - R1.1.** The Responsible Entity shall maintain documentation describing its risk-based assessment methodology that includes procedures and evaluation criteria.
 - R1.2.** The risk-based assessment shall consider the following assets:
 - R1.2.1.** Control centers and backup control centers performing the functions of the entities listed in the Applicability section of this standard.
 - R1.2.2.** Transmission substations that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System.
 - R1.2.3.** Generation resources that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System.
 - R1.2.4.** Systems and facilities critical to system restoration, including blackstart generators and substations in the electrical path of transmission lines used for initial system restoration.
 - R1.2.5.** Systems and facilities critical to automatic load shedding under a common control system capable of shedding 300 MW or more.
 - R1.2.6.** Remedial Action Schemes that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System.
 - R1.2.7.** Any additional assets that support the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System that the Responsible Entity deems appropriate to include in its assessment.
- R2.** Critical Asset Identification — The Responsible Entity shall develop a list of its identified Critical Assets determined through an annual application of the risk-based assessment methodology required in R1. The Responsible Entity shall review this list at least annually, and update it as necessary.
- R3.** Critical Cyber Asset Identification — Using the list of Critical Assets developed pursuant to Requirement R2, the Responsible Entity shall develop a list of associated Critical Cyber Assets essential to the operation of the Critical Asset. Examples at control centers and backup control centers include systems and facilities at master and remote sites that provide monitoring and control, automatic generation control, real-time power system modeling, and real-time inter-utility data exchange. The Responsible Entity shall review this list at least annually, and update it as necessary. For the purpose of Standard CIP-002-3b(X), Critical Cyber Assets are further qualified to be those having at least one of the following characteristics:

Deleted: The first day of the third calendar quarter after applicable regulatory approvals have been received (or the Reliability Standard otherwise becomes effective the first day of the third calendar quarter after BOT adoption in those jurisdictions where regulatory approval is not required)

Deleted: Special Protection System

- R3.1.** The Cyber Asset uses a routable protocol to communicate outside the Electronic Security Perimeter; or,
- R3.2.** The Cyber Asset uses a routable protocol within a control center; or,
- R3.3.** The Cyber Asset is dial-up accessible.
- R4.** Annual Approval — The senior manager or delegate(s) shall approve annually the risk-based assessment methodology, the list of Critical Assets and the list of Critical Cyber Assets. Based on Requirements R1, R2, and R3 the Responsible Entity may determine that it has no Critical Assets or Critical Cyber Assets. The Responsible Entity shall keep a signed and dated record of the senior manager or delegate(s)'s approval of the risk-based assessment methodology, the list of Critical Assets and the list of Critical Cyber Assets (even if such lists are null.)

C. Measures

- M1.** The Responsible Entity shall make available its current risk-based assessment methodology documentation as specified in Requirement R1.
- M2.** The Responsible Entity shall make available its list of Critical Assets as specified in Requirement R2.
- M3.** The Responsible Entity shall make available its list of Critical Cyber Assets as specified in Requirement R3.
- M4.** The Responsible Entity shall make available its approval records of annual approvals as specified in Requirement R4.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

- 1.1.1** Regional Entity for Responsible Entities that do not perform delegated tasks for their Regional Entity.
- 1.1.2** ERO for Regional Entity.
- 1.1.3** Third-party monitor without vested interest in the outcome for NERC.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame

Not applicable.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Processes

- Compliance Audits
- Self-Certifications
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Violation Investigations
- Self-Reporting
- Complaints

Standard CIP-002-3b(X) — Cyber Security — Critical Cyber Asset Identification

1.4. Data Retention

1.4.1 The Responsible Entity shall keep documentation required by Standard CIP-002-3b(X) from the previous full calendar year unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

1.4.2 The Compliance Enforcement Authority in conjunction with the Registered Entity shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.5. Additional Compliance Information

1.5.1 None.

2. Violation Severity Levels

| Requirement | VRF | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-------------|--------|-----------|---|---|--|
| R1. | MEDIUM | N/A | N/A | N/A | The responsible entity has not documented a risk-based assessment methodology to use to identify its Critical Assets as specified in R1. |
| R1.1. | LOWER | N/A | The Responsible Entity maintained documentation describing its risk-based assessment methodology which includes evaluation criteria, but does not include procedures. | The Responsible Entity maintained documentation describing its risk-based assessment methodology that includes procedures but does not include evaluation criteria. | The Responsible Entity did not maintain documentation describing its risk-based assessment methodology that includes procedures and evaluation criteria. |
| R1.2. | MEDIUM | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Responsible Entity did not consider all of the asset types listed in R1.2.1 through R1.2.7 in its risk-based assessment. |
| R1.2.1. | LOWER | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.2.2. | LOWER | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.2.3. | LOWER | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.2.4. | LOWER | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.2.5. | LOWER | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |

Standard CIP-002-3b(X) — Cyber Security — Critical Cyber Asset Identification

| Requirement | VRF | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-------------|-------|-----------|---|--|--|
| R1.2.6. | LOWER | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.2.7. | LOWER | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R2. | HIGH | N/A | N/A | The Responsible Entity has developed a list of Critical Assets but the list has not been reviewed and updated annually as required. | The Responsible Entity did not develop a list of its identified Critical Assets even if such list is null. |
| R3. | HIGH | N/A | N/A | The Responsible Entity has developed a list of associated Critical Cyber Assets essential to the operation of the Critical Asset list as per requirement R2 but the list has not been reviewed and updated annually as required. | The Responsible Entity did not develop a list of associated Critical Cyber Assets essential to the operation of the Critical Asset list as per requirement R2 even if such list is null. |
| R3.1. | LOWER | N/A | N/A | N/A | A Cyber Asset essential to the operation of the Critical Asset was identified that met the criteria in this requirement but was not included in the Critical Cyber Asset List. |
| R3.2. | LOWER | N/A | N/A | N/A | A Cyber Asset essential to the operation of the Critical Asset was identified that met the criteria in this requirement but was not included in the Critical Cyber Asset List. |
| R3.3. | LOWER | N/A | N/A | N/A | A Cyber Asset essential to the operation of the Critical Asset was identified that met the criteria in this requirement but was not included in the Critical Cyber Asset List. |
| R4. | LOWER | N/A | The Responsible Entity does not have a signed and dated | The Responsible Entity does not have a signed and dated record of the senior manager or delegate(s)'s annual | The Responsible Entity does not have a signed and dated record of the senior manager or delegate(s) annual approval of |

Standard CIP-002-3b(X) — Cyber Security — Critical Cyber Asset Identification

| Requirement | VRF | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-------------|-----|-----------|--|--|---|
| | | | record of the senior manager or delegate(s)'s annual approval of the risk-based assessment methodology, the list of Critical Assets or the list of Critical Cyber Assets (even if such lists are null.) | approval of two of the following: the risk-based assessment methodology, the list of Critical Assets or the list of Critical Cyber Assets (even if such lists are null.) | 1) A risk based assessment methodology for identification of Critical Assets, 2) a signed and dated approval of the list of Critical Assets, nor 3) a signed and dated approval of the list of Critical Cyber Assets (even if such lists are null.) |

E. Regional Variances

None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|------------------|-------------------|---|---|
| 1 | January 16, 2006 | R3.2 — Change “Control Center” to “control center” | Errata |
| 2 | | Modifications to clarify the requirements and to bring the compliance elements into conformance with the latest guidelines for developing compliance elements of standards. Removal of reasonable business judgment. Replaced the RRO with the RE as a responsible entity. Rewording of Effective Date. Changed compliance monitor to Compliance Enforcement Authority. | |
| 3 | | Updated version number from -2 to -3 | |
| 3 | December 16, 2009 | Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees | Update |
| 3a | May 9, 2012 | Interpretation of R3 for Duke Energy adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | |
| 3b | February 7, 2013 | Interpretation of R1.2.5 for OGE adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | |
| 3b | March 21, 2013 | FERC Order issued remanding interpretation of R3 for Duke Energy; interpretation removed from standard (previously Appendix 1) | |
| 3b(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

Deleted: 3b

Appendix 1

| Project 2012-INT-05: Response to Request for an Interpretation of NERC Standard CIP-002-3 for the OGE Energy Corporation | |
|--|--|
| Date submitted: 2/24/11 | |
| The following interpretation of NERC Standard CIP-002-3 Cyber Security — Critical Cyber Asset Identification, Requirement R1.2.5, was developed by a project team from the CIP Interpretation Drafting Team. | |
| Requirement Number and Text of Requirement | |
| R1.Critical Asset Identification Method — The Responsible Entity shall identify and document a risk-based assessment methodology to use to identify its Critical Assets. R1.2. The risk-based assessment shall consider the following assets: R1.2.5. Systems and facilities critical to automatic load shedding under a common control system capable of shedding 300 MW or more. | |
| Identify specifically what requirement needs clarification (as submitted): | |
| Requirement Number and Text of Requirement: CIP-002-3 R1.2.5 - Systems and facilities critical to automatic load shedding under a common control system capable of shedding 300 MW or more. Clarification needed: Based on the text above, an auditor could apply this standard to the Smart Grid Advanced Meter Infrastructure (AMI) remote connect/disconnect functionality. While the AMI system is not designed to perform automatic load shedding of 300 MW it could be repurposed to shed an aggregate load of 300 MW or more. However, it is important to note that the AMI remote disconnect function is not used for under-voltage load shedding or under-frequency load shedding as a part of the region's load shedding program. The primary purpose of the AMI remote connect/disconnect function is to connect and disconnect individual retail electric customers from a central location rather than at the meter itself to enable substantial efficiency gains. OGE would like NERC to clarify that a company's SmartGrid AMI functionality, which may be able to disconnect 300+ MW of load, is not considered a system or facility critical to automatic load shedding | |

Standard CIP-002-3b(X) — Cyber Security — Critical Cyber Asset Identification

under a common control system capable of shedding 300 mw and therefore it should not be included in the Company's risk based methodology. OGE believes this clarification is appropriate because CIP-002-3 R1.2.5 was written to address under-voltage and under-frequency load shedding systems; SmartGrid AMI disconnect functionality pertains to neither.

Question Summary

OGE Energy Corporation seeks clarification on the meaning of CIP-002-3, Requirement R1.2.5 as it relates to “SmartGrid Advanced Meter Infrastructure (AMI) remote connect/disconnect functionality.”

In its response, the Interpretation Drafting Team will answer whether a company’s SmartGrid AMI functionality, which may be able to disconnect more than 300 MW of load, is considered a system or facility critical to automatic load shedding under a common control system capable of shedding 300 MW or more under CIP-002-3, Requirement 1.2.5.

Response

In evaluating OGE’s request, the Interpretation Drafting Team (IDT) clarifies the meaning of CIP-002-3, Requirement R1.2.5 as it relates and applies to new technologies such as AMI. CIP-002-3, Requirement R1.2.5, along with the context of the standard as a whole, informed development of this interpretation.

CIP-002-3, Requirement R1.2 specifies that the Responsible Entity’s risk-based assessment methodology (“RBAM”) “shall consider” the assets described in Requirement R1.2.5.

During the identification and documentation of the RBAM, a Responsible Entity shall consider “Systems and facilities critical to automatic load shedding under a common control system capable of shedding 300 MW or more” as specified in Requirement R1.2.5. Requirement R2 then requires the entity to apply this RBAM annually to identify Critical Assets. If a system or facility does not meet the specifications of Requirement R1.2.5, the RBAM is not required to consider that asset.

The Critical Asset identification method under CIP-002-3, Requirement R1 is based on a facts and circumstance-driven analysis and is not dependent exclusively on specific technology or specific types of systems or facilities. For instance, systems or facilities such as AMI may have the potential or capability to be set up to automatically shed load, but having that potential or capability does not necessarily mean that the system or facility performs the function as described in Requirement R1.2.5. Therefore, an AMI system specifically built and configured to perform the Remote Disconnect function that does not automatically shed load without human operator initiation would not meet the criteria found in CIP-002-3, Requirement R1.2.5.

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Event Reporting
2. **Number:** EOP-004-2(X)
3. **Purpose:** To improve the reliability of the Bulk Electric System by requiring the reporting of events by Responsible Entities.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. **Functional Entities:** For the purpose of the Requirements and the EOP-004 Attachment 1 contained herein, the following functional entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entity.”
 - 4.1.1. Reliability Coordinator
 - 4.1.2. Balancing Authority
 - 4.1.3. Transmission Owner
 - 4.1.4. Transmission Operator
 - 4.1.5. Generator Owner
 - 4.1.6. Generator Operator
 - 4.1.7. Distribution Provider
5. **Effective Dates:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.
6. **Background:**

NERC established a SAR Team in 2009 to investigate and propose revisions to the CIP-001 and EOP-004 Reliability Standards. The team was asked to consider the following:

 1. CIP-001 could be merged with EOP-004 to eliminate redundancies.
 2. Acts of sabotage have to be reported to the DOE as part of EOP-004.
 3. Specific references to the DOE form need to be eliminated.
 4. EOP-004 had some ‘fill-in-the-blank’ components to eliminate.

The development included other improvements to the standards deemed appropriate by the drafting team, with the consensus of stakeholders, consistent with establishing high quality, enforceable and technically sufficient Bulk Electric System reliability standards.

The SAR for Project 2009-01, Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting was moved forward for standard drafting by the NERC Standards Committee in August of 2009. The Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting Standard Drafting Team (DSR SDT) was formed in late 2009.

The DSR SDT developed a concept paper to solicit stakeholder input regarding the proposed reporting concepts that the DSR SDT had developed. The posting of the concept paper sought comments from stakeholders on the “road map” that will be used by the DSR SDT in updating or revising CIP-001 and EOP-004. The concept paper provided stakeholders the background information and thought process of the DSR SDT. The DSR SDT has reviewed the existing standards, the SAR, issues from the NERC issues database and FERC Order 693 Directives in order to determine a prudent course of action with respect to revision of these standards.

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1.** Each Responsible Entity shall have an event reporting Operating Plan in accordance with EOP-004-2(X) Attachment 1 that includes the protocol(s) for reporting to the Electric Reliability Organization and other organizations (e.g., the Regional Entity, company personnel, the Responsible Entity’s Reliability Coordinator, law enforcement, or governmental authority). *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*

- M1.** Each Responsible Entity will have a dated event reporting Operating Plan that includes, but is not limited to the protocol(s) and each organization identified to receive an event report for event types specified in EOP-004-2(X) Attachment 1 and in accordance with the entity responsible for reporting.

- R2.** Each Responsible Entity shall report events per their Operating Plan within 24 hours of recognition of meeting an event type threshold for reporting or by the end of the next business day if the event occurs on a weekend (which is recognized to be 4 PM local time on Friday to 8 AM Monday local time). *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Assessment]*

- M2.** Each Responsible Entity will have as evidence of reporting an event, copy of the completed EOP-004-2(X) Attachment 2 form or a DOE-OE-417 form; and evidence of submittal (e.g., operator log or other operating documentation, voice recording, electronic mail message, or confirmation of facsimile) demonstrating the event report was submitted within 24 hours of recognition of meeting the threshold for reporting or by the

end of the next business day if the event occurs on a weekend (which is recognized to be 4 PM local time on Friday to 8 AM Monday local time). (R2)

- R3.** Each Responsible Entity shall validate all contact information contained in the Operating Plan pursuant to Requirement R1 each calendar year. [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
- M3.** Each Responsible Entity will have dated records to show that it validated all contact information contained in the Operating Plan each calendar year. Such evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated voice recordings and operating logs or other communication documentation. (R3)

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1 Compliance Enforcement Authority

The Regional Entity shall serve as the Compliance Enforcement Authority (CEA) unless the applicable entity is owned, operated, or controlled by the Regional Entity. In such cases the ERO or a Regional Entity approved by FERC or other applicable governmental authority shall serve as the CEA.

1.2 Evidence Retention

The Responsible Entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

- Each Responsible Entity shall retain the current Operating Plan plus each version issued since the last audit for Requirements R1, and Measure M1.
- Each Responsible Entity shall retain evidence of compliance since the last audit for Requirements R2, R3 and Measure M2, M3.

If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved or for the duration specified above, whichever is longer.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.3 Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Processes:

Compliance Audit

Self-Certification

Spot Checking

Compliance Investigation

Self-Reporting

Complaint

1.4 Additional Compliance Information

None

Table of Compliance Elements

| R # | Time Horizon | VRF | Violation Severity Levels | | | |
|-----|---------------------|-------|--|---|---|--|
| | | | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
| R1 | Operations Planning | Lower | The Responsible Entity had an Operating Plan, but failed to include one applicable event type. | The Responsible Entity had an Operating Plan, but failed to include two applicable event types. | The Responsible Entity had an Operating Plan, but failed to include three applicable event types. | The Responsible Entity had an Operating Plan, but failed to include four or more applicable event types. OR The Responsible Entity failed to have an event reporting Operating Plan. |

| R # | Time Horizon | VRF | Violation Severity Levels | | | |
|-----|-----------------------|--------|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
| R2 | Operations Assessment | Medium | <p>The Responsible Entity submitted an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to all required recipients more than 24 hours but less than or equal to 36 hours after meeting an event threshold for reporting.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to submit an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to one entity identified in its event reporting Operating Plan within 24 hours.</p> | <p>The Responsible Entity submitted an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to all required recipients more than 36 hours but less than or equal to 48 hours after meeting an event threshold for reporting.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to submit an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to two entities identified in its event reporting Operating Plan within 24 hours.</p> | <p>The Responsible Entity submitted an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to all required recipients more than 48 hours but less than or equal to 60 hours after meeting an event threshold for reporting.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to submit an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to three entities identified in its event reporting Operating Plan within 24 hours.</p> | <p>The Responsible Entity submitted an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to all required recipients more than 60 hours after meeting an event threshold for reporting.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to submit an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to four or more entities identified in its event reporting Operating Plan within 24 hours.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to submit a report for an event in EOP-004 Attachment 1.</p> |

| R # | Time Horizon | VRF | Violation Severity Levels | | | |
|-----|---------------------|--------|--|---|--|--|
| | | | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
| R3 | Operations Planning | Medium | <p>The Responsible Entity validated all contact information contained in the Operating Plan but was late by less than one calendar month.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity validated 75% but less than 100% of the contact information contained in the Operating Plan.</p> | <p>The Responsible Entity validated all contact information contained in the Operating Plan but was late by one calendar month or more but less than two calendar months.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity validated 50% and less than 75% of the contact information contained in the Operating Plan.</p> | <p>The Responsible Entity validated all contact information contained in the Operating Plan but was late by two calendar months or more but less than three calendar months.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity validated 25% and less than 50% of the contact information contained in the Operating Plan.</p> | <p>The Responsible Entity validated all contact information contained in the Operating Plan but was late by three calendar months or more.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity validated less than 25% of contact information contained in the Operating Plan.</p> |

D. Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. References

Guideline and Technical Basis (attached)

EOP-004 - Attachment 1: Reportable Events

NOTE: Under certain adverse conditions (e.g. severe weather, multiple events) it may not be possible to report the damage caused by an event and issue a written Event Report within the timing in the standard. In such cases, the affected Responsible Entity shall notify parties per Requirement R2 and provide as much information as is available at the time of the notification. Submit reports to the ERO via one of the following: e-mail: systemawareness@nerc.net, Facsimile 404-446-9770 or Voice: 404-446-9780.

Submit EOP-004 Attachment 2 (or DOE-OE-417) pursuant to Requirements R1 and R2.

| Event Type | Entity with Reporting Responsibility | Threshold for Reporting |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| Damage or destruction of a Facility | RC, BA, TOP | Damage or destruction of a Facility within its Reliability Coordinator Area, Balancing Authority Area or Transmission Operator Area that results in actions to avoid a BES Emergency. |
| Damage or destruction of a Facility | BA, TO, TOP, GO, GOP, DP | Damage or destruction of its Facility that results from actual or suspected intentional human action. |
| Physical threats to a Facility | BA, TO, TOP, GO, GOP, DP | Physical threat to its Facility excluding weather or natural disaster related threats, which has the potential to degrade the normal operation of the Facility. OR Suspicious device or activity at a Facility. Do not report theft unless it degrades normal operation of a Facility. |

EOP-004-2(X) — Event Reporting

| Event Type | Entity with Reporting Responsibility | Threshold for Reporting |
|--|--|--|
| Physical threats to a BES control center | RC, BA, TOP | Physical threat to its BES control center, excluding weather or natural disaster related threats, which has the potential to degrade the normal operation of the control center. OR Suspicious device or activity at a BES control center. |
| BES Emergency requiring public appeal for load reduction | Initiating entity is responsible for reporting | Public appeal for load reduction event. |
| BES Emergency requiring system-wide voltage reduction | Initiating entity is responsible for reporting | System wide voltage reduction of 3% or more. |
| BES Emergency requiring manual firm load shedding | Initiating entity is responsible for reporting | Manual firm load shedding \geq 100 MW. |
| BES Emergency resulting in automatic firm load shedding | DP, TOP | Automatic firm load shedding \geq 100 MW (via automatic undervoltage or underfrequency load shedding schemes, or RAS). |
| Voltage deviation on a Facility | TOP | Observed within its area a voltage deviation of \pm 10% of nominal voltage sustained for \geq 15 continuous minutes. |

EOP-004-2(X) — Event Reporting

| Event Type | Entity with Reporting Responsibility | Threshold for Reporting |
|--|--------------------------------------|---|
| IROL Violation (all Interconnections) or SOL Violation for Major WECC Transfer Paths (WECC only) | RC | Operate outside the IROL for time greater than IROL T_v (all Interconnections) or Operate outside the SOL for more than 30 minutes for Major WECC Transfer Paths (WECC only). |
| Loss of firm load | BA, TOP, DP | Loss of firm load for ≥ 15 Minutes: ≥ 300 MW for entities with previous year's demand $\geq 3,000$ OR ≥ 200 MW for all other entities |
| System separation (islanding) | RC, BA, TOP | Each separation resulting in an island ≥ 100 MW |
| Generation loss | BA, GOP | Total generation loss, within one minute, of : $\geq 2,000$ MW for entities in the Eastern or Western Interconnection OR $\geq 1,000$ MW for entities in the ERCOT or Quebec Interconnection |
| Complete loss of off-site power to a nuclear generating plant (grid supply) | TO, TOP | Complete loss of off-site power affecting a nuclear generating station per the Nuclear Plant Interface Requirement |

EOP-004-2(X) — Event Reporting

| Event Type | Entity with Reporting Responsibility | Threshold for Reporting |
|---|--------------------------------------|---|
| Transmission loss | TOP | Unexpected loss within its area, contrary to design, of three or more BES Elements caused by a common disturbance (excluding successful automatic reclosing). |
| Unplanned BES control center evacuation | RC, BA, TOP | Unplanned evacuation from BES control center facility for 30 continuous minutes or more. |
| Complete loss of voice communication capability | RC, BA, TOP | Complete loss of voice communication capability affecting a BES control center for 30 continuous minutes or more. |
| Complete loss of monitoring capability | RC, BA, TOP | Complete loss of monitoring capability affecting a BES control center for 30 continuous minutes or more such that analysis capability (i.e., State Estimator or Contingency Analysis) is rendered inoperable. |

EOP-004 - Attachment 2: Event Reporting Form

| EOP-004 Attachment 2: Event Reporting Form | | | |
|---|--|---|---------------------------------|
| <p>Use this form to report events. The Electric Reliability Organization will accept the DOE OE-417 form in lieu of this form if the entity is required to submit an OE-417 report. Submit reports to the ERO via one of the following: e-mail: systemawareness@nerc.net , Facsimile 404-446-9770 or voice: 404-446-9780.</p> | | | |
| Task | Comments | | |
| 1. | Entity filing the report include: Company name: Name of contact person: Email address of contact person: Telephone Number: Submitted by (name): | | |
| 2. | Date and Time of recognized event. Date: (mm/dd/yyyy) Time: (hh:mm) Time/Zone: | | |
| 3. | Did the event originate in your system? Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown <input type="checkbox"/> | | |
| 4. | <p style="text-align: center;">Event Identification and Description:</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; vertical-align: top;"> (Check applicable box) <input type="checkbox"/> Damage or destruction of a Facility <input type="checkbox"/> Physical Threat to a Facility <input type="checkbox"/> Physical Threat to a control center <input type="checkbox"/> BES Emergency: <input type="checkbox"/> public appeal for load reduction <input type="checkbox"/> system-wide voltage reduction <input type="checkbox"/> manual firm load shedding <input type="checkbox"/> automatic firm load shedding <input type="checkbox"/> Voltage deviation on a Facility <input type="checkbox"/> IROL Violation (all Interconnections) or SOL Violation for Major WECC Transfer Paths (WECC only) <input type="checkbox"/> Loss of firm load <input type="checkbox"/> System separation <input type="checkbox"/> Generation loss <input type="checkbox"/> Complete loss of off-site power to a nuclear generating plant (grid supply) <input type="checkbox"/> Transmission loss <input type="checkbox"/> unplanned control center evacuation <input type="checkbox"/> Complete loss of voice communication capability <input type="checkbox"/> Complete loss of monitoring capability </td> <td style="width: 50%; vertical-align: top;"> Written description (optional): </td> </tr> </table> | (Check applicable box) <input type="checkbox"/> Damage or destruction of a Facility <input type="checkbox"/> Physical Threat to a Facility <input type="checkbox"/> Physical Threat to a control center <input type="checkbox"/> BES Emergency: <input type="checkbox"/> public appeal for load reduction <input type="checkbox"/> system-wide voltage reduction <input type="checkbox"/> manual firm load shedding <input type="checkbox"/> automatic firm load shedding <input type="checkbox"/> Voltage deviation on a Facility <input type="checkbox"/> IROL Violation (all Interconnections) or SOL Violation for Major WECC Transfer Paths (WECC only) <input type="checkbox"/> Loss of firm load <input type="checkbox"/> System separation <input type="checkbox"/> Generation loss <input type="checkbox"/> Complete loss of off-site power to a nuclear generating plant (grid supply) <input type="checkbox"/> Transmission loss <input type="checkbox"/> unplanned control center evacuation <input type="checkbox"/> Complete loss of voice communication capability <input type="checkbox"/> Complete loss of monitoring capability | Written description (optional): |
| (Check applicable box) <input type="checkbox"/> Damage or destruction of a Facility <input type="checkbox"/> Physical Threat to a Facility <input type="checkbox"/> Physical Threat to a control center <input type="checkbox"/> BES Emergency: <input type="checkbox"/> public appeal for load reduction <input type="checkbox"/> system-wide voltage reduction <input type="checkbox"/> manual firm load shedding <input type="checkbox"/> automatic firm load shedding <input type="checkbox"/> Voltage deviation on a Facility <input type="checkbox"/> IROL Violation (all Interconnections) or SOL Violation for Major WECC Transfer Paths (WECC only) <input type="checkbox"/> Loss of firm load <input type="checkbox"/> System separation <input type="checkbox"/> Generation loss <input type="checkbox"/> Complete loss of off-site power to a nuclear generating plant (grid supply) <input type="checkbox"/> Transmission loss <input type="checkbox"/> unplanned control center evacuation <input type="checkbox"/> Complete loss of voice communication capability <input type="checkbox"/> Complete loss of monitoring capability | Written description (optional): | | |

Guideline and Technical Basis

Distribution Provider Applicability Discussion

The DSR SDT has included Distribution Providers (DP) as an applicable entity under this standard. The team realizes that not all DPs will own BES Facilities and will not meet the “Threshold for Reporting” for any event listed in Attachment 1. These DPs will not have any reports to submit under Requirement R2. However, these DPs will be responsible for meeting Requirements R1 and R3. The DSR SDT does not intend for these entities to have a detailed Operating Plan to address events that are not applicable to them. In this instance, the DSR SDT intends for the DP to have a very simple Operating Plan that includes a statement that there are no applicable events in Attachment 1 (to meet R1) and that the DP will review the list of events in Attachment 1 each year (to meet R3). The team does not think this will be a burden on any entity as the development and annual validation of the Operating Plan should not take more than 30 minutes on an annual basis. If a DP discovers applicable events during the annual review, it is expected that the DP will develop a more detailed Operating Plan to comply with the requirements of the standard.

Multiple Reports for a Single Organization

For entities that have multiple registrations, the DSR SDT intends that these entities will only have to submit one report for any individual event. For example, if an entity is registered as a Reliability Coordinator, Balancing Authority and Transmission Operator, the entity would only submit one report for a particular event rather submitting three reports as each individual registered entity.

Summary of Key Concepts

The DSR SDT identified the following principles to assist them in developing the standard:

- Develop a single form to report disturbances and events that threaten the reliability of the Bulk Electric System
- Investigate other opportunities for efficiency, such as development of an electronic form and possible inclusion of regional reporting requirements
- Establish clear criteria for reporting
- Establish consistent reporting timelines
- Provide clarity around who will receive the information and how it will be used

During the development of concepts, the DSR SDT considered the FERC directive to “further define sabotage”. There was concern among stakeholders that a definition may be ambiguous and subject to interpretation. Consequently, the DSR SDT decided to eliminate the term sabotage from the standard. The team felt that it was almost impossible to determine if an act or event was sabotage or vandalism without the intervention of law enforcement. The DSR SDT felt that attempting to define sabotage would result in further ambiguity with respect to

EOP-004-2(X) — Event Reporting

reporting events. The term “sabotage” is no longer included in the standard. The events listed in EOP-004 Attachment 1 were developed to provide guidance for reporting both actual events as well as events which may have an impact on the Bulk Electric System. The DSR SDT believes that this is an equally effective and efficient means of addressing the FERC Directive.

The types of events that are required to be reported are contained within EOP-004 Attachment 1. The DSR SDT has coordinated with the NERC Events Analysis Working Group to develop the list of events that are to be reported under this standard. EOP-004 Attachment 1 pertains to those actions or events that have impacted the Bulk Electric System. These events were previously reported under EOP-004-1, CIP-001-1 or the Department of Energy form OE-417. EOP-004 Attachment 1 covers similar items that may have had an impact on the Bulk Electric System or has the potential to have an impact and should be reported.

The DSR SDT wishes to make clear that the proposed Standard does not include any real-time operating notifications for the events listed in EOP-004 Attachment 1. Real-time communication is achieved is covered in other standards. The proposed standard deals exclusively with after-the-fact reporting.

Data Gathering

The requirements of EOP-004-1 require that entities “promptly analyze Bulk Electric System disturbances on its system or facilities” (Requirement R2). The requirements of EOP-004-2(X) specify that certain types of events are to be reported but do not include provisions to analyze events. Events reported under EOP-004-2(X) may trigger further scrutiny by the ERO Events Analysis Program. If warranted, the Events Analysis Program personnel may request that more data for certain events be provided by the reporting entity or other entities that may have experienced the event. Entities are encouraged to become familiar with the Events Analysis Program and the NERC Rules of Procedure to learn more about with the expectations of the program.

Law Enforcement Reporting

The reliability objective of EOP-004-2(X) is to improve the reliability of the Bulk Electric System by requiring the reporting of events by Responsible Entities. Certain outages, such as those due to vandalism and terrorism, may not be reasonably preventable. These are the types of events that should be reported to law enforcement. Entities rely upon law enforcement agencies to respond to and investigate those events which have the potential to impact a wider area of the BES. The inclusion of reporting to law enforcement enables and supports reliability principles such as protection of Bulk Electric System from malicious physical attack. The importance of BES awareness of the threat around them is essential to the effective operation and planning to mitigate the potential risk to the BES.

Stakeholders in the Reporting Process

- Industry

- NERC (ERO), Regional Entity
- FERC
- DOE
- NRC
- DHS – Federal
- Homeland Security- State
- State Regulators
- Local Law Enforcement
- State or Provincial Law Enforcement
- FBI
- Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)

The above stakeholders have an interest in the timely notification, communication and response to an incident at a Facility. The stakeholders have various levels of accountability and have a vested interest in the protection and response to ensure the reliability of the BES.

Present expectations of the industry under CIP-001-1a:

It has been the understanding by industry participants that an occurrence of sabotage has to be reported to the FBI. The FBI has the jurisdictional requirements to investigate acts of sabotage and terrorism. The CIP-001-1-1a standard requires a liaison relationship on behalf of the industry and the FBI or RCMP. These requirements, under the standard, of the industry have not been clear and have lead to misunderstandings and confusion in the industry as to how to demonstrate that the liaison is in place and effective. As an example of proof of compliance with Requirement R4, Responsible Entities have asked FBI Office personnel to provide, on FBI letterhead, confirmation of the existence of a working relationship to report acts of sabotage, the number of years the liaison relationship has been in existence, and the validity of the telephone numbers for the FBI.

Coordination of Local and State Law Enforcement Agencies with the FBI

The Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) came into being with the first task force being established in 1980. JTTFs are small cells of highly trained, locally based, committed investigators, analysts, linguists, SWAT experts, and other specialists from dozens of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The JTTF is a multi-agency effort led by the Justice Department and FBI designed to combine the resources of federal, state, and local law enforcement. Coordination and communications largely through the interagency National Joint Terrorism Task Force, working out of FBI Headquarters, which makes sure that information and intelligence flows freely among the local JTTFs. This information flow can be most beneficial to the industry in analytical intelligence, incident response and investigation. Historically, the most immediate response to an industry incident has been local and state law enforcement agencies to suspected vandalism and criminal damages at industry facilities. Relying upon the JTTF

coordination between local, state and FBI law enforcement would be beneficial to effective communications and the appropriate level of investigative response.

Coordination of Local and Provincial Law Enforcement Agencies with the RCMP


A similar law enforcement coordination hierarchy exists in Canada. Local and Provincial law enforcement coordinate to investigate suspected acts of vandalism and sabotage. The Provincial law enforcement agency has a reporting relationship with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).

A Reporting Process Solution – EOP-004

A proposal discussed with the FBI, FERC Staff, NERC Standards Project Coordinator and the SDT Chair is reflected in the flowchart below (Reporting Hierarchy for Reportable Events). Essentially, reporting an event to law enforcement agencies will only require the industry to notify the state or provincial or local level law enforcement agency. The state or provincial or local level law enforcement agency will coordinate with law enforcement with jurisdiction to investigate. If the state or provincial or local level law enforcement agency decides federal agency law enforcement or the RCMP should respond and investigate, the state or provincial or local level law enforcement agency will notify and coordinate with the FBI or the RCMP.

Example of Reporting Process including Law Enforcement

Entity Experiencing An Event in Attachment 1



* Canadian entities will follow law enforcement protocols applicable in their jurisdictions

Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting Standard Drafting Team (Project 2009-01) - Reporting Concepts

Introduction

The SAR for Project 2009-01, Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting was moved forward for standard drafting by the NERC Standards Committee in August of 2009. The Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting Standard Drafting Team (DSR SDT) was formed in late 2009 and has developed updated standards based on the SAR.

The standards listed under the SAR are:

- CIP-001 — Sabotage Reporting
- EOP-004 — Disturbance Reporting

The changes do not include any real-time operating notifications for the types of events covered by CIP-001 and EOP-004. The real-time reporting requirements are achieved through the RCIS and are covered in other standards (e.g. EOP-002-Capacity and Energy Emergencies). These standards deal exclusively with after-the-fact reporting.

The DSR SDT has consolidated disturbance and sabotage event reporting under a single standard. These two components and other key concepts are discussed in the following sections.

Summary of Concepts and Assumptions:

The Standard:

- Requires reporting of “events” that impact or may impact the reliability of the Bulk Electric System
- Provides clear criteria for reporting
- Includes consistent reporting timelines
- Identifies appropriate applicability, including a reporting hierarchy in the case of disturbance reporting
- Provides clarity around of who will receive the information

Discussion of Disturbance Reporting

Disturbance reporting requirements existed in the previous version of EOP-004. The current approved definition of Disturbance from the NERC Glossary of Terms is:

1. An unplanned event that produces an abnormal system condition.
2. Any perturbation to the electric system.

3. The unexpected change in ACE that is caused by the sudden failure of generation or interruption of load.

Disturbance reporting requirements and criteria were in the previous EOP-004 standard and its attachments. The DSR SDT discussed the reliability needs for disturbance reporting and developed the list of events that are to be reported under this standard (EOP-004 Attachment 1).

Discussion of Event Reporting

There are situations worthy of reporting because they have the potential to impact reliability.

Event reporting facilitates industry awareness, which allows potentially impacted parties to prepare for and possibly mitigate any associated reliability risk. It also provides the raw material, in the case of certain potential reliability threats, to see emerging patterns.

Examples of such events include:

- Bolts removed from transmission line structures
- Train derailment adjacent to a Facility that either could have damaged a Facility directly or could indirectly damage a Facility (e.g. flammable or toxic cargo that could pose fire hazard or could cause evacuation of a control center)
- Destruction of Bulk Electric System equipment

What about sabotage?

One thing became clear in the DSR SDT's discussion concerning sabotage: everyone has a different definition. The current standard CIP-001 elicited the following response from FERC in FERC Order 693, paragraph 471 which states in part: *“. . . the Commission directs the ERO to develop the following modifications to the Reliability Standard through the Reliability Standards development process: (1) further define sabotage and provide guidance as to the triggering events that would cause an entity to report a sabotage event.”*

Often, the underlying reason for an event is unknown or cannot be confirmed. The DSR SDT believes that by reporting material risks to the Bulk Electric System using the event categorization in this standard, it will be easier to get the relevant information for mitigation, awareness, and tracking, while removing the distracting element of motivation.

Certain types of events should be reported to NERC, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and/or Provincial or local law enforcement. Other types of events may have different reporting requirements. For example, an event that is related to copper theft may only need to be reported to the local law enforcement authorities.

Potential Uses of Reportable Information

Event analysis, correlation of data, and trend identification are a few potential uses for the information reported under this standard. The standard requires Functional entities to report the incidents and provide known information at the time of the report. Further data gathering necessary for event analysis is provided for under the Events Analysis Program and the NERC Rules of Procedure. Other entities (e.g. – NERC, Law Enforcement, etc) will be responsible for performing the analyses. The [NERC Rules of Procedure \(section 800\)](#) provide an overview of the responsibilities of the ERO in regards to analysis and dissemination of information for reliability. Jurisdictional agencies (which may include DHS, FBI, NERC, RE, FERC, Provincial Regulators, and DOE) have other duties and responsibilities.

Collection of Reportable Information or “One stop shopping”

The DSR SDT recognizes that some regions require reporting of additional information beyond what is in EOP-004. The DSR SDT has updated the listing of reportable events in EOP-004 Attachment 1 based on discussions with jurisdictional agencies, NERC, Regional Entities and stakeholder input. There is a possibility that regional differences still exist.

The reporting required by this standard is intended to meet the uses and purposes of NERC. The DSR SDT recognizes that other requirements for reporting exist (e.g., DOE-417 reporting), which may duplicate or overlap the information required by NERC. To the extent that other reporting is required, the DSR SDT envisions that duplicate entry of information should not be necessary, and the submission of the alternate report will be acceptable to NERC so long as all information required by NERC is submitted. For example, if the NERC Report duplicates information from the DOE form, the DOE report may be sent to the NERC in lieu of entering that information on the NERC report.

Rationale:

During development of this standard, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. Upon BOT approval, the text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section.

Rationale for R1:

The requirement to have an Operating Plan for reporting specific types of events provides the entity with a method to have its operating personnel recognize events that affect reliability and to be able to report them to appropriate parties; e.g., Regional Entities, applicable Reliability Coordinators, and law enforcement and other jurisdictional agencies when so recognized. In addition, these event reports are an input to the NERC Events Analysis Program. These other parties use this information to promote reliability, develop a culture of reliability excellence, provide industry collaboration and promote a learning organization.

Every Registered Entity that owns or operates elements or devices on the grid has a formal or informal process, procedure, or steps it takes to gather information regarding what happened when events occur. This requirement has the Responsible Entity establish documentation on

how that procedure, process, or plan is organized. This documentation may be a single document or a combination of various documents that achieve the reliability objective. The communication protocol(s) could include a process flowchart, identification of internal and external personnel or entities to be notified, or a list of personnel by name and their associated contact information. An existing procedure that meets the requirements of CIP-001-2a may be included in this Operating Plan along with other processes, procedures or plans to meet this requirement.

Rationale for R2:

Each Responsible Entity must report and communicate events according to its Operating Plan based on the information in EOP-004-2(X) Attachment 1. By implementing the event reporting Operating Plan the Responsible Entity will assure situational awareness to the Electric Reliability Organization so that they may develop trends and prepare for a possible next event and mitigate the current event. This will assure that the BES remains secure and stable by mitigation actions that the Responsible Entity has within its function. By communicating events per the Operating Plan, the Responsible Entity will assure that people/agencies are aware of the current situation and they may prepare to mitigate current and further events.

Rationale for R3:

Requirement 3 calls for the Responsible Entity to validate the contact information contained in the Operating Plan each calendar year. This requirement helps ensure that the event reporting Operating Plan is up to date and entities will be able to effectively report events to assure situational awareness to the Electric Reliability Organization. If an entity experiences an actual event, communication evidence from the event may be used to show compliance with the validation requirement for the specific contacts used for the event.

Rationale for EOP-004 Attachment 1:

The DSR SDT used the defined term “Facility” to add clarity for several events listed in Attachment 1. A Facility is defined as:

“A set of electrical equipment that operates as a single Bulk Electric System Element (e.g., a line, a generator, a shunt compensator, transformer, etc.)”

The DSR SDT does not intend the use of the term Facility to mean a substation or any other facility (not a defined term) that one might consider in everyday discussions regarding the grid. This is intended to mean ONLY a Facility as defined above.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|------------------|--|--|
| 2 | | Merged CIP-001-2a Sabotage Reporting and EOP-004-1 Disturbance Reporting into EOP-004-2 Event Reporting; Retire CIP-001-2a Sabotage Reporting and Retired EOP-004-1 Disturbance Reporting. | Revision to entire standard (Project 2009-01) |
| 2 | November 7, 2012 | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | |
| 2 | June 20, 2013 | FERC approved | |
| 2(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

EOP-004-2(X) — Event Reporting

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Event Reporting
2. **Number:** EOP-004-2(X)
3. **Purpose:** To improve the reliability of the Bulk Electric System by requiring the reporting of events by Responsible Entities.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. **Functional Entities:** For the purpose of the Requirements and the EOP-004 Attachment 1 contained herein, the following functional entities will be collectively referred to as “Responsible Entity.”
 - 4.1.1. Reliability Coordinator
 - 4.1.2. Balancing Authority
 - 4.1.3. Transmission Owner
 - 4.1.4. Transmission Operator
 - 4.1.5. Generator Owner
 - 4.1.6. Generator Operator
 - 4.1.7. Distribution Provider

5. **Effective Dates:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

6. Background:

NERC established a SAR Team in 2009 to investigate and propose revisions to the CIP-001 and EOP-004 Reliability Standards. The team was asked to consider the following:

1. CIP-001 could be merged with EOP-004 to eliminate redundancies.
2. Acts of sabotage have to be reported to the DOE as part of EOP-004.
3. Specific references to the DOE form need to be eliminated.
4. EOP-004 had some ‘fill-in-the-blank’ components to eliminate.

Deleted: The first day of the first calendar quarter that is six months beyond the date that this standard is approved by applicable regulatory authorities. In those jurisdictions where regulatory approval is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is six months beyond the date this standard is approved by the NERC Board of Trustees, or as otherwise made effective pursuant to the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities.¶

EOP-004-2(X) — Event Reporting

The development included other improvements to the standards deemed appropriate by the drafting team, with the consensus of stakeholders, consistent with establishing high quality, enforceable and technically sufficient Bulk Electric System reliability standards.

The SAR for Project 2009-01, Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting was moved forward for standard drafting by the NERC Standards Committee in August of 2009. The Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting Standard Drafting Team (DSR SDT) was formed in late 2009.

The DSR SDT developed a concept paper to solicit stakeholder input regarding the proposed reporting concepts that the DSR SDT had developed. The posting of the concept paper sought comments from stakeholders on the “road map” that will be used by the DSR SDT in updating or revising CIP-001 and EOP-004. The concept paper provided stakeholders the background information and thought process of the DSR SDT. The DSR SDT has reviewed the existing standards, the SAR, issues from the NERC issues database and FERC Order 693 Directives in order to determine a prudent course of action with respect to revision of these standards.

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1.** Each Responsible Entity shall have an event reporting Operating Plan in accordance with EOP-004-2(X) Attachment 1 that includes the protocol(s) for reporting to the Electric Reliability Organization and other organizations (e.g., the Regional Entity, company personnel, the Responsible Entity’s Reliability Coordinator, law enforcement, or governmental authority). *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*
- M1.** Each Responsible Entity will have a dated event reporting Operating Plan that includes, but is not limited to the protocol(s) and each organization identified to receive an event report for event types specified in EOP-004-2(X) Attachment 1 and in accordance with the entity responsible for reporting.
- R2.** Each Responsible Entity shall report events per their Operating Plan within 24 hours of recognition of meeting an event type threshold for reporting or by the end of the next business day if the event occurs on a weekend (which is recognized to be 4 PM local time on Friday to 8 AM Monday local time). *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Assessment]*
- M2.** Each Responsible Entity will have as evidence of reporting an event, copy of the completed EOP-004-2(X) Attachment 2 form or a DOE-OE-417 form; and evidence of submittal (e.g., operator log or other operating documentation, voice recording, electronic mail message, or confirmation of facsimile) demonstrating the event report was submitted within 24 hours of recognition of meeting the threshold for reporting or by the

EOP-004-2(X) — Event Reporting

end of the next business day if the event occurs on a weekend (which is recognized to be 4 PM local time on Friday to 8 AM Monday local time). (R2)

- R3.** Each Responsible Entity shall validate all contact information contained in the Operating Plan pursuant to Requirement R1 each calendar year. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium]*
[Time Horizon: Operations Planning]
- M3.** Each Responsible Entity will have dated records to show that it validated all contact information contained in the Operating Plan each calendar year. Such evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated voice recordings and operating logs or other communication documentation. (R3)

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1 Compliance Enforcement Authority

The Regional Entity shall serve as the Compliance Enforcement Authority (CEA) unless the applicable entity is owned, operated, or controlled by the Regional Entity. In such cases the ERO or a Regional Entity approved by FERC or other applicable governmental authority shall serve as the CEA.

1.2 Evidence Retention

The Responsible Entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

- Each Responsible Entity shall retain the current Operating Plan plus each version issued since the last audit for Requirements R1, and Measure M1.
- Each Responsible Entity shall retain evidence of compliance since the last audit for Requirements R2, R3 and Measure M2, M3.

If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved or for the duration specified above, whichever is longer.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

EOP-004-2(X) — Event Reporting

1.3 Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Processes:

Compliance Audit

Self-Certification

Spot Checking

Compliance Investigation

Self-Reporting

Complaint

1.4 Additional Compliance Information

None

Table of Compliance Elements

| R # | Time Horizon | VRF | Violation Severity Levels | | | |
|-----|---------------------|-------|--|---|---|--|
| | | | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
| R1 | Operations Planning | Lower | The Responsible Entity had an Operating Plan, but failed to include one applicable event type. | The Responsible Entity had an Operating Plan, but failed to include two applicable event types. | The Responsible Entity had an Operating Plan, but failed to include three applicable event types. | The Responsible Entity had an Operating Plan, but failed to include four or more applicable event types. OR The Responsible Entity failed to have an event reporting Operating Plan. |

EOP-004-2(X) — Event Reporting

| R # | Time Horizon | VRF | Violation Severity Levels | | | |
|-----|-----------------------|--------|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
| R2 | Operations Assessment | Medium | <p>The Responsible Entity submitted an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to all required recipients more than 24 hours but less than or equal to 36 hours after meeting an event threshold for reporting.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to submit an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to one entity identified in its event reporting Operating Plan within 24 hours.</p> | <p>The Responsible Entity submitted an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to all required recipients more than 36 hours but less than or equal to 48 hours after meeting an event threshold for reporting.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to submit an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to two entities identified in its event reporting Operating Plan within 24 hours.</p> | <p>The Responsible Entity submitted an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to all required recipients more than 48 hours but less than or equal to 60 hours after meeting an event threshold for reporting.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to submit an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to three entities identified in its event reporting Operating Plan within 24 hours.</p> | <p>The Responsible Entity submitted an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to all required recipients more than 60 hours after meeting an event threshold for reporting.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to submit an event report (e.g., written or verbal) to four or more entities identified in its event reporting Operating Plan within 24 hours.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity failed to submit a report for an event in EOP-004 Attachment 1.</p> |

| R # | Time Horizon | VRF | Violation Severity Levels | | | |
|-----|---------------------|--------|--|---|--|--|
| | | | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
| R3 | Operations Planning | Medium | <p>The Responsible Entity validated all contact information contained in the Operating Plan but was late by less than one calendar month.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity validated 75% but less than 100% of the contact information contained in the Operating Plan.</p> | <p>The Responsible Entity validated all contact information contained in the Operating Plan but was late by one calendar month or more but less than two calendar months.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity validated 50% and less than 75% of the contact information contained in the Operating Plan.</p> | <p>The Responsible Entity validated all contact information contained in the Operating Plan but was late by two calendar months or more but less than three calendar months.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity validated 25% and less than 50% of the contact information contained in the Operating Plan.</p> | <p>The Responsible Entity validated all contact information contained in the Operating Plan but was late by three calendar months or more.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Responsible Entity validated less than 25% of contact information contained in the Operating Plan.</p> |

D. Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. References

Guideline and Technical Basis (attached)

EOP-004-2(X) — Event Reporting

EOP-004 - Attachment 1: Reportable Events

NOTE: Under certain adverse conditions (e.g. severe weather, multiple events) it may not be possible to report the damage caused by an event and issue a written Event Report within the timing in the standard. In such cases, the affected Responsible Entity shall notify parties per Requirement R2 and provide as much information as is available at the time of the notification. Submit reports to the ERO via one of the following: e-mail: systemawareness@nerc.net, Facsimile 404-446-9770 or Voice: 404-446-9780.

Deleted:

Submit EOP-004 Attachment 2 (or DOE-OE-417) pursuant to Requirements R1 and R2.

| Event Type | Entity with Reporting Responsibility | Threshold for Reporting |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| Damage or destruction of a Facility | RC, BA, TOP | Damage or destruction of a Facility within its Reliability Coordinator Area, Balancing Authority Area or Transmission Operator Area that results in actions to avoid a BES Emergency. |
| Damage or destruction of a Facility | BA, TO, TOP, GO, GOP, DP | Damage or destruction of its Facility that results from actual or suspected intentional human action. |
| Physical threats to a Facility | BA, TO, TOP, GO, GOP, DP | Physical threat to its Facility excluding weather or natural disaster related threats, which has the potential to degrade the normal operation of the Facility. OR Suspicious device or activity at a Facility. Do not report theft unless it degrades normal operation of a Facility. |

EOP-004-2(X) — Event Reporting

| Event Type | Entity with Reporting Responsibility | Threshold for Reporting |
|--|--|--|
| Physical threats to a BES control center | RC, BA, TOP | Physical threat to its BES control center, excluding weather or natural disaster related threats, which has the potential to degrade the normal operation of the control center. OR Suspicious device or activity at a BES control center. |
| BES Emergency requiring public appeal for load reduction | Initiating entity is responsible for reporting | Public appeal for load reduction event. |
| BES Emergency requiring system-wide voltage reduction | Initiating entity is responsible for reporting | System wide voltage reduction of 3% or more. |
| BES Emergency requiring manual firm load shedding | Initiating entity is responsible for reporting | Manual firm load shedding \geq 100 MW. |
| BES Emergency resulting in automatic firm load shedding | DP, TOP | Automatic firm load shedding \geq 100 MW (via automatic undervoltage or underfrequency load shedding schemes, or RAS). |
| Voltage deviation on a Facility | TOP | Observed within its area a voltage deviation of \pm 10% of nominal voltage sustained for \geq 15 continuous minutes. |

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EOP-004-2(X) — Event Reporting

| Event Type | Entity with Reporting Responsibility | Threshold for Reporting |
|--|--------------------------------------|---|
| IROL Violation (all Interconnections) or SOL Violation for Major WECC Transfer Paths (WECC only) | RC | Operate outside the IROL for time greater than IROL T_v (all Interconnections) or Operate outside the SOL for more than 30 minutes for Major WECC Transfer Paths (WECC only). |
| Loss of firm load | BA, TOP, DP | Loss of firm load for ≥ 15 Minutes: ≥ 300 MW for entities with previous year's demand $\geq 3,000$ OR ≥ 200 MW for all other entities |
| System separation (islanding) | RC, BA, TOP | Each separation resulting in an island ≥ 100 MW |
| Generation loss | BA, GOP | Total generation loss, within one minute, of : $\geq 2,000$ MW for entities in the Eastern or Western Interconnection OR $\geq 1,000$ MW for entities in the ERCOT or Quebec Interconnection |
| Complete loss of off-site power to a nuclear generating plant (grid supply) | TO, TOP | Complete loss of off-site power affecting a nuclear generating station per the Nuclear Plant Interface Requirement |

EOP-004-2(X) — Event Reporting

| Event Type | Entity with Reporting Responsibility | Threshold for Reporting |
|---|--------------------------------------|---|
| Transmission loss | TOP | Unexpected loss within its area, contrary to design, of three or more BES Elements caused by a common disturbance (excluding successful automatic reclosing). |
| Unplanned BES control center evacuation | RC, BA, TOP | Unplanned evacuation from BES control center facility for 30 continuous minutes or more. |
| Complete loss of voice communication capability | RC, BA, TOP | Complete loss of voice communication capability affecting a BES control center for 30 continuous minutes or more. |
| Complete loss of monitoring capability | RC, BA, TOP | Complete loss of monitoring capability affecting a BES control center for 30 continuous minutes or more such that analysis capability (i.e., State Estimator or Contingency Analysis) is rendered inoperable. |

EOP-004 - Attachment 2: Event Reporting Form

| EOP-004 Attachment 2: Event Reporting Form | | | |
|---|---|---|---------------------------------|
| <p>Use this form to report events. The Electric Reliability Organization will accept the DOE OE-417 form in lieu of this form if the entity is required to submit an OE-417 report. Submit reports to the ERO via one of the following: e-mail: systemawareness@nerc.net, Facsimile 404-446-9770 or voice: 404-446-9780.</p> | | | |
| Task | Comments | | |
| 1. | Entity filing the report include: Company name: Name of contact person: Email address of contact person: Telephone Number: Submitted by (name): | | |
| 2. | Date and Time of recognized event. Date: (mm/dd/yyyy) Time: (hh:mm) Time/Zone: | | |
| 3. | Did the event originate in your system? Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown <input type="checkbox"/> | | |
| 4. | <p style="text-align: center;">Event Identification and Description:</p> <table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 40%; vertical-align: top;"> (Check applicable box) <input type="checkbox"/> Damage or destruction of a Facility <input type="checkbox"/> Physical Threat to a Facility <input type="checkbox"/> Physical Threat to a control center <input type="checkbox"/> BES Emergency: <input type="checkbox"/> public appeal for load reduction <input type="checkbox"/> system-wide voltage reduction <input type="checkbox"/> manual firm load shedding <input type="checkbox"/> automatic firm load shedding <input type="checkbox"/> Voltage deviation on a Facility <input type="checkbox"/> IROL Violation (all Interconnections) or SOL Violation for Major WECC Transfer Paths (WECC only) <input type="checkbox"/> Loss of firm load <input type="checkbox"/> System separation <input type="checkbox"/> Generation loss <input type="checkbox"/> Complete loss of off-site power to a nuclear generating plant (grid supply) <input type="checkbox"/> Transmission loss <input type="checkbox"/> unplanned control center evacuation <input type="checkbox"/> Complete loss of voice communication capability <input type="checkbox"/> Complete loss of monitoring capability </td> <td style="width: 60%; vertical-align: top;"> Written description (optional): </td> </tr> </table> | (Check applicable box) <input type="checkbox"/> Damage or destruction of a Facility <input type="checkbox"/> Physical Threat to a Facility <input type="checkbox"/> Physical Threat to a control center <input type="checkbox"/> BES Emergency: <input type="checkbox"/> public appeal for load reduction <input type="checkbox"/> system-wide voltage reduction <input type="checkbox"/> manual firm load shedding <input type="checkbox"/> automatic firm load shedding <input type="checkbox"/> Voltage deviation on a Facility <input type="checkbox"/> IROL Violation (all Interconnections) or SOL Violation for Major WECC Transfer Paths (WECC only) <input type="checkbox"/> Loss of firm load <input type="checkbox"/> System separation <input type="checkbox"/> Generation loss <input type="checkbox"/> Complete loss of off-site power to a nuclear generating plant (grid supply) <input type="checkbox"/> Transmission loss <input type="checkbox"/> unplanned control center evacuation <input type="checkbox"/> Complete loss of voice communication capability <input type="checkbox"/> Complete loss of monitoring capability | Written description (optional): |
| (Check applicable box) <input type="checkbox"/> Damage or destruction of a Facility <input type="checkbox"/> Physical Threat to a Facility <input type="checkbox"/> Physical Threat to a control center <input type="checkbox"/> BES Emergency: <input type="checkbox"/> public appeal for load reduction <input type="checkbox"/> system-wide voltage reduction <input type="checkbox"/> manual firm load shedding <input type="checkbox"/> automatic firm load shedding <input type="checkbox"/> Voltage deviation on a Facility <input type="checkbox"/> IROL Violation (all Interconnections) or SOL Violation for Major WECC Transfer Paths (WECC only) <input type="checkbox"/> Loss of firm load <input type="checkbox"/> System separation <input type="checkbox"/> Generation loss <input type="checkbox"/> Complete loss of off-site power to a nuclear generating plant (grid supply) <input type="checkbox"/> Transmission loss <input type="checkbox"/> unplanned control center evacuation <input type="checkbox"/> Complete loss of voice communication capability <input type="checkbox"/> Complete loss of monitoring capability | Written description (optional): | | |

Guideline and Technical Basis

Distribution Provider Applicability Discussion

The DSR SDT has included Distribution Providers (DP) as an applicable entity under this standard. The team realizes that not all DPs will own BES Facilities and will not meet the “Threshold for Reporting” for any event listed in Attachment 1. These DPs will not have any reports to submit under Requirement R2. However, these DPs will be responsible for meeting Requirements R1 and R3. The DSR SDT does not intend for these entities to have a detailed Operating Plan to address events that are not applicable to them. In this instance, the DSR SDT intends for the DP to have a very simple Operating Plan that includes a statement that there are no applicable events in Attachment 1 (to meet R1) and that the DP will review the list of events in Attachment 1 each year (to meet R3). The team does not think this will be a burden on any entity as the development and annual validation of the Operating Plan should not take more than 30 minutes on an annual basis. If a DP discovers applicable events during the annual review, it is expected that the DP will develop a more detailed Operating Plan to comply with the requirements of the standard.

Multiple Reports for a Single Organization

For entities that have multiple registrations, the DSR SDT intends that these entities will only have to submit one report for any individual event. For example, if an entity is registered as a Reliability Coordinator, Balancing Authority and Transmission Operator, the entity would only submit one report for a particular event rather submitting three reports as each individual registered entity.

Summary of Key Concepts

The DSR SDT identified the following principles to assist them in developing the standard:

- Develop a single form to report disturbances and events that threaten the reliability of the Bulk Electric System
- Investigate other opportunities for efficiency, such as development of an electronic form and possible inclusion of regional reporting requirements
- Establish clear criteria for reporting
- Establish consistent reporting timelines
- Provide clarity around who will receive the information and how it will be used

During the development of concepts, the DSR SDT considered the FERC directive to “further define sabotage”. There was concern among stakeholders that a definition may be ambiguous and subject to interpretation. Consequently, the DSR SDT decided to eliminate the term sabotage from the standard. The team felt that it was almost impossible to determine if an act or event was sabotage or vandalism without the intervention of law enforcement. The DSR SDT felt that attempting to define sabotage would result in further ambiguity with respect to

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reporting events. The term “sabotage” is no longer included in the standard. The events listed in EOP-004 Attachment 1 were developed to provide guidance for reporting both actual events as well as events which may have an impact on the Bulk Electric System. The DSR SDT believes that this is an equally effective and efficient means of addressing the FERC Directive.

The types of events that are required to be reported are contained within EOP-004 Attachment 1. The DSR SDT has coordinated with the NERC Events Analysis Working Group to develop the list of events that are to be reported under this standard. EOP-004 Attachment 1 pertains to those actions or events that have impacted the Bulk Electric System. These events were previously reported under EOP-004-1, CIP-001-1 or the Department of Energy form OE-417. EOP-004 Attachment 1 covers similar items that may have had an impact on the Bulk Electric System or has the potential to have an impact and should be reported.

The DSR SDT wishes to make clear that the proposed Standard does not include any real-time operating notifications for the events listed in EOP-004 Attachment 1. Real-time communication is achieved is covered in other standards. The proposed standard deals exclusively with after-the-fact reporting.

Data Gathering

The requirements of EOP-004-1 require that entities “promptly analyze Bulk Electric System disturbances on its system or facilities” (Requirement R2). The requirements of EOP-004-2(X) specify that certain types of events are to be reported but do not include provisions to analyze events. Events reported under EOP-004-2(X) may trigger further scrutiny by the ERO Events Analysis Program. If warranted, the Events Analysis Program personnel may request that more data for certain events be provided by the reporting entity or other entities that may have experienced the event. Entities are encouraged to become familiar with the Events Analysis Program and the NERC Rules of Procedure to learn more about with the expectations of the program.

Law Enforcement Reporting

The reliability objective of EOP-004-2(X) is to improve the reliability of the Bulk Electric System by requiring the reporting of events by Responsible Entities. Certain outages, such as those due to vandalism and terrorism, may not be reasonably preventable. These are the types of events that should be reported to law enforcement. Entities rely upon law enforcement agencies to respond to and investigate those events which have the potential to impact a wider area of the BES. The inclusion of reporting to law enforcement enables and supports reliability principles such as protection of Bulk Electric System from malicious physical attack. The importance of BES awareness of the threat around them is essential to the effective operation and planning to mitigate the potential risk to the BES.

Stakeholders in the Reporting Process

- Industry

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- NERC (ERO), Regional Entity
- FERC
- DOE
- NRC
- DHS – Federal
- Homeland Security- State
- State Regulators
- Local Law Enforcement
- State or Provincial Law Enforcement
- FBI
- Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)

The above stakeholders have an interest in the timely notification, communication and response to an incident at a Facility. The stakeholders have various levels of accountability and have a vested interest in the protection and response to ensure the reliability of the BES.

Present expectations of the industry under CIP-001-1a:

It has been the understanding by industry participants that an occurrence of sabotage has to be reported to the FBI. The FBI has the jurisdictional requirements to investigate acts of sabotage and terrorism. The CIP-001-1-1a standard requires a liaison relationship on behalf of the industry and the FBI or RCMP. These requirements, under the standard, of the industry have not been clear and have lead to misunderstandings and confusion in the industry as to how to demonstrate that the liaison is in place and effective. As an example of proof of compliance with Requirement R4, Responsible Entities have asked FBI Office personnel to provide, on FBI letterhead, confirmation of the existence of a working relationship to report acts of sabotage, the number of years the liaison relationship has been in existence, and the validity of the telephone numbers for the FBI.

Coordination of Local and State Law Enforcement Agencies with the FBI

The Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) came into being with the first task force being established in 1980. JTTFs are small cells of highly trained, locally based, committed investigators, analysts, linguists, SWAT experts, and other specialists from dozens of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The JTTF is a multi-agency effort led by the Justice Department and FBI designed to combine the resources of federal, state, and local law enforcement. Coordination and communications largely through the interagency National Joint Terrorism Task Force, working out of FBI Headquarters, which makes sure that information and intelligence flows freely among the local JTTFs. This information flow can be most beneficial to the industry in analytical intelligence, incident response and investigation. Historically, the most immediate response to an industry incident has been local and state law enforcement agencies to suspected vandalism and criminal damages at industry facilities. Relying upon the JTTF

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coordination between local, state and FBI law enforcement would be beneficial to effective communications and the appropriate level of investigative response.

Coordination of Local and Provincial Law Enforcement Agencies with the RCMP


A similar law enforcement coordination hierarchy exists in Canada. Local and Provincial law enforcement coordinate to investigate suspected acts of vandalism and sabotage. The Provincial law enforcement agency has a reporting relationship with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).

A Reporting Process Solution – EOP-004

A proposal discussed with the FBI, FERC Staff, NERC Standards Project Coordinator and the SDT Chair is reflected in the flowchart below (Reporting Hierarchy for Reportable Events). Essentially, reporting an event to law enforcement agencies will only require the industry to notify the state or provincial or local level law enforcement agency. The state or provincial or local level law enforcement agency will coordinate with law enforcement with jurisdiction to investigate. If the state or provincial or local level law enforcement agency decides federal agency law enforcement or the RCMP should respond and investigate, the state or provincial or local level law enforcement agency will notify and coordinate with the FBI or the RCMP.

Example of Reporting Process including Law Enforcement Enforcement

Entity Experiencing An Event in Attachment 1



* Canadian entities will follow law enforcement protocols applicable in their jurisdictions

Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting Standard Drafting Team (Project 2009-01) - Reporting Concepts

Introduction

The SAR for Project 2009-01, Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting was moved forward for standard drafting by the NERC Standards Committee in August of 2009. The Disturbance and Sabotage Reporting Standard Drafting Team (DSR SDT) was formed in late 2009 and has developed updated standards based on the SAR.

The standards listed under the SAR are:

- CIP-001 — Sabotage Reporting
- EOP-004 — Disturbance Reporting

The changes do not include any real-time operating notifications for the types of events covered by CIP-001 and EOP-004. The real-time reporting requirements are achieved through the RCIS and are covered in other standards (e.g. EOP-002-Capacity and Energy Emergencies). These standards deal exclusively with after-the-fact reporting.

The DSR SDT has consolidated disturbance and sabotage event reporting under a single standard. These two components and other key concepts are discussed in the following sections.

Summary of Concepts and Assumptions:

The Standard:

- Requires reporting of “events” that impact or may impact the reliability of the Bulk Electric System
- Provides clear criteria for reporting
- Includes consistent reporting timelines
- Identifies appropriate applicability, including a reporting hierarchy in the case of disturbance reporting
- Provides clarity around of who will receive the information

Discussion of Disturbance Reporting

Disturbance reporting requirements existed in the previous version of EOP-004. The current approved definition of Disturbance from the NERC Glossary of Terms is:

1. An unplanned event that produces an abnormal system condition.
2. Any perturbation to the electric system.

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3. The unexpected change in ACE that is caused by the sudden failure of generation or interruption of load.

Disturbance reporting requirements and criteria were in the previous EOP-004 standard and its attachments. The DSR SDT discussed the reliability needs for disturbance reporting and developed the list of events that are to be reported under this standard (EOP-004 Attachment 1).

Discussion of Event Reporting

There are situations worthy of reporting because they have the potential to impact reliability.

Event reporting facilitates industry awareness, which allows potentially impacted parties to prepare for and possibly mitigate any associated reliability risk. It also provides the raw material, in the case of certain potential reliability threats, to see emerging patterns.

Examples of such events include:

- Bolts removed from transmission line structures
- Train derailment adjacent to a Facility that either could have damaged a Facility directly or could indirectly damage a Facility (e.g. flammable or toxic cargo that could pose fire hazard or could cause evacuation of a control center)
- Destruction of Bulk Electric System equipment

What about sabotage?

One thing became clear in the DSR SDT's discussion concerning sabotage: everyone has a different definition. The current standard CIP-001 elicited the following response from FERC in FERC Order 693, paragraph 471 which states in part: *" . . . the Commission directs the ERO to develop the following modifications to the Reliability Standard through the Reliability Standards development process: (1) further define sabotage and provide guidance as to the triggering events that would cause an entity to report a sabotage event."*

Often, the underlying reason for an event is unknown or cannot be confirmed. The DSR SDT believes that by reporting material risks to the Bulk Electric System using the event categorization in this standard, it will be easier to get the relevant information for mitigation, awareness, and tracking, while removing the distracting element of motivation.

Certain types of events should be reported to NERC, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and/or Provincial or local law enforcement. Other types of events may have different reporting requirements. For example, an event that is related to copper theft may only need to be reported to the local law enforcement authorities.

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Potential Uses of Reportable Information

Event analysis, correlation of data, and trend identification are a few potential uses for the information reported under this standard. The standard requires Functional entities to report the incidents and provide known information at the time of the report. Further data gathering necessary for event analysis is provided for under the Events Analysis Program and the NERC Rules of Procedure. Other entities (e.g. – NERC, Law Enforcement, etc) will be responsible for performing the analyses. The [NERC Rules of Procedure \(section 800\)](#) provide an overview of the responsibilities of the ERO in regards to analysis and dissemination of information for reliability. Jurisdictional agencies (which may include DHS, FBI, NERC, RE, FERC, Provincial Regulators, and DOE) have other duties and responsibilities.

Collection of Reportable Information or “One stop shopping”

The DSR SDT recognizes that some regions require reporting of additional information beyond what is in EOP-004. The DSR SDT has updated the listing of reportable events in EOP-004 Attachment 1 based on discussions with jurisdictional agencies, NERC, Regional Entities and stakeholder input. There is a possibility that regional differences still exist.

The reporting required by this standard is intended to meet the uses and purposes of NERC. The DSR SDT recognizes that other requirements for reporting exist (e.g., DOE-417 reporting), which may duplicate or overlap the information required by NERC. To the extent that other reporting is required, the DSR SDT envisions that duplicate entry of information should not be necessary, and the submission of the alternate report will be acceptable to NERC so long as all information required by NERC is submitted. For example, if the NERC Report duplicates information from the DOE form, the DOE report may be sent to the NERC in lieu of entering that information on the NERC report.

Rationale:

During development of this standard, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. Upon BOT approval, the text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section.

Rationale for R1:

The requirement to have an Operating Plan for reporting specific types of events provides the entity with a method to have its operating personnel recognize events that affect reliability and to be able to report them to appropriate parties; e.g., Regional Entities, applicable Reliability Coordinators, and law enforcement and other jurisdictional agencies when so recognized. In addition, these event reports are an input to the NERC Events Analysis Program. These other parties use this information to promote reliability, develop a culture of reliability excellence, provide industry collaboration and promote a learning organization.

Every Registered Entity that owns or operates elements or devices on the grid has a formal or informal process, procedure, or steps it takes to gather information regarding what happened when events occur. This requirement has the Responsible Entity establish documentation on

EOP-004-2(X) — Event Reporting

how that procedure, process, or plan is organized. This documentation may be a single document or a combination of various documents that achieve the reliability objective. The communication protocol(s) could include a process flowchart, identification of internal and external personnel or entities to be notified, or a list of personnel by name and their associated contact information. An existing procedure that meets the requirements of CIP-001-2a may be included in this Operating Plan along with other processes, procedures or plans to meet this requirement.

Rationale for R2:

Each Responsible Entity must report and communicate events according to its Operating Plan based on the information in EOP-004-2(X) Attachment 1. By implementing the event reporting Operating Plan the Responsible Entity will assure situational awareness to the Electric Reliability Organization so that they may develop trends and prepare for a possible next event and mitigate the current event. This will assure that the BES remains secure and stable by mitigation actions that the Responsible Entity has within its function. By communicating events per the Operating Plan, the Responsible Entity will assure that people/agencies are aware of the current situation and they may prepare to mitigate current and further events.

Rationale for R3:

Requirement 3 calls for the Responsible Entity to validate the contact information contained in the Operating Plan each calendar year. This requirement helps ensure that the event reporting Operating Plan is up to date and entities will be able to effectively report events to assure situational awareness to the Electric Reliability Organization. If an entity experiences an actual event, communication evidence from the event may be used to show compliance with the validation requirement for the specific contacts used for the event.

Rationale for EOP-004 Attachment 1:

The DSR SDT used the defined term “Facility” to add clarity for several events listed in Attachment 1. A Facility is defined as:

“A set of electrical equipment that operates as a single Bulk Electric System Element (e.g., a line, a generator, a shunt compensator, transformer, etc.)”

The DSR SDT does not intend the use of the term Facility to mean a substation or any other facility (not a defined term) that one might consider in everyday discussions regarding the grid. This is intended to mean ONLY a Facility as defined above.

EOP-004-2(X) — Event Reporting

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|-------------|------------------|--|---|
| 2 | | Merged CIP-001-2a Sabotage Reporting and EOP-004-1 Disturbance Reporting into EOP-004-2 Event Reporting; Retire CIP-001-2a Sabotage Reporting and Retired EOP-004-1 Disturbance Reporting. | Revision to entire standard (Project 2009-01) |
| 2 | November 7, 2012 | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | |
| 2 | June 20, 2013 | FERC approved | |
| <u>2(X)</u> | <u>TBD</u> | <u>Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees</u> | <u>Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS</u> |

Standard FAC-010-2.1(X) — System Operating Limits Methodology for the Planning Horizon

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** System Operating Limits Methodology for the Planning Horizon
2. **Number:** FAC-010-2.1(X)
3. **Purpose:** To ensure that System Operating Limits (SOLs) used in the reliable planning of the Bulk Electric System (BES) are determined based on an established methodology or methodologies.
4. **Applicability**
 - 4.1. Planning Authority
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1. The Planning Authority shall have a documented SOL Methodology for use in developing SOLs within its Planning Authority Area. This SOL Methodology shall:
 - R1.1. Be applicable for developing SOLs used in the planning horizon.
 - R1.2. State that SOLs shall not exceed associated Facility Ratings.
 - R1.3. Include a description of how to identify the subset of SOLs that qualify as IROLs.
- R2. The Planning Authority's SOL Methodology shall include a requirement that SOLs provide BES performance consistent with the following:
 - R2.1. In the pre-contingency state and with all Facilities in service, the BES shall demonstrate transient, dynamic and voltage stability; all Facilities shall be within their Facility Ratings and within their thermal, voltage and stability limits. In the determination of SOLs, the BES condition used shall reflect expected system conditions and shall reflect changes to system topology such as Facility outages.
 - R2.2. Following the single Contingencies¹ identified in Requirement 2.2.1 through Requirement 2.2.3, the system shall demonstrate transient, dynamic and voltage stability; all Facilities shall be operating within their Facility Ratings and within their thermal, voltage and stability limits; and Cascading or uncontrolled separation shall not occur.
 - R2.2.1. Single line to ground or three-phase Fault (whichever is more severe), with Normal Clearing, on any Faulted generator, line, transformer, or shunt device.
 - R2.2.2. Loss of any generator, line, transformer, or shunt device without a Fault.
 - R2.2.3. Single pole block, with Normal Clearing, in a monopolar or bipolar high voltage direct current system.

¹ The Contingencies identified in R2.2.1 through R2.2.3 are the minimum contingencies that must be studied but are not necessarily the only Contingencies that should be studied.

Standard FAC-010-2.1(X) — System Operating Limits Methodology for the Planning Horizon

- R2.3.** Starting with all Facilities in service, the system's response to a single Contingency, may include any of the following:
 - R2.3.1.** Planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to radial customers or some local network customers connected to or supplied by the Faulted Facility or by the affected area.
 - R2.3.2.** System reconfiguration through manual or automatic control or protection actions.
- R2.4.** To prepare for the next Contingency, system adjustments may be made, including changes to generation, uses of the transmission system, and the transmission system topology.
- R2.5.** Starting with all Facilities in service and following any of the multiple Contingencies identified in Reliability Standard TPL-003 the system shall demonstrate transient, dynamic and voltage stability; all Facilities shall be operating within their Facility Ratings and within their thermal, voltage and stability limits; and Cascading or uncontrolled separation shall not occur.
- R2.6.** In determining the system's response to any of the multiple Contingencies, identified in Reliability Standard TPL-003, in addition to the actions identified in R2.3.1 and R2.3.2, the following shall be acceptable:
 - R2.6.1.** Planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to customers (load shedding), the planned removal from service of certain generators, and/or the curtailment of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power Transfers.
- R3.** The Planning Authority's methodology for determining SOLs, shall include, as a minimum, a description of the following, along with any reliability margins applied for each:
 - R3.1.** Study model (must include at least the entire Planning Authority Area as well as the critical modeling details from other Planning Authority Areas that would impact the Facility or Facilities under study).
 - R3.2.** Selection of applicable Contingencies.
 - R3.3.** Level of detail of system models used to determine SOLs.
 - R3.4.** Allowed uses of Remedial Action Schemes.
 - R3.5.** Anticipated transmission system configuration, generation dispatch and Load level.
 - R3.6.** Criteria for determining when violating a SOL qualifies as an Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit (IROL) and criteria for developing any associated IROL T_v .
- R4.** The Planning Authority shall issue its SOL Methodology, and any change to that methodology, to all of the following prior to the effectiveness of the change:
 - R4.1.** Each adjacent Planning Authority and each Planning Authority that indicated it has a reliability-related need for the methodology.
 - R4.2.** Each Reliability Coordinator and Transmission Operator that operates any portion of the Planning Authority's Planning Authority Area.
 - R4.3.** Each Transmission Planner that works in the Planning Authority's Planning Authority Area.
- R5.** If a recipient of the SOL Methodology provides documented technical comments on the methodology, the Planning Authority shall provide a documented response to that recipient

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within 45 calendar days of receipt of those comments. The response shall indicate whether a change will be made to the SOL Methodology and, if no change will be made to that SOL Methodology, the reason why. (Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)

C. Measures

- M1.** The Planning Authority's SOL Methodology shall address all of the items listed in Requirement 1 through Requirement 3.
- M2.** The Planning Authority shall have evidence it issued its SOL Methodology and any changes to that methodology, including the date they were issued, in accordance with Requirement 4.

If the recipient of the SOL Methodology provides documented comments on its technical review of that SOL methodology, the Planning Authority that distributed that SOL Methodology shall have evidence that it provided a written response to that commenter within 45 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement 5. (Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Regional Reliability Organization

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame

Each Planning Authority shall self-certify its compliance to the Compliance Monitor at least once every three years. New Planning Authorities shall demonstrate compliance through an on-site audit conducted by the Compliance Monitor within the first year that it commences operation. The Compliance Monitor shall also conduct an on-site audit once every nine years and an investigation upon complaint to assess performance.

The Performance-Reset Period shall be twelve months from the last non-compliance.

1.3. Data Retention

The Planning Authority shall keep all superseded portions to its SOL Methodology for 12 months beyond the date of the change in that methodology ~~and shall keep all documented comments on its SOL Methodology and associated responses for three years.~~ In addition, entities found non-compliant shall keep information related to the non-compliance until found compliant. (Deleted text retired-Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)

The Compliance Monitor shall keep the last audit and all subsequent compliance records.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

The Planning Authority shall make the following available for inspection during an on-site audit by the Compliance Monitor or within 15 business days of a request as part of an investigation upon complaint:

1.4.1 SOL Methodology.

Documented comments provided by a recipient of the SOL Methodology on its technical review of a SOL Methodology, and the associated responses. (Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)

1.4.2 Superseded portions of its SOL Methodology that had been made within the past 12 months.

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3. Violation Severity Levels:

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|--|--|--|---|
| R1 | Not applicable. | The Planning Authority has a documented SOL Methodology for use in developing SOLs within its Planning Authority Area, but it does not address R1.2 | The Planning Authority has a documented SOL Methodology for use in developing SOLs within its Planning Authority Area, but it does not address R1.3. | The Planning Authority has a documented SOL Methodology for use in developing SOLs within its Planning Authority Area, but it does not address R1.1. OR The Planning Authority has no documented SOL Methodology for use in developing SOLs within its Planning Authority Area. |
| R2 | The Planning Authority's SOL Methodology is missing one requirement as described in R2.1, R2.2, R2.3, R2.4, R2.5, or R2.6. | The Planning Authority's SOL Methodology is missing two requirements as described in R2.1, R2.2, R2.3, R2.4, R2.5, or R2.6 | The Planning Authority's SOL Methodology is missing three requirements as described in R2.1, R2.2, R2.3, R2.4, R2.5, or R2.6. | The Planning Authority's SOL Methodology is missing four or more requirements as described in R2.1, R2.2-, R2.3, R2.4, R2.5, or R2.6 |
| R3 | The Planning Authority has a methodology for determining SOLs that includes a description for all but one of the following: R3.1 through R3.6. | The Planning Authority has a methodology for determining SOLs that includes a description for all but two of the following: R3.1 through R3.6. | The Planning Authority has a methodology for determining SOLs that includes a description for all but three of the following: R3.1 through R3.6. | The Planning Authority has a methodology for determining SOLs that is missing a description of four or more of the following: R3.1 through R3.6. |
| R4 | One or both of the following: The Planning Authority issued its SOL Methodology and changes to that methodology to all but one of the required entities. For a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided up to 30 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change. | One of the following: The Planning Authority issued its SOL Methodology and changes to that methodology to all but one of the required entities AND for a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided 30 calendar days or more, but less than 60 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change. | One of the following: The Planning Authority issued its SOL Methodology and changes to that methodology to all but one of the required entities AND for a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided 60 calendar days or more, but less than 90 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change. | One of the following: The Planning Authority failed to issue its SOL Methodology and changes to that methodology to more than three of the required entities. The Planning Authority issued its SOL Methodology and changes to that methodology to all but one of the required entities AND for a change in |

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| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|--|--|---|--|
| | | <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Authority issued its SOL Methodology and changes to that methodology to all but two of the required entities AND for a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided up to 30 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change.</p> | <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Authority issued its SOL Methodology and changes to that methodology to all but two of the required entities AND for a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided 30 calendar days or more, but less than 60 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Authority issued its SOL Methodology and changes to that methodology to all but three of the required entities AND for a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided up to 30 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change.</p> | <p>methodology, the changed methodology was provided 90 calendar days or more after the effectiveness of the change.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Authority issued its SOL Methodology and changes to that methodology to all but two of the required entities AND for a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided 60 calendar days or more, but less than 90 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Authority issued its SOL Methodology and changes to that methodology to all but three of the required entities AND for a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided 30 calendar days or more, but less than 60 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change.</p> <p>The Planning Authority issued its SOL Methodology and changes to that methodology to all but four of the required entities AND for a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided up to 30 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change.</p> |
| R5 | The Planning Authority received documented technical | The Planning Authority received documented technical | The Planning Authority received documented technical | The Planning Authority received documented technical |

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| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|--|--|--|--|---|
| <p>(Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)</p> | <p>comments on its SOL Methodology and provided a complete response in a time period that was longer than 45 calendar days but less than 60 calendar days.</p> | <p>comments on its SOL Methodology and provided a complete response in a time period that was 60 calendar days or longer but less than 75 calendar days.</p> | <p>comments on its SOL Methodology and provided a complete response in a time period that was 75 calendar days or longer but less than 90 calendar days.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Authority's response to documented technical comments on its SOL Methodology indicated that a change will not be made, but did not include an explanation of why the change will not be made.</p> | <p>comments on its SOL Methodology and provided a complete response in a time period that was 90 calendar days or longer.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Authority's response to documented technical comments on its SOL Methodology did not indicate whether a change will be made to the SOL Methodology.</p> |

E. Regional Differences

- 1.** The following Interconnection-wide Regional Difference shall be applicable in the Western Interconnection:
 - 1.1.** As governed by the requirements of R2.5 and R2.6, starting with all Facilities in service, shall require the evaluation of the following multiple Facility Contingencies when establishing SOLs:
 - 1.1.1** Simultaneous permanent phase to ground Faults on different phases of each of two adjacent transmission circuits on a multiple circuit tower, with Normal Clearing. If multiple circuit towers are used only for station entrance and exit purposes, and if they do not exceed five towers at each station, then this condition is an acceptable risk and therefore can be excluded.
 - 1.1.2** A permanent phase to ground Fault on any generator, transmission circuit, transformer, or bus section with Delayed Fault Clearing except for bus sectionalizing breakers or bus-tie breakers addressed in E1.1.7
 - 1.1.3** Simultaneous permanent loss of both poles of a direct current bipolar Facility without an alternating current Fault.
 - 1.1.4** The failure of a circuit breaker associated with a Remedial Action Scheme to operate when required following: the loss of any element without a Fault; or a permanent phase to ground Fault, with Normal Clearing, on any transmission circuit, transformer or bus section.
 - 1.1.5** A non-three phase Fault with Normal Clearing on common mode Contingency of two adjacent circuits on separate towers unless the event frequency is determined to be less than one in thirty years.
 - 1.1.6** A common mode outage of two generating units connected to the same switchyard, not otherwise addressed by FAC-010.
 - 1.1.7** The loss of multiple bus sections as a result of failure or delayed clearing of a bus tie or bus sectionalizing breaker to clear a permanent Phase to Ground Fault.
 - 1.2.** SOLs shall be established such that for multiple Facility Contingencies in E1.1.1 through E1.1.5 operation within the SOL shall provide system performance consistent with the following:
 - 1.2.1** All Facilities are operating within their applicable Post-Contingency thermal, frequency and voltage limits.
 - 1.2.2** Cascading does not occur.
 - 1.2.3** Uncontrolled separation of the system does not occur.
 - 1.2.4** The system demonstrates transient, dynamic and voltage stability.
 - 1.2.5** Depending on system design and expected system impacts, the controlled interruption of electric supply to customers (load shedding), the planned removal from service of certain generators, and/or the curtailment of contracted firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power transfers may be necessary to maintain the overall security of the interconnected transmission systems.
 - 1.2.6** Interruption of firm transfer, Load or system reconfiguration is permitted through manual or automatic control or protection actions.

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- 1.2.7** To prepare for the next Contingency, system adjustments are permitted, including changes to generation, Load and the transmission system topology when determining limits.
- 1.3.** SOLs shall be established such that for multiple Facility Contingencies in E1.1.6 through E1.1.7 operation within the SOL shall provide system performance consistent with the following with respect to impacts on other systems:
- 1.3.1** Cascading does not occur.
- 1.4.** The Western Interconnection may make changes (performance category adjustments) to the Contingencies required to be studied and/or the required responses to Contingencies for specific facilities based on actual system performance and robust design. Such changes will apply in determining SOLs.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|------------------|---|-----------------|
| 1 | November 1, 2006 | Adopted by Board of Trustees | New |
| 1 | November 1, 2006 | Fixed typo. Removed the word “each” from the 1 st sentence of section D.1.3, Data Retention. | 01/11/07 |
| 2 | June 24, 2008 | Adopted by Board of Trustees; FERC Order 705 | Revised |
| 2 | | Changed the effective date to July 1, 2008 Changed “Cascading Outage” to “Cascading” Replaced Levels of Non-compliance with Violation Severity Levels | Revised |
| 2 | January 22, 2010 | Updated effective date and footer to April 29, 2009 based on the March 20, 2009 FERC Order | Update |
| 2.1 | November 5, 2009 | Adopted by the Board of Trustees — errata change Section E1.1 modified to reflect the renumbering of requirements R2.4 and R2.5 from FAC-010-1 to R2.5 and R2.6 in FAC-010-2. | Errata |
| 2.1 | April 19, 2010 | FERC Approved — errata change Section E1.1 modified to reflect the renumbering of requirements R2.4 and R2.5 from FAC-010-1 to R2.5 and R2.6 in FAC-010-2. | Errata |
| 2.1 | February 7, 2013 | R5 and associated elements approved by NERC Board of Trustees for retirement as part of the Paragraph 81 project (Project 2013-02) pending applicable regulatory approval. | |

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| | | | |
|--------|-------------------|--|--|
| 2.1 | November 21, 2013 | R5 and associated elements approved by FERC for retirement as part of the Paragraph 81 project (Project 2013-02) | |
| 2.1 | February 24, 2014 | Updated VSLs based on June 24, 2013 approval. | |
| 2.1(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

Standard FAC-010-2.1(X) — System Operating Limits Methodology for the Planning Horizon

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** System Operating Limits Methodology for the Planning Horizon
2. **Number:** FAC-010-2.1(X)
3. **Purpose:** To ensure that System Operating Limits (SOLs) used in the reliable planning of the Bulk Electric System (BES) are determined based on an established methodology or methodologies.
4. **Applicability**
 - 4.1. Planning Authority
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Deleted: April 19, 2010

B. Requirements

- R1.** The Planning Authority shall have a documented SOL Methodology for use in developing SOLs within its Planning Authority Area. This SOL Methodology shall:
 - R1.1.** Be applicable for developing SOLs used in the planning horizon.
 - R1.2.** State that SOLs shall not exceed associated Facility Ratings.
 - R1.3.** Include a description of how to identify the subset of SOLs that qualify as IROLs.
- R2.** The Planning Authority's SOL Methodology shall include a requirement that SOLs provide BES performance consistent with the following:
 - R2.1.** In the pre-contingency state and with all Facilities in service, the BES shall demonstrate transient, dynamic and voltage stability; all Facilities shall be within their Facility Ratings and within their thermal, voltage and stability limits. In the determination of SOLs, the BES condition used shall reflect expected system conditions and shall reflect changes to system topology such as Facility outages.
 - R2.2.** Following the single Contingencies¹ identified in Requirement 2.2.1 through Requirement 2.2.3, the system shall demonstrate transient, dynamic and voltage stability; all Facilities shall be operating within their Facility Ratings and within their thermal, voltage and stability limits; and Cascading or uncontrolled separation shall not occur.
 - R2.2.1.** Single line to ground or three-phase Fault (whichever is more severe), with Normal Clearing, on any Faulted generator, line, transformer, or shunt device.
 - R2.2.2.** Loss of any generator, line, transformer, or shunt device without a Fault.
 - R2.2.3.** Single pole block, with Normal Clearing, in a monopolar or bipolar high voltage direct current system.

¹ The Contingencies identified in R2.2.1 through R2.2.3 are the minimum contingencies that must be studied but are not necessarily the only Contingencies that should be studied.

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- R2.3.** Starting with all Facilities in service, the system’s response to a single Contingency, may include any of the following:
 - R2.3.1.** Planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to radial customers or some local network customers connected to or supplied by the Faulted Facility or by the affected area.
 - R2.3.2.** System reconfiguration through manual or automatic control or protection actions.
- R2.4.** To prepare for the next Contingency, system adjustments may be made, including changes to generation, uses of the transmission system, and the transmission system topology.
- R2.5.** Starting with all Facilities in service and following any of the multiple Contingencies identified in Reliability Standard TPL-003 the system shall demonstrate transient, dynamic and voltage stability; all Facilities shall be operating within their Facility Ratings and within their thermal, voltage and stability limits; and Cascading or uncontrolled separation shall not occur.
- R2.6.** In determining the system’s response to any of the multiple Contingencies, identified in Reliability Standard TPL-003, in addition to the actions identified in R2.3.1 and R2.3.2, the following shall be acceptable:
 - R2.6.1.** Planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to customers (load shedding), the planned removal from service of certain generators, and/or the curtailment of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power Transfers.
- R3.** The Planning Authority’s methodology for determining SOLs, shall include, as a minimum, a description of the following, along with any reliability margins applied for each:
 - R3.1.** Study model (must include at least the entire Planning Authority Area as well as the critical modeling details from other Planning Authority Areas that would impact the Facility or Facilities under study).
 - R3.2.** Selection of applicable Contingencies.
 - R3.3.** Level of detail of system models used to determine SOLs.
 - R3.4.** Allowed uses of Remedial Action Schemes.
 - R3.5.** Anticipated transmission system configuration, generation dispatch and Load level.
 - R3.6.** Criteria for determining when violating a SOL qualifies as an Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit (IROL) and criteria for developing any associated IROL T_v .
- R4.** The Planning Authority shall issue its SOL Methodology, and any change to that methodology, to all of the following prior to the effectiveness of the change:
 - R4.1.** Each adjacent Planning Authority and each Planning Authority that indicated it has a reliability-related need for the methodology.
 - R4.2.** Each Reliability Coordinator and Transmission Operator that operates any portion of the Planning Authority’s Planning Authority Area.
 - R4.3.** Each Transmission Planner that works in the Planning Authority’s Planning Authority Area.
- R5.** If a recipient of the SOL Methodology provides documented technical comments on the methodology, the Planning Authority shall provide a documented response to that recipient

Deleted: Special Protection Systems or

Deleted: Plans

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within 45 calendar days of receipt of those comments. The response shall indicate whether a change will be made to the SOL Methodology and, if no change will be made to that SOL Methodology, the reason why. (Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)

C. Measures

- M1.** The Planning Authority's SOL Methodology shall address all of the items listed in Requirement 1 through Requirement 3.
- M2.** The Planning Authority shall have evidence it issued its SOL Methodology and any changes to that methodology, including the date they were issued, in accordance with Requirement 4.

If the recipient of the SOL Methodology provides documented comments on its technical review of that SOL methodology, the Planning Authority that distributed that SOL Methodology shall have evidence that it provided a written response to that commenter within 45 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement 5. (Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Regional Reliability Organization

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame

Each Planning Authority shall self-certify its compliance to the Compliance Monitor at least once every three years. New Planning Authorities shall demonstrate compliance through an on-site audit conducted by the Compliance Monitor within the first year that it commences operation. The Compliance Monitor shall also conduct an on-site audit once every nine years and an investigation upon complaint to assess performance.

The Performance-Reset Period shall be twelve months from the last non-compliance.

1.3. Data Retention

The Planning Authority shall keep all superseded portions to its SOL Methodology for 12 months beyond the date of the change in that methodology ~~and shall keep all documented comments on its SOL Methodology and associated responses for three years.~~ In addition, entities found non-compliant shall keep information related to the non-compliance until found compliant. (Deleted text retired-Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)

The Compliance Monitor shall keep the last audit and all subsequent compliance records.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

The Planning Authority shall make the following available for inspection during an on-site audit by the Compliance Monitor or within 15 business days of a request as part of an investigation upon complaint:

1.4.1 SOL Methodology.

Documented comments provided by a recipient of the SOL Methodology on its technical review of a SOL Methodology, and the associated responses.
(Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)

1.4.2 Superseded portions of its SOL Methodology that had been made within the past 12 months.

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- 1.4.3** Evidence that the SOL Methodology and any changes to the methodology that occurred within the past 12 months were issued to all required entities.
- 2. Levels of Non-Compliance for Western Interconnection: (To be replaced with VSLs once developed and approved by WECC)**

 - 2.1. Level 1:** There shall be a level one non-compliance if either of the following conditions exists:

 - 2.1.1** The SOL Methodology did not include a statement indicating that Facility Ratings shall not be exceeded.
 - 2.1.2** No evidence of responses to a recipient’s comments on the SOL Methodology. *(Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)*
 - 2.2. Level 2:** The SOL Methodology did not include a requirement to address all of the elements in R2.1 through R2.3 and E1.
 - 2.3. Level 3:** There shall be a level three non-compliance if any of the following conditions exists:

 - 2.3.1** The SOL Methodology did not include a statement indicating that Facility Ratings shall not be exceeded and the methodology did not include evaluation of system response to one of the three types of single Contingencies identified in R2.2.
 - 2.3.2** The SOL Methodology did not include a statement indicating that Facility Ratings shall not be exceeded and the methodology did not include evaluation of system response to two of the seven types of multiple Contingencies identified in E1.1.
 - 2.3.3** The System Operating Limits Methodology did not include a statement indicating that Facility Ratings shall not be exceeded and the methodology did not address two of the six required topics in R3.
 - 2.4. Level 4:** The SOL Methodology was not issued to all required entities in accordance with R4

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3. Violation Severity Levels:

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|--|--|--|---|
| R1 | Not applicable. | The Planning Authority has a documented SOL Methodology for use in developing SOLs within its Planning Authority Area, but it does not address R1.2 | The Planning Authority has a documented SOL Methodology for use in developing SOLs within its Planning Authority Area, but it does not address R1.3. | The Planning Authority has a documented SOL Methodology for use in developing SOLs within its Planning Authority Area, but it does not address R1.1. OR The Planning Authority has no documented SOL Methodology for use in developing SOLs within its Planning Authority Area. |
| R2 | The Planning Authority's SOL Methodology is missing one requirement as described in R2.1, R2.2, R2.3, R2.4, R2.5, or R2.6. | The Planning Authority's SOL Methodology is missing two requirements as described in R2.1, R2.2, R2.3, R2.4, R2.5, or R2.6 | The Planning Authority's SOL Methodology is missing three requirements as described in R2.1, R2.2, R2.3, R2.4, R2.5, or R2.6. | The Planning Authority's SOL Methodology is missing four or more requirements as described in R2.1, R2.2, R2.3, R2.4, R2.5, or R2.6 |
| R3 | The Planning Authority has a methodology for determining SOLs that includes a description for all but one of the following: R3.1 through R3.6. | The Planning Authority has a methodology for determining SOLs that includes a description for all but two of the following: R3.1 through R3.6. | The Planning Authority has a methodology for determining SOLs that includes a description for all but three of the following: R3.1 through R3.6. | The Planning Authority has a methodology for determining SOLs that is missing a description of four or more of the following: R3.1 through R3.6. |
| R4 | One or both of the following: The Planning Authority issued its SOL Methodology and changes to that methodology to all but one of the required entities. For a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided up to 30 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change. | One of the following: The Planning Authority issued its SOL Methodology and changes to that methodology to all but one of the required entities AND for a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided 30 calendar days or more, but less than 60 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change. | One of the following: The Planning Authority issued its SOL Methodology and changes to that methodology to all but one of the required entities AND for a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided 60 calendar days or more, but less than 90 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change. | One of the following: The Planning Authority failed to issue its SOL Methodology and changes to that methodology to more than three of the required entities. The Planning Authority issued its SOL Methodology and changes to that methodology to all but one of the required entities AND for a change in |

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| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|--|--|---|--|
| | | <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Authority issued its SOL Methodology and changes to that methodology to all but two of the required entities AND for a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided up to 30 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change.</p> | <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Authority issued its SOL Methodology and changes to that methodology to all but two of the required entities AND for a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided 30 calendar days or more, but less than 60 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Authority issued its SOL Methodology and changes to that methodology to all but three of the required entities AND for a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided up to 30 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change.</p> | <p>methodology, the changed methodology was provided 90 calendar days or more after the effectiveness of the change.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Authority issued its SOL Methodology and changes to that methodology to all but two of the required entities AND for a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided 60 calendar days or more, but less than 90 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Authority issued its SOL Methodology and changes to that methodology to all but three of the required entities AND for a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided 30 calendar days or more, but less than 60 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change.</p> <p>The Planning Authority issued its SOL Methodology and changes to that methodology to all but four of the required entities AND for a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided up to 30 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change.</p> |
| R5 | The Planning Authority received documented technical | The Planning Authority received documented technical | The Planning Authority received documented technical | The Planning Authority received documented technical |

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| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|--|--|--|--|---|
| <p>(Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)</p> | <p>comments on its SOL Methodology and provided a complete response in a time period that was longer than 45 calendar days but less than 60 calendar days.</p> | <p>comments on its SOL Methodology and provided a complete response in a time period that was 60 calendar days or longer but less than 75 calendar days.</p> | <p>comments on its SOL Methodology and provided a complete response in a time period that was 75 calendar days or longer but less than 90 calendar days.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Authority's response to documented technical comments on its SOL Methodology indicated that a change will not be made, but did not include an explanation of why the change will not be made.</p> | <p>comments on its SOL Methodology and provided a complete response in a time period that was 90 calendar days or longer.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Authority's response to documented technical comments on its SOL Methodology did not indicate whether a change will be made to the SOL Methodology.</p> |

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E. Regional Differences

1. The following Interconnection-wide Regional Difference shall be applicable in the Western Interconnection:
 - 1.1. As governed by the requirements of R2.5 and R2.6, starting with all Facilities in service, shall require the evaluation of the following multiple Facility Contingencies when establishing SOLs:
 - 1.1.1 Simultaneous permanent phase to ground Faults on different phases of each of two adjacent transmission circuits on a multiple circuit tower, with Normal Clearing. If multiple circuit towers are used only for station entrance and exit purposes, and if they do not exceed five towers at each station, then this condition is an acceptable risk and therefore can be excluded.
 - 1.1.2 A permanent phase to ground Fault on any generator, transmission circuit, transformer, or bus section with Delayed Fault Clearing except for bus sectionalizing breakers or bus-tie breakers addressed in E1.1.7
 - 1.1.3 Simultaneous permanent loss of both poles of a direct current bipolar Facility without an alternating current Fault.
 - 1.1.4 The failure of a circuit breaker associated with a [Remedial Action Scheme](#) to operate when required following: the loss of any element without a Fault; or a permanent phase to ground Fault, with Normal Clearing, on any transmission circuit, transformer or bus section.
 - 1.1.5 A non-three phase Fault with Normal Clearing on common mode Contingency of two adjacent circuits on separate towers unless the event frequency is determined to be less than one in thirty years.
 - 1.1.6 A common mode outage of two generating units connected to the same switchyard, not otherwise addressed by FAC-010.
 - 1.1.7 The loss of multiple bus sections as a result of failure or delayed clearing of a bus tie or bus sectionalizing breaker to clear a permanent Phase to Ground Fault.
 - 1.2. SOLs shall be established such that for multiple Facility Contingencies in E1.1.1 through E1.1.5 operation within the SOL shall provide system performance consistent with the following:
 - 1.2.1 All Facilities are operating within their applicable Post-Contingency thermal, frequency and voltage limits.
 - 1.2.2 Cascading does not occur.
 - 1.2.3 Uncontrolled separation of the system does not occur.
 - 1.2.4 The system demonstrates transient, dynamic and voltage stability.
 - 1.2.5 Depending on system design and expected system impacts, the controlled interruption of electric supply to customers (load shedding), the planned removal from service of certain generators, and/or the curtailment of contracted firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power transfers may be necessary to maintain the overall security of the interconnected transmission systems.
 - 1.2.6 Interruption of firm transfer, Load or system reconfiguration is permitted through manual or automatic control or protection actions.

Deleted: Special Protection System

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1.2.7 To prepare for the next Contingency, system adjustments are permitted, including changes to generation, Load and the transmission system topology when determining limits.

1.3. SOLs shall be established such that for multiple Facility Contingencies in E1.1.6 through E1.1.7 operation within the SOL shall provide system performance consistent with the following with respect to impacts on other systems:

1.3.1 Cascading does not occur.

1.4. The Western Interconnection may make changes (performance category adjustments) to the Contingencies required to be studied and/or the required responses to Contingencies for specific facilities based on actual system performance and robust design. Such changes will apply in determining SOLs.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|------------------|---|-----------------|
| 1 | November 1, 2006 | Adopted by Board of Trustees | New |
| 1 | November 1, 2006 | Fixed typo. Removed the word “each” from the 1 st sentence of section D.1.3, Data Retention. | 01/11/07 |
| 2 | June 24, 2008 | Adopted by Board of Trustees; FERC Order 705 | Revised |
| 2 | | Changed the effective date to July 1, 2008 Changed “Cascading Outage” to “Cascading” Replaced Levels of Non-compliance with Violation Severity Levels | Revised |
| 2 | January 22, 2010 | Updated effective date and footer to April 29, 2009 based on the March 20, 2009 FERC Order | Update |
| 2.1 | November 5, 2009 | Adopted by the Board of Trustees — errata change Section E1.1 modified to reflect the renumbering of requirements R2.4 and R2.5 from FAC-010-1 to R2.5 and R2.6 in FAC-010-2. | Errata |
| 2.1 | April 19, 2010 | FERC Approved — errata change Section E1.1 modified to reflect the renumbering of requirements R2.4 and R2.5 from FAC-010-1 to R2.5 and R2.6 in FAC-010-2. | Errata |
| 2.1 | February 7, 2013 | R5 and associated elements approved by NERC Board of Trustees for retirement as part of the Paragraph 81 project (Project 2013-02) pending applicable regulatory approval. | |

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| | | | |
|---------------|-------------------|--|---|
| 2.1 | November 21, 2013 | R5 and associated elements approved by FERC for retirement as part of the Paragraph 81 project (Project 2013-02) | |
| 2.1 | February 24, 2014 | Updated VSLs based on June 24, 2013 approval. | |
| <u>2.1(X)</u> | <u>TBD</u> | <u>Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees</u> | <u>Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS</u> |

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** System Operating Limits Methodology for the Operations Horizon
2. **Number:** FAC-011-2(X)
3. **Purpose:** To ensure that System Operating Limits (SOLs) used in the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System (BES) are determined based on an established methodology or methodologies.
4. **Applicability**
 - 4.1. Reliability Coordinator
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1. The Reliability Coordinator shall have a documented methodology for use in developing SOLs (SOL Methodology) within its Reliability Coordinator Area. This SOL Methodology shall:
 - R1.1. Be applicable for developing SOLs used in the operations horizon.
 - R1.2. State that SOLs shall not exceed associated Facility Ratings.
 - R1.3. Include a description of how to identify the subset of SOLs that qualify as IROLs.
- R2. The Reliability Coordinator's SOL Methodology shall include a requirement that SOLs provide BES performance consistent with the following:
 - R2.1. In the pre-contingency state, the BES shall demonstrate transient, dynamic and voltage stability; all Facilities shall be within their Facility Ratings and within their thermal, voltage and stability limits. In the determination of SOLs, the BES condition used shall reflect current or expected system conditions and shall reflect changes to system topology such as Facility outages.
 - R2.2. Following the single Contingencies¹ identified in Requirement 2.2.1 through Requirement 2.2.3, the system shall demonstrate transient, dynamic and voltage stability; all Facilities shall be operating within their Facility Ratings and within their thermal, voltage and stability limits; and Cascading or uncontrolled separation shall not occur.
 - R2.2.1. Single line to ground or 3-phase Fault (whichever is more severe), with Normal Clearing, on any Faulted generator, line, transformer, or shunt device.
 - R2.2.2. Loss of any generator, line, transformer, or shunt device without a Fault.

¹ The Contingencies identified in FAC-011 R2.2.1 through R2.2.3 are the minimum contingencies that must be studied but are not necessarily the only Contingencies that should be studied.

- R5.** If a recipient of the SOL Methodology provides documented technical comments on the methodology, the Reliability Coordinator shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 45 calendar days of receipt of those comments. The response shall indicate whether a change will be made to the SOL Methodology and, if no change will be made to that SOL Methodology, the reason why. (Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)

C. Measures

- M1.** The Reliability Coordinator's SOL Methodology shall address all of the items listed in Requirement 1 through Requirement 3.
- M2.** The Reliability Coordinator shall have evidence it issued its SOL Methodology, and any changes to that methodology, including the date they were issued, in accordance with Requirement 4.
- M3.** If the recipient of the SOL Methodology provides documented comments on its technical review of that SOL methodology, the Reliability Coordinator that distributed that SOL Methodology shall have evidence that it provided a written response to that commenter within 45 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement 5. (Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Regional Reliability Organization

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame

Each Reliability Coordinator shall self-certify its compliance to the Compliance Monitor at least once every three years. New Reliability Authorities shall demonstrate compliance through an on-site audit conducted by the Compliance Monitor within the first year that it commences operation. The Compliance Monitor shall also conduct an on-site audit once every nine years and an investigation upon complaint to assess performance.

The Performance-Reset Period shall be twelve months from the last non-compliance.

1.3. Data Retention

The Reliability Coordinator shall keep all superseded portions to its SOL Methodology for 12 months beyond the date of the change in that methodology ~~and shall keep all documented comments on its SOL Methodology and associated responses for three years.~~ In addition, entities found non-compliant shall keep information related to the non-compliance until found compliant. (Deleted text retired-Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)

The Compliance Monitor shall keep the last audit and all subsequent compliance records.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

The Reliability Coordinator shall make the following available for inspection during an on-site audit by the Compliance Monitor or within 15 business days of a request as part of an investigation upon complaint:

1.4.1 SOL Methodology.

1.4.2 Documented comments provided by a recipient of the SOL Methodology on its technical review of a SOL Methodology, and the associated responses.
(Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)

1.4.3 Superseded portions of its SOL Methodology that had been made within the past 12 months.

1.4.4 Evidence that the SOL Methodology and any changes to the methodology that occurred within the past 12 months were issued to all required entities.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance for Western Interconnection: (To be replaced with VSLs once developed and approved by WECC)

2.1. Level 1: There shall be a level one non-compliance if either of the following conditions exists:

2.1.1 The SOL Methodology did not include a statement indicating that Facility Ratings shall not be exceeded.

2.1.2 No evidence of responses to a recipient's comments on the SOL Methodology
(Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)

2.2. Level 2: The SOL Methodology did not include a requirement to address all of the elements in R3.1, R3.2, R3.4 through R3.7 and E1.

2.3. Level 3: There shall be a level three non-compliance if any of the following conditions exists:

2.3.1 The SOL Methodology did not include a statement indicating that Facility Ratings shall not be exceeded and the methodology did not include evaluation of system response to one of the three types of single Contingencies identified in R2.2.

2.3.2 The SOL Methodology did not include a statement indicating that Facility Ratings shall not be exceeded and the methodology did not include evaluation of system response to two of the seven types of multiple Contingencies identified in E1.1.

2.3.3 The System Operating Limits Methodology did not include a statement indicating that Facility Ratings shall not be exceeded and the methodology did not address two of the six required topics in R3.1, R3.2, R3.4 through R3.7.

2.4. Level 4: The SOL Methodology was not issued to all required entities in accordance with R4.

3. Violation Severity Levels:

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|--|---|---|---|
| R1 | Not applicable. | The Reliability Coordinator has a documented SOL Methodology for use in developing SOLs within its Reliability Coordinator Area, but it does not address R1.2 | The Reliability Coordinator has a documented SOL Methodology for use in developing SOLs within its Reliability Coordinator Area, but it does not address R1.3. | The Reliability Coordinator has a documented SOL Methodology for use in developing SOLs within its Reliability Coordinator Area, but it does not address R1.1. OR The Reliability Coordinator has no documented SOL Methodology for use in developing SOLs within its Reliability Coordinator Area. |
| R2 | The Reliability Coordinator's SOL Methodology requires that SOLs are set to meet BES performance following single contingencies, but does not require that SOLs are set to meet BES performance in the pre-contingency state. (R2.1) | Not applicable. | The Reliability Coordinator's SOL Methodology requires that SOLs are set to meet BES performance in the pre-contingency state, but does not require that SOLs are set to meet BES performance following single contingencies. (R2.2 – R2.4) | The Reliability Coordinator's SOL Methodology does not require that SOLs are set to meet BES performance in the pre-contingency state and does not require that SOLs are set to meet BES performance following single contingencies. (R2.1 through R2.4) |
| R3 | The Reliability Coordinator's SOL Methodology includes a description for all but one of the following: R3.1 through R3.7. | The Reliability Coordinator's SOL Methodology includes a description for all but two of the following: R3.1 through R3.7. | The Reliability Coordinator's SOL Methodology includes a description for all but three of the following: R3.1 through R3.7. | The Reliability Coordinator's SOL Methodology is missing a description of four or more of the following: R3.1 through R3.7. |
| R3.6 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R4 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to issue its SOL Methodology and/or one or more changes to that methodology to one of the required entities specified in R4.1, R4.2, and R4.3. | The Reliability Coordinator failed to issue its SOL Methodology and/or one or more changes to that methodology to two of the required entities specified in R4.1, R4.2, and R4.3. | The Reliability Coordinator failed to issue its SOL Methodology and/or one or more changes to that methodology to three of the required entities specified in R4.1, R4.2, and R4.3. | The Reliability Coordinator failed to issue its SOL Methodology and/or one or more changes to that methodology to four or more of the required entities specified in R4.1, R4.2, and R4.3 |

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| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|---|---|---|---|--|
| | <p>OR</p> <p>For a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided to one or more of the required entities before the effectiveness of the change, but was provided to all the required entities no more than 10 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change.</p> | <p>OR</p> <p>For a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided to one or more of the required entities more than 10 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change, but less than or equal to 20 days after the effectiveness of the change.</p> | <p>OR</p> <p>For a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided to one or more of required entities more than 20 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change, but less than or equal to 30 days after the effectiveness of the change.</p> | <p>OR</p> <p>For a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided to one or more of the required entities more than 30 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change.</p> |
| <p>R5 (Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)</p> | <p>The Reliability Coordinator received documented technical comments on its SOL Methodology and provided a complete response in a time period that was longer than 45 calendar days but less than 60 calendar days.</p> | <p>The Reliability Coordinator received documented technical comments on its SOL Methodology and provided a complete response in a time period that was 60 calendar days or longer but less than 75 calendar days.</p> | <p>The Reliability Coordinator received documented technical comments on its SOL Methodology and provided a complete response in a time period that was 75 calendar days or longer but less than 90 calendar days.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Reliability Coordinator's response to documented technical comments on its SOL Methodology indicated that a change will not be made, but did not include an explanation of why the change will not be made.</p> | <p>The Reliability Coordinator received documented technical comments on its SOL Methodology and provided a complete response in a time period that was 90 calendar days or longer.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Reliability Coordinator's response to documented technical comments on its SOL Methodology did not indicate whether a change will be made to the SOL Methodology.</p> |

Regional Differences

- 1.** The following Interconnection-wide Regional Difference shall be applicable in the Western Interconnection:
 - 1.1.** As governed by the requirements of R3.3, starting with all Facilities in service, shall require the evaluation of the following multiple Facility Contingencies when establishing SOLs:
 - 1.1.1** Simultaneous permanent phase to ground Faults on different phases of each of two adjacent transmission circuits on a multiple circuit tower, with Normal Clearing. If multiple circuit towers are used only for station entrance and exit purposes, and if they do not exceed five towers at each station, then this condition is an acceptable risk and therefore can be excluded.
 - 1.1.2** A permanent phase to ground Fault on any generator, transmission circuit, transformer, or bus section with Delayed Fault Clearing except for bus sectionalizing breakers or bus-tie breakers addressed in E1.1.7
 - 1.1.3** Simultaneous permanent loss of both poles of a direct current bipolar Facility without an alternating current Fault.
 - 1.1.4** The failure of a circuit breaker associated with a Remedial Action Scheme to operate when required following: the loss of any element without a Fault; or a permanent phase to ground Fault, with Normal Clearing, on any transmission circuit, transformer or bus section.
 - 1.1.5** A non-three phase Fault with Normal Clearing on common mode Contingency of two adjacent circuits on separate towers unless the event frequency is determined to be less than one in thirty years.
 - 1.1.6** A common mode outage of two generating units connected to the same switchyard, not otherwise addressed by FAC-011.
 - 1.1.7** The loss of multiple bus sections as a result of failure or delayed clearing of a bus tie or bus sectionalizing breaker to clear a permanent Phase to Ground Fault.
 - 1.2.** SOLs shall be established such that for multiple Facility Contingencies in E1.1.1 through E1.1.5 operation within the SOL shall provide system performance consistent with the following:
 - 1.2.1** All Facilities are operating within their applicable Post-Contingency thermal, frequency and voltage limits.
 - 1.2.2** Cascading does not occur.
 - 1.2.3** Uncontrolled separation of the system does not occur.
 - 1.2.4** The system demonstrates transient, dynamic and voltage stability.
 - 1.2.5** Depending on system design and expected system impacts, the controlled interruption of electric supply to customers (load shedding), the planned removal from service of certain generators, and/or the curtailment of contracted firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power transfers may be necessary to maintain the overall security of the interconnected transmission systems.
 - 1.2.6** Interruption of firm transfer, Load or system reconfiguration is permitted through manual or automatic control or protection actions.

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- 1.2.7 To prepare for the next Contingency, system adjustments are permitted, including changes to generation, Load and the transmission system topology when determining limits.
- 1.3. SOLs shall be established such that for multiple Facility Contingencies in E1.1.6 through E1.1.7 operation within the SOL shall provide system performance consistent with the following with respect to impacts on other systems:
 - 1.3.1 Cascading does not occur.
- 1.4. The Western Interconnection may make changes (performance category adjustments) to the Contingencies required to be studied and/or the required responses to Contingencies for specific facilities based on actual system performance and robust design. Such changes will apply in determining SOLs.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|-------------------|---|--|
| 1 | November 1, 2006 | Adopted by Board of Trustees | New |
| 2 | | Changed the effective date to October 1, 2008 Changed “Cascading Outage” to “Cascading” Replaced Levels of Non-compliance with Violation Severity Levels Corrected footnote 1 to reference FAC-011 rather than FAC-010 | Revised |
| 2 | June 24, 2008 | Adopted by Board of Trustees: FERC Order 705 | Revised |
| 2 | January 22, 2010 | Updated effective date and footer to April 29, 2009 based on the March 20, 2009 FERC Order | Update |
| 2 | February 7, 2013 | R5 and associated elements approved by NERC Board of Trustees for retirement as part of the Paragraph 81 project (Project 2013-02) pending applicable regulatory approval. | |
| 2 | November 21, 2013 | R5 and associated elements approved by FERC for retirement as part of the Paragraph 81 project (Project 2013-02) | |
| 2 | February 24, 2014 | Updated VSLs based on June 24, 2013 approval. | |
| 2(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

Standard FAC-011-2(X) — System Operating Limits Methodology for the Operations Horizon

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** System Operating Limits Methodology for the Operations Horizon
2. **Number:** FAC-011-2(X)
3. **Purpose:** To ensure that System Operating Limits (SOLs) used in the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System (BES) are determined based on an established methodology or methodologies.
4. **Applicability**
 - 4.1. Reliability Coordinator
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Deleted: April 29, 2009

B. Requirements

- R1. The Reliability Coordinator shall have a documented methodology for use in developing SOLs (SOL Methodology) within its Reliability Coordinator Area. This SOL Methodology shall:
 - R1.1. Be applicable for developing SOLs used in the operations horizon.
 - R1.2. State that SOLs shall not exceed associated Facility Ratings.
 - R1.3. Include a description of how to identify the subset of SOLs that qualify as IROLs.
- R2. The Reliability Coordinator's SOL Methodology shall include a requirement that SOLs provide BES performance consistent with the following:
 - R2.1. In the pre-contingency state, the BES shall demonstrate transient, dynamic and voltage stability; all Facilities shall be within their Facility Ratings and within their thermal, voltage and stability limits. In the determination of SOLs, the BES condition used shall reflect current or expected system conditions and shall reflect changes to system topology such as Facility outages.
 - R2.2. Following the single Contingencies¹ identified in Requirement 2.2.1 through Requirement 2.2.3, the system shall demonstrate transient, dynamic and voltage stability; all Facilities shall be operating within their Facility Ratings and within their thermal, voltage and stability limits; and Cascading or uncontrolled separation shall not occur.
 - R2.2.1. Single line to ground or 3-phase Fault (whichever is more severe), with Normal Clearing, on any Faulted generator, line, transformer, or shunt device.
 - R2.2.2. Loss of any generator, line, transformer, or shunt device without a Fault.

¹ The Contingencies identified in FAC-011 R2.2.1 through R2.2.3 are the minimum contingencies that must be studied but are not necessarily the only Contingencies that should be studied.

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- R5.** If a recipient of the SOL Methodology provides documented technical comments on the methodology, the Reliability Coordinator shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 45 calendar days of receipt of those comments. The response shall indicate whether a change will be made to the SOL Methodology and, if no change will be made to that SOL Methodology, the reason why. (Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)

C. Measures

- M1.** The Reliability Coordinator’s SOL Methodology shall address all of the items listed in Requirement 1 through Requirement 3.
- M2.** The Reliability Coordinator shall have evidence it issued its SOL Methodology, and any changes to that methodology, including the date they were issued, in accordance with Requirement 4.
- M3.** If the recipient of the SOL Methodology provides documented comments on its technical review of that SOL methodology, the Reliability Coordinator that distributed that SOL Methodology shall have evidence that it provided a written response to that commenter within 45 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement 5. (Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Regional Reliability Organization

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame

Each Reliability Coordinator shall self-certify its compliance to the Compliance Monitor at least once every three years. New Reliability Authorities shall demonstrate compliance through an on-site audit conducted by the Compliance Monitor within the first year that it commences operation. The Compliance Monitor shall also conduct an on-site audit once every nine years and an investigation upon complaint to assess performance.

The Performance-Reset Period shall be twelve months from the last non-compliance.

1.3. Data Retention

The Reliability Coordinator shall keep all superseded portions to its SOL Methodology for 12 months beyond the date of the change in that methodology ~~and shall keep all documented comments on its SOL Methodology and associated responses for three years.~~ In addition, entities found non-compliant shall keep information related to the non-compliance until found compliant. (Deleted text retired-Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)

The Compliance Monitor shall keep the last audit and all subsequent compliance records.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

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The Reliability Coordinator shall make the following available for inspection during an on-site audit by the Compliance Monitor or within 15 business days of a request as part of an investigation upon complaint:

- 1.4.1 SOL Methodology.
 - 1.4.2 Documented comments provided by a recipient of the SOL Methodology on its technical review of a SOL Methodology, and the associated responses.
(Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)
 - 1.4.3 Superseded portions of its SOL Methodology that had been made within the past 12 months.
 - 1.4.4 Evidence that the SOL Methodology and any changes to the methodology that occurred within the past 12 months were issued to all required entities.
2. **Levels of Non-Compliance for Western Interconnection: (To be replaced with VSLs once developed and approved by WECC)**
- 2.1. **Level 1:** There shall be a level one non-compliance if either of the following conditions exists:
 - 2.1.1 The SOL Methodology did not include a statement indicating that Facility Ratings shall not be exceeded.
 - 2.1.2 No evidence of responses to a recipient's comments on the SOL Methodology
(Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)
 - 2.2. **Level 2:** The SOL Methodology did not include a requirement to address all of the elements in R3.1, R3.2, R3.4 through R3.7 and E1.
 - 2.3. **Level 3:** There shall be a level three non-compliance if any of the following conditions exists:
 - 2.3.1 The SOL Methodology did not include a statement indicating that Facility Ratings shall not be exceeded and the methodology did not include evaluation of system response to one of the three types of single Contingencies identified in R2.2.
 - 2.3.2 The SOL Methodology did not include a statement indicating that Facility Ratings shall not be exceeded and the methodology did not include evaluation of system response to two of the seven types of multiple Contingencies identified in E1.1.
 - 2.3.3 The System Operating Limits Methodology did not include a statement indicating that Facility Ratings shall not be exceeded and the methodology did not address two of the six required topics in R3.1, R3.2, R3.4 through R3.7.
 - 2.4. **Level 4:** The SOL Methodology was not issued to all required entities in accordance with R4.

Standard FAC-011-2(X) — System Operating Limits Methodology for the Operations Horizon

3. Violation Severity Levels:

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|--|---|---|---|
| R1 | Not applicable. | The Reliability Coordinator has a documented SOL Methodology for use in developing SOLs within its Reliability Coordinator Area, but it does not address R1.2 | The Reliability Coordinator has a documented SOL Methodology for use in developing SOLs within its Reliability Coordinator Area, but it does not address R1.3. | The Reliability Coordinator has a documented SOL Methodology for use in developing SOLs within its Reliability Coordinator Area, but it does not address R1.1. OR The Reliability Coordinator has no documented SOL Methodology for use in developing SOLs within its Reliability Coordinator Area. |
| R2 | The Reliability Coordinator's SOL Methodology requires that SOLs are set to meet BES performance following single contingencies, but does not require that SOLs are set to meet BES performance in the pre-contingency state. (R2.1) | Not applicable. | The Reliability Coordinator's SOL Methodology requires that SOLs are set to meet BES performance in the pre-contingency state, but does not require that SOLs are set to meet BES performance following single contingencies. (R2.2 – R2.4) | The Reliability Coordinator's SOL Methodology does not require that SOLs are set to meet BES performance in the pre-contingency state and does not require that SOLs are set to meet BES performance following single contingencies. (R2.1 through R2.4) |
| R3 | The Reliability Coordinator's SOL Methodology includes a description for all but one of the following: R3.1 through R3.7. | The Reliability Coordinator's SOL Methodology includes a description for all but two of the following: R3.1 through R3.7. | The Reliability Coordinator's SOL Methodology includes a description for all but three of the following: R3.1 through R3.7. | The Reliability Coordinator's SOL Methodology is missing a description of four or more of the following: R3.1 through R3.7. |
| R3.6 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R4 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to issue its SOL Methodology and/or one or more changes to that methodology to one of the required entities specified in R4.1, R4.2, and R4.3. | The Reliability Coordinator failed to issue its SOL Methodology and/or one or more changes to that methodology to two of the required entities specified in R4.1, R4.2, and R4.3. | The Reliability Coordinator failed to issue its SOL Methodology and/or one or more changes to that methodology to three of the required entities specified in R4.1, R4.2, and R4.3. | The Reliability Coordinator failed to issue its SOL Methodology and/or one or more changes to that methodology to four or more of the required entities specified in R4.1, R4.2, and R4.3 |

Standard FAC-011-2(X) — System Operating Limits Methodology for the Operations Horizon

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|---|---|---|---|--|
| | <p>OR</p> <p>For a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided to one or more of the required entities before the effectiveness of the change, but was provided to all the required entities no more than 10 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change.</p> | <p>OR</p> <p>For a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided to one or more of the required entities more than 10 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change, but less than or equal to 20 days after the effectiveness of the change.</p> | <p>OR</p> <p>For a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided to one or more of required entities more than 20 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change, but less than or equal to 30 days after the effectiveness of the change.</p> | <p>OR</p> <p>For a change in methodology, the changed methodology was provided to one or more of the required entities more than 30 calendar days after the effectiveness of the change.</p> |
| <p>R5 (Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)</p> | <p>The Reliability Coordinator received documented technical comments on its SOL Methodology and provided a complete response in a time period that was longer than 45 calendar days but less than 60 calendar days.</p> | <p>The Reliability Coordinator received documented technical comments on its SOL Methodology and provided a complete response in a time period that was 60 calendar days or longer but less than 75 calendar days.</p> | <p>The Reliability Coordinator received documented technical comments on its SOL Methodology and provided a complete response in a time period that was 75 calendar days or longer but less than 90 calendar days.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Reliability Coordinator's response to documented technical comments on its SOL Methodology indicated that a change will not be made, but did not include an explanation of why the change will not be made.</p> | <p>The Reliability Coordinator received documented technical comments on its SOL Methodology and provided a complete response in a time period that was 90 calendar days or longer.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Reliability Coordinator's response to documented technical comments on its SOL Methodology did not indicate whether a change will be made to the SOL Methodology.</p> |

Regional Differences

1. The following Interconnection-wide Regional Difference shall be applicable in the Western Interconnection:
 - 1.1. As governed by the requirements of R3.3, starting with all Facilities in service, shall require the evaluation of the following multiple Facility Contingencies when establishing SOLs:
 - 1.1.1 Simultaneous permanent phase to ground Faults on different phases of each of two adjacent transmission circuits on a multiple circuit tower, with Normal Clearing. If multiple circuit towers are used only for station entrance and exit purposes, and if they do not exceed five towers at each station, then this condition is an acceptable risk and therefore can be excluded.
 - 1.1.2 A permanent phase to ground Fault on any generator, transmission circuit, transformer, or bus section with Delayed Fault Clearing except for bus sectionalizing breakers or bus-tie breakers addressed in E1.1.7
 - 1.1.3 Simultaneous permanent loss of both poles of a direct current bipolar Facility without an alternating current Fault.
 - 1.1.4 The failure of a circuit breaker associated with a [Remedial Action Scheme](#) to operate when required following: the loss of any element without a Fault; or a permanent phase to ground Fault, with Normal Clearing, on any transmission circuit, transformer or bus section.
 - 1.1.5 A non-three phase Fault with Normal Clearing on common mode Contingency of two adjacent circuits on separate towers unless the event frequency is determined to be less than one in thirty years.
 - 1.1.6 A common mode outage of two generating units connected to the same switchyard, not otherwise addressed by FAC-011.
 - 1.1.7 The loss of multiple bus sections as a result of failure or delayed clearing of a bus tie or bus sectionalizing breaker to clear a permanent Phase to Ground Fault.
 - 1.2. SOLs shall be established such that for multiple Facility Contingencies in E1.1.1 through E1.1.5 operation within the SOL shall provide system performance consistent with the following:
 - 1.2.1 All Facilities are operating within their applicable Post-Contingency thermal, frequency and voltage limits.
 - 1.2.2 Cascading does not occur.
 - 1.2.3 Uncontrolled separation of the system does not occur.
 - 1.2.4 The system demonstrates transient, dynamic and voltage stability.
 - 1.2.5 Depending on system design and expected system impacts, the controlled interruption of electric supply to customers (load shedding), the planned removal from service of certain generators, and/or the curtailment of contracted firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power transfers may be necessary to maintain the overall security of the interconnected transmission systems.
 - 1.2.6 Interruption of firm transfer, Load or system reconfiguration is permitted through manual or automatic control or protection actions.

Deleted: Special Protection System

Standard FAC-011-2(X) — System Operating Limits Methodology for the Operations Horizon

1.2.7 To prepare for the next Contingency, system adjustments are permitted, including changes to generation, Load and the transmission system topology when determining limits.

1.3. SOLs shall be established such that for multiple Facility Contingencies in E1.1.6 through E1.1.7 operation within the SOL shall provide system performance consistent with the following with respect to impacts on other systems:

1.3.1 Cascading does not occur.

1.4. The Western Interconnection may make changes (performance category adjustments) to the Contingencies required to be studied and/or the required responses to Contingencies for specific facilities based on actual system performance and robust design. Such changes will apply in determining SOLs.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|-------------|-------------------|---|---|
| 1 | November 1, 2006 | Adopted by Board of Trustees | New |
| 2 | | Changed the effective date to October 1, 2008 Changed “Cascading Outage” to “Cascading” Replaced Levels of Non-compliance with Violation Severity Levels Corrected footnote 1 to reference FAC-011 rather than FAC-010 | Revised |
| 2 | June 24, 2008 | Adopted by Board of Trustees: FERC Order 705 | Revised |
| 2 | January 22, 2010 | Updated effective date and footer to April 29, 2009 based on the March 20, 2009 FERC Order | Update |
| 2 | February 7, 2013 | R5 and associated elements approved by NERC Board of Trustees for retirement as part of the Paragraph 81 project (Project 2013-02) pending applicable regulatory approval. | |
| 2 | November 21, 2013 | R5 and associated elements approved by FERC for retirement as part of the Paragraph 81 project (Project 2013-02) | |
| 2 | February 24, 2014 | Updated VSLs based on June 24, 2013 approval. | |
| <u>2(X)</u> | <u>TBD</u> | <u>Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees</u> | <u>Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS</u> |

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Reliability Coordination — Current Day Operations
2. **Number:** IRO-005-3.1a(X)
3. **Purpose:** The Reliability Coordinator must be continuously aware of conditions within its Reliability Coordinator Area and include this information in its reliability assessments. The Reliability Coordinator must monitor Bulk Electric System parameters that may have significant impacts upon the Reliability Coordinator Area and neighboring Reliability Coordinator Areas.
4. **Applicability**
 - 4.1. Reliability Coordinators.
 - 4.2. Balancing Authorities.
 - 4.3. Transmission Operators.
 - 4.4. Transmission Service Providers.
 - 4.5. Generator Operators.
 - 4.6. Load-Serving Entities.
 - 4.7. Purchasing-Selling Entities.
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1. Each Reliability Coordinator shall monitor its Reliability Coordinator Area parameters, including but not limited to the following:
 - R1.1. Current status of Bulk Electric System elements (transmission or generation including critical auxiliaries such as Automatic Voltage Regulators and Remedial Action Schemes) and system loading.
 - R1.2. Current pre-contingency element conditions (voltage, thermal, or stability), including any applicable mitigation plans to alleviate SOL or IROL violations, including the plan's viability and scope.
 - R1.3. Current post-contingency element conditions (voltage, thermal, or stability), including any applicable mitigation plans to alleviate SOL or IROL violations, including the plan's viability and scope.
 - R1.4. System real and reactive reserves (actual versus required).
 - R1.5. Capacity and energy adequacy conditions.
 - R1.6. Current ACE for all its Balancing Authorities.

- R1.7.** Current local or Transmission Loading Relief procedures in effect.
- R1.8.** Planned generation dispatches.
- R1.9.** Planned transmission or generation outages.
- R1.10.** Contingency events.
- R2.** Each Reliability Coordinator shall monitor its Balancing Authorities' parameters to ensure that the required amount of operating reserves is provided and available as required to meet the Control Performance Standard and Disturbance Control Standard requirements. If necessary, the Reliability Coordinator shall direct the Balancing Authorities in the Reliability Coordinator Area to arrange for assistance from neighboring Balancing Authorities. The Reliability Coordinator shall issue Energy Emergency Alerts as needed and at the request of its Balancing Authorities and Load-Serving Entities.
- R3.** Each Reliability Coordinator shall ensure its Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities are aware of Geo-Magnetic Disturbance (GMD) forecast information and assist as needed in the development of any required response plans.
- R4.** The Reliability Coordinator shall disseminate information within its Reliability Coordinator Area, as required.
- R5.** Each Reliability Coordinator shall monitor system frequency and its Balancing Authorities' performance and direct any necessary rebalancing to return to CPS and DCS compliance. The Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities shall utilize all resources, including firm load shedding, as directed by its Reliability Coordinator to relieve the emergent condition.
- R6.** The Reliability Coordinator shall coordinate with Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, and Generator Operators as needed to develop and implement action plans to mitigate potential or actual SOL, CPS, or DCS violations. The Reliability Coordinator shall coordinate pending generation and transmission maintenance outages with Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, and Generator Operators as needed in both the real time and next-day reliability analysis timeframes.
- R7.** As necessary, the Reliability Coordinator shall assist the Balancing Authorities in its Reliability Coordinator Area in arranging for assistance from neighboring Reliability Coordinator Areas or Balancing Authorities.
- R8.** The Reliability Coordinator shall identify sources of large Area Control Errors that may be contributing to Frequency Error, Time Error, or Inadvertent Interchange and shall discuss corrective actions with the appropriate Balancing Authority. The Reliability Coordinator shall direct its Balancing Authority to comply with CPS and DCS.
- R9.** Whenever a Remedial Action Scheme that may have an inter-Balancing Authority, or inter-Transmission Operator impact (e.g., could potentially affect transmission flows resulting in a SOL or IROL violation) is armed, the Reliability Coordinators shall be aware of the impact of the operation of that Remedial Action Scheme on inter-area flows. The Transmission Operator shall immediately inform the Reliability Coordinator of the status of the Remedial Action Scheme including any degradation or potential failure to operate as expected.
- R10.** In instances where there is a difference in derived limits, the Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, Generator Operators, Transmission Service Providers, Load-Serving Entities, and Purchasing-Selling Entities shall always operate the Bulk Electric System to the most limiting parameter.
- R11.** The Transmission Service Provider shall respect SOLs and IROLs in accordance with filed tariffs and regional Total Transfer Calculation and Available Transfer Calculation processes.

- R12.** Each Reliability Coordinator who foresees a transmission problem (such as an SOL or IROL violation, loss of reactive reserves, etc.) within its Reliability Coordinator Area shall issue an alert to all impacted Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities in its Reliability Coordinator Area without delay. The receiving Reliability Coordinator shall disseminate this information to its impacted Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities. The Reliability Coordinator shall notify all impacted Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, when the transmission problem has been mitigated.

C. Measures

- M1.** The Reliability Coordinator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, Energy Management System description documents, computer printouts, a prepared report specifically detailing compliance to each of the bullets in Requirement 1, EMS availability, SCADA data collection system communications performance or equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that it monitors the Reliability Coordinator Area parameters specified in Requirements 1.1 through 1.9.
- M2.** If one of its Balancing Authorities has insufficient operating reserves, the Reliability Coordinator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to computer printouts, operating logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, or equivalent evidence that will be used to determine if the Reliability Coordinator directed and, if needed, assisted the Balancing Authorities in the Reliability Coordinator Area to arrange for assistance from neighboring Balancing Authorities. (Requirement 2 and Requirement 7)
- M3.** The Reliability Coordinator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications or equivalent evidence that will be used to determine if it informed Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities of Geo-Magnetic Disturbance (GMD) forecast information and provided assistance as needed in the development of any required response plans. (Requirement 3)
- M4.** The Reliability Coordinator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, Hot Line recordings, electronic communications or equivalent evidence that will be used to determine if it disseminated information within its Reliability Coordinator Area in accordance with Requirement 4.
- M5.** The Reliability Coordinator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, computer printouts, operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications or equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that it monitored system frequency and Balancing Authority performance and directed any necessary rebalancing, as specified in Requirement 5 Part 1.
- M6.** The Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications or equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that it utilized all resources, including firm load shedding, as directed by its Reliability Coordinator, to relieve an emergent condition. (Requirement 5 Part 2)
- M7.** The Reliability Coordinator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications, operator logs or equivalent evidence that will be used to determine if it coordinated with Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, and Generator Operators as needed to develop and implement action plans to mitigate potential or actual SOL, CPS, or DCS violations including the coordination of pending generation and transmission maintenance

outages with Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities and Generator Operators.
(Requirement 6 Part 1)

- M8.** If a large Area Control Error has occurred, the Reliability Coordinator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, Hot Line recordings, electronic communications or equivalent evidence that will be used to determine if it identified sources of the Area Control Errors, and initiated corrective actions with the appropriate Balancing Authority if the problem was within the Reliability Coordinator's Area (Requirement 8 Part 1)
- M9.** If a Remedial Action Scheme is armed and that system could have had an inter-area impact, the Reliability Coordinator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, agreements with their Transmission Operators, procedural documents, operator logs, computer analysis, training modules, training records or equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that it was aware of the impact of that Remedial Action Scheme on inter-area flows. (Requirement 9)
- M10.** If there is an instance where there is a disagreement on a derived limit, the Transmission Operator, Balancing Authority, Generator Operator, Load-serving Entity, Purchasing-selling Entity and Transmission Service Provider involved in the disagreement shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, operator logs, voice recordings, electronic communications or equivalent evidence that will be used to determine if it operated to the most limiting parameter. (Requirement 10)
- M11.** The Transmission Service Providers shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, procedural documents, operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications or equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that it respected the SOLs or IROLs in accordance with filed tariffs and regional Total Transfer Calculation and Available Transfer Calculation processes.(Requirement 11)
- M12.** The Reliability Coordinator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications or equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that it issued alerts when it foresaw a transmission problem (such as an SOL or IROL violation, loss of reactive reserves, etc.) within its Reliability Coordinator Area, to all impacted Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities in its Reliability Coordinator Area as specified in Requirement 12 Part 1.
- M13.** The Reliability Coordinator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications or equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that upon receiving information such as an SOL or IROL violation, loss of reactive reserves, etc. it disseminated the information to its impacted Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities as specified in Requirement 12 Part 2.
- M14.** The Reliability Coordinator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications or equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that it notified all impacted Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities and Reliability Coordinators when a transmission problem has been mitigated. (Requirement 12 Part 3)

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Regional Reliability Organizations shall be responsible for compliance monitoring.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring and Reset Time Frame

One or more of the following methods will be used to assess compliance:

- Self-certification (Conducted annually with submission according to schedule.)
- Spot Check Audits (Conducted anytime with up to 30 days notice given to prepare.)
- Periodic Audit (Conducted once every three years according to schedule.)
- Triggered Investigations (Notification of an investigation must be made within 60 days of an event or complaint of noncompliance. The entity will have up to 30 days to prepare for the investigation. An entity may request an extension of the preparation period and the extension will be considered by the Compliance Monitor on a case-by-case basis.)

The Performance-Reset Period shall be 12 months from the last finding of non-compliance.

1.3. Data Retention

For Measures 1 and 9, each Reliability Coordinator shall have its current in-force documents as evidence.

For Measures 2–8 and Measures 12 through 13, the Reliability Coordinator shall keep 90 days of historical data (evidence).

For Measure 6, the Transmission Operator and Balancing Authority shall keep 90 days of historical data (evidence).

For Measure 10, the Transmission Operator, Balancing Authority, and Transmission Service Provider shall keep 90 days of historical data (evidence).

For Measure 11, the Transmission Service Provider shall keep 90 days of historical data (evidence).

If an entity is found non-compliant the entity shall keep information related to the noncompliance until found compliant or for two years plus the current year, whichever is longer.

Evidence used as part of a triggered investigation shall be retained by the entity being investigated for one year from the date that the investigation is closed, as determined by the Compliance Monitor,

The Compliance Monitor shall keep the last periodic audit report and all requested and submitted subsequent compliance records.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

Standard IRO-005-3.1a(X) — Reliability Coordination — Current Day Operations

2. Violation Severity Levels:

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|---|---|---|---|
| R1 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor one (1) of the elements listed in IRO-005-3.1a(X) R1.1 through R1.10. | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor two (2) of the elements listed in IRO-005-3.1a(X) R1.1 through R1.10. | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor three (3) of the elements listed in IRO-005-3.1a(X) R1.1 through R1.10. | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor more than three (3) of the elements listed in IRO-005-3.1a(X) R1.1 through R1.10. |
| R1.1 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor the current status of Bulk Electric System elements (transmission or generation including critical auxiliaries such as Automatic Voltage Regulators and Remedial Action Schemes) and system loading. | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.2 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor current pre-contingency element conditions (voltage, thermal, or stability), including any applicable mitigation plans to alleviate SOL or IROL violations, including the plan’s viability and scope. | N/A | N/A | N/A |

Standard IRO-005-3.1a(X) — Reliability Coordination — Current Day Operations

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|--|----------|------|--------|
| R1.3 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor current post-contingency element conditions (voltage, thermal, or stability), including any applicable mitigation plans to alleviate SOL or IROL violations, including the plan’s viability and scope. | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.4 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor system real and reactive reserves (actual versus required). | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.5 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor capacity and energy adequacy conditions. | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.6 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor current ACE for all its Balancing Authorities. | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.7 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor current local or Transmission Loading Relief procedures in effect. | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.8 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor planned generation dispatches. | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.9 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor planned transmission or generation outages. | N/A | N/A | N/A |

Standard IRO-005-3.1a(X) — Reliability Coordination — Current Day Operations

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|---|--|---|---|
| R1.10 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor contingency events. | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R2 | N/A | The Reliability Coordinator failed to direct the Balancing Authorities in the Reliability Coordinator Area to arrange for assistance from neighboring Balancing Authorities. | The Reliability Coordinator failed to issue Energy Emergency Alerts as needed and at the request of its Balancing Authorities and Load-Serving Entities. | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor its Balancing Authorities' parameters to ensure that the required amount of operating reserves was provided and available as required to meet the Control Performance Standard and Disturbance Control Standard requirements. |
| R3 | N/A | N/A | The Reliability Coordinator ensured its Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities were aware of Geo-Magnetic Disturbance (GMD) forecast information, but failed to assist, when needed, in the development of any required response plans. | The Reliability Coordinator failed to ensure its Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities were aware of Geo-Magnetic Disturbance (GMD) forecast information. |
| R4 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Reliability Coordinator failed to disseminate information within its Reliability Coordinator Area, when required. |

Standard IRO-005-3.1a(X) — Reliability Coordination — Current Day Operations

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|----------|---|---|
| R5 | N/A | N/A | The Reliability Coordinator monitored system frequency and its Balancing Authorities' performance but failed to direct any necessary rebalancing to return to CPS and DCS compliance. | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor system frequency and its Balancing Authorities' performance and direct any necessary rebalancing to return to CPS and DCS compliance or the responsible entity failed to utilize all resources, including firm load shedding, as directed by its Reliability Coordinator to relieve the emergent condition. |

Standard IRO-005-3.1a(X) — Reliability Coordination — Current Day Operations

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|--|---|--|
| R6 | N/A | <p>The Reliability Coordinator coordinated with Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, and Generator Operators, as needed, to develop action plans to mitigate potential or actual SOL, CPS, or DCS violations but failed to implement said plans</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Reliability Coordinator failed to coordinate pending generation and transmission maintenance outages with Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, and Generator Operators as needed in either the real-time reliability analysis time frame or the next-day reliability analysis</p> | <p>The Reliability Coordinator failed to coordinate with Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, and Generator Operators as needed to develop and implement action plans to mitigate potential or actual SOL, CPS, or DCS violations</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Reliability Coordinator failed to coordinate pending generation and transmission maintenance outages with Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, and Generator Operators as needed in both the real-time and next-day reliability analysis timeframes.</p> | <p>The Reliability Coordinator failed to coordinate with Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, and Generator Operators as needed to develop and implement action plans to mitigate potential or actual SOL, CPS, or DCS violations and the Reliability Coordinator failed to coordinate pending generation and transmission maintenance outages with Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, and Generator Operators as needed in both the real-time and next-day reliability analysis timeframes.</p> |
| R7 | N/A | N/A | N/A | <p>The Reliability Coordinator failed to assist the Balancing Authorities in its Reliability Coordinator Area in arranging for assistance from neighboring Reliability Coordinator Areas or Balancing Authorities, when necessary.</p> |

Standard IRO-005-3.1a(X) — Reliability Coordination — Current Day Operations

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|--|--|---|
| R8 | N/A | The Reliability Coordinator identified sources of large Area Control Errors that were contributing to Frequency Error, Time Error, or Inadvertent Interchange and discussed corrective actions with the appropriate Balancing Authority but failed to direct the Balancing Authority to comply with CPS and DCS. | The Reliability Coordinator identified sources of large Area Control Errors that were contributing to Frequency Error, Time Error, or Inadvertent Interchange but failed to discuss corrective actions with the appropriate Balancing Authority. | The Reliability Coordinator failed to identify sources of large Area Control Errors that were contributing to Frequency Error, Time Error, or Inadvertent Interchange. |
| R9 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Reliability Coordinator failed to be aware of the impact on inter-area flows of an inter-Balancing Authority or inter-Transmission Operator, following the operation of a Remedial Action Scheme that is armed (e.g., could potentially affect transmission flows resulting in a SOL or IROL violation), or the Transmission Operator failed to immediately inform the Reliability Coordinator of the status of the Remedial Action Scheme including any degradation or potential failure to operate as expected. |

Standard IRO-005-3.1a(X) — Reliability Coordination — Current Day Operations

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|--|------|---|
| R10 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The responsible entity failed to operate the Bulk Electric System to the most limiting parameter in instances where there was a difference in derived limits. |
| R11 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Transmission Service Provider failed to respect SOLs or IROLs in accordance with filed tariffs and regional Total Transfer Calculation and Available Transfer Calculation processes. |
| R12 | N/A | The Reliability Coordinator failed to notify all impacted Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, when the transmission problem had been mitigated. | N/A | The Reliability Coordinator who foresaw a transmission problem (such as an SOL or IROL violation, loss of reactive reserves, etc.) within its Reliability Coordinator Area failed to issue an alert to all impacted Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities in its Reliability Coordinator Area, or the receiving Reliability Coordinator failed to disseminate this information to its impacted Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities. |

E. Regional Differences

None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|--------------------|---|-----------------|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0 | August 8, 2005 | Removed “Proposed” from Effective Date | Errata |
| 1 | | Retired R2, R3, R5; modified R9, R13 and R14; retired R16 and R17 Retired M2 and M3; modified M9 and M12; retired M13 Made conforming changes to data retention Replaced Levels of Non-compliance with the Feb 28, BOT approved Violation Severity Levels (VSLs) Retired VSLs associated with R2, R3, R5, R16 and R17; Modified VSLs associated with R9 and R13, and R14 | Revised |
| 2 | November 1, 2006 | Approved by the Board of Trustees | |
| 2 | January 1, 2007 | Effective Date | |
| 2a | November 5, 2009 | Approved by the Board of Trustees | |
| 3 | October 17, 2008 | Approved by the Board of Trustees | |
| 3 | March 17, 2011 | Order issued by FERC approving IRO-005-3 (approval effective 5/23/11) | |
| 3a | April 21, 2011 | Added FERC approved Interpretation | |
| 3.1a | March 8, 2012 | Errata adopted by Standards Committee; (removed outdated references in Measures M10 and M11 to ‘Part 2’ of Requirements R10 and R11) | Errata |
| 3.1a | September 13, 2012 | FERC approved | Errata |

Standard IRO-005-3.1a(X) — Reliability Coordination — Current Day Operations

| | | | |
|---------|-------------------|---|--|
| 3.1a | February 28, 2014 | Updated VSLs based on June 24, 2013 approval. | |
| 3.1a(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

Appendix 1

| Requirement Number and Text of Requirement |
|--|
| <p>TOP-005-1 Requirement R3</p> <p>Upon request, each Balancing Authority and Transmission Operator shall provide to other Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators with immediate responsibility for operational reliability, the operating data that are necessary to allow these Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators to perform operational reliability assessments and to coordinate reliable operations. Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators shall provide the types of data as listed in Attachment 1-TOP-005-0(X) “Electric System Reliability Data,” unless otherwise agreed to by the Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators with immediate responsibility for operational reliability.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>The above-referenced Attachment 1 — TOP-005-0 specifies the following data as item 2.6: New or <u>degraded</u> Remedial Action Schemes. [Underline added for emphasis.]</i></p> <p>IRO-005-1 Requirement R12¹</p> <p>R12. Whenever a Remedial Action Scheme that may have an inter-Balancing Authority, or inter-Transmission Operator impact (e.g., could potentially affect transmission flows resulting in a SOL or IROL violation) is armed, the Reliability Coordinators shall be aware of the impact of the operation of that Remedial Action Scheme on inter-area flows. The Transmission Operator shall immediately inform the Reliability Coordinator of the status of the Remedial Action Scheme including any <u>degradation</u> or potential failure to operate as expected. [Underline added for emphasis.]</p> <p>PRC-012-0(X) Requirements R1 and R1.3</p> <p>R1. Each Regional Reliability Organization with a Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Providers that uses or is planning to use a RAS shall have a documented Regional Reliability Organization RAS review procedure to ensure that RAS comply with Regional criteria and NERC Reliability Standards. The Regional RAS review procedure shall include:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">R1.3. Requirements to demonstrate that the RAS shall be designed so that a single RAS component failure, when the RAS was intended to operate, does not prevent the interconnected transmission system from meeting the performance requirements defined in Reliability Standards TPL-001-0, TPL-002-0, and TPL-003-0.</p> |
| Background Information for Interpretation |
| <p>The TOP-005-1 standard focuses on two key obligations. The first key obligation (Requirement R1) is a “responsibility mandate.” Requirement R1 establishes who is responsible for the obligation to provide operating data “required” by a Reliability Coordinator within the framework of the Reliability Coordinator requirements defined in the IRO standards. The second key obligation (Requirement R3) is a “performance mandate.” Requirement R3 defines the obligation to provide data “requested” by other reliability entities that is needed “to perform assessments and to coordinate operations.”</p> <p>The Attachment to TOP-005-1 is provided as a guideline of what “can be shared.” The Attachment is not an obligation of “what must be shared.” Enforceable NERC Requirements must be explicitly contained within a given Standard’s approved requirements. In this case, the standard only requires data “upon request.” If a Reliability Coordinator or other reliability entity were to request data such as</p> |

¹ In the current version of the Standard (IRO-005-3a)(X), this requirement is R9.

listed in the Attachment, then the entity being asked would be mandated by Requirements R1 and R3 to provide that data (including item 2.6, whether it is or is not in some undefined “degraded” state).

IRO-002-1 requires the Reliability Coordinator to have processes in place to support its reliability obligations (Requirement R2). Requirement R4 mandates that the Reliability Coordinator have communications processes in place to meet its reliability obligations, and Requirement R5 et al mandate the Reliability Coordinator to have the tools to carry out these reliability obligations.

IRO-003-2 (Requirements R1 and R2) requires the Reliability Coordinator to monitor the state of its system.

IRO-004-1 requires that the Reliability Coordinator carry out studies to identify Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (Requirement R1) and to be aware of system conditions via monitoring tools and information exchange.

IRO-005-1 mandates that each Reliability Coordinator monitor predefined base conditions (Requirement R1), collect additional data when operating limits are or may be exceeded (Requirement R3), and identify actual or potential threats (Requirement R5). The basis for that request is left to each Reliability Coordinator. The Purpose statement of IRO-005-1 focuses on the Reliability Coordinator’s obligation to be aware of conditions that may have a “significant” impact upon its area and to communicate that information to others (Requirements R7 and R9). Please note: it is from this communication that Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities would either obtain or would know to ask for RAS information from another Transmission Operator.

The IRO-005-1 (Requirement R12) standard implies that degraded is a condition that will result in a failure to operate as designed. If the loss of a communication channel will result in the failure of a RAS to operate as designed then the Transmission Operator would be mandated to report that information. On the other hand, if the loss of a communication channel will not result in the failure of the RAS to operate as designed, then such a condition can be, but is not mandated to be, reported.

Conclusion

The TOP-005-1 standard does not provide, nor does it require, a definition for the term “degraded.”

The IRO-005-1 (R12) standard implies that degraded is a condition that will result in a failure of a RAS to operate as designed. If the loss of a communication channel will result in the failure of a RAS to operate as designed, then the Transmission Operator would be mandated to report that information. On the other hand, if the loss of a communication channel will not result in the failure of the RAS to operate as designed, then such a condition can be, but is not mandated to be, reported.

To request a formal definition of the term degraded, the Reliability Standards Development Procedure requires the submittal of a Standards Authorization Request.

Standard IRO-005-3.1a(X) — Reliability Coordination — Current Day Operations

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Reliability Coordination — Current Day Operations
2. **Number:** IRO-005-3.1a(X)
3. **Purpose:** The Reliability Coordinator must be continuously aware of conditions within its Reliability Coordinator Area and include this information in its reliability assessments. The Reliability Coordinator must monitor Bulk Electric System parameters that may have significant impacts upon the Reliability Coordinator Area and neighboring Reliability Coordinator Areas.
4. **Applicability**
 - 4.1. Reliability Coordinators.
 - 4.2. Balancing Authorities.
 - 4.3. Transmission Operators.
 - 4.4. Transmission Service Providers.
 - 4.5. Generator Operators.
 - 4.6. Load-Serving Entities.
 - 4.7. Purchasing-Selling Entities.
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1. Each Reliability Coordinator shall monitor its Reliability Coordinator Area parameters, including but not limited to the following:
 - R1.1. Current status of Bulk Electric System elements (transmission or generation including critical auxiliaries such as Automatic Voltage Regulators and Remedial Action Schemes) and system loading.
 - R1.2. Current pre-contingency element conditions (voltage, thermal, or stability), including any applicable mitigation plans to alleviate SOL or IROL violations, including the plan's viability and scope.
 - R1.3. Current post-contingency element conditions (voltage, thermal, or stability), including any applicable mitigation plans to alleviate SOL or IROL violations, including the plan's viability and scope.
 - R1.4. System real and reactive reserves (actual versus required).
 - R1.5. Capacity and energy adequacy conditions.
 - R1.6. Current ACE for all its Balancing Authorities.

Deleted: In those jurisdictions where no regulatory approval is required, the standard shall become effective on the latter of either April 1, 2009 or the first day of the first calendar quarter, three months after BOT adoption.¶
In those jurisdictions where regulatory approval is required, the standard shall become effective on the latter of either April 1, 2009 or the first day of the first calendar quarter, three months after applicable regulatory approval.¶

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Standard IRO-005-3.1a(X) — Reliability Coordination — Current Day Operations

- R1.7.** Current local or Transmission Loading Relief procedures in effect.
- R1.8.** Planned generation dispatches.
- R1.9.** Planned transmission or generation outages.
- R1.10.** Contingency events.
- R2.** Each Reliability Coordinator shall monitor its Balancing Authorities' parameters to ensure that the required amount of operating reserves is provided and available as required to meet the Control Performance Standard and Disturbance Control Standard requirements. If necessary, the Reliability Coordinator shall direct the Balancing Authorities in the Reliability Coordinator Area to arrange for assistance from neighboring Balancing Authorities. The Reliability Coordinator shall issue Energy Emergency Alerts as needed and at the request of its Balancing Authorities and Load-Serving Entities.
- R3.** Each Reliability Coordinator shall ensure its Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities are aware of Geo-Magnetic Disturbance (GMD) forecast information and assist as needed in the development of any required response plans.
- R4.** The Reliability Coordinator shall disseminate information within its Reliability Coordinator Area, as required.
- R5.** Each Reliability Coordinator shall monitor system frequency and its Balancing Authorities' performance and direct any necessary rebalancing to return to CPS and DCS compliance. The Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities shall utilize all resources, including firm load shedding, as directed by its Reliability Coordinator to relieve the emergent condition.
- R6.** The Reliability Coordinator shall coordinate with Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, and Generator Operators as needed to develop and implement action plans to mitigate potential or actual SOL, CPS, or DCS violations. The Reliability Coordinator shall coordinate pending generation and transmission maintenance outages with Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, and Generator Operators as needed in both the real time and next-day reliability analysis timeframes.
- R7.** As necessary, the Reliability Coordinator shall assist the Balancing Authorities in its Reliability Coordinator Area in arranging for assistance from neighboring Reliability Coordinator Areas or Balancing Authorities.
- R8.** The Reliability Coordinator shall identify sources of large Area Control Errors that may be contributing to Frequency Error, Time Error, or Inadvertent Interchange and shall discuss corrective actions with the appropriate Balancing Authority. The Reliability Coordinator shall direct its Balancing Authority to comply with CPS and DCS.
- R9.** Whenever a Remedial Action Scheme that may have an inter-Balancing Authority, or inter-Transmission Operator impact (e.g., could potentially affect transmission flows resulting in a SOL or IROL violation) is armed, the Reliability Coordinators shall be aware of the impact of the operation of that Remedial Action Scheme on inter-area flows. The Transmission Operator shall immediately inform the Reliability Coordinator of the status of the Remedial Action Scheme including any degradation or potential failure to operate as expected.
- R10.** In instances where there is a difference in derived limits, the Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, Generator Operators, Transmission Service Providers, Load-Serving Entities, and Purchasing-Selling Entities shall always operate the Bulk Electric System to the most limiting parameter.
- R11.** The Transmission Service Provider shall respect SOLs and IROLs in accordance with filed tariffs and regional Total Transfer Calculation and Available Transfer Calculation processes.

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Standard IRO-005-3.1a(X) — Reliability Coordination — Current Day Operations

R12. Each Reliability Coordinator who foresees a transmission problem (such as an SOL or IROL violation, loss of reactive reserves, etc.) within its Reliability Coordinator Area shall issue an alert to all impacted Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities in its Reliability Coordinator Area without delay. The receiving Reliability Coordinator shall disseminate this information to its impacted Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities. The Reliability Coordinator shall notify all impacted Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, when the transmission problem has been mitigated.

C. Measures

- M1.** The Reliability Coordinator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, Energy Management System description documents, computer printouts, a prepared report specifically detailing compliance to each of the bullets in Requirement 1, EMS availability, SCADA data collection system communications performance or equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that it monitors the Reliability Coordinator Area parameters specified in Requirements 1.1 through 1.9.
- M2.** If one of its Balancing Authorities has insufficient operating reserves, the Reliability Coordinator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to computer printouts, operating logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, or equivalent evidence that will be used to determine if the Reliability Coordinator directed and, if needed, assisted the Balancing Authorities in the Reliability Coordinator Area to arrange for assistance from neighboring Balancing Authorities. (Requirement 2 and Requirement 7)
- M3.** The Reliability Coordinator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications or equivalent evidence that will be used to determine if it informed Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities of Geo-Magnetic Disturbance (GMD) forecast information and provided assistance as needed in the development of any required response plans. (Requirement 3)
- M4.** The Reliability Coordinator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, Hot Line recordings, electronic communications or equivalent evidence that will be used to determine if it disseminated information within its Reliability Coordinator Area in accordance with Requirement 4.
- M5.** The Reliability Coordinator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, computer printouts, operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications or equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that it monitored system frequency and Balancing Authority performance and directed any necessary rebalancing, as specified in Requirement 5 Part 1.
- M6.** The Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications or equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that it utilized all resources, including firm load shedding, as directed by its Reliability Coordinator, to relieve an emergent condition. (Requirement 5 Part 2)
- M7.** The Reliability Coordinator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications, operator logs or equivalent evidence that will be used to determine if it coordinated with Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, and Generator Operators as needed to develop and implement action plans to mitigate potential or actual SOL, CPS, or DCS violations including the coordination of pending generation and transmission maintenance

Standard IRO-005-3.1a(X) — Reliability Coordination — Current Day Operations

outages with Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities and Generator Operators. (Requirement 6 Part 1)

- M8.** If a large Area Control Error has occurred, the Reliability Coordinator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, Hot Line recordings, electronic communications or equivalent evidence that will be used to determine if it identified sources of the Area Control Errors, and initiated corrective actions with the appropriate Balancing Authority if the problem was within the Reliability Coordinator's Area (Requirement 8 Part 1)
- M9.** If a Remedial Action Scheme is armed and that system could have had an inter-area impact, the Reliability Coordinator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, agreements with their Transmission Operators, procedural documents, operator logs, computer analysis, training modules, training records or equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that it was aware of the impact of that Remedial Action Scheme on inter-area flows. (Requirement 9)
- M10.** If there is an instance where there is a disagreement on a derived limit, the Transmission Operator, Balancing Authority, Generator Operator, Load-serving Entity, Purchasing-selling Entity and Transmission Service Provider involved in the disagreement shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, operator logs, voice recordings, electronic communications or equivalent evidence that will be used to determine if it operated to the most limiting parameter. (Requirement 10)
- M11.** The Transmission Service Providers shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, procedural documents, operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications or equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that it respected the SOLs or IROLs in accordance with filed tariffs and regional Total Transfer Calculation and Available Transfer Calculation processes. (Requirement 11)
- M12.** The Reliability Coordinator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications or equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that it issued alerts when it foresaw a transmission problem (such as an SOL or IROL violation, loss of reactive reserves, etc.) within its Reliability Coordinator Area, to all impacted Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities in its Reliability Coordinator Area as specified in Requirement 12 Part 1.
- M13.** The Reliability Coordinator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications or equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that upon receiving information such as an SOL or IROL violation, loss of reactive reserves, etc. it disseminated the information to its impacted Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities as specified in Requirement 12 Part 2.
- M14.** The Reliability Coordinator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include, but is not limited to, operator logs, voice recordings or transcripts of voice recordings, electronic communications or equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that it notified all impacted Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities and Reliability Coordinators when a transmission problem has been mitigated. (Requirement 12 Part 3)

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D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Regional Reliability Organizations shall be responsible for compliance monitoring.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring and Reset Time Frame

One or more of the following methods will be used to assess compliance:

- Self-certification (Conducted annually with submission according to schedule.)
- Spot Check Audits (Conducted anytime with up to 30 days notice given to prepare.)
- Periodic Audit (Conducted once every three years according to schedule.)
- Triggered Investigations (Notification of an investigation must be made within 60 days of an event or complaint of noncompliance. The entity will have up to 30 days to prepare for the investigation. An entity may request an extension of the preparation period and the extension will be considered by the Compliance Monitor on a case-by-case basis.)

The Performance-Reset Period shall be 12 months from the last finding of non-compliance.

1.3. Data Retention

For Measures 1 and 9, each Reliability Coordinator shall have its current in-force documents as evidence.

For Measures 2–8 and Measures 12 through 13, the Reliability Coordinator shall keep 90 days of historical data (evidence).

For Measure 6, the Transmission Operator and Balancing Authority shall keep 90 days of historical data (evidence).

For Measure 10, the Transmission Operator, Balancing Authority, and Transmission Service Provider shall keep 90 days of historical data (evidence).

For Measure 11, the Transmission Service Provider shall keep 90 days of historical data (evidence).

If an entity is found non-compliant the entity shall keep information related to the noncompliance until found compliant or for two years plus the current year, whichever is longer.

Evidence used as part of a triggered investigation shall be retained by the entity being investigated for one year from the date that the investigation is closed, as determined by the Compliance Monitor,

The Compliance Monitor shall keep the last periodic audit report and all requested and submitted subsequent compliance records.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

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2. Violation Severity Levels:

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|---|---|---|---|
| R1 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor one (1) of the elements listed in IRO-005-3.1a(X) R1.1 through R1.10. | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor two (2) of the elements listed in IRO-005-3.1a(X) R1.1 through R1.10. | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor three (3) of the elements listed in IRO-005-3.1a(X) R1.1 through R1.10. | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor more than three (3) of the elements listed in IRO-005-3.1a(X) R1.1 through R1.10. |
| R1.1 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor the current status of Bulk Electric System elements (transmission or generation including critical auxiliaries such as Automatic Voltage Regulators and Remedial Action Schemes) and system loading. | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.2 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor current pre-contingency element conditions (voltage, thermal, or stability), including any applicable mitigation plans to alleviate SOL or IROL violations, including the plan's viability and scope. | N/A | N/A | N/A |

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Standard IRO-005-3.1a(X) — Reliability Coordination — Current Day Operations

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|--|----------|------|--------|
| R1.3 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor current post-contingency element conditions (voltage, thermal, or stability), including any applicable mitigation plans to alleviate SOL or IROL violations, including the plan's viability and scope. | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.4 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor system real and reactive reserves (actual versus required). | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.5 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor capacity and energy adequacy conditions. | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.6 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor current ACE for all its Balancing Authorities. | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.7 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor current local or Transmission Loading Relief procedures in effect. | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.8 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor planned generation dispatches. | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R1.9 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor planned transmission or generation outages. | N/A | N/A | N/A |

Standard IRO-005-3.1a(X) — Reliability Coordination — Current Day Operations

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|---|--|---|---|
| R1.10 | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor contingency events. | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| R2 | N/A | The Reliability Coordinator failed to direct the Balancing Authorities in the Reliability Coordinator Area to arrange for assistance from neighboring Balancing Authorities. | The Reliability Coordinator failed to issue Energy Emergency Alerts as needed and at the request of its Balancing Authorities and Load-Serving Entities. | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor its Balancing Authorities' parameters to ensure that the required amount of operating reserves was provided and available as required to meet the Control Performance Standard and Disturbance Control Standard requirements. |
| R3 | N/A | N/A | The Reliability Coordinator ensured its Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities were aware of Geo-Magnetic Disturbance (GMD) forecast information, but failed to assist, when needed, in the development of any required response plans. | The Reliability Coordinator failed to ensure its Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities were aware of Geo-Magnetic Disturbance (GMD) forecast information. |
| R4 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Reliability Coordinator failed to disseminate information within its Reliability Coordinator Area, when required. |

Standard IRO-005-3.1a(X) — Reliability Coordination — Current Day Operations

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|----------|---|---|
| R5 | N/A | N/A | The Reliability Coordinator monitored system frequency and its Balancing Authorities' performance but failed to direct any necessary rebalancing to return to CPS and DCS compliance. | The Reliability Coordinator failed to monitor system frequency and its Balancing Authorities' performance and direct any necessary rebalancing to return to CPS and DCS compliance or the responsible entity failed to utilize all resources, including firm load shedding, as directed by its Reliability Coordinator to relieve the emergent condition. |

Standard IRO-005-3.1a(X) — Reliability Coordination — Current Day Operations

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|---|--|---|
| R6 | N/A | <p>The Reliability Coordinator coordinated with Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, and Generator Operators, as needed, to develop action plans to mitigate potential or actual SOL, CPS, or DCS violations but failed to implement said plans</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Reliability Coordinator failed to coordinate pending generation and transmission maintenance outages with Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, and Generator Operators as needed in either the real- time reliability analysis time frame or the next-day reliability analysis</p> | <p>The Reliability Coordinator failed to coordinate with Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, and Generator Operators as needed to develop and implement action plans to mitigate potential or actual SOL, CPS, or DCS violations</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Reliability Coordinator failed to coordinate pending generation and transmission maintenance outages with Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, and Generator Operators as needed in both the real- time and next-day reliability analysis timeframes.</p> | <p>The Reliability Coordinator failed to coordinate with Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, and Generator Operators as needed to develop and implement action plans to mitigate potential or actual SOL, CPS, or DCS violations and the Reliability Coordinator failed to coordinate pending generation and transmission maintenance outages with Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, and Generator Operators as needed in both the real- time and next-day reliability analysis timeframes.</p> |
| R7 | N/A | N/A | N/A | <p>The Reliability Coordinator failed to assist the Balancing Authorities in its Reliability Coordinator Area in arranging for assistance from neighboring Reliability Coordinator Areas or Balancing Authorities, when necessary.</p> |

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| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|--|--|---|
| R8 | N/A | The Reliability Coordinator identified sources of large Area Control Errors that were contributing to Frequency Error, Time Error, or Inadvertent Interchange and discussed corrective actions with the appropriate Balancing Authority but failed to direct the Balancing Authority to comply with CPS and DCS. | The Reliability Coordinator identified sources of large Area Control Errors that were contributing to Frequency Error, Time Error, or Inadvertent Interchange but failed to discuss corrective actions with the appropriate Balancing Authority. | The Reliability Coordinator failed to identify sources of large Area Control Errors that were contributing to Frequency Error, Time Error, or Inadvertent Interchange. |
| R9 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Reliability Coordinator failed to be aware of the impact on inter-area flows of an inter-Balancing Authority or inter-Transmission Operator, following the operation of a <u>Remedial Action Scheme</u> that is armed (e.g., could potentially affect transmission flows resulting in a SOL or IROL violation), or the Transmission Operator failed to immediately inform the Reliability Coordinator of the status of the <u>Remedial Action Scheme</u> including any degradation or potential failure to operate as expected. |

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Standard IRO-005-3.1a(X) — Reliability Coordination — Current Day Operations

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|--|------|---|
| R10 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The responsible entity failed to operate the Bulk Electric System to the most limiting parameter in instances where there was a difference in derived limits. |
| R11 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Transmission Service Provider failed to respect SOLs or IROLs in accordance with filed tariffs and regional Total Transfer Calculation and Available Transfer Calculation processes. |
| R12 | N/A | The Reliability Coordinator failed to notify all impacted Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities, when the transmission problem had been mitigated. | N/A | The Reliability Coordinator who foresaw a transmission problem (such as an SOL or IROL violation, loss of reactive reserves, etc.) within its Reliability Coordinator Area failed to issue an alert to all impacted Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities in its Reliability Coordinator Area, or the receiving Reliability Coordinator failed to disseminate this information to its impacted Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities. |

E. Regional Differences

None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|--------------------|---|-----------------|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0 | August 8, 2005 | Removed “Proposed” from Effective Date | Errata |
| 1 | | Retired R2, R3, R5; modified R9, R13 and R14; retired R16 and R17 Retired M2 and M3; modified M9 and M12; retired M13 Made conforming changes to data retention Replaced Levels of Non-compliance with the Feb 28, BOT approved Violation Severity Levels (VSLs) Retired VSLs associated with R2, R3, R5, R16 and R17; Modified VSLs associated with R9 and R13, and R14 | Revised |
| 2 | November 1, 2006 | Approved by the Board of Trustees | |
| 2 | January 1, 2007 | Effective Date | |
| 2a | November 5, 2009 | Approved by the Board of Trustees | |
| 3 | October 17, 2008 | Approved by the Board of Trustees | |
| 3 | March 17, 2011 | Order issued by FERC approving IRO-005-3 (approval effective 5/23/11) | |
| 3a | April 21, 2011 | Added FERC approved Interpretation | |
| 3.1a | March 8, 2012 | Errata adopted by Standards Committee; (removed outdated references in Measures M10 and M11 to ‘Part 2’ of Requirements R10 and R11) | Errata |
| 3.1a | September 13, 2012 | FERC approved | Errata |

Standard IRO-005-3.1a(X) — Reliability Coordination — Current Day Operations

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|----------------|-------------------|---|---|
| 3.1a | February 28, 2014 | Updated VSLs based on June 24, 2013 approval. | |
| <u>3.1a(X)</u> | <u>TBD</u> | <u>Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees</u> | <u>Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS</u> |

Appendix 1

| Requirement Number and Text of Requirement |
|--|
| <p>TOP-005-1 Requirement R3</p> <p>Upon request, each Balancing Authority and Transmission Operator shall provide to other Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators with immediate responsibility for operational reliability, the operating data that are necessary to allow these Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators to perform operational reliability assessments and to coordinate reliable operations. Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators shall provide the types of data as listed in Attachment 1-TOP-005-0(X) “Electric System Reliability Data,” unless otherwise agreed to by the Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators with immediate responsibility for operational reliability.</p> <p><i>The above-referenced Attachment 1 — TOP-005-0 specifies the following data as item 2.6: New or <u>degraded Remedial Action Schemes</u>. [Underline added for emphasis.]</i></p> |
| <p>IRO-005-1 Requirement R12¹</p> <p>R12. Whenever a <u>Remedial Action Scheme</u> that may have an inter-Balancing Authority, or inter-Transmission Operator impact (e.g., could potentially affect transmission flows resulting in a SOL or IROL violation) is armed, the Reliability Coordinators shall be aware of the impact of the operation of that <u>Remedial Action Scheme</u> on inter-area flows. The Transmission Operator shall immediately inform the Reliability Coordinator of the status of the <u>Remedial Action Scheme</u> including any <u>degradation</u> or potential failure to operate as expected. [Underline added for emphasis.]</p> |
| <p>PRC-012-0(X) Requirements R1 and R1.3</p> <p>R1. Each Regional Reliability Organization with a Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Providers that uses or is planning to use a <u>RAS</u> shall have a documented Regional Reliability Organization <u>RAS</u> review procedure to ensure that <u>RAS</u> comply with Regional criteria and NERC Reliability Standards. The Regional <u>RAS</u> review procedure shall include:</p> <p>R1.3. Requirements to demonstrate that the <u>RAS</u> shall be designed so that a single <u>RAS</u> component failure, when the <u>RAS</u> was intended to operate, does not prevent the interconnected transmission system from meeting the performance requirements defined in Reliability Standards TPL-001-0, TPL-002-0, and TPL-003-0.</p> |
| <p>Background Information for Interpretation</p> <p>The TOP-005-1 standard focuses on two key obligations. The first key obligation (Requirement R1) is a “responsibility mandate.” Requirement R1 establishes who is responsible for the obligation to provide operating data “required” by a Reliability Coordinator within the framework of the Reliability Coordinator requirements defined in the IRO standards. The second key obligation (Requirement R3) is a “performance mandate.” Requirement R3 defines the obligation to provide data “requested” by other reliability entities that is needed “to perform assessments and to coordinate operations.”</p> <p>The Attachment to TOP-005-1 is provided as a guideline of what “can be shared.” The Attachment is not an obligation of “what must be shared.” Enforceable NERC Requirements must be explicitly contained within a given Standard’s approved requirements. In this case, the standard only requires data “upon request.” If a Reliability Coordinator or other reliability entity were to request data such as</p> |

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¹ In the current version of the Standard (IRO-005-3a)(X), this requirement is R9.

Standard IRO-005-3.1a(X) — Reliability Coordination — Current Day Operations

listed in the Attachment, then the entity being asked would be mandated by Requirements R1 and R3 to provide that data (including item 2.6, whether it is or is not in some undefined “degraded” state).

IRO-002-1 requires the Reliability Coordinator to have processes in place to support its reliability obligations (Requirement R2). Requirement R4 mandates that the Reliability Coordinator have communications processes in place to meet its reliability obligations, and Requirement R5 et al mandate the Reliability Coordinator to have the tools to carry out these reliability obligations.

IRO-003-2 (Requirements R1 and R2) requires the Reliability Coordinator to monitor the state of its system.

IRO-004-1 requires that the Reliability Coordinator carry out studies to identify Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (Requirement R1) and to be aware of system conditions via monitoring tools and information exchange.

IRO-005-1 mandates that each Reliability Coordinator monitor predefined base conditions (Requirement R1), collect additional data when operating limits are or may be exceeded (Requirement R3), and identify actual or potential threats (Requirement R5). The basis for that request is left to each Reliability Coordinator. The Purpose statement of IRO-005-1 focuses on the Reliability Coordinator’s obligation to be aware of conditions that may have a “significant” impact upon its area and to communicate that information to others (Requirements R7 and R9). Please note: it is from this communication that Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities would either obtain or would know to ask for RAS information from another Transmission Operator.

The IRO-005-1 (Requirement R12) standard implies that degraded is a condition that will result in a failure to operate as designed. If the loss of a communication channel will result in the failure of a RAS to operate as designed then the Transmission Operator would be mandated to report that information. On the other hand, if the loss of a communication channel will not result in the failure of the RAS to operate as designed, then such a condition can be, but is not mandated to be, reported.

Conclusion

The TOP-005-1 standard does not provide, nor does it require, a definition for the term “degraded.”

The IRO-005-1 (R12) standard implies that degraded is a condition that will result in a failure of a RAS to operate as designed. If the loss of a communication channel will result in the failure of a RAS to operate as designed, then the Transmission Operator would be mandated to report that information. On the other hand, if the loss of a communication channel will not result in the failure of the RAS to operate as designed, then such a condition can be, but is not mandated to be, reported.

To request a formal definition of the term degraded, the Reliability Standards Development Procedure requires the submittal of a Standards Authorization Request.

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A. Introduction

1. **Title:** **Rated System Path Methodology**
2. **Number:** **MOD-029-1a(X)**
3. **Purpose:** To increase consistency and reliability in the development and documentation of transfer capability calculations for short-term use performed by entities using the Rated System Path Methodology to support analysis and system operations.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Each Transmission Operator that uses the Rated System Path Methodology to calculate Total Transfer Capabilities (TTCs) for ATC Paths.
 - 4.2. Each Transmission Service Provider that uses the Rated System Path Methodology to calculate Available Transfer Capabilities (ATCs) for ATC Paths.
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1. When calculating TTCs for ATC Paths, the Transmission Operator shall use a Transmission model which satisfies the following requirements: [*Violation Risk Factor: Lower*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
 - R1.1. The model utilizes data and assumptions consistent with the time period being studied and that meets the following criteria:
 - R1.1.1. Includes at least:
 - R1.1.1.1. The Transmission Operator area. Equivalent representation of radial lines and facilities 161kV or below is allowed.
 - R1.1.1.2. All Transmission Operator areas contiguous with its own Transmission Operator area. (Equivalent representation is allowed.)
 - R1.1.1.3. Any other Transmission Operator area linked to the Transmission Operator's area by joint operating agreement. (Equivalent representation is allowed.)

- R2.3.** For an ATC Path whose capacity is limited by contract, set TTC on the ATC Path at the lesser of the maximum allowable contract capacity or the reliability limit as determined by R2.1.
- R2.4.** For an ATC Path whose TTC varies due to simultaneous interaction with one or more other paths, develop a nomogram describing the interaction of the paths and the resulting TTC under specified conditions.
- R2.5.** The Transmission Operator shall identify when the TTC for the ATC Path being studied has an adverse impact on the TTC value of any existing path. Do this by modeling the flow on the path being studied at its proposed new TTC level simultaneous with the flow on the existing path at its TTC level while at the same time honoring the reliability criteria outlined in R2.1. The Transmission Operator shall include the resolution of this adverse impact in its study report for the ATC Path.
- R2.6.** Where multiple ownership of Transmission rights exists on an ATC Path, allocate TTC of that ATC Path in accordance with the contractual agreement made by the multiple owners of that ATC Path.
- R2.7.** For ATC Paths whose path rating, adjusted for seasonal variance, was established, known and used in operation since January 1, 1994, and no action has been taken to have the path rated using a different method, set the TTC at that previously established amount.
- R2.8.** Create a study report that describes the steps above that were undertaken (R2.1 – R2.7), including the contingencies and assumptions used, when determining the TTC and the results of the study. Where three phase fault damping is used to determine stability limits, that report shall also identify the percent used and include justification for use unless specified otherwise in the ATCID.
- R3.** Each Transmission Operator shall establish the TTC at the lesser of the value calculated in R2 or any System Operating Limit (SOL) for that ATC Path. [*Violation Risk Factor: Lower*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
- R4.** Within seven calendar days of the finalization of the study report, the Transmission Operator shall make available to the Transmission Service Provider of the ATC Path, the most current value for TTC and the TTC study report documenting the assumptions used and steps taken in determining the current value for TTC for that ATC Path. [*Violation Risk Factor: Lower*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
- R5.** When calculating ETC for firm Existing Transmission Commitments (ETC_F) for a specified period for an ATC Path, the Transmission Service Provider shall use the algorithm below: [*Violation Risk Factor: Lower*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

$$ETC_F = NL_F + NITS_F + GF_F + PTP_F + ROR_F + OS_F$$

Where:

NL_F is the firm capacity set aside to serve peak Native Load forecast commitments for the time period being calculated, to include losses, and Native

Load growth, not otherwise included in Transmission Reliability Margin or Capacity Benefit Margin.

NITS_F is the firm capacity reserved for Network Integration Transmission Service serving Load, to include losses, and Load growth, not otherwise included in Transmission Reliability Margin or Capacity Benefit Margin.

GF_F is the firm capacity set aside for grandfathered Transmission Service and contracts for energy and/or Transmission Service, where executed prior to the effective date of a Transmission Service Provider’s Open Access Transmission Tariff or “safe harbor tariff.”

PTP_F is the firm capacity reserved for confirmed Point-to-Point Transmission Service.

ROR_F is the firm capacity reserved for Roll-over rights for contracts granting Transmission Customers the right of first refusal to take or continue to take Transmission Service when the Transmission Customer’s Transmission Service contract expires or is eligible for renewal.

OS_F is the firm capacity reserved for any other service(s), contract(s), or agreement(s) not specified above using Firm Transmission Service as specified in the ATCID.

- R6.** When calculating ETC for non-firm Existing Transmission Commitments (ETC_{NF}) for all time horizons for an ATC Path the Transmission Service Provider shall use the following algorithm: [*Violation Risk Factor: Lower*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

$$ETC_{NF} = NITS_{NF} + GF_{NF} + PTP_{NF} + OS_{NF}$$

Where:

NITS_{NF} is the non-firm capacity set aside for Network Integration Transmission Service serving Load (i.e., secondary service), to include losses, and load growth not otherwise included in Transmission Reliability Margin or Capacity Benefit Margin.

GF_{NF} is the non-firm capacity set aside for grandfathered Transmission Service and contracts for energy and/or Transmission Service, where executed prior to the effective date of a Transmission Service Provider’s Open Access Transmission Tariff or “safe harbor tariff.”

PTP_{NF} is non-firm capacity reserved for confirmed Point-to-Point Transmission Service.

OS_{NF} is the non-firm capacity reserved for any other service(s), contract(s), or agreement(s) not specified above using non-firm transmission service as specified in the ATCID.

- R7.** When calculating firm ATC for an ATC Path for a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider shall use the following algorithm: [*Violation Risk Factor: Lower*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

$$ATC_F = TTC - ETC_F - CBM - TRM + Postbacks_F + counterflows_F$$

Where

ATC_F is the firm Available Transfer Capability for the ATC Path for that period.

TTC is the Total Transfer Capability of the ATC Path for that period.

ETC_F is the sum of existing firm commitments for the ATC Path during that period.

CBM is the Capacity Benefit Margin for the ATC Path during that period.

TRM is the Transmission Reliability Margin for the ATC Path during that period.

Postbacks_F are changes to firm Available Transfer Capability due to a change in the use of Transmission Service for that period, as defined in Business Practices.

counterflows_F are adjustments to firm Available Transfer Capability as determined by the Transmission Service Provider and specified in their ATCID.

- R8.** When calculating non-firm ATC for an ATC Path for a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider shall use the following algorithm: [*Violation Risk Factor: Lower*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

$$ATC_{NF} = TTC - ETC_F - ETC_{NF} - CBM_S - TRM_U + Postbacks_{NF} + counterflows_{NF}$$

Where:

ATC_{NF} is the non-firm Available Transfer Capability for the ATC Path for that period.

TTC is the Total Transfer Capability of the ATC Path for that period.

ETC_F is the sum of existing firm commitments for the ATC Path during that period.

ETC_{NF} is the sum of existing non-firm commitments for the ATC Path during that period.

CBM_S is the Capacity Benefit Margin for the ATC Path that has been scheduled during that period.

TRM_U is the Transmission Reliability Margin for the ATC Path that has not been released for sale (unreleased) as non-firm capacity by the Transmission Service Provider during that period.

Postbacks_{NF} are changes to non-firm Available Transfer Capability due to a change in the use of Transmission Service for that period, as defined in Business Practices.

counterflows_{NF} are adjustments to non-firm Available Transfer Capability as determined by the Transmission Service Provider and specified in its ATCID.

C. Measures

- M1.** Each Transmission Operator that uses the Rated System Path Methodology shall produce any Transmission model it used to calculate TTC for purposes of calculating ATC for each ATC Path, as required in R1, for the time horizon(s) to be examined. (R1)
- M1.1.** Production shall be in the same form and format used by the Transmission Operator to calculate the TTC, as required in R1. (R1)
- M1.2.** The Transmission model produced must include the areas listed in R1.1.1 (or an equivalent representation, as described in the requirement) (R1.1)
- M1.3.** The Transmission model produced must show the use of the modeling parameters stated in R1.1.2 through R1.1.10; except that, no evidence shall be required to prove: 1) utilization of a Remedial Action Scheme where none was included in the model or 2) that no additions or retirements to the generation or Transmission system occurred. (R1.1.2 through R1.1.10)
- M1.4.** The Transmission Operator must provide evidence that the models used to determine TTC included Facility Ratings as provided by the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner. (R1.2)
- M2.** Each Transmission Operator that uses the Rated System Path Methodology shall produce the ATCID it uses to show where it has described and used additional modeling criteria in its ACTID that are not otherwise included in MOD-29 (R1.1.4, R.1.1.9, and R1.1.10).
- M3.** Each Transmission Operator that uses the Rated System Path Methodology with paths with ratings established prior to January 1, 1994 shall provide evidence the path and its rating were established prior to January 1, 1994. (R2.7)
- M4.** Each Transmission Operator that uses the Rated System Path Methodology shall produce as evidence the study reports, as required in R.2.8, for each path for which it determined TTC for the period examined. (R2)
- M5.** Each Transmission Operator shall provide evidence that it used the lesser of the calculated TTC or the SOL as the TTC, by producing: 1) all values calculated pursuant to R2 for each ATC Path, 2) Any corresponding SOLs for those ATC Paths, and 3) the TTC set by the Transmission Operator and given to the Transmission Service Provider for use in R7 and R8 for each ATC Path. (R3)
- M6.** Each Transmission Operator shall provide evidence (such as logs or data) that it provided the TTC and its study report to the Transmission Service Provider within seven calendar days of the finalization of the study report. (R4)
- M7.** The Transmission Service Provider shall demonstrate compliance with R5 by recalculating firm ETC for any specific time period as described in (MOD-001 R2), using the algorithm defined in R5 and with data used to calculate the specified value for the designated time period. The data used must meet the requirements specified in MOD-029-1(X) and the ATCID. To account for differences that may occur when recalculating the value (due to mixing automated and manual processes), any recalculated value that is within +/- 15% or 15 MW, whichever is greater, of the

originally calculated value, is evidence that the Transmission Service Provider used the algorithm in R5 to calculate its firm ETC. (R5)

- M8.** The Transmission Service Provider shall demonstrate compliance with R5 by recalculating non-firm ETC for any specific time period as described in (MOD-001 R2), using the algorithm defined in R6 and with data used to calculate this specified value for the designated time period. The data used must meet the requirements specified in the MOD-029 and the ATCID. To account for differences that may occur when recalculating the value (due to mixing automated and manual processes), any recalculated value that is within +/- 15% or 15 MW, whichever is greater, of the originally calculated value, is evidence that the Transmission Service Provider used the algorithm in R6 to calculate its non-firm ETC. (R6)
- M9.** Each Transmission Service Provider shall produce the supporting documentation for the processes used to implement the algorithm that calculates firm ATCs, as required in R7. Such documentation must show that only the variables allowed in R7 were used to calculate firm ATCs, and that the processes use the current values for the variables as determined in the requirements or definitions. Note that any variable may legitimately be zero if the value is not applicable or calculated to be zero (such as counterflows, TRM, CBM, etc...). The supporting documentation may be provided in the same form and format as stored by the Transmission Service Provider. (R7)
- M10.** Each Transmission Service Provider shall produce the supporting documentation for the processes used to implement the algorithm that calculates non-firm ATCs, as required in R8. Such documentation must show that only the variables allowed in R8 were used to calculate non-firm ATCs, and that the processes use the current values for the variables as determined in the requirements or definitions. Note that any variable may legitimately be zero if the value is not applicable or calculated to be zero (such as counterflows, TRM, CBM, etc...). The supporting documentation may be provided in the same form and format as stored by the Transmission Service Provider. (R8)

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

Regional Entity.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame

Not applicable.

1.3. Data Retention

- The Transmission Operator and Transmission Service Provider shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:
- The Transmission Operator shall have its latest models used to determine TTC for R1. (M1)

- The Transmission Operator shall have the current, in force ATCID(s) provided by its Transmission Service Provider(s) and any prior versions of the ATCID that were in force since the last compliance audit to show compliance with R1. (M2)
- The Transmission Operator shall retain evidence of any path and its rating that was established prior to January 1, 1994. (M3)
- The Transmission Operator shall retain the latest version and prior version of the TTC study reports to show compliance with R2. (M4)
- The Transmission Operator shall retain evidence for the most recent three calendar years plus the current year to show compliance with R3 and R4. (M5 and M6)
- The Transmission Service Provider shall retain evidence to show compliance in calculating hourly values required in R5 and R6 for the most recent 14 days; evidence to show compliance in calculating daily values required in R5 and R6 for the most recent 30 days; and evidence to show compliance in calculating daily values required in R5 and R6 for the most recent sixty days. (M7 and M8)
- The Transmission Service Provider shall retain evidence for the most recent three calendar years plus the current year to show compliance with R7 and R8. (M9 and M10)
- If a Transmission Service Provider or Transmission Operator is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until found compliant.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.4. Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Processes:

The following processes may be used:

- Compliance Audits
- Self-Certifications
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Violation Investigations
- Self-Reporting
- Complaints

1.5. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Violation Severity Levels

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----|--|--|--|---|
| R1. | <p>The Transmission Operator used a model that met all but one of the modeling requirements specified in R1.1.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p>The Transmission Operator utilized one to ten Facility Ratings that were different from those specified by a Transmission Owner or Generation Owner in their Transmission model. (R1.2)</p> | <p>The Transmission Operator used a model that met all but two of the modeling requirements specified in R1.1.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p>The Transmission Operator utilized eleven to twenty Facility Ratings that were different from those specified by a Transmission Owner or Generation Owner in their Transmission model. (R1.2)</p> | <p>The Transmission Operator used a model that met all but three of the modeling requirements specified in R1.1.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p>The Transmission Operator utilized twenty-one to thirty Facility Ratings that were different from those specified by a Transmission Owner or Generation Owner in their Transmission model. (R1.2)</p> | <p>The Transmission Operator used a model that did not meet four or more of the modeling requirements specified in R1.1.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p>The Transmission Operator utilized more than thirty Facility Ratings that were different from those specified by a Transmission Owner or Generation Owner in their Transmission model. (R1.2)</p> |
| R2 | <p>One or both of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator did not calculate TTC using one of the items in sub-requirements R2.1-R2.6. The Transmission Operator does not include one required item in the study report required in R2.8. | <p>One or both of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator did not calculate TTC using two of the items in sub-requirements R2.1-R2.6. The Transmission Operator does not include two required items in the study report required in R2.8. | <p>One or both of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator did not calculate TTC using three of the items in sub-requirements R2.1-R2.6. The Transmission Operator does not include three required items in the study report required in R2.8. | <p>One or more of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator did not calculate TTC using four or more of the items in sub-requirements R2.1-R2.6. The Transmission Operator did not apply R2.7. The Transmission Operator does not include four or more required items in the study report required in R2.8 |

Standard MOD-029-1a(X) — Rated System Path Methodology

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----|--|--|--|--|
| R3. | The Transmission Operator did not specify the TTC as the lesser of the TTC calculated using the process described in R2 or any associated SOL for more than zero ATC Paths, BUT, not more than 1% of all ATC Paths or 1 ATC Path (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Operator did not specify the TTC as the lesser of the TTC calculated using the process described in R2 or any associated SOL for more than 1% of all ATC Paths or 1 ATC Path (whichever is greater), BUT not more than 2% of all ATC Paths or 2 ATC Paths (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Operator did not specify the TTC as the lesser of the TTC calculated using the process described in R2 or any associated SOL for more than 2% of all ATC Paths or 2 ATC Paths (whichever is greater), BUT not more than 5% of all ATC Paths or 3 ATC Paths (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Operator did not specify the TTC as the lesser of the TTC calculated using the process described in R2 or any associated SOL, for more than 5% of all ATC Paths or 3 ATC Paths (whichever is greater). |
| R4. | The Transmission Operator provided the TTC and study report to the Transmission Service Provider more than seven, but not more than 14 calendar days after the report was finalized. | The Transmission Operator provided the TTC and study report to the Transmission Service Provider more than 14, but not more than 21 calendar days after the report was finalized. | The Transmission Operator provided the TTC and study report to the Transmission Service Provider more than 21, but not more than 28 calendar days after the report was finalized. | The Transmission Operator provided the TTC and study report to the Transmission Service Provider more than 28 calendar days after the report was finalized. |
| R5. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M7 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 15% of the value calculated in the measure or 15MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 25% of the value calculated in the measure or 25MW, whichever is greater. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M7 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 25% of the value calculated in the measure or 25MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 35% of the value calculated in the measure or 35MW, whichever is greater. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M7 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 35% of the value calculated in the measure or 35MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 45% of the value calculated in the measure or 45MW, whichever is greater. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M7 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 45% of the value calculated in the measure or 45MW, whichever is greater. |

Standard MOD-029-1a(X) — Rated System Path Methodology

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----|--|--|--|--|
| R6. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a non-firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M8 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 15% of the value calculated in the measure or 15MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 25% of the value calculated in the measure or 25MW, whichever is greater. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a non-firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M8 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 25% of the value calculated in the measure or 25MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 35% of the value calculated in the measure or 35MW, whichever is greater. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a non-firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M8 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 35% of the value calculated in the measure or 35MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 45% of the value calculated in the measure or 45MW, whichever is greater. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a non-firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M8 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 45% of the value calculated in the measure or 45MW, whichever is greater. |
| R7. | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R7 when determining firm ATC, or used additional elements, for more than zero ATC Paths, but not more than 5% of all ATC Paths or 1 ATC Path (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R7 when determining firm ATC, or used additional elements, for more than 5% of all ATC Paths or 1 ATC Path (whichever is greater), but not more than 10% of all ATC Paths or 2 ATC Paths (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R7 when determining firm ATC, or used additional elements, for more than 10% of all ATC Paths or 2 ATC Paths (whichever is greater), but not more than 15% of all ATC Paths or 3 ATC Paths (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R7 when determining firm ATC, or used additional elements, for more than 15% of all ATC Paths or more than 3 ATC Paths (whichever is greater). |
| R8. | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R8 when determining non-firm ATC, or used additional elements, for more than zero ATC Paths, but not more than 5% of all ATC Paths or 1 ATC Path (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R8 when determining non-firm ATC, or used additional elements, for more than 5% of all ATC Paths or 1 ATC Path (whichever is greater), but not more than 10% of all ATC Paths or 2 ATC Paths (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R8 when determining non-firm ATC, or used additional elements, for more than 10% of all ATC Paths or 2 ATC Paths (whichever is greater), but not more than 15% of all ATC Paths or 3 ATC Paths (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R8 when determining non-firm ATC, or used additional elements, for more than 15% of all ATC Paths or more than 3 ATC Paths (whichever is greater). |

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|------------------------------|--|--|
| 1 | 8/26/2008 | Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees | |
| 1a | Board approved 11/05/2009 | Interpretation of R5 and R6 | Interpretation (Project 2009-15) |
| 1a | February 28, 2014 | Updated VSLs based on June 24, 2013 approval. | |
| 1a(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

Appendix 1

| Requirement Number and Text of Requirement |
|---|
| <p>MOD-001-01 Requirement R2:</p> <p>R2. Each Transmission Service Provider shall calculate ATC or AFC values as listed below using the methodology or methodologies selected by its Transmission Operator(s):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> R2.1. Hourly values for at least the next 48 hours. R2.2. Daily values for at least the next 31 calendar days. R2.3. Monthly values for at least the next 12 months (months 2-13). <p>MOD-001-01 Requirement R8:</p> <p>R8. Each Transmission Service Provider that calculates ATC shall recalculate ATC at a minimum on the following frequency, unless none of the calculated values identified in the ATC equation have changed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> R8.1. Hourly values, once per hour. Transmission Service Providers are allowed up to 175 hours per calendar year during which calculations are not required to be performed, despite a change in a calculated value identified in the ATC equation. R8.2. Daily values, once per day. R8.3. Monthly values, once per week. |
| Question #1 |
| <p>Is the “advisory ATC” used under the NYISO tariff subject to the ATC calculation and recalculation requirements in MOD-001-1 Requirements R2 and R8? If not, is it necessary to document the frequency of “advisory” calculations in the responsible entity’s Available Transfer Capability Implementation Document?</p> |
| Response to Question #1 |
| <p>Requirements R2 and R8 of MOD-001-1 are both related to Requirement R1, which defines that ATC methodologies are to be applied to specific “ATC Paths.” The NERC definition of ATC Path is “Any combination of Point of Receipt and Point of Delivery for which ATC is calculated; and any Posted Path.” Based on a review of the language included in this request, the NYISO Open Access Transmission Tariff, and other information posted on the NYISO Web site, it appears that the NYISO does indeed have multiple ATC Paths, which are subject to the calculation and recalculation requirements in Requirements R2 and R8. It appears from reviewing this information that ATC is defined in the NYISO tariff in the same manner in which NERC defines it, making it difficult to conclude that NYISO’s “advisory ATC” is not the same as ATC. In addition, it appears that pre-scheduling is permitted on certain external paths, making the calculation of ATC prior to day ahead necessary on those paths.</p> |

The second part of NYISO’s question is only applicable if the first part was answered in the negative and therefore will not be addressed.

Requirement Number and Text of Requirement

MOD-029-01(X) Requirements R5 and R6:

R5. When calculating ETC for firm Existing Transmission Commitments (ETC_F) for a specified period for an ATC Path, the Transmission Service Provider shall use the algorithm below:

$$ETC_F = NL_F + NITS_F + GF_F + PTP_F + ROR_F + OS_F$$

Where:

NL_F is the firm capacity set aside to serve peak Native Load forecast commitments for the time period being calculated, to include losses, and Native Load growth, not otherwise included in Transmission Reliability Margin or Capacity Benefit Margin.

NITS_F is the firm capacity reserved for Network Integration Transmission Service serving Load, to include losses, and Load growth, not otherwise included in Transmission Reliability Margin or Capacity Benefit Margin.

GF_F is the firm capacity set aside for grandfathered Transmission Service and contracts for energy and/or Transmission Service, where executed prior to the effective date of a Transmission Service Provider’s Open Access Transmission Tariff or “safe harbor tariff.”

PTP_F is the firm capacity reserved for confirmed Point-to-Point Transmission Service.

ROR_F is the firm capacity reserved for Roll-over rights for contracts granting Transmission Customers the right of first refusal to take or continue to take Transmission Service when the Transmission Customer’s Transmission Service contract expires or is eligible for renewal.

OS_F is the firm capacity reserved for any other service(s), contract(s), or agreement(s) not specified above using Firm Transmission Service as specified in the ATCID.

R6. When calculating ETC for non-firm Existing Transmission Commitments (ETC_{NF}) for all time horizons for an ATC Path the Transmission Service Provider shall use the following algorithm:

$$ETC_{NF} = NITS_{NF} + GF_{NF} + PTP_{NF} + OS_{NF}$$

Where:

NITS_{NF} is the non-firm capacity set aside for Network Integration Transmission Service serving Load (i.e., secondary service), to include losses, and load growth not otherwise included in Transmission Reliability Margin or Capacity Benefit Margin.

GF_{NF} is the non-firm capacity set aside for grandfathered Transmission Service and contracts for energy and/or Transmission Service, where executed prior to the effective date of a Transmission Service Provider's Open Access Transmission Tariff or "safe harbor tariff."

PTP_{NF} is non-firm capacity reserved for confirmed Point-to-Point Transmission Service.

OS_{NF} is the non-firm capacity reserved for any other service(s), contract(s), or agreement(s) not specified above using non-firm transmission service as specified in the ATCID.

Question #2

Could OS_F in MOD-029-1(X) Requirement R5 and OS_{NF} in MOD-029-1(X) Requirement R6 be calculated using Transmission Flow Utilization in the determination of ATC?

Response to Question #2

This request for interpretation and the NYISO Open Access Transmission Tariff describe the NYISO's concept of "Transmission Flow Utilization;" however, it is unclear whether or not Native Load, Point-to-Point Transmission Service, Network Integration Transmission Service, or any of the other components explicitly defined in Requirements R5 and R6 are incorporated into "Transmission Flow Utilization." Provided that "Transmission Flow Utilization" does not include Native Load, Point-to-Point Transmission Service, Network Integration Transmission Service, or any of the other components explicitly defined in Requirements R5 and R6, it is appropriate to be included within the "Other Services" term. However, if "Transmission Flow Utilization" does incorporate those components, then simply including "Transmission Flow Utilization" in "Other Service" would be inappropriate.

Standard MOD-029-1a(X)— Rated System Path Methodology

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Rated System Path Methodology
2. **Number:** MOD-029-1a(X)
3. **Purpose:** To increase consistency and reliability in the development and documentation of transfer capability calculations for short-term use performed by entities using the Rated System Path Methodology to support analysis and system operations.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Each Transmission Operator that uses the Rated System Path Methodology to calculate Total Transfer Capabilities (TTCs) for ATC Paths.
 - 4.2. Each Transmission Service Provider that uses the Rated System Path Methodology to calculate Available Transfer Capabilities (ATCs) for ATC Paths.
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

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B. Requirements

- R1. When calculating TTCs for ATC Paths, the Transmission Operator shall use a Transmission model which satisfies the following requirements: [*Violation Risk Factor: Lower*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
 - R1.1. The model utilizes data and assumptions consistent with the time period being studied and that meets the following criteria:
 - R1.1.1. Includes at least:
 - R1.1.1.1. The Transmission Operator area. Equivalent representation of radial lines and facilities 161kV or below is allowed.
 - R1.1.1.2. All Transmission Operator areas contiguous with its own Transmission Operator area. (Equivalent representation is allowed.)
 - R1.1.1.3. Any other Transmission Operator area linked to the Transmission Operator's area by joint operating agreement. (Equivalent representation is allowed.)

Standard MOD-029-1a(X)— Rated System Path Methodology

- R1.1.2.** Models all system Elements as in-service for the assumed initial conditions.
 - R1.1.3.** Models all generation (may be either a single generator or multiple generators) that is greater than 20 MVA at the point of interconnection in the studied area.
 - R1.1.4.** Models phase shifters in non-regulating mode, unless otherwise specified in the Available Transfer Capability Implementation Document (ATCID).
 - R1.1.5.** Uses Load forecast by Balancing Authority.
 - R1.1.6.** Uses Transmission Facility additions and retirements.
 - R1.1.7.** Uses Generation Facility additions and retirements.
 - R1.1.8.** Uses **Remedial Action Scheme (RAS)** models where currently existing or projected for implementation within the studied time horizon.
 - R1.1.9.** Models series compensation for each line at the expected operating level unless specified otherwise in the ATCID.
 - R1.1.10.** Includes any other modeling requirements or criteria specified in the ATCID.
 - R1.2.** Uses Facility Ratings as provided by the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner
- R2.** The Transmission Operator shall use the following process to determine TTC:
[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]
- R2.1.** Except where otherwise specified within MOD-029-1(X), adjust base case generation and Load levels within the updated power flow model to determine the TTC (maximum flow or reliability limit) that can be simulated on the ATC Path while at the same time satisfying all planning criteria contingencies as follows:
 - R2.1.1.** When modeling normal conditions, all Transmission Elements will be modeled at or below 100% of their continuous rating.
 - R2.1.2.** When modeling contingencies the system shall demonstrate transient, dynamic and voltage stability, with no Transmission Element modeled above its Emergency Rating.
 - R2.1.3.** Uncontrolled separation shall not occur.
 - R2.2.** Where it is impossible to actually simulate a reliability-limited flow in a direction counter to prevailing flows (on an alternating current Transmission line), set the TTC for the non-prevailing direction equal to the TTC in the prevailing direction. If the TTC in the prevailing flow direction is dependent on a **Remedial Action Scheme (RAS)**, set the TTC for the non-prevailing flow direction equal to the greater of the maximum flow that can be simulated in the non-prevailing flow direction or the maximum TTC that can be achieved in the prevailing flow direction without use of a **RAS**.

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Standard MOD-029-1a(X)— Rated System Path Methodology

- R2.3.** For an ATC Path whose capacity is limited by contract, set TTC on the ATC Path at the lesser of the maximum allowable contract capacity or the reliability limit as determined by R2.1.
- R2.4.** For an ATC Path whose TTC varies due to simultaneous interaction with one or more other paths, develop a nomogram describing the interaction of the paths and the resulting TTC under specified conditions.
- R2.5.** The Transmission Operator shall identify when the TTC for the ATC Path being studied has an adverse impact on the TTC value of any existing path. Do this by modeling the flow on the path being studied at its proposed new TTC level simultaneous with the flow on the existing path at its TTC level while at the same time honoring the reliability criteria outlined in R2.1. The Transmission Operator shall include the resolution of this adverse impact in its study report for the ATC Path.
- R2.6.** Where multiple ownership of Transmission rights exists on an ATC Path, allocate TTC of that ATC Path in accordance with the contractual agreement made by the multiple owners of that ATC Path.
- R2.7.** For ATC Paths whose path rating, adjusted for seasonal variance, was established, known and used in operation since January 1, 1994, and no action has been taken to have the path rated using a different method, set the TTC at that previously established amount.
- R2.8.** Create a study report that describes the steps above that were undertaken (R2.1 – R2.7), including the contingencies and assumptions used, when determining the TTC and the results of the study. Where three phase fault damping is used to determine stability limits, that report shall also identify the percent used and include justification for use unless specified otherwise in the ATCID.
- R3.** Each Transmission Operator shall establish the TTC at the lesser of the value calculated in R2 or any System Operating Limit (SOL) for that ATC Path. [*Violation Risk Factor: Lower*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
- R4.** Within seven calendar days of the finalization of the study report, the Transmission Operator shall make available to the Transmission Service Provider of the ATC Path, the most current value for TTC and the TTC study report documenting the assumptions used and steps taken in determining the current value for TTC for that ATC Path. [*Violation Risk Factor: Lower*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
- R5.** When calculating ETC for firm Existing Transmission Commitments (ETC_F) for a specified period for an ATC Path, the Transmission Service Provider shall use the algorithm below: [*Violation Risk Factor: Lower*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

$$ETC_F = NL_F + NITS_F + GF_F + PTP_F + ROR_F + OS_F$$

Where:

NL_F is the firm capacity set aside to serve peak Native Load forecast commitments for the time period being calculated, to include losses, and Native

Standard MOD-029-1a(X)— Rated System Path Methodology

Load growth, not otherwise included in Transmission Reliability Margin or Capacity Benefit Margin.

NITS_F is the firm capacity reserved for Network Integration Transmission Service serving Load, to include losses, and Load growth, not otherwise included in Transmission Reliability Margin or Capacity Benefit Margin.

GF_F is the firm capacity set aside for grandfathered Transmission Service and contracts for energy and/or Transmission Service, where executed prior to the effective date of a Transmission Service Provider’s Open Access Transmission Tariff or “safe harbor tariff.”

PTP_F is the firm capacity reserved for confirmed Point-to-Point Transmission Service.

ROR_F is the firm capacity reserved for Roll-over rights for contracts granting Transmission Customers the right of first refusal to take or continue to take Transmission Service when the Transmission Customer’s Transmission Service contract expires or is eligible for renewal.

OS_F is the firm capacity reserved for any other service(s), contract(s), or agreement(s) not specified above using Firm Transmission Service as specified in the ATCID.

- R6.** When calculating ETC for non-firm Existing Transmission Commitments (ETC_{NF}) for all time horizons for an ATC Path the Transmission Service Provider shall use the following algorithm: [*Violation Risk Factor: Lower*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

$$ETC_{NF} = NITS_{NF} + GF_{NF} + PTP_{NF} + OS_{NF}$$

Where:

NITS_{NF} is the non-firm capacity set aside for Network Integration Transmission Service serving Load (i.e., secondary service), to include losses, and load growth not otherwise included in Transmission Reliability Margin or Capacity Benefit Margin.

GF_{NF} is the non-firm capacity set aside for grandfathered Transmission Service and contracts for energy and/or Transmission Service, where executed prior to the effective date of a Transmission Service Provider’s Open Access Transmission Tariff or “safe harbor tariff.”

PTP_{NF} is non-firm capacity reserved for confirmed Point-to-Point Transmission Service.

OS_{NF} is the non-firm capacity reserved for any other service(s), contract(s), or agreement(s) not specified above using non-firm transmission service as specified in the ATCID.

- R7.** When calculating firm ATC for an ATC Path for a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider shall use the following algorithm: [*Violation Risk Factor: Lower*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

$$ATC_F = TTC - ETC_F - CBM - TRM + Postbacks_F + counterflows_F$$

Where

ATC_F is the firm Available Transfer Capability for the ATC Path for that period.

TTC is the Total Transfer Capability of the ATC Path for that period.

ETC_F is the sum of existing firm commitments for the ATC Path during that period.

CBM is the Capacity Benefit Margin for the ATC Path during that period.

TRM is the Transmission Reliability Margin for the ATC Path during that period.

Postbacks_F are changes to firm Available Transfer Capability due to a change in the use of Transmission Service for that period, as defined in Business Practices.

counterflows_F are adjustments to firm Available Transfer Capability as determined by the Transmission Service Provider and specified in their ATCID.

- R8.** When calculating non-firm ATC for an ATC Path for a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider shall use the following algorithm: [*Violation Risk Factor: Lower*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

$$ATC_{NF} = TTC - ETC_F - ETC_{NF} - CBM_S - TRM_U + Postbacks_{NF} + counterflows_{NF}$$

Where:

ATC_{NF} is the non-firm Available Transfer Capability for the ATC Path for that period.

TTC is the Total Transfer Capability of the ATC Path for that period.

ETC_F is the sum of existing firm commitments for the ATC Path during that period.

ETC_{NF} is the sum of existing non-firm commitments for the ATC Path during that period.

CBM_S is the Capacity Benefit Margin for the ATC Path that has been scheduled during that period.

TRM_U is the Transmission Reliability Margin for the ATC Path that has not been released for sale (unreleased) as non-firm capacity by the Transmission Service Provider during that period.

Postbacks_{NF} are changes to non-firm Available Transfer Capability due to a change in the use of Transmission Service for that period, as defined in Business Practices.

counterflows_{NF} are adjustments to non-firm Available Transfer Capability as determined by the Transmission Service Provider and specified in its ATCID.

Standard MOD-029-1a(X)— Rated System Path Methodology

C. Measures

- M1.** Each Transmission Operator that uses the Rated System Path Methodology shall produce any Transmission model it used to calculate TTC for purposes of calculating ATC for each ATC Path, as required in R1, for the time horizon(s) to be examined. (R1)
 - M1.1.** Production shall be in the same form and format used by the Transmission Operator to calculate the TTC, as required in R1. (R1)
 - M1.2.** The Transmission model produced must include the areas listed in R1.1.1 (or an equivalent representation, as described in the requirement) (R1.1)
 - M1.3.** The Transmission model produced must show the use of the modeling parameters stated in R1.1.2 through R1.1.10; except that, no evidence shall be required to prove: 1) utilization of a Remedial Action Scheme where none was included in the model or 2) that no additions or retirements to the generation or Transmission system occurred. (R1.1.2 through R1.1.10)
 - M1.4.** The Transmission Operator must provide evidence that the models used to determine TTC included Facility Ratings as provided by the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner. (R1.2)
- M2.** Each Transmission Operator that uses the Rated System Path Methodology shall produce the ATCID it uses to show where it has described and used additional modeling criteria in its ACTID that are not otherwise included in MOD-29 (R1.1.4, R1.1.9, and R1.1.10).
- M3.** Each Transmission Operator that uses the Rated System Path Methodology with paths with ratings established prior to January 1, 1994 shall provide evidence the path and its rating were established prior to January 1, 1994. (R2.7)
- M4.** Each Transmission Operator that uses the Rated System Path Methodology shall produce as evidence the study reports, as required in R.2.8, for each path for which it determined TTC for the period examined. (R2)
- M5.** Each Transmission Operator shall provide evidence that it used the lesser of the calculated TTC or the SOL as the TTC, by producing: 1) all values calculated pursuant to R2 for each ATC Path, 2) Any corresponding SOLs for those ATC Paths, and 3) the TTC set by the Transmission Operator and given to the Transmission Service Provider for use in R7 and R8 for each ATC Path. (R3)
- M6.** Each Transmission Operator shall provide evidence (such as logs or data) that it provided the TTC and its study report to the Transmission Service Provider within seven calendar days of the finalization of the study report. (R4)
- M7.** The Transmission Service Provider shall demonstrate compliance with R5 by recalculating firm ETC for any specific time period as described in (MOD-001 R2), using the algorithm defined in R5 and with data used to calculate the specified value for the designated time period. The data used must meet the requirements specified in MOD-029-1(X) and the ATCID. To account for differences that may occur when recalculating the value (due to mixing automated and manual processes), any recalculated value that is within +/- 15% or 15 MW, whichever is greater, of the

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originally calculated value, is evidence that the Transmission Service Provider used the algorithm in R5 to calculate its firm ETC. (R5)

- M8.** The Transmission Service Provider shall demonstrate compliance with R5 by recalculating non-firm ETC for any specific time period as described in (MOD-001 R2), using the algorithm defined in R6 and with data used to calculate this specified value for the designated time period. The data used must meet the requirements specified in the MOD-029 and the ATCID. To account for differences that may occur when recalculating the value (due to mixing automated and manual processes), any recalculated value that is within +/- 15% or 15 MW, whichever is greater, of the originally calculated value, is evidence that the Transmission Service Provider used the algorithm in R6 to calculate its non-firm ETC. (R6)
- M9.** Each Transmission Service Provider shall produce the supporting documentation for the processes used to implement the algorithm that calculates firm ATCs, as required in R7. Such documentation must show that only the variables allowed in R7 were used to calculate firm ATCs, and that the processes use the current values for the variables as determined in the requirements or definitions. Note that any variable may legitimately be zero if the value is not applicable or calculated to be zero (such as counterflows, TRM, CBM, etc...). The supporting documentation may be provided in the same form and format as stored by the Transmission Service Provider. (R7)
- M10.** Each Transmission Service Provider shall produce the supporting documentation for the processes used to implement the algorithm that calculates non-firm ATCs, as required in R8. Such documentation must show that only the variables allowed in R8 were used to calculate non-firm ATCs, and that the processes use the current values for the variables as determined in the requirements or definitions. Note that any variable may legitimately be zero if the value is not applicable or calculated to be zero (such as counterflows, TRM, CBM, etc...). The supporting documentation may be provided in the same form and format as stored by the Transmission Service Provider. (R8)

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

Regional Entity.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame

Not applicable.

1.3. Data Retention

- The Transmission Operator and Transmission Service Provider shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:
- The Transmission Operator shall have its latest models used to determine TTC for R1. (M1)

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- The Transmission Operator shall have the current, in force ATCID(s) provided by its Transmission Service Provider(s) and any prior versions of the ATCID that were in force since the last compliance audit to show compliance with R1. (M2)
- The Transmission Operator shall retain evidence of any path and its rating that was established prior to January 1, 1994. (M3)
- The Transmission Operator shall retain the latest version and prior version of the TTC study reports to show compliance with R2. (M4)
- The Transmission Operator shall retain evidence for the most recent three calendar years plus the current year to show compliance with R3 and R4. (M5 and M6)
- The Transmission Service Provider shall retain evidence to show compliance in calculating hourly values required in R5 and R6 for the most recent 14 days; evidence to show compliance in calculating daily values required in R5 and R6 for the most recent 30 days; and evidence to show compliance in calculating daily values required in R5 and R6 for the most recent sixty days. (M7 and M8)
- The Transmission Service Provider shall retain evidence for the most recent three calendar years plus the current year to show compliance with R7 and R8. (M9 and M10)
- If a Transmission Service Provider or Transmission Operator is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until found compliant.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.4. Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Processes:

The following processes may be used:

- Compliance Audits
- Self-Certifications
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Violation Investigations
- Self-Reporting
- Complaints

1.5. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Violation Severity Levels

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----|--|--|--|---|
| R1. | <p>The Transmission Operator used a model that met all but one of the modeling requirements specified in R1.1.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Operator utilized one to ten Facility Ratings that were different from those specified by a Transmission Owner or Generation Owner in their Transmission model. (R1.2)</p> | <p>The Transmission Operator used a model that met all but two of the modeling requirements specified in R1.1.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Operator utilized eleven to twenty Facility Ratings that were different from those specified by a Transmission Owner or Generation Owner in their Transmission model. (R1.2)</p> | <p>The Transmission Operator used a model that met all but three of the modeling requirements specified in R1.1.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Operator utilized twenty-one to thirty Facility Ratings that were different from those specified by a Transmission Owner or Generation Owner in their Transmission model. (R1.2)</p> | <p>The Transmission Operator used a model that did not meet four or more of the modeling requirements specified in R1.1.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Transmission Operator utilized more than thirty Facility Ratings that were different from those specified by a Transmission Owner or Generation Owner in their Transmission model. (R1.2)</p> |
| R2 | <p>One or both of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator did not calculate TTC using one of the items in sub-requirements R2.1-R2.6. The Transmission Operator does not include one required item in the study report required in R2.8. | <p>One or both of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator did not calculate TTC using two of the items in sub-requirements R2.1-R2.6. The Transmission Operator does not include two required items in the study report required in R2.8. | <p>One or both of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator did not calculate TTC using three of the items in sub-requirements R2.1-R2.6. The Transmission Operator does not include three required items in the study report required in R2.8. | <p>One or more of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator did not calculate TTC using four or more of the items in sub-requirements R2.1-R2.6. The Transmission Operator did not apply R2.7. The Transmission Operator does not include four or more required items in the study report required in R2.8 |

Standard MOD-029-1a(X)— Rated System Path Methodology

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----|--|--|--|--|
| R3. | The Transmission Operator did not specify the TTC as the lesser of the TTC calculated using the process described in R2 or any associated SOL for more than zero ATC Paths, BUT, not more than 1% of all ATC Paths or 1 ATC Path (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Operator did not specify the TTC as the lesser of the TTC calculated using the process described in R2 or any associated SOL for more than 1% of all ATC Paths or 1 ATC Path (whichever is greater), BUT not more than 2% of all ATC Paths or 2 ATC Paths (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Operator did not specify the TTC as the lesser of the TTC calculated using the process described in R2 or any associated SOL for more than 2% of all ATC Paths or 2 ATC Paths (whichever is greater), BUT not more than 5% of all ATC Paths or 3 ATC Paths (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Operator did not specify the TTC as the lesser of the TTC calculated using the process described in R2 or any associated SOL, for more than 5% of all ATC Paths or 3 ATC Paths (whichever is greater). |
| R4. | The Transmission Operator provided the TTC and study report to the Transmission Service Provider more than seven, but not more than 14 calendar days after the report was finalized. | The Transmission Operator provided the TTC and study report to the Transmission Service Provider more than 14, but not more than 21 calendar days after the report was finalized. | The Transmission Operator provided the TTC and study report to the Transmission Service Provider more than 21, but not more than 28 calendar days after the report was finalized. | The Transmission Operator provided the TTC and study report to the Transmission Service Provider more than 28 calendar days after the report was finalized. |
| R5. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M7 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 15% of the value calculated in the measure or 15MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 25% of the value calculated in the measure or 25MW, whichever is greater. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M7 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 25% of the value calculated in the measure or 25MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 35% of the value calculated in the measure or 35MW, whichever is greater. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M7 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 35% of the value calculated in the measure or 35MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 45% of the value calculated in the measure or 45MW, whichever is greater. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M7 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 45% of the value calculated in the measure or 45MW, whichever is greater. |

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| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----|--|--|--|--|
| R6. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a non-firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M8 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 15% of the value calculated in the measure or 15MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 25% of the value calculated in the measure or 25MW, whichever is greater. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a non-firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M8 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 25% of the value calculated in the measure or 25MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 35% of the value calculated in the measure or 35MW, whichever is greater. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a non-firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M8 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 35% of the value calculated in the measure or 35MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 45% of the value calculated in the measure or 45MW, whichever is greater. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a non-firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M8 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 45% of the value calculated in the measure or 45MW, whichever is greater. |
| R7. | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R7 when determining firm ATC, or used additional elements, for more than zero ATC Paths, but not more than 5% of all ATC Paths or 1 ATC Path (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R7 when determining firm ATC, or used additional elements, for more than 5% of all ATC Paths or 1 ATC Path (whichever is greater), but not more than 10% of all ATC Paths or 2 ATC Paths (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R7 when determining firm ATC, or used additional elements, for more than 10% of all ATC Paths or 2 ATC Paths (whichever is greater), but not more than 15% of all ATC Paths or 3 ATC Paths (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R7 when determining firm ATC, or used additional elements, for more than 15% of all ATC Paths or more than 3 ATC Paths (whichever is greater). |
| R8. | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R8 when determining non-firm ATC, or used additional elements, for more than zero ATC Paths, but not more than 5% of all ATC Paths or 1 ATC Path (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R8 when determining non-firm ATC, or used additional elements, for more than 5% of all ATC Paths or 1 ATC Path (whichever is greater), but not more than 10% of all ATC Paths or 2 ATC Paths (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R8 when determining non-firm ATC, or used additional elements, for more than 10% of all ATC Paths or 2 ATC Paths (whichever is greater), but not more than 15% of all ATC Paths or 3 ATC Paths (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R8 when determining non-firm ATC, or used additional elements, for more than 15% of all ATC Paths or more than 3 ATC Paths (whichever is greater). |

Standard MOD-029-1a(X) — Rated System Path Methodology

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|--------------|------------------------------|--|---|
| 1 | 8/26/2008 | Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees | |
| 1a | Board approved 11/05/2009 | Interpretation of R5 and R6 | Interpretation (Project 2009-15) |
| 1a | February 28, 2014 | Updated VSLs based on June 24, 2013 approval. | |
| <u>1a(X)</u> | <u>TBD</u> | <u>Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees</u> | <u>Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS</u> |

Appendix 1

| Requirement Number and Text of Requirement |
|---|
| <p>MOD-001-01 Requirement R2:</p> <p>R2. Each Transmission Service Provider shall calculate ATC or AFC values as listed below using the methodology or methodologies selected by its Transmission Operator(s):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">R2.1. Hourly values for at least the next 48 hours.R2.2. Daily values for at least the next 31 calendar days.R2.3. Monthly values for at least the next 12 months (months 2-13). |
| <p>MOD-001-01 Requirement R8:</p> <p>R8. Each Transmission Service Provider that calculates ATC shall recalculate ATC at a minimum on the following frequency, unless none of the calculated values identified in the ATC equation have changed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">R8.1. Hourly values, once per hour. Transmission Service Providers are allowed up to 175 hours per calendar year during which calculations are not required to be performed, despite a change in a calculated value identified in the ATC equation.R8.2. Daily values, once per day.R8.3. Monthly values, once per week. |
| Question #1 |
| <p>Is the “advisory ATC” used under the NYISO tariff subject to the ATC calculation and recalculation requirements in MOD-001-1 Requirements R2 and R8? If not, is it necessary to document the frequency of “advisory” calculations in the responsible entity’s Available Transfer Capability Implementation Document?</p> |
| Response to Question #1 |
| <p>Requirements R2 and R8 of MOD-001-1 are both related to Requirement R1, which defines that ATC methodologies are to be applied to specific “ATC Paths.” The NERC definition of ATC Path is “Any combination of Point of Receipt and Point of Delivery for which ATC is calculated; and any Posted Path.” Based on a review of the language included in this request, the NYISO Open Access Transmission Tariff, and other information posted on the NYISO Web site, it appears that the NYISO does indeed have multiple ATC Paths, which are subject to the calculation and recalculation requirements in Requirements R2 and R8. It appears from reviewing this information that ATC is defined in the NYISO tariff in the same manner in which NERC defines it, making it difficult to conclude that NYISO’s “advisory ATC” is not the same as ATC. In addition, it appears that pre-scheduling is permitted on certain external paths, making the calculation of ATC prior to day ahead necessary on those paths.</p> |

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The second part of NYISO's question is only applicable if the first part was answered in the negative and therefore will not be addressed.

Requirement Number and Text of Requirement

MOD-029-01(X) Requirements R5 and R6:

R5. When calculating ETC for firm Existing Transmission Commitments (ETC_F) for a specified period for an ATC Path, the Transmission Service Provider shall use the algorithm below:

$$ETC_F = NL_F + NITS_F + GF_F + PTP_F + ROR_F + OS_F$$

Where:

NL_F is the firm capacity set aside to serve peak Native Load forecast commitments for the time period being calculated, to include losses, and Native Load growth, not otherwise included in Transmission Reliability Margin or Capacity Benefit Margin.

$NITS_F$ is the firm capacity reserved for Network Integration Transmission Service serving Load, to include losses, and Load growth, not otherwise included in Transmission Reliability Margin or Capacity Benefit Margin.

GF_F is the firm capacity set aside for grandfathered Transmission Service and contracts for energy and/or Transmission Service, where executed prior to the effective date of a Transmission Service Provider's Open Access Transmission Tariff or "safe harbor tariff."

PTP_F is the firm capacity reserved for confirmed Point-to-Point Transmission Service.

ROR_F is the firm capacity reserved for Roll-over rights for contracts granting Transmission Customers the right of first refusal to take or continue to take Transmission Service when the Transmission Customer's Transmission Service contract expires or is eligible for renewal.

OS_F is the firm capacity reserved for any other service(s), contract(s), or agreement(s) not specified above using Firm Transmission Service as specified in the ATCID.

R6. When calculating ETC for non-firm Existing Transmission Commitments (ETC_{NF}) for all time horizons for an ATC Path the Transmission Service Provider shall use the following algorithm:

$$ETC_{NF} = NITS_{NF} + GF_{NF} + PTP_{NF} + OS_{NF}$$

Where:

$NITS_{NF}$ is the non-firm capacity set aside for Network Integration Transmission Service serving Load (i.e., secondary service), to include losses, and load growth not otherwise included in Transmission Reliability Margin or Capacity Benefit Margin.

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GF_{NF} is the non-firm capacity set aside for grandfathered Transmission Service and contracts for energy and/or Transmission Service, where executed prior to the effective date of a Transmission Service Provider's Open Access Transmission Tariff or "safe harbor tariff."

PTP_{NF} is non-firm capacity reserved for confirmed Point-to-Point Transmission Service.

OS_{NF} is the non-firm capacity reserved for any other service(s), contract(s), or agreement(s) not specified above using non-firm transmission service as specified in the ATCID.

Question #2

Could OS_F in MOD-029-1(X) Requirement R5 and OS_{NF} in MOD-029-1(X) Requirement R6 be calculated using Transmission Flow Utilization in the determination of ATC?

Response to Question #2

This request for interpretation and the NYISO Open Access Transmission Tariff describe the NYISO's concept of "Transmission Flow Utilization;" however, it is unclear whether or not Native Load, Point-to-Point Transmission Service, Network Integration Transmission Service, or any of the other components explicitly defined in Requirements R5 and R6 are incorporated into "Transmission Flow Utilization." Provided that "Transmission Flow Utilization" does not include Native Load, Point-to-Point Transmission Service, Network Integration Transmission Service, or any of the other components explicitly defined in Requirements R5 and R6, it is appropriate to be included within the "Other Services" term. However, if "Transmission Flow Utilization" does incorporate those components, then simply including "Transmission Flow Utilization" in "Other Service" would be inappropriate.

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** **Flowgate Methodology**
2. **Number:** **MOD-030-02(X)**
3. **Purpose:** To increase consistency and reliability in the development and documentation of transfer capability calculations for short-term use performed by entities using the Flowgate Methodology to support analysis and system operations.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1.1 Each Transmission Operator that uses the Flowgate Methodology to support the calculation of Available Flowgate Capabilities (AFCs) on Flowgates.
 - 4.1.2 Each Transmission Service Provider that uses the Flowgate Methodology to calculate AFCs on Flowgates.
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1. The Transmission Service Provider shall include in its “Available Transfer Capability Implementation Document” (ATCID): [*Violation Risk Factor: To Be Determined*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
 - R1.1. The criteria used by the Transmission Operator to identify sets of Transmission Facilities as Flowgates that are to be considered in Available Flowgate Capability (AFC) calculations.
 - R1.2. The following information on how source and sink for transmission service is accounted for in AFC calculations including:
 - R1.2.1. Define if the source used for AFC calculations is obtained from the source field or the Point of Receipt (POR) field of the transmission reservation.
 - R1.2.2. Define if the sink used for AFC calculations is obtained from the sink field or the Point of Delivery (POD) field of the transmission reservation.
 - R1.2.3. The source/sink or POR/POD identification and mapping to the model.
 - R1.2.4. If the Transmission Service Provider’s AFC calculation process involves a grouping of generators, the ATCID must identify how these generators participate in the group.
- R2. The Transmission Operator shall perform the following: [*Violation Risk Factor: To Be Determined*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
 - R2.1. Include Flowgates used in the AFC process based, at a minimum, on the following criteria:
 - R2.1.1. Results of a first Contingency transfer analysis for ATC Paths internal to a Transmission Operator’s system up to the path capability such that at a

minimum the first three limiting Elements and their worst associated Contingency combinations with an OTDF of at least 5% and within the Transmission Operator's system are included as Flowgates.

R2.1.1.1. Use first Contingency criteria consistent with those first Contingency criteria used in planning of operations for the applicable time periods, including use of Remedial Action Schemes.

R2.1.1.2. Only the most limiting element in a series configuration needs to be included as a Flowgate.

R2.1.1.3. If any limiting element is kept within its limit for its associated worst Contingency by operating within the limits of another Flowgate, then no new Flowgate needs to be established for such limiting elements or Contingencies.

R2.1.2. Results of a first Contingency transfer analysis from all adjacent Balancing Authority source and sink (as defined in the ATCID) combinations up to the path capability such that at a minimum the first three limiting Elements and their worst associated Contingency combinations with an Outage Transfer Distribution Factor (OTDF) of at least 5% and within the Transmission Operator's system are included as Flowgates unless the interface between such adjacent Balancing Authorities is accounted for using another ATC methodology.

R2.1.2.1. Use first Contingency criteria consistent with those first Contingency criteria used in planning of operations for the applicable time periods, including use of Remedial Action Schemes.

R2.1.2.2. Only the most limiting element in a series configuration needs to be included as a Flowgate.

R2.1.2.3. If any limiting element is kept within its limit for its associated worst Contingency by operating within the limits of another Flowgate, then no new Flowgate needs to be established for such limiting elements or Contingencies.

R2.1.3. Any limiting Element/Contingency combination at least within its Reliability Coordinator's Area that has been subjected to an Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure within the last 12 months, unless the limiting Element/Contingency combination is accounted for using another ATC methodology or was created to address temporary operating conditions.

R2.1.4. Any limiting Element/Contingency combination within the Transmission model that has been requested to be included by any other Transmission Service Provider using the Flowgate Methodology or Area Interchange Methodology, where:

R2.1.4.1. The coordination of the limiting Element/Contingency combination is not already addressed through a different methodology, and

- Any generator within the Transmission Service Provider's area has at least a 5% Power Transfer Distribution Factor

(PTDF) or Outage Transfer Distribution Factor (OTDF) impact on the Flowgate when delivered to the aggregate load of its own area, or

- A transfer from any Balancing Area within the Transmission Service Provider's area to a Balancing Area adjacent has at least a 5% PTDF or OTDF impact on the Flowgate.
- The Transmission Operator may utilize distribution factors less than 5% if desired.

R2.1.4.2. The limiting Element/Contingency combination is included in the requesting Transmission Service Provider's methodology.

- R2.2.** At a minimum, establish a list of Flowgates by creating, modifying, or deleting Flowgate definitions at least once per calendar year.
- R2.3.** At a minimum, establish a list of Flowgates by creating, modifying, or deleting Flowgates that have been requested as part of R2.1.4 within thirty calendar days from the request.
- R2.4.** Establish the TFC of each of the defined Flowgates as equal to:
- For thermal limits, the System Operating Limit (SOL) of the Flowgate.
 - For voltage or stability limits, the flow that will respect the SOL of the Flowgate.
- R2.5.** At a minimum, establish the TFC once per calendar year.
- R2.5.1.** If notified of a change in the Rating by the Transmission Owner that would affect the TFC of a flowgate used in the AFC process, the TFC should be updated within seven calendar days of the notification.
- R2.6.** Provide the Transmission Service Provider with the TFCs within seven calendar days of their establishment.
- R3.** The Transmission Operator shall make available to the Transmission Service Provider a Transmission model to determine Available Flowgate Capability (AFC) that meets the following criteria: [*Violation Risk Factor: To Be Determined*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
- R3.1.** Contains generation Facility Ratings, such as generation maximum and minimum output levels, specified by the Generator Owners of the Facilities within the model.
- R3.2.** Updated at least once per day for AFC calculations for intra-day, next day, and days two through 30.
- R3.3.** Updated at least once per month for AFC calculations for months two through 13.
- R3.4.** Contains modeling data and system topology for the Facilities within its Reliability Coordinator's Area. Equivalent representation of radial lines and Facilities 161kV or below is allowed.
- R3.5.** Contains modeling data and system topology (or equivalent representation) for immediately adjacent and beyond Reliability Coordination Areas.
- R4.** When calculating AFCs, the Transmission Service Provider shall represent the impact of Transmission Service as follows: [*Violation Risk Factor: To Be Determined*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

- If the source, as specified in the ATCID, has been identified in the reservation and it is discretely modeled in the Transmission Service Provider’s Transmission model, use the discretely modeled point as the source.
 - If the source, as specified in the ATCID, has been identified in the reservation and the point can be mapped to an “equivalence” or “aggregate” representation in the Transmission Service Provider’s Transmission model, use the modeled equivalence or aggregate as the source.
 - If the source, as specified in the ATCID, has been identified in the reservation and the point cannot be mapped to a discretely modeled point or an “equivalence” representation in the Transmission Service Provider’s Transmission model, use the immediately adjacent Balancing Authority associated with the Transmission Service Provider from which the power is to be received as the source.
 - If the source, as specified in the ATCID, has not been identified in the reservation use the immediately adjacent Balancing Authority associated with the Transmission Service Provider from which the power is to be received as the source.
 - If the sink, as specified in the ATCID, has been identified in the reservation and it is discretely modeled in the Transmission Service Provider’s Transmission model, use the discretely modeled point as the sink.
 - If the sink, as specified in the ATCID, has been identified in the reservation and the point can be mapped to an “equivalence” or “aggregate” representation in the Transmission Service Provider’s Transmission model, use the modeled equivalence or aggregate as the sink.
 - If the sink, as specified in the ATCID, has been identified in the reservation and the point cannot be mapped to a discretely modeled point or an “equivalence” representation in the Transmission Service Provider’s Transmission model, use the immediately adjacent Balancing Authority associated with the Transmission Service Provider receiving the power as the sink.
 - If the sink, as specified in the ATCID, has not been identified in the reservation use the immediately adjacent Balancing Authority associated with the Transmission Service Provider receiving the power as the sink.
- R5.** When calculating AFCs, the Transmission Service Provider shall: [*Violation Risk Factor: To Be Determined*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
- R5.1.** Use the models provided by the Transmission Operator.
 - R5.2.** Include in the transmission model expected generation and Transmission outages, additions, and retirements within the scope of the model as specified in the ATCID and in effect during the applicable period of the AFC calculation for the Transmission Service Provider’s area, all adjacent Transmission Service Providers, and any Transmission Service Providers with which coordination agreements have been executed.
 - R5.3.** For external Flowgates, identified in R2.1.4, use the AFC provided by the Transmission Service Provider that calculates AFC for that Flowgate.
- R6.** When calculating the impact of ETC for firm commitments (ETC_{Fi}) for all time periods for a Flowgate, the Transmission Service Provider shall sum the following: [*Violation Risk Factor: To Be Determined*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

- R6.1.** The impact of firm Network Integration Transmission Service, including the impacts of generation to load, in the model referenced in R5.2 for the Transmission Service Provider's area, based on:
 - R6.1.1.** Load forecast for the time period being calculated, including Native Load and Network Service load
 - R6.1.2.** Unit commitment and Dispatch Order, to include all designated network resources and other resources that are committed or have the legal obligation to run as specified in the Transmission Service Provider's ATCID.
- R6.2.** The impact of any firm Network Integration Transmission Service, including the impacts of generation to load in the model referenced in R5.2 and has a distribution factor equal to or greater than the percentage¹ used to curtail in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure used by the Transmission Service Provider, for all adjacent Transmission Service Providers and any other Transmission Service Providers with which coordination agreements have been executed based on:
 - R6.2.1.** Load forecast for the time period being calculated, including Native Load and Network Service load
 - R6.2.2.** Unit commitment and Dispatch Order, to include all designated network resources and other resources that are committed or have the legal obligation to run as specified in the Transmission Service Provider's ATCID.
- R6.3.** The impact of all confirmed firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service expected to be scheduled, including roll-over rights for Firm Transmission Service contracts, for the Transmission Service Provider's area.
- R6.4.** The impact of any confirmed firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service expected to be scheduled, filtered to reduce or eliminate duplicate impacts from transactions using Transmission service from multiple Transmission Service Providers, including roll-over rights for Firm Transmission Service contracts having a distribution factor equal to or greater than the percentage² used to curtail in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure used by the Transmission Service Provider, for all adjacent Transmission Service Providers and any other Transmission Service Providers with which coordination agreements have been executed.
- R6.5.** The impact of any Grandfathered firm obligations expected to be scheduled or expected to flow for the Transmission Service Provider's area.
- R6.6.** The impact of any Grandfathered firm obligations expected to be scheduled or expected to flow that have a distribution factor equal to or greater than the percentage³ used to curtail in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure used by the Transmission Service Provider, for all adjacent Transmission

¹ A percentage less than that used in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure may be utilized.

² A percentage less than that used in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure may be utilized.

³ A percentage less than that used in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure may be utilized.

Service Providers and any other Transmission Service Providers with which coordination agreements have been executed.

- R6.7.** The impact of other firm services determined by the Transmission Service Provider.
- R7.** When calculating the impact of ETC for non-firm commitments (ETC_{NFi}) for all time periods for a Flowgate the Transmission Service Provider shall sum: [*Violation Risk Factor: To Be Determined*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
- R7.1.** The impact of all confirmed non-firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service expected to be scheduled for the Transmission Service Provider's area.
- R7.2.** The impact of any confirmed non-firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service expected to be scheduled, filtered to reduce or eliminate duplicate impacts from transactions using Transmission service from multiple Transmission Service Providers, that have a distribution factor equal to or greater than the percentage⁴ used to curtail in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure used by the Transmission Service Provider, for all adjacent Transmission Service Providers and any other Transmission Service Providers with which coordination agreements have been executed.
- R7.3.** The impact of any Grandfathered non-firm obligations expected to be scheduled or expected to flow for the Transmission Service Provider's area.
- R7.4.** The impact of any Grandfathered non-firm obligations expected to be scheduled or expected to flow that have a distribution factor equal to or greater than the percentage⁵ used to curtail in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure used by the Transmission Service Provider, for all adjacent Transmission Service Providers and any other Transmission Service Providers with which coordination agreements have been executed.
- R7.5.** The impact of non-firm Network Integration Transmission Service serving Load within the Transmission Service Provider's area (i.e., secondary service), to include load growth, and losses not otherwise included in Transmission Reliability Margin or Capacity Benefit Margin.
- R7.6.** The impact of any non-firm Network Integration Transmission Service (secondary service) with a distribution factor equal to or greater than the percentage⁶ used to curtail in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure used by the Transmission Service Provider, filtered to reduce or eliminate duplicate impacts from transactions using Transmission service from multiple Transmission Service Providers, for all adjacent Transmission Service Providers and any other Transmission Service Providers with which coordination agreements have been executed.
- R7.7.** The impact of other non-firm services determined by the Transmission Service Provider.

⁴ A percentage less than that used in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure may be utilized.

⁵ A percentage less than that used in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure may be utilized.

⁶ A percentage less than that used in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure may be utilized.

- R8.** When calculating firm AFC for a Flowgate for a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider shall use the following algorithm (subject to allocation processes described in the ATCID): [*Violation Risk Factor: To Be Determined*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

$$AFC_F = TFC - ETC_{Fi} - CBM_i - TRM_i + Postbacks_{SFi} + counterflows_{Fi}$$

Where:

AFC_F is the firm Available Flowgate Capability for the Flowgate for that period.

TFC is the Total Flowgate Capability of the Flowgate.

ETC_{Fi} is the sum of the impacts of existing firm Transmission commitments for the Flowgate during that period.

CBM_i is the impact of the Capacity Benefit Margin on the Flowgate during that period.

TRM_i is the impact of the Transmission Reliability Margin on the Flowgate during that period.

Postbacks_{Fi} are changes to firm AFC due to a change in the use of Transmission Service for that period, as defined in Business Practices.

counterflows_{Fi} are adjustments to firm AFC as determined by the Transmission Service Provider and specified in their ATCID.

- R9.** When calculating non-firm AFC for a Flowgate for a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider shall use the following algorithm (subject to allocation processes described in the ATCID): [*Violation Risk Factor: To Be Determined*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

$$AFC_{NF} = TFC - ETC_{Fi} - ETC_{NFi} - CBM_{Si} - TRM_{Ui} + Postbacks_{SNFi} + counterflows$$

Where:

AFC_{NF} is the non-firm Available Flowgate Capability for the Flowgate for that period.

TFC is the Total Flowgate Capability of the Flowgate.

ETC_{Fi} is the sum of the impacts of existing firm Transmission commitments for the Flowgate during that period.

ETC_{NFi} is the sum of the impacts of existing non-firm Transmission commitments for the Flowgate during that period.

CBM_{Si} is the impact of any schedules during that period using Capacity Benefit Margin.

TRM_{Ui} is the impact on the Flowgate of the Transmission Reliability Margin that has not been released (unreleased) for sale as non-firm capacity by the Transmission Service Provider during that period.

Postbacks_{NF} are changes to non-firm Available Flowgate Capability due to a change in the use of Transmission Service for that period, as defined in Business Practices.

counterflows_{NF} are adjustments to non-firm AFC as determined by the Transmission Service Provider and specified in their ATCID.

- R10.** Each Transmission Service Provider shall recalculate AFC, utilizing the updated models described in R3.2, R3.3, and R5, at a minimum on the following frequency, unless none of the calculated values identified in the AFC equation have changed: [*Violation Risk Factor: To Be Determined*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

- R10.1.** For hourly AFC, once per hour. Transmission Service Providers are allowed up to 175 hours per calendar year during which calculations are not required to be performed, despite a change in a calculated value identified in the AFC equation.
- R10.2.** For daily AFC, once per day.
- R10.3.** For monthly AFC, once per week.
- R11.** When converting Flowgate AFCs to ATCs for ATC Paths, the Transmission Service Provider shall convert those values based on the following algorithm: [*Violation Risk Factor: To Be Determined*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

$$ATC = \min(P)$$

$$P = \{PATC_1, PATC_2, \dots, PATC_n\}$$

$$PATC_n = \frac{AFC_n}{DF_{np}}$$

Where:

ATC is the Available Transfer Capability.

P is the set of partial Available Transfer Capabilities for all “impacted” Flowgates honored by the Transmission Service Provider; a Flowgate is considered “impacted” by a path if the Distribution Factor for that path is greater than the percentage⁷ used to curtail in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure used by the Transmission Service Provider on an OTDF Flowgate or PTDF Flowgate.

PATC_n is the partial Available Transfer Capability for a path relative to a Flowgate *n*.

AFC_n is the Available Flowgate Capability of a Flowgate *n*.

DF_{np} is the distribution factor for Flowgate *n* relative to path *p*.

C. Measures

- M1.** Each Transmission Service Provider shall provide its ATCID and other evidence (such as written documentation) to show that its ATCID contains the criteria used by the Transmission Operator to identify sets of Transmission Facilities as Flowgates and information on how sources and sinks are accounted for in AFC calculations. (R1)
- M2.** The Transmission Operator shall provide evidence (such as studies and working papers) that all Flowgates that meet the criteria described in R2.1 are considered in its AFC calculations. (R2.1)
- M3.** The Transmission Operator shall provide evidence (such as logs) that it updated its list of Flowgates at least once per calendar year. (R2.2)
- M4.** The Transmission Operator shall provide evidence (such as logs and dated requests) that it updated the list of Flowgates within thirty calendar days from a request. (R2.3)
- M5.** The Transmission Operator shall provide evidence (such as data or models) that it determined the TFC for each Flowgate as defined in R2.4. (R2.4)

⁷ A percentage less than that used in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure may be utilized.

- M6.** The Transmission Operator shall provide evidence (such as logs) that it established the TFCs for each Flowgate in accordance with the timing defined in R2.5. (R2.5)
- M7.** The Transmission Operator shall provide evidence (such as logs and electronic communication) that it provided the Transmission Service Provider with updated TFCs within seven calendar days of their determination. (R2.6)
- M8.** The Transmission Operator shall provide evidence (such as written documentation, logs, models, and data) that the Transmission model used to determine AFCs contains the information specified in R3. (R3)
- M9.** The Transmission Service Provider shall provide evidence (such as written documentation and data) that the modeling of point-to-point reservations was based on the rules described in R4. (R4)
- M10.** The Transmission Service Provider shall provide evidence including the models received from Transmission Operators and other evidence (such as documentation and data) to show that it used the Transmission Operator's models in calculating AFC. (R5.1)
- M11.** The Transmission Service Provider shall provide evidence (such as written documentation, electronic communications, and data) that all expected generation and Transmission outages, additions, and retirements were included in the AFC calculation as specified in the ATCID. (R5.2)
- M12.** The Transmission Service Provider shall provide evidence (such as logs, electronic communications, and data) that AFCs provided by third parties on external Flowgates were used instead of those calculated by the Transmission Operator. (R5.3)
- M13.** The Transmission Service Provider shall demonstrate compliance with R6 by recalculating firm ETC for any specific time period as described in (MOD-001 R2), using the requirements defined in R6 and with data used to calculate the specified value for the designated time period. The data used must meet the requirements specified in this standard and the ATCID. To account for differences that may occur when recalculating the value (due to mixing automated and manual processes), any recalculated value that is within +/- 15% or 15 MW, whichever is greater, of the originally calculated value, is evidence that the Transmission Service Provider used the requirements defined in R6 to calculate its firm ETC. (R6)
- M14.** The Transmission Service Provider shall demonstrate compliance with R7 by recalculating non-firm ETC for any specific time period as described in (MOD-001 R2), using the requirements defined in R7 and with data used to calculate the specified value for the designated time period. The data used must meet the requirements specified in the standard and the ATCID. To account for differences that may occur when recalculating the value (due to mixing automated and manual processes), any recalculated value that is within +/- 15% or 15 MW, whichever is greater, of the originally calculated value, is evidence that the Transmission Service Provider used the requirements in R7 to calculate its non-firm ETC. (R7)
- M15.** Each Transmission Service Provider shall produce the supporting documentation for the processes used to implement the algorithm that calculates firm AFCs, as required in R8. Such documentation must show that only the variables allowed in R8 were used to calculate firm AFCs, and that the processes use the current values for the variables as determined in the requirements or definitions. Note that any variable may legitimately be zero if the value is not applicable or calculated to be zero (such as counterflows, TRM, CBM, etc...). The supporting documentation may be provided in the same form and format as stored by the Transmission Service Provider. (R8)

- M16.** Each Transmission Service Provider shall produce the supporting documentation for the processes used to implement the algorithm that calculates non-firm AFCs, as required in R9. Such documentation must show that only the variables allowed in R9 were used to calculate non-firm AFCs, and that the processes use the current values for the variables as determined in the requirements or definitions. Note that any variable may legitimately be zero if the value is not applicable or calculated to be zero (such as counterflows, TRM, CBM, etc...). The supporting documentation may be provided in the same form and format as stored by the Transmission Service Provider. (R9)
- M17.** The Transmission Service Provider shall provide evidence (such as documentation, dated logs, and data) that it calculated AFC on the frequency defined in R10. (R10)
- M18.** The Transmission Service Provider shall provide evidence (such as documentation and data) when converting Flowgate AFCs to ATCs for ATC Paths, it follows the procedure described in R11. (R11)

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

Regional Entity.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame

Not applicable.

1.3. Data Retention

The Transmission Operator and Transmission Service Provider shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

- The Transmission Service Provider shall retain its current, in force ATCID and any prior versions of the ATCID that were in force since the last compliance audit to show compliance with R1.
- The Transmission Operator shall have its latest model used to determine flowgates and TFC and evidence of the previous version to show compliance with R2 and R3.
- The Transmission Operator shall retain evidence to show compliance with R2.1, R2.3 for the most recent 12 months.
- The Transmission Operator shall retain evidence to show compliance with R2.2, R2.4 and R2.5 for the most recent three calendar years plus current year.
- The Transmission Service Provider shall retain evidence to show compliance with R4 for 12 months or until the model used to calculate AFC is updated, whichever is longer.
- The Transmission Service Provider shall retain evidence to show compliance with R5, R8, R9, R10, and R11 for the most recent calendar year plus current year.
- The Transmission Service Provider shall retain evidence to show compliance in calculating hourly values required in R6 and R7 for the most recent 14 days; evidence to show compliance in calculating daily values required in R6 and R7 for the most recent 30 days; and evidence to show compliance in calculating monthly values required in R6 and R7 for the most recent sixty days.

- If a Transmission Service Provider or Transmission Operator is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until found compliant.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.4. Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Processes:

The following processes may be used:

- Compliance Audits
- Self-Certifications
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Violation Investigations
- Self-Reporting
- Complaints

1.5. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Violation Severity Levels

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----|---|--|--|--|
| R1. | The Transmission Service Provider does not include in its ATCID one or two of the sub-requirements listed under R1.2, or the sub-requirement is incomplete. | The Transmission Service Provider does not include in its ATCID three of the sub-requirements listed under R1.2, or the sub-requirement is incomplete. | The Transmission Service Provider does not include in its ATCID the information described in R1.1. OR The Transmission Service Provider does not include in its ATCID the information described in R1.2 (1.2.1, 1.2.2., 1.2.3, and 1.2.4 are missing). | The Transmission Service Provider does not include in its ATCID the information described in R1.1 and R1.2 (1.2.1, 1.2.2., 1.2.3, and 1.2.4 are missing). |
| R2. | One or more of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator established its list of Flowgates less frequently than once per calendar year, but not more than three months late as described in R2.2. The Transmission Operator established its list of Flowgates more than thirty days, but not more than sixty days, following a request to create, modify or delete a flowgate as described in R2.3. The Transmission Operator has not updated its Flowgate TFC when notified by the Transmission Owner in more than 7 days, but it has not | One or more of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator did not include a Flowgate in their AFC calculations that met the criteria described in R2.1. The Transmission Operator established its list of Flowgates more than three months late, but not more than six months late as described in R2.2. The Transmission Operator established its list of Flowgates more than sixty days, but not more than ninety days, following a request to create, modify or delete a flowgate as described in R2.3. | One or more of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator did not include two to five Flowgates in their AFC calculations that met the criteria described in R2.1. The Transmission Operator established its list of Flowgates more than six months late, but not more than nine months late as described in R2.2. The Transmission Operator established its list of Flowgates more than ninety days, but not more than 120 days, following a request to create, modify or delete a flowgate as described in R2.3. | One or more of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator did not include six or more Flowgates in their AFC calculations that met the criteria described in R2.1. The Transmission Operator established its list of Flowgates more than nine months late as described in R2.2. The Transmission Operator did not establish its list of internal Flowgates as described in R2.2. The Transmission Operator established its list of Flowgates more than 120 days following a request to create, modify or delete a |

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----|---|---|---|--|
| | <p>been more than 14 days since the notification (R2.5.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator has not provided its Transmission Service Provider with its Flowgate TFCs within seven days (one week) of their determination, but is has not been more than 14 days (two weeks) since their determination. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator has not updated its Flowgate TFCs at least once within a calendar year, and it has been not more than 15 months since the last update. The Transmission Operator has not updated its Flowgate TFC when notified by the Transmission Owner in more than 14 days, but it has not been more than 21 days since the notification (R2.5.1) The Transmission Operator has not provided its Transmission Service Provider with its Flowgate TFCs in more than 14 days (two weeks) of their determination, but is has not been more than 21 days (three weeks) since their determination. | <p>The Transmission Operator has not updated its Flowgate TFCs at least once within a calendar year, and it has been more than 15 months but not more than 18 months since the last update.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator has not updated its Flowgate TFCs when notified by the Transmission Owner in more than 21 days, but it has not been more than 28 days since the notification (R2.5.1) The Transmission Operator has not provided its Transmission Service Provider with its Flowgate TFCs in more than 21 days (three weeks) of their determination, but is has not been more than 28 days (four weeks) since their determination. | <p>flowgate as described in R2.3.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator did not establish its list of external Flowgates following a request to create, modify or delete an external flowgate as described in R2.3. The Transmission Operator did not determine the TFC for a flowgate as described in R2.4. The Transmission Operator has not updated its Flowgate TFCs at least once within a calendar year, and it has been more than 18 months since the last update. (R2.5) The Transmission Operator has not updated its Flowgate TFCs when notified by the Transmission Owner in more than 28 calendar days (R2.5.1) The Transmission Operator has not provided its Transmission Service Provider with its Flowgate TFCs in more than 28 days (4 weeks) of their determination. |

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----|---|--|--|---|
| R3. | <p>One or more of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Transmission Operator used one to ten Facility Ratings that were different from those specified by a Transmission or Generator Owner in their Transmission model. • The Transmission Operator did not update the model per R3.2 for one or more calendar days but not more than 2 calendar days • The Transmission Operator did not update the model for per R3.3 for one or more months but not more than six weeks | <p>One or more of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Transmission Operator used eleven to twenty Facility Ratings that were different from those specified by a Transmission or Generator Owner in their Transmission model. • The Transmission Operator did not update the model per R3.2 for more than 2 calendar days but not more than 3 calendar days • The Transmission Operator did not update the model for per R3.3 for more than six weeks but not more than eight weeks | <p>One or more of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Transmission Operator used twenty-one to thirty Facility Ratings that were different from those specified by a Transmission or Generator Owner in their Transmission model. • The Transmission Operator did not update the model per R3.2 for more than 3 calendar days but not more than 4 calendar days • The Transmission Operator did not update the model for per R3.3 for more than eight weeks but not more than ten weeks | <p>One or more of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Transmission Operator did not update the model per R3.2 for more than 4 calendar days • The Transmission Operator did not update the model for per R3.3 for more than ten weeks • The Transmission Operator used more than thirty Facility Ratings that were different from those specified by a Transmission or Generator Owner in their Transmission model. • The Transmission operator did not include in the Transmission model detailed modeling data and topology for its own Reliability Coordinator area. • The Transmission operator did not include in the Transmission modeling data and topology for immediately adjacent and beyond Reliability Coordinator area. |
| R4. | <p>The Transmission Service Provider did not represent the impact of Transmission Service as described in R4 for more than zero, but not more than</p> | <p>The Transmission Service Provider did not represent the impact of Transmission Service as described in R4 for more than 5%, but not more than</p> | <p>The Transmission Service Provider did not represent the impact of Transmission Service as described in R4 for more than 10%, but not more than</p> | <p>The Transmission Service Provider did not represent the impact of Transmission Service as described in R4 for more than 15% of all reservations; or</p> |

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| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----|--|--|--|--|
| | 5% of all reservations; or more than zero, but not more than 1 reservation, whichever is greater.. | 10% of all reservations; or more than 1, but not more than 2 reservations, whichever is greater.. | 15% of all reservations; or more than 2, but not more than 3 reservations, whichever is greater.. | more than 3 reservations, whichever is greater.. |
| R5. | The Transmission Service Provider did not include in the AFC process one to ten expected generation or Transmission outages, additions or retirements within the scope of the model as specified in the ATCID. | The Transmission Service Provider did not include in the AFC process eleven to twenty-five expected generation and Transmission outages, additions or retirements within the scope of the model as specified in the ATCID. | The Transmission Service Provider did not include in the AFC process twenty-six to fifty expected generation and Transmission outages, additions or retirements within the scope of the model as specified in the ATCID. | One or more of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Transmission Service Provider did not use the model provided by the Transmission Operator. • The Transmission Service Provider did not include in the AFC process more than fifty expected generation and Transmission outages, additions or retirements within the scope of the model as specified in the ATCID. • The Transmission Service provider did not use AFC provided by a third party. |
| R6. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M13 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 15% of the value calculated in the measure or 15MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 25% of the value | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M13 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 25% of the value calculated in the measure or 25MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 35% of the value | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M13 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 35% of the value calculated in the measure or 35MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 45% of the value | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M13 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 45% of the value calculated in the measure or 45MW, whichever is greater. |

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| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----|---|---|---|---|
| | calculated in the measure or 25MW, whichever is greater.. | calculated in the measure or 35MW, whichever is greater. | calculated in the measure or 45MW, whichever is greater. | |
| R7. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a non-firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M14 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 15% of the value calculated in the measure or 15MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 25% of the value calculated in the measure or 25MW, whichever is greater. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a non-firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M14 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 25% of the value calculated in the measure or 25MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 35% of the value calculated in the measure or 35MW, whichever is greater. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a non-firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M14 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 35% of the value calculated in the measure or 35MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 45% of the value calculated in the measure or 45MW, whichever is greater. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a non-firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M14 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 45% of the value calculated in the measure or 45MW, whichever is greater. |
| R8. | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R8 when determining firm AFC, or used additional elements, for more than zero Flowgates, but not more than 5% of all Flowgates or 1 Flowgate (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R8 when determining firm AFC, or used additional elements, for more than 5% of all Flowgates or 1 Flowgates (whichever is greater), but not more than 10% of all Flowgates or 2 Flowgates (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R8 when determining firm AFC, or used additional elements, for more than 10% of all Flowgates or 2 Flowgates (whichever is greater), but not more than 15% of all Flowgates or 3 Flowgates (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R8 when determining firm AFC, or used additional elements, for more than 15% of all Flowgates or more than 3 Flowgates (whichever is greater). |
| R9. | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R8 when determining non-firm AFC, or used additional elements, for more than zero Flowgates, but not more than 5% of all | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R9 when determining non-firm AFC, or used additional elements, for more than 5% of all Flowgates | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R9 when determining non-firm AFC, or used additional elements, for more than 10% of all | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R9 when determining non-firm AFC, or used additional elements, for more than 15% of all |

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| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----|---|---|---|--|
| | Flowgates or 1 Flowgate (whichever is greater). | or 1 Flowgate (whichever is greater), but not more than 10% of all Flowgates or 2 Flowgates (whichever is greater). | Flowgates or 2 Flowgates (whichever is greater), but not more than 15% of all Flowgates or 3 Flowgates (whichever is greater). | Flowgates or more than 3 Flowgates (whichever is greater). |
| R10 | <p>One or more of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ For Hourly, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for one or more hours but not more than 15 hours, and was in excess of the 175-hour per year requirement. ▪ For Daily, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for one or more calendar days but not more than 3 calendar days. ▪ For Monthly, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for seven or more calendar days, but less than 14 calendar days. | <p>One or more of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ For Hourly, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for more than 15 hours but not more than 20 hours, and was in excess of the 175-hour per year requirement. ▪ For Daily, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for more than 3 calendar days but not more than 4 calendar days. ▪ For Monthly, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for 14 or more calendar days, but less than 21 calendar days. | <p>One or more of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ For Hourly, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for more than 20 hours but not more than 25 hours, and was in excess of the 175-hour per year requirement. ▪ For Daily, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for more than 4 calendar days but not more than 5 calendar days. ▪ For Monthly, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for 21 or more calendar days, but less than 28 calendar days. | <p>One or more of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ For Hourly, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for more than 25 hours, and was in excess of the 175-hour per year requirement. ▪ For Daily, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for more than 5 calendar days. ▪ For Monthly, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for 28 or more calendar days. |

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| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|------|-----------|--------------|----------|---|
| R11. | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Transmission Service Provider did not follow the procedure for converting Flowgate AFCs to ATCs described in R11. |

A. Regional Differences

None identified.

B. Associated Documents

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|------|---|--|
| 2 | | Modified R2.1.1.3, R2.1.2.3, R2.1.3, R2.2, R2.3 and R11 Made conforming changes to M18 and VSLs for R2 and R11 | Revised |
| 2(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

Standard MOD-030-02(X) — Flowgate Methodology

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Flowgate Methodology
2. **Number:** MOD-030-02(X)
3. **Purpose:** To increase consistency and reliability in the development and documentation of transfer capability calculations for short-term use performed by entities using the Flowgate Methodology to support analysis and system operations.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1.1 Each Transmission Operator that uses the Flowgate Methodology to support the calculation of Available Flowgate Capabilities (AFCs) on Flowgates.
 - 4.1.2 Each Transmission Service Provider that uses the Flowgate Methodology to calculate AFCs on Flowgates.
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Deleted: Proposed

Deleted: The date upon which MOD-030-01 is currently scheduled to become effective.

B. Requirements

- R1. The Transmission Service Provider shall include in its “Available Transfer Capability Implementation Document” (ATCID): [*Violation Risk Factor: To Be Determined*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
 - R1.1. The criteria used by the Transmission Operator to identify sets of Transmission Facilities as Flowgates that are to be considered in Available Flowgate Capability (AFC) calculations.
 - R1.2. The following information on how source and sink for transmission service is accounted for in AFC calculations including:
 - R1.2.1. Define if the source used for AFC calculations is obtained from the source field or the Point of Receipt (POR) field of the transmission reservation.
 - R1.2.2. Define if the sink used for AFC calculations is obtained from the sink field or the Point of Delivery (POD) field of the transmission reservation.
 - R1.2.3. The source/sink or POR/POD identification and mapping to the model.
 - R1.2.4. If the Transmission Service Provider’s AFC calculation process involves a grouping of generators, the ATCID must identify how these generators participate in the group.
- R2. The Transmission Operator shall perform the following: [*Violation Risk Factor: To Be Determined*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
 - R2.1. Include Flowgates used in the AFC process based, at a minimum, on the following criteria:
 - R2.1.1. Results of a first Contingency transfer analysis for ATC Paths internal to a Transmission Operator’s system up to the path capability such that at a

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minimum the first three limiting Elements and their worst associated Contingency combinations with an OTDF of at least 5% and within the Transmission Operator's system are included as Flowgates.

R2.1.1.1. Use first Contingency criteria consistent with those first Contingency criteria used in planning of operations for the applicable time periods, including use of Remedial Action Schemes.

Deleted: Special Protection System

R2.1.1.2. Only the most limiting element in a series configuration needs to be included as a Flowgate.

R2.1.1.3. If any limiting element is kept within its limit for its associated worst Contingency by operating within the limits of another Flowgate, then no new Flowgate needs to be established for such limiting elements or Contingencies.

R2.1.2. Results of a first Contingency transfer analysis from all adjacent Balancing Authority source and sink (as defined in the ATCID) combinations up to the path capability such that at a minimum the first three limiting Elements and their worst associated Contingency combinations with an Outage Transfer Distribution Factor (OTDF) of at least 5% and within the Transmission Operator's system are included as Flowgates unless the interface between such adjacent Balancing Authorities is accounted for using another ATC methodology.

R2.1.2.1. Use first Contingency criteria consistent with those first Contingency criteria used in planning of operations for the applicable time periods, including use of Remedial Action Schemes.

Deleted: Special Protection System

R2.1.2.2. Only the most limiting element in a series configuration needs to be included as a Flowgate.

R2.1.2.3. If any limiting element is kept within its limit for its associated worst Contingency by operating within the limits of another Flowgate, then no new Flowgate needs to be established for such limiting elements or Contingencies.

R2.1.3. Any limiting Element/Contingency combination at least within its Reliability Coordinator's Area that has been subjected to an Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure within the last 12 months, unless the limiting Element/Contingency combination is accounted for using another ATC methodology or was created to address temporary operating conditions.

R2.1.4. Any limiting Element/Contingency combination within the Transmission model that has been requested to be included by any other Transmission Service Provider using the Flowgate Methodology or Area Interchange Methodology, where:

R2.1.4.1. The coordination of the limiting Element/Contingency combination is not already addressed through a different methodology, and

- Any generator within the Transmission Service Provider's area has at least a 5% Power Transfer Distribution Factor

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(PTDF) or Outage Transfer Distribution Factor (OTDF) impact on the Flowgate when delivered to the aggregate load of its own area, or

- A transfer from any Balancing Area within the Transmission Service Provider's area to a Balancing Area adjacent has at least a 5% PTDF or OTDF impact on the Flowgate.
- The Transmission Operator may utilize distribution factors less than 5% if desired.

R2.1.4.2. The limiting Element/Contingency combination is included in the requesting Transmission Service Provider's methodology.

- R2.2.** At a minimum, establish a list of Flowgates by creating, modifying, or deleting Flowgate definitions at least once per calendar year.
- R2.3.** At a minimum, establish a list of Flowgates by creating, modifying, or deleting Flowgates that have been requested as part of R2.1.4 within thirty calendar days from the request.
- R2.4.** Establish the TFC of each of the defined Flowgates as equal to:
- For thermal limits, the System Operating Limit (SOL) of the Flowgate.
 - For voltage or stability limits, the flow that will respect the SOL of the Flowgate.
- R2.5.** At a minimum, establish the TFC once per calendar year.
- R2.5.1.** If notified of a change in the Rating by the Transmission Owner that would affect the TFC of a flowgate used in the AFC process, the TFC should be updated within seven calendar days of the notification.
- R2.6.** Provide the Transmission Service Provider with the TFCs within seven calendar days of their establishment.
- R3.** The Transmission Operator shall make available to the Transmission Service Provider a Transmission model to determine Available Flowgate Capability (AFC) that meets the following criteria: [*Violation Risk Factor: To Be Determined*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
- R3.1.** Contains generation Facility Ratings, such as generation maximum and minimum output levels, specified by the Generator Owners of the Facilities within the model.
- R3.2.** Updated at least once per day for AFC calculations for intra-day, next day, and days two through 30.
- R3.3.** Updated at least once per month for AFC calculations for months two through 13.
- R3.4.** Contains modeling data and system topology for the Facilities within its Reliability Coordinator's Area. Equivalent representation of radial lines and Facilities 161kV or below is allowed.
- R3.5.** Contains modeling data and system topology (or equivalent representation) for immediately adjacent and beyond Reliability Coordination Areas.
- R4.** When calculating AFCs, the Transmission Service Provider shall represent the impact of Transmission Service as follows: [*Violation Risk Factor: To Be Determined*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

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- If the source, as specified in the ATCID, has been identified in the reservation and it is discretely modeled in the Transmission Service Provider's Transmission model, use the discretely modeled point as the source.
 - If the source, as specified in the ATCID, has been identified in the reservation and the point can be mapped to an "equivalence" or "aggregate" representation in the Transmission Service Provider's Transmission model, use the modeled equivalence or aggregate as the source.
 - If the source, as specified in the ATCID, has been identified in the reservation and the point cannot be mapped to a discretely modeled point or an "equivalence" representation in the Transmission Service Provider's Transmission model, use the immediately adjacent Balancing Authority associated with the Transmission Service Provider from which the power is to be received as the source.
 - If the source, as specified in the ATCID, has not been identified in the reservation use the immediately adjacent Balancing Authority associated with the Transmission Service Provider from which the power is to be received as the source.
 - If the sink, as specified in the ATCID, has been identified in the reservation and it is discretely modeled in the Transmission Service Provider's Transmission model, use the discretely modeled point as the sink.
 - If the sink, as specified in the ATCID, has been identified in the reservation and the point can be mapped to an "equivalence" or "aggregate" representation in the Transmission Service Provider's Transmission model, use the modeled equivalence or aggregate as the sink.
 - If the sink, as specified in the ATCID, has been identified in the reservation and the point cannot be mapped to a discretely modeled point or an "equivalence" representation in the Transmission Service Provider's Transmission model, use the immediately adjacent Balancing Authority associated with the Transmission Service Provider receiving the power as the sink.
 - If the sink, as specified in the ATCID, has not been identified in the reservation use the immediately adjacent Balancing Authority associated with the Transmission Service Provider receiving the power as the sink.
- R5.** When calculating AFCs, the Transmission Service Provider shall: [*Violation Risk Factor: To Be Determined*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
- R5.1.** Use the models provided by the Transmission Operator.
 - R5.2.** Include in the transmission model expected generation and Transmission outages, additions, and retirements within the scope of the model as specified in the ATCID and in effect during the applicable period of the AFC calculation for the Transmission Service Provider's area, all adjacent Transmission Service Providers, and any Transmission Service Providers with which coordination agreements have been executed.
 - R5.3.** For external Flowgates, identified in R2.1.4, use the AFC provided by the Transmission Service Provider that calculates AFC for that Flowgate.
- R6.** When calculating the impact of ETC for firm commitments (ETC_{Fi}) for all time periods for a Flowgate, the Transmission Service Provider shall sum the following: [*Violation Risk Factor: To Be Determined*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

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- R6.1.** The impact of firm Network Integration Transmission Service, including the impacts of generation to load, in the model referenced in R5.2 for the Transmission Service Provider's area, based on:
- R6.1.1.** Load forecast for the time period being calculated, including Native Load and Network Service load
 - R6.1.2.** Unit commitment and Dispatch Order, to include all designated network resources and other resources that are committed or have the legal obligation to run as specified in the Transmission Service Provider's ATCID.
- R6.2.** The impact of any firm Network Integration Transmission Service, including the impacts of generation to load in the model referenced in R5.2 and has a distribution factor equal to or greater than the percentage¹ used to curtail in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure used by the Transmission Service Provider, for all adjacent Transmission Service Providers and any other Transmission Service Providers with which coordination agreements have been executed based on:
- R6.2.1.** Load forecast for the time period being calculated, including Native Load and Network Service load
 - R6.2.2.** Unit commitment and Dispatch Order, to include all designated network resources and other resources that are committed or have the legal obligation to run as specified in the Transmission Service Provider's ATCID.
- R6.3.** The impact of all confirmed firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service expected to be scheduled, including roll-over rights for Firm Transmission Service contracts, for the Transmission Service Provider's area.
- R6.4.** The impact of any confirmed firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service expected to be scheduled, filtered to reduce or eliminate duplicate impacts from transactions using Transmission service from multiple Transmission Service Providers, including roll-over rights for Firm Transmission Service contracts having a distribution factor equal to or greater than the percentage² used to curtail in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure used by the Transmission Service Provider, for all adjacent Transmission Service Providers and any other Transmission Service Providers with which coordination agreements have been executed.
- R6.5.** The impact of any Grandfathered firm obligations expected to be scheduled or expected to flow for the Transmission Service Provider's area.
- R6.6.** The impact of any Grandfathered firm obligations expected to be scheduled or expected to flow that have a distribution factor equal to or greater than the percentage³ used to curtail in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure used by the Transmission Service Provider, for all adjacent Transmission

¹ A percentage less than that used in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure may be utilized.

² A percentage less than that used in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure may be utilized.

³ A percentage less than that used in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure may be utilized.

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Service Providers and any other Transmission Service Providers with which coordination agreements have been executed.

- R6.7.** The impact of other firm services determined by the Transmission Service Provider.
- R7.** When calculating the impact of ETC for non-firm commitments (ETC_{NFI}) for all time periods for a Flowgate the Transmission Service Provider shall sum: [*Violation Risk Factor: To Be Determined*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
- R7.1.** The impact of all confirmed non-firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service expected to be scheduled for the Transmission Service Provider's area.
- R7.2.** The impact of any confirmed non-firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service expected to be scheduled, filtered to reduce or eliminate duplicate impacts from transactions using Transmission service from multiple Transmission Service Providers, that have a distribution factor equal to or greater than the percentage⁴ used to curtail in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure used by the Transmission Service Provider, for all adjacent Transmission Service Providers and any other Transmission Service Providers with which coordination agreements have been executed.
- R7.3.** The impact of any Grandfathered non-firm obligations expected to be scheduled or expected to flow for the Transmission Service Provider's area.
- R7.4.** The impact of any Grandfathered non-firm obligations expected to be scheduled or expected to flow that have a distribution factor equal to or greater than the percentage⁵ used to curtail in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure used by the Transmission Service Provider, for all adjacent Transmission Service Providers and any other Transmission Service Providers with which coordination agreements have been executed.
- R7.5.** The impact of non-firm Network Integration Transmission Service serving Load within the Transmission Service Provider's area (i.e., secondary service), to include load growth, and losses not otherwise included in Transmission Reliability Margin or Capacity Benefit Margin.
- R7.6.** The impact of any non-firm Network Integration Transmission Service (secondary service) with a distribution factor equal to or greater than the percentage⁶ used to curtail in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure used by the Transmission Service Provider, filtered to reduce or eliminate duplicate impacts from transactions using Transmission service from multiple Transmission Service Providers, for all adjacent Transmission Service Providers and any other Transmission Service Providers with which coordination agreements have been executed.
- R7.7.** The impact of other non-firm services determined by the Transmission Service Provider.

⁴ A percentage less than that used in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure may be utilized.

⁵ A percentage less than that used in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure may be utilized.

⁶ A percentage less than that used in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure may be utilized.

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- R8.** When calculating firm AFC for a Flowgate for a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider shall use the following algorithm (subject to allocation processes described in the ATCID): [*Violation Risk Factor: To Be Determined*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

$$AFC_F = TFC - ETC_{Fi} - CBM_i - TRM_i + Postbacks_{Fi} + counterflows_{Fi}$$

Where:

AFC_F is the firm Available Flowgate Capability for the Flowgate for that period.

TFC is the Total Flowgate Capability of the Flowgate.

ETC_{Fi} is the sum of the impacts of existing firm Transmission commitments for the Flowgate during that period.

CBM_i is the impact of the Capacity Benefit Margin on the Flowgate during that period.

TRM_i is the impact of the Transmission Reliability Margin on the Flowgate during that period.

Postbacks_{Fi} are changes to firm AFC due to a change in the use of Transmission Service for that period, as defined in Business Practices.

counterflows_{Fi} are adjustments to firm AFC as determined by the Transmission Service Provider and specified in their ATCID.

- R9.** When calculating non-firm AFC for a Flowgate for a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider shall use the following algorithm (subject to allocation processes described in the ATCID): [*Violation Risk Factor: To Be Determined*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

$$AFC_{NF} = TFC - ETC_{Fi} - ETC_{NFi} - CBM_{Si} - TRM_{Ui} + Postbacks_{NFi} + counterflows$$

Where:

AFC_{NF} is the non-firm Available Flowgate Capability for the Flowgate for that period.

TFC is the Total Flowgate Capability of the Flowgate.

ETC_{Fi} is the sum of the impacts of existing firm Transmission commitments for the Flowgate during that period.

ETC_{NFi} is the sum of the impacts of existing non-firm Transmission commitments for the Flowgate during that period.

CBM_{Si} is the impact of any schedules during that period using Capacity Benefit Margin.

TRM_{Ui} is the impact on the Flowgate of the Transmission Reliability Margin that has not been released (unreleased) for sale as non-firm capacity by the Transmission Service Provider during that period.

Postbacks_{NF} are changes to non-firm Available Flowgate Capability due to a change in the use of Transmission Service for that period, as defined in Business Practices.

counterflows_{NF} are adjustments to non-firm AFC as determined by the Transmission Service Provider and specified in their ATCID.

- R10.** Each Transmission Service Provider shall recalculate AFC, utilizing the updated models described in R3.2, R3.3, and R5, at a minimum on the following frequency, unless none of the calculated values identified in the AFC equation have changed: [*Violation Risk Factor: To Be Determined*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

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- R10.1.** For hourly AFC, once per hour. Transmission Service Providers are allowed up to 175 hours per calendar year during which calculations are not required to be performed, despite a change in a calculated value identified in the AFC equation.
- R10.2.** For daily AFC, once per day.
- R10.3.** For monthly AFC, once per week.
- R11.** When converting Flowgate AFCs to ATCs for ATC Paths, the Transmission Service Provider shall convert those values based on the following algorithm: [*Violation Risk Factor: To Be Determined*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

$$\text{ATC} = \min(P)$$
$$P = \{\text{PATC}_1, \text{PATC}_2, \dots, \text{PATC}_n\}$$
$$\text{PATC}_n = \frac{\text{AFC}_n}{\text{DF}_{np}}$$

Where:

ATC is the Available Transfer Capability.

P is the set of partial Available Transfer Capabilities for all “impacted” Flowgates honored by the Transmission Service Provider; a Flowgate is considered “impacted” by a path if the Distribution Factor for that path is greater than the percentage⁷ used to curtail in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure used by the Transmission Service Provider on an OTDF Flowgate or PTDF Flowgate.

PATC_n is the partial Available Transfer Capability for a path relative to a Flowgate *n*.

AFC_n is the Available Flowgate Capability of a Flowgate *n*.

DF_{np} is the distribution factor for Flowgate *n* relative to path *p*.

C. Measures

- M1.** Each Transmission Service Provider shall provide its ATCID and other evidence (such as written documentation) to show that its ATCID contains the criteria used by the Transmission Operator to identify sets of Transmission Facilities as Flowgates and information on how sources and sinks are accounted for in AFC calculations. (R1)
- M2.** The Transmission Operator shall provide evidence (such as studies and working papers) that all Flowgates that meet the criteria described in R2.1 are considered in its AFC calculations. (R2.1)
- M3.** The Transmission Operator shall provide evidence (such as logs) that it updated its list of Flowgates at least once per calendar year. (R2.2)
- M4.** The Transmission Operator shall provide evidence (such as logs and dated requests) that it updated the list of Flowgates within thirty calendar days from a request. (R2.3)
- M5.** The Transmission Operator shall provide evidence (such as data or models) that it determined the TFC for each Flowgate as defined in R2.4. (R2.4)

⁷ A percentage less than that used in the Interconnection-wide congestion management procedure may be utilized.

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- M6.** The Transmission Operator shall provide evidence (such as logs) that it established the TFCs for each Flowgate in accordance with the timing defined in R2.5. (R2.5)
- M7.** The Transmission Operator shall provide evidence (such as logs and electronic communication) that it provided the Transmission Service Provider with updated TFCs within seven calendar days of their determination. (R2.6)
- M8.** The Transmission Operator shall provide evidence (such as written documentation, logs, models, and data) that the Transmission model used to determine AFCs contains the information specified in R3. (R3)
- M9.** The Transmission Service Provider shall provide evidence (such as written documentation and data) that the modeling of point-to-point reservations was based on the rules described in R4. (R4)
- M10.** The Transmission Service Provider shall provide evidence including the models received from Transmission Operators and other evidence (such as documentation and data) to show that it used the Transmission Operator's models in calculating AFC. (R5.1)
- M11.** The Transmission Service Provider shall provide evidence (such as written documentation, electronic communications, and data) that all expected generation and Transmission outages, additions, and retirements were included in the AFC calculation as specified in the ATCID. (R5.2)
- M12.** The Transmission Service Provider shall provide evidence (such as logs, electronic communications, and data) that AFCs provided by third parties on external Flowgates were used instead of those calculated by the Transmission Operator. (R5.3)
- M13.** The Transmission Service Provider shall demonstrate compliance with R6 by recalculating firm ETC for any specific time period as described in (MOD-001 R2), using the requirements defined in R6 and with data used to calculate the specified value for the designated time period. The data used must meet the requirements specified in this standard and the ATCID. To account for differences that may occur when recalculating the value (due to mixing automated and manual processes), any recalculated value that is within +/- 15% or 15 MW, whichever is greater, of the originally calculated value, is evidence that the Transmission Service Provider used the requirements defined in R6 to calculate its firm ETC. (R6)
- M14.** The Transmission Service Provider shall demonstrate compliance with R7 by recalculating non-firm ETC for any specific time period as described in (MOD-001 R2), using the requirements defined in R7 and with data used to calculate the specified value for the designated time period. The data used must meet the requirements specified in the standard and the ATCID. To account for differences that may occur when recalculating the value (due to mixing automated and manual processes), any recalculated value that is within +/- 15% or 15 MW, whichever is greater, of the originally calculated value, is evidence that the Transmission Service Provider used the requirements in R7 to calculate its non-firm ETC. (R7)
- M15.** Each Transmission Service Provider shall produce the supporting documentation for the processes used to implement the algorithm that calculates firm AFCs, as required in R8. Such documentation must show that only the variables allowed in R8 were used to calculate firm AFCs, and that the processes use the current values for the variables as determined in the requirements or definitions. Note that any variable may legitimately be zero if the value is not applicable or calculated to be zero (such as counterflows, TRM, CBM, etc...). The supporting documentation may be provided in the same form and format as stored by the Transmission Service Provider. (R8)

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- M16.** Each Transmission Service Provider shall produce the supporting documentation for the processes used to implement the algorithm that calculates non-firm AFCs, as required in R9. Such documentation must show that only the variables allowed in R9 were used to calculate non-firm AFCs, and that the processes use the current values for the variables as determined in the requirements or definitions. Note that any variable may legitimately be zero if the value is not applicable or calculated to be zero (such as counterflows, TRM, CBM, etc...). The supporting documentation may be provided in the same form and format as stored by the Transmission Service Provider. (R9)
- M17.** The Transmission Service Provider shall provide evidence (such as documentation, dated logs, and data) that it calculated AFC on the frequency defined in R10. (R10)
- M18.** The Transmission Service Provider shall provide evidence (such as documentation and data) when converting Flowgate AFCs to ATCs for ATC Paths, it follows the procedure described in R11. (R11)

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

Regional Entity.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame

Not applicable.

1.3. Data Retention

The Transmission Operator and Transmission Service Provider shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

- The Transmission Service Provider shall retain its current, in force ATCID and any prior versions of the ATCID that were in force since the last compliance audit to show compliance with R1.
- The Transmission Operator shall have its latest model used to determine flowgates and TFC and evidence of the previous version to show compliance with R2 and R3.
- The Transmission Operator shall retain evidence to show compliance with R2.1, R2.3 for the most recent 12 months.
- The Transmission Operator shall retain evidence to show compliance with R2.2, R2.4 and R2.5 for the most recent three calendar years plus current year.
- The Transmission Service Provider shall retain evidence to show compliance with R4 for 12 months or until the model used to calculate AFC is updated, whichever is longer.
- The Transmission Service Provider shall retain evidence to show compliance with R5, R8, R9, R10, and R11 for the most recent calendar year plus current year.
- The Transmission Service Provider shall retain evidence to show compliance in calculating hourly values required in R6 and R7 for the most recent 14 days; evidence to show compliance in calculating daily values required in R6 and R7 for the most recent 30 days; and evidence to show compliance in calculating monthly values required in R6 and R7 for the most recent sixty days.

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- If a Transmission Service Provider or Transmission Operator is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until found compliant.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.4. Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Processes:

The following processes may be used:

- Compliance Audits
- Self-Certifications
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Violation Investigations
- Self-Reporting
- Complaints

1.5. Additional Compliance Information

None.

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2. Violation Severity Levels

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----|---|--|--|--|
| R1. | The Transmission Service Provider does not include in its ATCID one or two of the sub-requirements listed under R1.2, or the sub-requirement is incomplete. | The Transmission Service Provider does not include in its ATCID three of the sub-requirements listed under R1.2, or the sub-requirement is incomplete. | The Transmission Service Provider does not include in its ATCID the information described in R1.1. OR The Transmission Service Provider does not include in its ATCID the information described in R1.2 (1.2.1, 1.2.2., 1.2.3, and 1.2.4 are missing). | The Transmission Service Provider does not include in its ATCID the information described in R1.1 and R1.2 (1.2.1, 1.2.2., 1.2.3, and 1.2.4 are missing). |
| R2. | One or more of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator established its list of Flowgates less frequently than once per calendar year, but not more than three months late as described in R2.2. The Transmission Operator established its list of Flowgates more than thirty days, but not more than sixty days, following a request to create, modify or delete a flowgate as described in R2.3. The Transmission Operator has not updated its Flowgate TFC when notified by the Transmission Owner in more than 7 days, but it has not | One or more of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator did not include a Flowgate in their AFC calculations that met the criteria described in R2.1. The Transmission Operator established its list of Flowgates more than three months late, but not more than six months late as described in R2.2. The Transmission Operator established its list of Flowgates more than sixty days, but not more than ninety days, following a request to create, modify or delete a flowgate as described in R2.3. | One or more of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator did not include two to five Flowgates in their AFC calculations that met the criteria described in R2.1. The Transmission Operator established its list of Flowgates more than six months late, but not more than nine months late as described in R2.2. The Transmission Operator established its list of Flowgates more than ninety days, but not more than 120 days, following a request to create, modify or delete a flowgate as described in R2.3. | One or more of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator did not include six or more Flowgates in their AFC calculations that met the criteria described in R2.1. The Transmission Operator established its list of Flowgates more than nine months late as described in R2.2. The Transmission Operator did not establish its list of internal Flowgates as described in R2.2. The Transmission Operator established its list of Flowgates more than 120 days following a request to create, modify or delete a |

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| | <p>been more than 14 days since the notification (R2.5.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator has not provided its Transmission Service Provider with its Flowgate TFCs within seven days (one week) of their determination, but is has not been more than 14 days (two weeks) since their determination. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator has not updated its Flowgate TFCs at least once within a calendar year, and it has been not more than 15 months since the last update. The Transmission Operator has not updated its Flowgate TFC when notified by the Transmission Owner in more than 14 days, but it has not been more than 21 days since the notification (R2.5.1) The Transmission Operator has not provided its Transmission Service Provider with its Flowgate TFCs in more than 14 days (two weeks) of their determination, but is has not been more than 21 days (three weeks) since their determination. | <p>The Transmission Operator has not updated its Flowgate TFCs at least once within a calendar year, and it has been more than 15 months but not more than 18 months since the last update.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator has not updated its Flowgate TFCs when notified by the Transmission Owner in more than 21 days, but it has not been more than 28 days since the notification (R2.5.1) The Transmission Operator has not provided its Transmission Service Provider with its Flowgate TFCs in more than 21 days (three weeks) of their determination, but is has not been more than 28 days (four weeks) since their determination. | <p>flowgate as described in R2.3.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator did not establish its list of external Flowgates following a request to create, modify or delete an external flowgate as described in R2.3. The Transmission Operator did not determine the TFC for a flowgate as described in R2.4. The Transmission Operator has not updated its Flowgate TFCs at least once within a calendar year, and it has been more than 18 months since the last update. (R2.5) The Transmission Operator has not updated its Flowgate TFCs when notified by the Transmission Owner in more than 28 calendar days (R2.5.1) The Transmission Operator has not provided its Transmission Service Provider with its Flowgate TFCs in more than 28 days (4 weeks) of their determination. |

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| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
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| R3. | <p>One or more of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator used one to ten Facility Ratings that were different from those specified by a Transmission or Generator Owner in their Transmission model. The Transmission Operator did not update the model per R3.2 for one or more calendar days but not more than 2 calendar days The Transmission Operator did not update the model for per R3.3 for one or more months but not more than six weeks | <p>One or more of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator used eleven to twenty Facility Ratings that were different from those specified by a Transmission or Generator Owner in their Transmission model. The Transmission Operator did not update the model per R3.2 for more than 2 calendar days but not more than 3 calendar days The Transmission Operator did not update the model for per R3.3 for more than six weeks but not more than eight weeks | <p>One or more of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator used twenty-one to thirty Facility Ratings that were different from those specified by a Transmission or Generator Owner in their Transmission model. The Transmission Operator did not update the model per R3.2 for more than 3 calendar days but not more than 4 calendar days The Transmission Operator did not update the model for per R3.3 for more than eight weeks but not more than ten weeks | <p>One or more of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Operator did not update the model per R3.2 for more than 4 calendar days The Transmission Operator did not update the model for per R3.3 for more than ten weeks The Transmission Operator used more than thirty Facility Ratings that were different from those specified by a Transmission or Generator Owner in their Transmission model. The Transmission operator did not include in the Transmission model detailed modeling data and topology for its own Reliability Coordinator area. The Transmission operator did not include in the Transmission modeling data and topology for immediately adjacent and beyond Reliability Coordinator area. |
| R4. | The Transmission Service Provider did not represent the impact of Transmission Service as described in R4 for more than zero, but not more than | The Transmission Service Provider did not represent the impact of Transmission Service as described in R4 for more than 5%, but not more than | The Transmission Service Provider did not represent the impact of Transmission Service as described in R4 for more than 10%, but not more than | The Transmission Service Provider did not represent the impact of Transmission Service as described in R4 for more than 15% of all reservations; or |

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| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
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| | 5% of all reservations; or more than zero, but not more than 1 reservation, whichever is greater.. | 10% of all reservations; or more than 1, but not more than 2 reservations, whichever is greater.. | 15% of all reservations; or more than 2, but not more than 3 reservations, whichever is greater.. | more than 3 reservations, whichever is greater.. |
| R5. | The Transmission Service Provider did not include in the AFC process one to ten expected generation or Transmission outages, additions or retirements within the scope of the model as specified in the ATCID. | The Transmission Service Provider did not include in the AFC process eleven to twenty-five expected generation and Transmission outages, additions or retirements within the scope of the model as specified in the ATCID. | The Transmission Service Provider did not include in the AFC process twenty-six to fifty expected generation and Transmission outages, additions or retirements within the scope of the model as specified in the ATCID. | One or more of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Transmission Service Provider did not use the model provided by the Transmission Operator. The Transmission Service Provider did not include in the AFC process more than fifty expected generation and Transmission outages, additions or retirements within the scope of the model as specified in the ATCID. The Transmission Service provider did not use AFC provided by a third party. |
| R6. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M13 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 15% of the value calculated in the measure or 15MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 25% of the value | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M13 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 25% of the value calculated in the measure or 25MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 35% of the value | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M13 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 35% of the value calculated in the measure or 35MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 45% of the value | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M13 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 45% of the value calculated in the measure or 45MW, whichever is greater. |

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| | calculated in the measure or 25MW, whichever is greater.. | calculated in the measure or 35MW, whichever is greater. | calculated in the measure or 45MW, whichever is greater. | |
| R7. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a non-firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M14 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 15% of the value calculated in the measure or 15MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 25% of the value calculated in the measure or 25MW, whichever is greater. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a non-firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M14 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 25% of the value calculated in the measure or 25MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 35% of the value calculated in the measure or 35MW, whichever is greater. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a non-firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M14 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 35% of the value calculated in the measure or 35MW, whichever is greater, but not more than 45% of the value calculated in the measure or 45MW, whichever is greater. | For a specified period, the Transmission Service Provider calculated a non-firm ETC with an absolute value different than that calculated in M14 for the same period, and the absolute value difference was more than 45% of the value calculated in the measure or 45MW, whichever is greater. |
| R8. | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R8 when determining firm AFC, or used additional elements, for more than zero Flowgates, but not more than 5% of all Flowgates or 1 Flowgate (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R8 when determining firm AFC, or used additional elements, for more than 5% of all Flowgates or 1 Flowgates (whichever is greater), but not more than 10% of all Flowgates or 2 Flowgates (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R8 when determining firm AFC, or used additional elements, for more than 10% of all Flowgates or 2 Flowgates (whichever is greater), but not more than 15% of all Flowgates or 3 Flowgates (whichever is greater). | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R8 when determining firm AFC, or used additional elements, for more than 15% of all Flowgates or more than 3 Flowgates (whichever is greater). |
| R9. | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R8 when determining non-firm AFC, or used additional elements, for more than zero Flowgates, but not more than 5% of all | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R9 when determining non-firm AFC, or used additional elements, for more than 5% of all Flowgates | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R9 when determining non-firm AFC, or used additional elements, for more than 10% of all | The Transmission Service Provider did not use all the elements defined in R9 when determining non-firm AFC, or used additional elements, for more than 15% of all |

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| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----|---|---|---|--|
| | Flowgates or 1 Flowgate (whichever is greater). | or 1 Flowgate (whichever is greater), but not more than 10% of all Flowgates or 2 Flowgates (whichever is greater). | Flowgates or 2 Flowgates (whichever is greater), but not more than 15% of all Flowgates or 3 Flowgates (whichever is greater). | Flowgates or more than 3 Flowgates (whichever is greater). |
| R10 | <p>One or more of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> For Hourly, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for one or more hours but not more than 15 hours, and was in excess of the 175-hour per year requirement. For Daily, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for one or more calendar days but not more than 3 calendar days. For Monthly, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for seven or more calendar days, but less than 14 calendar days. | <p>One or more of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> For Hourly, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for more than 15 hours but not more than 20 hours, and was in excess of the 175-hour per year requirement. For Daily, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for more than 3 calendar days but not more than 4 calendar days. For Monthly, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for 14 or more calendar days, but less than 21 calendar days. | <p>One or more of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> For Hourly, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for more than 20 hours but not more than 25 hours, and was in excess of the 175-hour per year requirement. For Daily, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for more than 4 calendar days but not more than 5 calendar days. For Monthly, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for 21 or more calendar days, but less than 28 calendar days. | <p>One or more of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> For Hourly, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for more than 25 hours, and was in excess of the 175-hour per year requirement. For Daily, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for more than 5 calendar days. For Monthly, the values described in the AFC equation changed and the Transmission Service provider did not calculate for 28 or more calendar days. |

Deleted: Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees: February 10, 2009

Standard MOD-030-02(X) — Flowgate Methodology

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|------|-----------|--------------|----------|---|
| R11. | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Transmission Service Provider did not follow the procedure for converting Flowgate AFCs to ATCs described in R11. |

Deleted: Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees: February 10, 2009

A. Regional Differences

None identified.

B. Associated Documents

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|-----------------|----------------|---|---|
| 2 | | Modified R2.1.1.3, R2.1.2.3, R2.1.3, R2.2, R2.3 and R11 Made conforming changes to M18 and VSLs for R2 and R11 | Revised |
| 2(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

Deleted: Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees: February 10, 2009

A. Introduction

- 1. Title:** Nuclear Plant Interface Coordination
- 2. Number:** NUC-001-2.1(X)
- 3. Purpose:** This standard requires coordination between Nuclear Plant Generator Operators and Transmission Entities for the purpose of ensuring nuclear plant safe operation and shutdown.
- 4. Applicability:**
 - 4.1.** Nuclear Plant Generator Operator.
 - 4.2.** Transmission Entities shall mean all entities that are responsible for providing services related to Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements (NPIRs). Such entities may include one or more of the following:
 - 4.2.1** Transmission Operators.
 - 4.2.2** Transmission Owners.
 - 4.2.3** Transmission Planners.
 - 4.2.4** Transmission Service Providers.
 - 4.2.5** Balancing Authorities.
 - 4.2.6** Reliability Coordinators.
 - 4.2.7** Planning Coordinators.
 - 4.2.8** Distribution Providers.
 - 4.2.9** Load-serving Entities.
 - 4.2.10** Generator Owners.
 - 4.2.11** Generator Operators.
- 5. Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1.** The Nuclear Plant Generator Operator shall provide the proposed NPIRs in writing to the applicable Transmission Entities and shall verify receipt [*Risk Factor: Lower*]
- R2.** The Nuclear Plant Generator Operator and the applicable Transmission Entities shall have in effect one or more Agreements¹ that include mutually agreed to NPIRs and document how the

1. Agreements may include mutually agreed upon procedures or protocols in effect between entities or between departments of a vertically integrated system.

Nuclear Plant Generator Operator and the applicable Transmission Entities shall address and implement these NPIRs. [*Risk Factor: Medium*]

- R3.** Per the Agreements developed in accordance with this standard, the applicable Transmission Entities shall incorporate the NPIRs into their planning analyses of the electric system and shall communicate the results of these analyses to the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator. [*Risk Factor: Medium*]
- R4.** Per the Agreements developed in accordance with this standard, the applicable Transmission Entities shall: [*Risk Factor: High*]
 - R4.1.** Incorporate the NPIRs into their operating analyses of the electric system.
 - R4.2.** Operate the electric system to meet the NPIRs.
 - R4.3.** Inform the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator when the ability to assess the operation of the electric system affecting NPIRs is lost.
- R5.** The Nuclear Plant Generator Operator shall operate per the Agreements developed in accordance with this standard. [*Risk Factor: High*]
- R6.** Per the Agreements developed in accordance with this standard, the applicable Transmission Entities and the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator shall coordinate outages and maintenance activities which affect the NPIRs. [*Risk Factor: Medium*]
- R7.** Per the Agreements developed in accordance with this standard, the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator shall inform the applicable Transmission Entities of actual or proposed changes to nuclear plant design, configuration, operations, limits, Protection Systems, or capabilities that may impact the ability of the electric system to meet the NPIRs. [*Risk Factor: High*]
- R8.** Per the Agreements developed in accordance with this standard, the applicable Transmission Entities shall inform the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator of actual or proposed changes to electric system design, configuration, operations, limits, Protection Systems, or capabilities that may impact the ability of the electric system to meet the NPIRs. [*Risk Factor: High*]
- R9.** The Nuclear Plant Generator Operator and the applicable Transmission Entities shall include, as a minimum, the following elements within the agreement(s) identified in R2: [*Risk Factor: Medium*]
 - R9.1.** Administrative elements: (Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)
 - R9.1.1.** Definitions of key terms used in the agreement. (Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)
 - R9.1.2.** Names of the responsible entities, organizational relationships, and responsibilities related to the NPIRs. (Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)
 - R9.1.3.** A requirement to review the agreement(s) at least every three years. (Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)
 - R9.1.4.** A dispute resolution mechanism. (Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)
 - R9.2.** Technical requirements and analysis:
 - R9.2.1.** Identification of parameters, limits, configurations, and operating scenarios included in the NPIRs and, as applicable, procedures for providing any specific data not provided within the agreement.

- R9.2.2.** Identification of facilities, components, and configuration restrictions that are essential for meeting the NPIRs.
- R9.2.3.** Types of planning and operational analyses performed specifically to support the NPIRs, including the frequency of studies and types of Contingencies and scenarios required.
- R9.3.** Operations and maintenance coordination:
 - R9.3.1.** Designation of ownership of electrical facilities at the interface between the electric system and the nuclear plant and responsibilities for operational control coordination and maintenance of these facilities.
 - R9.3.2.** Identification of any maintenance requirements for equipment not owned or controlled by the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator that are necessary to meet the NPIRs.
 - R9.3.3.** Coordination of testing, calibration and maintenance of on-site and off-site power supply systems and related components.
 - R9.3.4.** Provisions to address mitigating actions needed to avoid violating NPIRs and to address periods when responsible Transmission Entity loses the ability to assess the capability of the electric system to meet the NPIRs. These provisions shall include responsibility to notify the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator within a specified time frame.
 - R9.3.5.** Provision for considering, within the restoration process, the requirements and urgency of a nuclear plant that has lost all off-site and on-site AC power.
 - R9.3.6.** Coordination of physical and cyber security protection of the Bulk Electric System at the nuclear plant interface to ensure each asset is covered under at least one entity's plan.
 - R9.3.7.** Coordination of the NPIRs with transmission system Remedial Action Schemes and underfrequency and undervoltage load shedding programs.
- R9.4.** Communications and training:
 - R9.4.1.** Provisions for communications between the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator and Transmission Entities, including communications protocols, notification time requirements, and definitions of terms.
 - R9.4.2.** Provisions for coordination during an off-normal or emergency event affecting the NPIRs, including the need to provide timely information explaining the event, an estimate of when the system will be returned to a normal state, and the actual time the system is returned to normal.
 - R9.4.3.** Provisions for coordinating investigations of causes of unplanned events affecting the NPIRs and developing solutions to minimize future risk of such events.
 - R9.4.4.** Provisions for supplying information necessary to report to government agencies, as related to NPIRs.
 - R9.4.5.** Provisions for personnel training, as related to NPIRs.

C. Measures

- M1.** The Nuclear Plant Generator Operator shall, upon request of the Compliance Enforcement Authority, provide a copy of the transmittal and receipt of transmittal of the proposed NPIRs to the responsible Transmission Entities. (Requirement 1)
- M2.** The Nuclear Plant Generator Operator and each Transmission Entity shall each have a copy of the Agreement(s) addressing the elements in Requirement 9 available for inspection upon request of the Compliance Enforcement Authority. (Requirement 2 and 9)
- M3.** Each Transmission Entity responsible for planning analyses in accordance with the Agreement shall, upon request of the Compliance Enforcement Authority, provide a copy of the planning analyses results transmitted to the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator, showing incorporation of the NPIRs. The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall refer to the Agreements developed in accordance with this standard for specific requirements. (Requirement 3)
- M4.** Each Transmission Entity responsible for operating the electric system in accordance with the Agreement shall demonstrate or provide evidence of the following, upon request of the Compliance Enforcement Authority:
 - M4.1** The NPIRs have been incorporated into the current operating analysis of the electric system. (Requirement 4.1)
 - M4.2** The electric system was operated to meet the NPIRs. (Requirement 4.2)
 - M4.3** The Transmission Entity informed the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator when it became aware it lost the capability to assess the operation of the electric system affecting the NPIRs. (Requirement 4.3)
- M5.** The Nuclear Plant Generator Operator shall, upon request of the Compliance Enforcement Authority, demonstrate or provide evidence that the Nuclear Power Plant is being operated consistent with the Agreements developed in accordance with this standard. (Requirement 5)
- M6.** The Transmission Entities and Nuclear Plant Generator Operator shall, upon request of the Compliance Enforcement Authority, provide evidence of the coordination between the Transmission Entities and the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator regarding outages and maintenance activities which affect the NPIRs. (Requirement 6)
- M7.** The Nuclear Plant Generator Operator shall provide evidence that it informed the applicable Transmission Entities of changes to nuclear plant design, configuration, operations, limits, Protection Systems, or capabilities that would impact the ability of the Transmission Entities to meet the NPIRs. (Requirement 7)
- M8.** The Transmission Entities shall each provide evidence that it informed the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator of changes to electric system design, configuration, operations, limits, Protection Systems, or capabilities that would impact the ability of the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator to meet the NPIRs. (Requirement 8)

D. Compliance

- 1. Compliance Monitoring Process**
 - 1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority**

Regional Entity.
 - 1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame**

Not applicable.
 - 1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Processes:**

Compliance Audits
Self-Certifications
Spot Checking
Compliance Violation Investigations
Self-Reporting
Complaints

1.4. Data Retention

The Responsible Entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

- For Measure 1, the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator shall keep its latest transmittals and receipts.
- For Measure 2, the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator and each Transmission Entity shall have its current, in-force agreement.
- For Measure 3, the Transmission Entity shall have the latest planning analysis results.
- For Measures 4.3, 6 and 8, the Transmission Entity shall keep evidence for two years plus current.
- For Measures 5, 6 and 7, the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator shall keep evidence for two years plus current.

If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant it shall keep information related to the noncompliance until found compliant.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.5. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Violation Severity Levels

- 2.1. Lower:** Agreement(s) exist per this standard and NPIRs were identified and implemented, but documentation described in M1-M8 was not provided.
- 2.2. Moderate:** Agreement(s) exist per R2 and NPIRs were identified and implemented, but one or more elements of the Agreement in R9 were not met.
- 2.3. High:** One or more requirements of R3 through R8 were not met.
- 2.4. Severe:** No proposed NPIRs were submitted per R1, no Agreement exists per this standard, or the Agreements were not implemented.

E. Regional Differences

The design basis for Canadian (CANDU) NPPs does not result in the same licensing requirements as U.S. NPPs. NRC design criteria specifies that in addition to emergency on-site electrical power, electrical power from the electric network also be provided to permit safe shutdown. This requirement is specified in such NRC Regulations as 10 CFR 50 Appendix A — General Design Criterion 17 and 10 CFR 50.63 Loss of all alternating current power. There are no equivalent Canadian Regulatory

Standard NUC-001-2.1(X) — Nuclear Plant Interface Coordination

requirements for Station Blackout (SBO) or coping times as they do not form part of the licensing basis for CANDU NPPs.

Therefore the definition of NPLR for Canadian CANDU units will be as follows:

Nuclear Plant Licensing Requirements (NPLR) are requirements included in the design basis of the nuclear plant and are statutorily mandated for the operation of the plant; when used in this standard, NPLR shall mean nuclear power plant licensing requirements for avoiding preventable challenges to nuclear safety as a result of an electric system disturbance, transient, or condition.

F. Associated Documents

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|-------------------|--|---|
| 1 | May 2, 2007 | Approved by Board of Trustees | New |
| 2 | To be determined | Modifications for Order 716 to Requirement R9.3.5 and footnote 1; modifications to bring compliance elements into conformance with the latest version of the ERO Rules of Procedure. | Revision |
| 2 | August 5, 2009 | Adopted by Board of Trustees | Revised |
| 2 | January 22, 2010 | Approved by FERC on January 21, 2010 Added Effective Date | Update |
| 2 | February 7, 2013 | R9.1, R9.1.1, R9.1.2, R9.1.3, and R9.1.4 and associated elements approved by NERC Board of Trustees for retirement as part of the Paragraph 81 project (Project 2013-02) pending applicable regulatory approval. | |
| 2.1 | April 11, 2012 | Errata approved by the Standards Committee; (Capitalized “Protection System” in accordance with Implementation Plan for Project 2007-17 approval of revised definition of “Protection System”) | Errata associated with Project 2007-17 |
| 2.1 | September 9, 2013 | Informational filing submitted to reflect the revised definition of Protection System in accordance with the Implementation Plan for the revised term. | |
| 2.1 | November 21, 2013 | R9.1, R9.1.1, R9.1.2, R9.1.3, and R9.1.4 and associated elements approved by FERC for retirement as part of the Paragraph 81 project (Project 2013-02) | |
| 2.1(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection |

Standard NUC-001-2.1(X) — Nuclear Plant Interface Coordination

| | | | |
|--|--|--|--|
| | | | System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |
|--|--|--|--|

Standard NUC-001-2.1(X) — Nuclear Plant Interface Coordination

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Nuclear Plant Interface Coordination
2. **Number:** NUC-001-2.1(X)
3. **Purpose:** This standard requires coordination between Nuclear Plant Generator Operators and Transmission Entities for the purpose of ensuring nuclear plant safe operation and shutdown.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Nuclear Plant Generator Operator.
 - 4.2. Transmission Entities shall mean all entities that are responsible for providing services related to Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements (NPIRs). Such entities may include one or more of the following:
 - 4.2.1 Transmission Operators.
 - 4.2.2 Transmission Owners.
 - 4.2.3 Transmission Planners.
 - 4.2.4 Transmission Service Providers.
 - 4.2.5 Balancing Authorities.
 - 4.2.6 Reliability Coordinators.
 - 4.2.7 Planning Coordinators.
 - 4.2.8 Distribution Providers.
 - 4.2.9 Load-serving Entities.
 - 4.2.10 Generator Owners.
 - 4.2.11 Generator Operators.
5. **Effective Date:** [This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve \(12\) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve \(12\) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.](#)

Deleted: . April 1, 2010

B. Requirements

- R1. The Nuclear Plant Generator Operator shall provide the proposed NPIRs in writing to the applicable Transmission Entities and shall verify receipt [*Risk Factor: Lower*]
- R2. The Nuclear Plant Generator Operator and the applicable Transmission Entities shall have in effect one or more Agreements¹ that include mutually agreed to NPIRs and document how the

1. Agreements may include mutually agreed upon procedures or protocols in effect between entities or between departments of a vertically integrated system.

Standard NUC-001-2.1(X) — Nuclear Plant Interface Coordination

Nuclear Plant Generator Operator and the applicable Transmission Entities shall address and implement these NPIRs. [*Risk Factor: Medium*]

- R3.** Per the Agreements developed in accordance with this standard, the applicable Transmission Entities shall incorporate the NPIRs into their planning analyses of the electric system and shall communicate the results of these analyses to the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator. [*Risk Factor: Medium*]
- R4.** Per the Agreements developed in accordance with this standard, the applicable Transmission Entities shall: [*Risk Factor: High*]
 - R4.1.** Incorporate the NPIRs into their operating analyses of the electric system.
 - R4.2.** Operate the electric system to meet the NPIRs.
 - R4.3.** Inform the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator when the ability to assess the operation of the electric system affecting NPIRs is lost.
- R5.** The Nuclear Plant Generator Operator shall operate per the Agreements developed in accordance with this standard. [*Risk Factor: High*]
- R6.** Per the Agreements developed in accordance with this standard, the applicable Transmission Entities and the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator shall coordinate outages and maintenance activities which affect the NPIRs. [*Risk Factor: Medium*]
- R7.** Per the Agreements developed in accordance with this standard, the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator shall inform the applicable Transmission Entities of actual or proposed changes to nuclear plant design, configuration, operations, limits, Protection Systems, or capabilities that may impact the ability of the electric system to meet the NPIRs. [*Risk Factor: High*]
- R8.** Per the Agreements developed in accordance with this standard, the applicable Transmission Entities shall inform the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator of actual or proposed changes to electric system design, configuration, operations, limits, Protection Systems, or capabilities that may impact the ability of the electric system to meet the NPIRs. [*Risk Factor: High*]
- R9.** The Nuclear Plant Generator Operator and the applicable Transmission Entities shall include, as a minimum, the following elements within the agreement(s) identified in R2: [*Risk Factor: Medium*]
 - R9.1.** Administrative elements: (Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)
 - R9.1.1.** Definitions of key terms used in the agreement. (Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)
 - R9.1.2.** Names of the responsible entities, organizational relationships, and responsibilities related to the NPIRs. (Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)
 - R9.1.3.** A requirement to review the agreement(s) at least every three years. (Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)
 - R9.1.4.** A dispute resolution mechanism. (Retirement approved by FERC effective January 21, 2014.)
 - R9.2.** Technical requirements and analysis:
 - R9.2.1.** Identification of parameters, limits, configurations, and operating scenarios included in the NPIRs and, as applicable, procedures for providing any specific data not provided within the agreement.

Standard NUC-001-2.1(X) — Nuclear Plant Interface Coordination

- R9.2.2.** Identification of facilities, components, and configuration restrictions that are essential for meeting the NPIRs.
- R9.2.3.** Types of planning and operational analyses performed specifically to support the NPIRs, including the frequency of studies and types of Contingencies and scenarios required.
- R9.3.** Operations and maintenance coordination:
 - R9.3.1.** Designation of ownership of electrical facilities at the interface between the electric system and the nuclear plant and responsibilities for operational control coordination and maintenance of these facilities.
 - R9.3.2.** Identification of any maintenance requirements for equipment not owned or controlled by the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator that are necessary to meet the NPIRs.
 - R9.3.3.** Coordination of testing, calibration and maintenance of on-site and off-site power supply systems and related components.
 - R9.3.4.** Provisions to address mitigating actions needed to avoid violating NPIRs and to address periods when responsible Transmission Entity loses the ability to assess the capability of the electric system to meet the NPIRs. These provisions shall include responsibility to notify the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator within a specified time frame.
 - R9.3.5.** Provision for considering, within the restoration process, the requirements and urgency of a nuclear plant that has lost all off-site and on-site AC power.
 - R9.3.6.** Coordination of physical and cyber security protection of the Bulk Electric System at the nuclear plant interface to ensure each asset is covered under at least one entity's plan.
 - R9.3.7.** Coordination of the NPIRs with transmission system [Remedial Action Schemes](#) and underfrequency and undervoltage load shedding programs.
- R9.4.** Communications and training:
 - R9.4.1.** Provisions for communications between the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator and Transmission Entities, including communications protocols, notification time requirements, and definitions of terms.
 - R9.4.2.** Provisions for coordination during an off-normal or emergency event affecting the NPIRs, including the need to provide timely information explaining the event, an estimate of when the system will be returned to a normal state, and the actual time the system is returned to normal.
 - R9.4.3.** Provisions for coordinating investigations of causes of unplanned events affecting the NPIRs and developing solutions to minimize future risk of such events.
 - R9.4.4.** Provisions for supplying information necessary to report to government agencies, as related to NPIRs.
 - R9.4.5.** Provisions for personnel training, as related to NPIRs.

Deleted: Special Protection System

C. Measures

Standard NUC-001-2.1(X) — Nuclear Plant Interface Coordination

- M1.** The Nuclear Plant Generator Operator shall, upon request of the Compliance Enforcement Authority, provide a copy of the transmittal and receipt of transmittal of the proposed NPIRs to the responsible Transmission Entities. (Requirement 1)
- M2.** The Nuclear Plant Generator Operator and each Transmission Entity shall each have a copy of the Agreement(s) addressing the elements in Requirement 9 available for inspection upon request of the Compliance Enforcement Authority. (Requirement 2 and 9)
- M3.** Each Transmission Entity responsible for planning analyses in accordance with the Agreement shall, upon request of the Compliance Enforcement Authority, provide a copy of the planning analyses results transmitted to the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator, showing incorporation of the NPIRs. The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall refer to the Agreements developed in accordance with this standard for specific requirements. (Requirement 3)
- M4.** Each Transmission Entity responsible for operating the electric system in accordance with the Agreement shall demonstrate or provide evidence of the following, upon request of the Compliance Enforcement Authority:
 - M4.1** The NPIRs have been incorporated into the current operating analysis of the electric system. (Requirement 4.1)
 - M4.2** The electric system was operated to meet the NPIRs. (Requirement 4.2)
 - M4.3** The Transmission Entity informed the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator when it became aware it lost the capability to assess the operation of the electric system affecting the NPIRs. (Requirement 4.3)
- M5.** The Nuclear Plant Generator Operator shall, upon request of the Compliance Enforcement Authority, demonstrate or provide evidence that the Nuclear Power Plant is being operated consistent with the Agreements developed in accordance with this standard. (Requirement 5)
- M6.** The Transmission Entities and Nuclear Plant Generator Operator shall, upon request of the Compliance Enforcement Authority, provide evidence of the coordination between the Transmission Entities and the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator regarding outages and maintenance activities which affect the NPIRs. (Requirement 6)
- M7.** The Nuclear Plant Generator Operator shall provide evidence that it informed the applicable Transmission Entities of changes to nuclear plant design, configuration, operations, limits, Protection Systems, or capabilities that would impact the ability of the Transmission Entities to meet the NPIRs. (Requirement 7)
- M8.** The Transmission Entities shall each provide evidence that it informed the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator of changes to electric system design, configuration, operations, limits, Protection Systems, or capabilities that would impact the ability of the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator to meet the NPIRs. (Requirement 8)

D. Compliance

- 1. Compliance Monitoring Process**
 - 1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority**

Regional Entity.
 - 1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame**

Not applicable.
 - 1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Processes:**

Standard NUC-001-2.1(X) — Nuclear Plant Interface Coordination

Compliance Audits
Self-Certifications
Spot Checking
Compliance Violation Investigations
Self-Reporting
Complaints

1.4. Data Retention

The Responsible Entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

- For Measure 1, the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator shall keep its latest transmittals and receipts.
- For Measure 2, the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator and each Transmission Entity shall have its current, in-force agreement.
- For Measure 3, the Transmission Entity shall have the latest planning analysis results.
- For Measures 4.3, 6 and 8, the Transmission Entity shall keep evidence for two years plus current.
- For Measures 5, 6 and 7, the Nuclear Plant Generator Operator shall keep evidence for two years plus current.

If a Responsible Entity is found non-compliant it shall keep information related to the noncompliance until found compliant.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.5. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Violation Severity Levels

- 2.1. Lower:** Agreement(s) exist per this standard and NPIRs were identified and implemented, but documentation described in M1-M8 was not provided.
- 2.2. Moderate:** Agreement(s) exist per R2 and NPIRs were identified and implemented, but one or more elements of the Agreement in R9 were not met.
- 2.3. High:** One or more requirements of R3 through R8 were not met.
- 2.4. Severe:** No proposed NPIRs were submitted per R1, no Agreement exists per this standard, or the Agreements were not implemented.

E. Regional Differences

The design basis for Canadian (CANDU) NPPs does not result in the same licensing requirements as U.S. NPPs. NRC design criteria specifies that in addition to emergency on-site electrical power, electrical power from the electric network also be provided to permit safe shutdown. This requirement is specified in such NRC Regulations as 10 CFR 50 Appendix A — General Design Criterion 17 and 10 CFR 50.63 Loss of all alternating current power. There are no equivalent Canadian Regulatory

Standard NUC-001-2.1(X) — Nuclear Plant Interface Coordination

requirements for Station Blackout (SBO) or coping times as they do not form part of the licensing basis for CANDU NPPs.

Therefore the definition of NPLR for Canadian CANDU units will be as follows:

Nuclear Plant Licensing Requirements (NPLR) are requirements included in the design basis of the nuclear plant and are statutorily mandated for the operation of the plant; when used in this standard, NPLR shall mean nuclear power plant licensing requirements for avoiding preventable challenges to nuclear safety as a result of an electric system disturbance, transient, or condition.

F. Associated Documents

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------------|-------------------|--|--|
| 1 | May 2, 2007 | Approved by Board of Trustees | New |
| 2 | To be determined | Modifications for Order 716 to Requirement R9.3.5 and footnote 1; modifications to bring compliance elements into conformance with the latest version of the ERO Rules of Procedure. | Revision |
| 2 | August 5, 2009 | Adopted by Board of Trustees | Revised |
| 2 | January 22, 2010 | Approved by FERC on January 21, 2010 Added Effective Date | Update |
| 2 | February 7, 2013 | R9.1, R9.1.1, R9.1.2, R9.1.3, and R9.1.4 and associated elements approved by NERC Board of Trustees for retirement as part of the Paragraph 81 project (Project 2013-02) pending applicable regulatory approval. | |
| 2.1 | April 11, 2012 | Errata approved by the Standards Committee; (Capitalized “Protection System” in accordance with Implementation Plan for Project 2007-17 approval of revised definition of “Protection System”) | Errata associated with Project 2007-17 |
| 2.1 | September 9, 2013 | Informational filing submitted to reflect the revised definition of Protection System in accordance with the Implementation Plan for the revised term. | |
| 2.1 | November 21, 2013 | R9.1, R9.1.1, R9.1.2, R9.1.3, and R9.1.4 and associated elements approved by FERC for retirement as part of the Paragraph 81 project (Project 2013-02) | |
| <u>2.1(X)</u> | <u>TBD</u> | <u>Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees</u> | <u>Replaced references to Special Protection</u> |

Standard NUC-001-2.1(X) — Nuclear Plant Interface Coordination

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| | | | <u>System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS</u> |
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A. Introduction

1. **Title:** System Protection Coordination
2. **Number:** PRC-001-1.1(X)
3. **Purpose:**
To ensure system protection is coordinated among operating entities.
4. **Applicability**
 - 4.1. Balancing Authorities
 - 4.2. Transmission Operators
 - 4.3. Generator Operators
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1. Each Transmission Operator, Balancing Authority, and Generator Operator shall be familiar with the purpose and limitations of Protection System schemes applied in its area.
- R2. Each Generator Operator and Transmission Operator shall notify reliability entities of relay or equipment failures as follows:
 - R2.1. If a protective relay or equipment failure reduces system reliability, the Generator Operator shall notify its Transmission Operator and Host Balancing Authority. The Generator Operator shall take corrective action as soon as possible.
 - R2.2. If a protective relay or equipment failure reduces system reliability, the Transmission Operator shall notify its Reliability Coordinator and affected Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities. The Transmission Operator shall take corrective action as soon as possible.
- R3. A Generator Operator or Transmission Operator shall coordinate new protective systems and changes as follows.
 - R3.1. Each Generator Operator shall coordinate all new protective systems and all protective system changes with its Transmission Operator and Host Balancing Authority.
 - R3.2. Each Transmission Operator shall coordinate all new protective systems and all protective system changes with neighboring Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities.

- R4.** Each Transmission Operator shall coordinate Protection Systems on major transmission lines and interconnections with neighboring Generator Operators, Transmission Operators, and Balancing Authorities.
- R5.** A Generator Operator or Transmission Operator shall coordinate changes in generation, transmission, load or operating conditions that could require changes in the Protection Systems of others:
 - R5.1.** Each Generator Operator shall notify its Transmission Operator in advance of changes in generation or operating conditions that could require changes in the Transmission Operator’s Protection Systems.
 - R5.2.** Each Transmission Operator shall notify neighboring Transmission Operators in advance of changes in generation, transmission, load, or operating conditions that could require changes in the other Transmission Operators’ Protection Systems.
- R6.** Each Transmission Operator and Balancing Authority shall monitor the status of each Remedial Action Scheme in their area, and shall notify affected Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities of each change in status.

C. Measures

- M1.** Each Generator Operator and Transmission Operator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include but is not limited to, revised fault analysis study, letters of agreement on settings, notifications of changes, or other equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that there was coordination of new protective systems or changes as noted in Requirements 3, 3.1, and 3.2.
- M2.** Each Transmission Operator and Balancing Authority shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include but is not limited to, documentation, electronic logs, computer printouts, or computer demonstration or other equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that it monitors the Remedial Action Schemes in its area. (Requirement 6 Part 1)
- M3.** Each Transmission Operator and Balancing Authority shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include but is not limited to, operator logs, phone records, electronic-notifications or other equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that it notified affected Transmission Operator and Balancing Authorities of changes in status of one of its Remedial Action Schemes. (Requirement 6 Part 2)

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Regional Reliability Organizations shall be responsible for compliance monitoring.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring and Reset Time Frame

One or more of the following methods will be used to assess compliance:

- Self-certification (Conducted annually with submission according to schedule.)
- Spot Check Audits (Conducted anytime with up to 30 days notice given to prepare.)
- Periodic Audit (Conducted once every three years according to schedule.)
- Triggered Investigations (Notification of an investigation must be made within 60 days of an event or complaint of noncompliance. The entity will have up to 30 days to prepare for the investigation. An entity may request an extension of the preparation period and the extension will be considered by the Compliance Monitor on a case-by-case basis.)

The Performance-Reset Period shall be 12 months from the last finding of non-compliance.

1.3. Data Retention

Each Generator Operator and Transmission Operator shall have current, in-force documents available as evidence of compliance for Measure 1.

Each Transmission Operator and Balancing Authority shall keep 90 days of historical data (evidence) for Measures 2 and 3.

If an entity is found non-compliant the entity shall keep information related to the noncompliance until found compliant or for two years plus the current year, whichever is longer.

Evidence used as part of a triggered investigation shall be retained by the entity being investigated for one year from the date that the investigation is closed, as determined by the Compliance Monitor,

The Compliance Monitor shall keep the last periodic audit report and all requested and submitted subsequent compliance records.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance for Generator Operators:

2.1. Level 1: Not applicable.

2.2. Level 2: Not applicable.

2.3. Level 3: Not applicable.

2.4. Level 4: Failed to provide evidence of coordination when installing new protective systems and all protective system changes with its Transmission Operator and Host Balancing Authority as specified in R3.1.

3. Levels of Non-Compliance for Transmission Operators:

3.1. Level 1: Not applicable.

3.2. Level 2: Not applicable.

3.3. **Level 3:** Not applicable.

3.4. **Level 4:** There shall be a separate Level 4 non-compliance, for every one of the following requirements that is in violation:

3.4.1 Failed to provide evidence of coordination when installing new protective systems and all protective system changes with neighboring Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities as specified in R3.2.

3.4.2 Did not monitor the status of each Remedial Action Scheme, or did not notify affected Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities of changes in special protection status as specified in R6.

4. **Levels of Non-Compliance for Balancing Authorities:**

4.1. **Level 1:** Not applicable.

4.2. **Level 2:** Not applicable.

4.3. **Level 3:** Not applicable.

4.4. **Level 4:** Did not monitor the status of each Remedial Action Scheme, or did not notify affected Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities of changes in special protection status as specified in R6.

E. Regional Differences

None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|-------------------|---|---|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0 | August 8, 2005 | Removed “Proposed” from Effective Date | Errata |
| 0 | August 25, 2005 | Fixed Standard number in Introduction from PRC-001-1 to PRC-001-0 | Errata |
| 1 | November 1, 2006 | Adopted by Board of Trustees | Revised |
| 1.1 | April 11, 2012 | Errata adopted by the Standards Committee; (Capitalized “Protection System” in accordance with Implementation Plan for Project 2007-17 approval of revised definition of “Protection System”) | Errata associated with Project 2007-17 |
| 1.1 | September 9, 2013 | Informational filing submitted to reflect the revised definition of Protection System in accordance with the Implementation Plan for the revised term. | |
| 1.1(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection |

Standard PRC-001-1.1(X) — System Protection Coordination

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| | | | System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |
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A. Introduction

1. **Title:** System Protection Coordination
2. **Number:** PRC-001-1.1(X)
3. **Purpose:**
To ensure system protection is coordinated among operating entities.
4. **Applicability**
 - 4.1. Balancing Authorities
 - 4.2. Transmission Operators
 - 4.3. Generator Operators
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Deleted: January 1, 2007 .

B. Requirements

- R1. Each Transmission Operator, Balancing Authority, and Generator Operator shall be familiar with the purpose and limitations of Protection System schemes applied in its area.
- R2. Each Generator Operator and Transmission Operator shall notify reliability entities of relay or equipment failures as follows:
 - R2.1. If a protective relay or equipment failure reduces system reliability, the Generator Operator shall notify its Transmission Operator and Host Balancing Authority. The Generator Operator shall take corrective action as soon as possible.
 - R2.2. If a protective relay or equipment failure reduces system reliability, the Transmission Operator shall notify its Reliability Coordinator and affected Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities. The Transmission Operator shall take corrective action as soon as possible.
- R3. A Generator Operator or Transmission Operator shall coordinate new protective systems and changes as follows.
 - R3.1. Each Generator Operator shall coordinate all new protective systems and all protective system changes with its Transmission Operator and Host Balancing Authority.
 - R3.2. Each Transmission Operator shall coordinate all new protective systems and all protective system changes with neighboring Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities.

Standard PRC-001-1.1(X) — System Protection Coordination

- R4.** Each Transmission Operator shall coordinate Protection Systems on major transmission lines and interconnections with neighboring Generator Operators, Transmission Operators, and Balancing Authorities.
- R5.** A Generator Operator or Transmission Operator shall coordinate changes in generation, transmission, load or operating conditions that could require changes in the Protection Systems of others:
 - R5.1.** Each Generator Operator shall notify its Transmission Operator in advance of changes in generation or operating conditions that could require changes in the Transmission Operator’s Protection Systems.
 - R5.2.** Each Transmission Operator shall notify neighboring Transmission Operators in advance of changes in generation, transmission, load, or operating conditions that could require changes in the other Transmission Operators’ Protection Systems.
- R6.** Each Transmission Operator and Balancing Authority shall monitor the status of each Remedial Action Scheme in their area, and shall notify affected Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities of each change in status.

Deleted: Special Protection System

C. Measures

- M1.** Each Generator Operator and Transmission Operator shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include but is not limited to, revised fault analysis study, letters of agreement on settings, notifications of changes, or other equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that there was coordination of new protective systems or changes as noted in Requirements 3, 3.1, and 3.2.
- M2.** Each Transmission Operator and Balancing Authority shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include but is not limited to, documentation, electronic logs, computer printouts, or computer demonstration or other equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that it monitors the Remedial Action Schemes in its area. (Requirement 6 Part 1)
- M3.** Each Transmission Operator and Balancing Authority shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include but is not limited to, operator logs, phone records, electronic-notifications or other equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that it notified affected Transmission Operator and Balancing Authorities of changes in status of one of its Remedial Action Schemes. (Requirement 6 Part 2)

Deleted: Special Protection System

Deleted: Special Protection System

D. Compliance

- 1. Compliance Monitoring Process**
 - 1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility**

Regional Reliability Organizations shall be responsible for compliance monitoring.
 - 1.2. Compliance Monitoring and Reset Time Frame**

One or more of the following methods will be used to assess compliance:

- Self-certification (Conducted annually with submission according to schedule.)
- Spot Check Audits (Conducted anytime with up to 30 days notice given to prepare.)
- Periodic Audit (Conducted once every three years according to schedule.)
- Triggered Investigations (Notification of an investigation must be made within 60 days of an event or complaint of noncompliance. The entity will have up to 30 days to prepare for the investigation. An entity may request an extension of the preparation period and the extension will be considered by the Compliance Monitor on a case-by-case basis.)

The Performance-Reset Period shall be 12 months from the last finding of non-compliance.

1.3. Data Retention

Each Generator Operator and Transmission Operator shall have current, in-force documents available as evidence of compliance for Measure 1.

Each Transmission Operator and Balancing Authority shall keep 90 days of historical data (evidence) for Measures 2 and 3.

If an entity is found non-compliant the entity shall keep information related to the noncompliance until found compliant or for two years plus the current year, whichever is longer.

Evidence used as part of a triggered investigation shall be retained by the entity being investigated for one year from the date that the investigation is closed, as determined by the Compliance Monitor,

The Compliance Monitor shall keep the last periodic audit report and all requested and submitted subsequent compliance records.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance for Generator Operators:

- 2.1. **Level 1:** Not applicable.
- 2.2. **Level 2:** Not applicable.
- 2.3. **Level 3:** Not applicable.
- 2.4. **Level 4:** Failed to provide evidence of coordination when installing new protective systems and all protective system changes with its Transmission Operator and Host Balancing Authority as specified in R3.1.

3. Levels of Non-Compliance for Transmission Operators:

- 3.1. **Level 1:** Not applicable.
- 3.2. **Level 2:** Not applicable.

Standard PRC-001-1.1(X) — System Protection Coordination

3.3. **Level 3:** Not applicable.

3.4. **Level 4:** There shall be a separate Level 4 non-compliance, for every one of the following requirements that is in violation:

3.4.1 Failed to provide evidence of coordination when installing new protective systems and all protective system changes with neighboring Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities as specified in R3.2.

3.4.2 Did not monitor the status of each Remedial Action Scheme, or did not notify affected Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities of changes in special protection status as specified in R6.

Deleted: Special Protection System

4. Levels of Non-Compliance for Balancing Authorities:

4.1. **Level 1:** Not applicable.

4.2. **Level 2:** Not applicable.

4.3. **Level 3:** Not applicable.

4.4. **Level 4:** Did not monitor the status of each Remedial Action Scheme, or did not notify affected Transmission Operators, Balancing Authorities of changes in special protection status as specified in R6.

Deleted: Special Protection System

E. Regional Differences

None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------------|-------------------|---|--|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0 | August 8, 2005 | Removed "Proposed" from Effective Date | Errata |
| 0 | August 25, 2005 | Fixed Standard number in Introduction from PRC-001-1 to PRC-001-0 | Errata |
| 1 | November 1, 2006 | Adopted by Board of Trustees | Revised |
| 1.1 | April 11, 2012 | Errata adopted by the Standards Committee; (Capitalized "Protection System" in accordance with Implementation Plan for Project 2007-17 approval of revised definition of "Protection System") | Errata associated with Project 2007-17 |
| 1.1 | September 9, 2013 | Informational filing submitted to reflect the revised definition of Protection System in accordance with the Implementation Plan for the revised term. | |
| <u>1.1(X)</u> | <u>TBD</u> | <u>Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees</u> | <u>Replaced references to Special Protection</u> |

Standard PRC-001-1.1(X) — System Protection Coordination

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| | | | <u>System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS</u> |
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A. Introduction

- 1. Title:** Protection System and Remedial Action Scheme Misoperation
- 2. Number:** PRC-004-WECC-1(X)
- 3. Purpose:** Regional Reliability Standard to ensure all transmission and generation Protection System and Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) Misoperations on Transmission Paths and RAS defined in section 4 are analyzed and/or mitigated.

4. Applicability

- 4.1.** Transmission Owners of selected WECC major transmission path facilities and RAS listed in tables titled “Major WECC Transfer Paths in the Bulk Electric System” provided at <http://www.wecc.biz/Standards/Approved%20Standards/Supporting%20Tables/Table%20Major%20Paths%204-28-08.pdf> and “Major WECC Remedial Action Schemes (RAS)” provided at <http://www.wecc.biz/Standards/Approved%20Standards/Supporting%20Tables/Table%20Major%20RAS%204-28-08.pdf>.
- 4.2.** Generator Owners that own RAS listed in the Table titled “Major WECC Remedial Action Schemes (RAS)” provided at <http://www.wecc.biz/Standards/Approved%20Standards/Supporting%20Tables/Table%20Major%20RAS%204-28-08.pdf>.
- 4.3.** Transmission Operators that operate major transmission path facilities and RAS listed in Tables titled “Major WECC Transfer Paths in the Bulk Electric System” provided at <http://www.wecc.biz/Standards/Approved%20Standards/Supporting%20Tables/Table%20Major%20Paths%204-28-08.pdf> and “Major WECC Remedial Action Schemes (RAS)” provided at <http://www.wecc.biz/Standards/Approved%20Standards/Supporting%20Tables/Table%20Major%20RAS%204-28-08.pdf>.
- 5. Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

The requirements below only apply to the major transmission paths facilities and RAS listed in the tables titled “Major WECC Transfer Paths in the Bulk Electric System” and “Major WECC Remedial Action Schemes (RAS).”

- R.1.** System Operators and System Protection personnel of the Transmission Owners and Generator Owners shall analyze all Protection System and RAS operations. *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Assessment]*
 - R1.1.** System Operators shall review all tripping of transmission elements and RAS operations to identify apparent Misoperations within 24 hours.
 - R1.2.** System Protection personnel shall analyze all operations of Protection Systems and RAS within 20 business days for correctness to characterize whether a Misoperation has occurred that may not have been identified by System Operators.

- R.2.** Transmission Owners and Generator Owners shall perform the following actions for each Misoperation of the Protection System or RAS. It is not intended that Requirements R2.1 through R2.4 apply to Protection System and/or RAS actions that appear to be entirely reasonable and correct at the time of occurrence and associated system performance is fully compliant with NERC Reliability Standards. If the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner later finds the Protection System or RAS operation to be incorrect through System Protection personnel analysis, the requirements of R2.1 through R2.4 become applicable at the time the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner identifies the Misoperation:
- R2.1.** If the Protection System or RAS has a Security-Based Misoperation and two or more Functionally Equivalent Protection Systems (FEPS) or Functionally Equivalent RAS (FERAS) remain in service to ensure Bulk Electric System (BES) reliability, the Transmission Owners or Generator Owners shall remove from service the Protection System or RAS that misoperated within 22 hours following identification of the Misoperation. Repair or replacement of the failed Protection System or RAS is at the Transmission Owners' and Generator Owners' discretion. *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Same-day Operations]*
- R2.2.** If the Protection System or RAS has a Security-Based Misoperation and only one FEPS or FERAS remains in service to ensure BES reliability, the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner shall perform the following. *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Same-day Operations]*
- R2.2.1.** Following identification of the Protection System or RAS Misoperation, Transmission Owners and Generator Owners shall remove from service within 22 hours for repair or modification the Protection System or RAS that misoperated.
- R2.2.2.** The Transmission Owner or Generator Owner shall repair or replace any Protection System or RAS that misoperated with a FEPS or FERAS within 20 business days of the date of removal. The Transmission Owner or Generator Owner shall remove the Element from service or disable the RAS if repair or replacement is not completed within 20 business days.
- R2.3.** If the Protection System or RAS has a Security-Based or Dependability-Based Misoperation and a FEPS and FERAS is not in service to ensure BES reliability, Transmission Owners or Generator Owners shall repair and place back in service within 22 hours the Protection System or RAS that misoperated. If this cannot be done, then Transmission Owners and Generator Owners shall perform the following. *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Same-day Operations]*
- R2.3.1.** When a FEPS is not available, the Transmission Owners shall remove the associated Element from service.
- R2.3.2.** When FERAS is not available, then
- 2.3.2.1.** The Generator Owners shall adjust generation to a reliable operating level, or
- 2.3.2.2.** Transmission Operators shall adjust the SOL and operate the facilities within established limits.
- R2.4.** If the Protection System or RAS has a Dependability-Based Misoperation but has one or more FEPS or FERAS that operated correctly, the associated Element or transmission path may remain in service without removing from service the Protection System or RAS that failed, provided one of the following is performed.
- R2.4.1.** Transmission Owners or Generator Owners shall repair or replace any

Protection System or RAS that misoperated with FEPS and FERAS within 20 business days of the date of the Misoperation identification, or

- R2.4.2.** Transmission Owners or Generator Owners shall remove from service the associated Element or RAS. [*Violation Risk Factor: Lower*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Assessment*]
- R.3.** Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall submit Misoperation incident reports to WECC within 10 business days for the following. [*Violation Risk Factor: Lower*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Assessment*]
 - R3.1.** Identification of a Misoperation of a Protection System and/or RAS,
 - R3.2.** Completion of repairs or the replacement of Protection System and/or RAS that misoperated.

C. Measures

Each measure below applies directly to the requirement by number.

- M1.** Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that they reported and analyzed all Protection System and RAS operations.
 - M1.1** Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that System Operating personnel reviewed all operations of Protection System and RAS within 24 hours.
 - M1.2** Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that System Protection personnel analyzed all operations of Protection System and RAS for correctness within 20 business days.
- M2.** Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence for the following.
 - M2.1** Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that they removed the Protection System or RAS that misoperated from service within 22 hours following identification of the Protection System or RAS Misoperation.
 - M2.2** Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that they removed from service and repaired the Protection System or RAS that misoperated per measurements M2.2.1 through M2.2.2.
 - M2.2.1** Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that they removed the Protection System or RAS that misoperated from service within 22 hours following identification of the Protection System or RAS Misoperation.
 - M2.2.2** Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that they repaired or replaced the Protection System or RAS that misoperated within 20 business days or either removed the Element from service or disabled the RAS.
 - M2.3** The Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that they repaired the Protection System or RAS that misoperated within 22 hours following identification of the Protection System or RAS Misoperation.
 - M2.3.1** The Transmission Owner shall have evidence that it removed the associated Element from service.
 - M2.3.2** The Generator Owners and Transmission Operators shall have documentation describing all actions taken that adjusted generation or SOLs and operated facilities within established limits.

- M2.4** Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that they repaired or replaced the Protection System or RAS that misoperated including documentation that describes the actions taken.
 - M2.4.1** Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that they repaired or replaced the Protection System or RAS that misoperated within 20 business days of the misoperation identification.
 - M2.4.2** Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that they removed the associated Element or RAS from service.
- M3.** Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that they reported the following within 10 business days.
 - M3.1** Identification of all Protection System and RAS Misoperations and corrective actions taken or planned.
 - M3.2** Completion of repair or replacement of Protection System and/or RAS that misoperated.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1 Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Compliance Enforcement Authority

1.2 Compliance Monitoring Period

Compliance Enforcement Authority may use one or more of the following methods to assess compliance:

- Misoperation Reports
- Reports submitted quarterly
- Spot check audits conducted anytime with 30 days notice given to prepare
- Periodic audit as scheduled by the Compliance Enforcement Authority
- Investigations
- Other methods as provided for in the Compliance Monitoring Enforcement Program

1.2.1 The Performance-reset Period is one calendar month.

1.3 Data Retention

Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, and Generation Owners shall keep evidence for Measures M1 and M2 for five calendar years plus year to date.

1.4 Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Violation Severity Levels

R1

| | | | |
|--------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------|
| Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|--------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------|

WECC Standard PRC-004-WECC-1(X) — Protection System and Remedial Action Scheme Misoperation

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|---|---|--|--|
| System Operating personnel of the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner did not review the Protection System Operation or RAS operation within 24 hours but did review the Protection System Operation or RAS operation within six business days. | System Operating personnel of the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner did not review the Protection System operation or RAS operation within six business days. | System Protection personnel of the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not analyze the Protection System operation or RAS operation within 20 business days but did analyze the Protection System operation or RAS operation within 25 business days. | System Protection personnel of the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner did not analyze the Protection System operation or RAS operation within 25 business days. |
|---|---|--|--|

R2.1 and R2.2.1

| Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|--|--|---|--|
| The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not remove from service, repair, or implement other compliance measures for the Protection System or RAS that misoperated as required within 22 hours but did perform the requirements within 24 hours. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not remove from service, repair, or implement other compliance measures for the Protection System or RAS that misoperated as required in less than 24 hours but did perform the requirements within 28 hours. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not perform the removal from service, repair, or implement other compliance measures for the Protection System or RAS that misoperated as required in less than 28 hours but did perform the requirements within 32 hours. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not perform the removal from service, repair, or implement other compliance measures for the Protection System or RAS that misoperated as required within 32 hours. |

R2.3

| Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|---|---|---|--|
| The Transmission Operator and Generator Owner did not adjust generation to a reliable operating level, adjust the SOL and operate the facilities within established limits or implement other compliance measures for the Protection System or RAS that misoperated as required within 22 hours but did perform the requirements within 24 hours. | The Transmission Operator and Generator Owner did not adjust generation to a reliable operating level, adjust the SOL and operate the facilities within established limits or implement other compliance measures for the Protection System or RAS that misoperated as required in less than 24 hours but did perform the requirements within 28 hours. | The Transmission Operator and Generator Owner did not adjust generation to a reliable operating level, adjust the SOL and operate the facilities within established limits or implement other compliance measures for the Protection System or RAS that misoperated as required in less than 28 hours but did perform the requirements within 32 hours. | The Transmission Operator and Generator Owner did not adjust generation to a reliable operating level, adjust the SOL and operate the facilities within established limits or implement other compliance measures for the Protection System or RAS that misoperated as required within 32 hours. |

R2.2.2 and R2.4

| Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|--------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------|
| | | | |

WECC Standard PRC-004-WECC-1(X) — Protection System and Remedial Action Scheme Misoperation

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|--|---|---|--|
| The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not perform the required repairs, replacement, or system operation adjustments to comply with the requirements within 20 business days but did perform the required activities within 25 business days. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not perform the required repairs, replacement, or system operation adjustment to comply with the requirements within 25 business days but did perform the required activities within 28 business days. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not perform the required repairs, replacement, or system operation adjustment to comply with the requirements within 28 business days but did perform the required activities within 30 business days. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not perform the required repairs, replacement, or system operation adjustments to comply with the requirements within 30 business days. |
|--|---|---|--|

R3.1

| Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not report the Misoperation and corrective actions taken or planned to comply with the requirements within 10 business days but did perform the required activities within 15 business days. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not report the Misoperation and corrective actions taken or planned to comply with the requirements within 15 business days but did perform the required activities within 20 business days. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not report the Misoperation and corrective actions taken or planned to comply with the requirements within 20 business days but did perform the required activities within 25 business days. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not report the Misoperation and corrective actions taken or planned to comply with the requirements within 25 business days. |

R3.2

| Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not report the completion of repair or replacement of Protection System and/or RAS that misoperated to comply with the requirements within 10 business days of the completion but did perform the required activities within 15 business days. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not report the completion of repair or replacement of Protection System and/or RAS that misoperated to comply with the requirements within 15 business days of the completion but did perform the required activities within 20 business days. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not report the completion of repair or replacement of Protection System and/or RAS that misoperated to comply with the requirements within 20 business days of the completion but did perform the required activities within 25 business days. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not report the completion of repair or replacement of Protection System and/or RAS that misoperated to comply with the requirements within 25 business days of the completion. |

Version History — Shows Approval History and Summary of Changes in the Action Field

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
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| 1 | April 16, 2008 | Permanent Replacement Standard for PRC-STD-001-1 and PRC-STD-003-1 | |

WECC Standard PRC-004-WECC-1(X) — Protection System and Remedial Action Scheme Misoperation

| | | | |
|------|----------------|---|--|
| 1 | April 21, 2011 | FERC Order issued approving PRC-004-WECC-1 (approval effective June 27, 2011) | |
| 1(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

WECC Standard PRC-004-WECC-1(X) — Protection System and Remedial Action Scheme Misoperation

A. Introduction

- 1. Title:** Protection System and Remedial Action Scheme Misoperation
- 2. Number:** PRC-004-WECC-1(X)
- 3. Purpose:** Regional Reliability Standard to ensure all transmission and generation Protection System and Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) Misoperations on Transmission Paths and RAS defined in section 4 are analyzed and/or mitigated.

4. Applicability

- 4.1.** Transmission Owners of selected WECC major transmission path facilities and RAS listed in tables titled “Major WECC Transfer Paths in the Bulk Electric System” provided at <http://www.wecc.biz/Standards/Approved%20Standards/Supporting%20Tables/Table%20Major%20Paths%204-28-08.pdf> and “Major WECC Remedial Action Schemes (RAS)” provided at <http://www.wecc.biz/Standards/Approved%20Standards/Supporting%20Tables/Table%20Major%20RAS%204-28-08.pdf>.
- 4.2.** Generator Owners that own RAS listed in the Table titled “Major WECC Remedial Action Schemes (RAS)” provided at <http://www.wecc.biz/Standards/Approved%20Standards/Supporting%20Tables/Table%20Major%20RAS%204-28-08.pdf>.
- 4.3.** Transmission Operators that operate major transmission path facilities and RAS listed in Tables titled “Major WECC Transfer Paths in the Bulk Electric System” provided at <http://www.wecc.biz/Standards/Approved%20Standards/Supporting%20Tables/Table%20Major%20Paths%204-28-08.pdf> and “Major WECC Remedial Action Schemes (RAS)” provided at <http://www.wecc.biz/Standards/Approved%20Standards/Supporting%20Tables/Table%20Major%20RAS%204-28-08.pdf>.

5. Effective Date: This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Deleted: On the first day of the second quarter following applicable regulatory approval.

B. Requirements

The requirements below only apply to the major transmission paths facilities and RAS listed in the tables titled “Major WECC Transfer Paths in the Bulk Electric System” and “Major WECC Remedial Action Schemes (RAS).”

- R.1.** System Operators and System Protection personnel of the Transmission Owners and Generator Owners shall analyze all Protection System and RAS operations. [*Violation Risk Factor: Lower*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Assessment*]
 - R1.1.** System Operators shall review all tripping of transmission elements and RAS operations to identify apparent Misoperations within 24 hours.
 - R1.2.** System Protection personnel shall analyze all operations of Protection Systems and RAS within 20 business days for correctness to characterize whether a Misoperation has occurred that may not have been identified by System Operators.

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WECC Standard PRC-004-WECC-1(X) — Protection System and Remedial Action Scheme Misoperation

R.2. Transmission Owners and Generator Owners shall perform the following actions for each Misoperation of the Protection System or RAS. It is not intended that Requirements R2.1 through R2.4 apply to Protection System and/or RAS actions that appear to be entirely reasonable and correct at the time of occurrence and associated system performance is fully compliant with NERC Reliability Standards. If the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner later finds the Protection System or RAS operation to be incorrect through System Protection personnel analysis, the requirements of R2.1 through R2.4 become applicable at the time the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner identifies the Misoperation:

R2.1. If the Protection System or RAS has a Security-Based Misoperation and two or more Functionally Equivalent Protection Systems (FEPS) or Functionally Equivalent RAS (FERAS) remain in service to ensure Bulk Electric System (BES) reliability, the Transmission Owners or Generator Owners shall remove from service the Protection System or RAS that misoperated within 22 hours following identification of the Misoperation. Repair or replacement of the failed Protection System or RAS is at the Transmission Owners' and Generator Owners' discretion. *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Same-day Operations]*

R2.2. If the Protection System or RAS has a Security-Based Misoperation and only one FEPS or FERAS remains in service to ensure BES reliability, the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner shall perform the following. *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Same-day Operations]*

R2.2.1. Following identification of the Protection System or RAS Misoperation, Transmission Owners and Generator Owners shall remove from service within 22 hours for repair or modification the Protection System or RAS that misoperated.

R2.2.2. The Transmission Owner or Generator Owner shall repair or replace any Protection System or RAS that misoperated with a FEPS or FERAS within 20 business days of the date of removal. The Transmission Owner or Generator Owner shall remove the Element from service or disable the RAS if repair or replacement is not completed within 20 business days.

R2.3. If the Protection System or RAS has a Security-Based or Dependability-Based Misoperation and a FEPS and FERAS is not in service to ensure BES reliability, Transmission Owners or Generator Owners shall repair and place back in service within 22 hours the Protection System or RAS that misoperated. If this cannot be done, then Transmission Owners and Generator Owners shall perform the following. *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Same-day Operations]*

R2.3.1. When a FEPS is not available, the Transmission Owners shall remove the associated Element from service.

R2.3.2. When FERAS is not available, then

2.3.2.1. The Generator Owners shall adjust generation to a reliable operating level, or

2.3.2.2. Transmission Operators shall adjust the SOL and operate the facilities within established limits.

R2.4. If the Protection System or RAS has a Dependability-Based Misoperation but has one or more FEPS or FERAS that operated correctly, the associated Element or transmission path may remain in service without removing from service the Protection System or RAS that failed, provided one of the following is performed.

R2.4.1. Transmission Owners or Generator Owners shall repair or replace any

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Protection System or RAS that misoperated with FEPS and FERAS within 20 business days of the date of the Misoperation identification, or

R2.4.2. Transmission Owners or Generator Owners shall remove from service the associated Element or RAS. *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Assessment]*

R.3. Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall submit Misoperation incident reports to WECC within 10 business days for the following. *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Assessment]*

R3.1. Identification of a Misoperation of a Protection System and/or RAS,

R3.2. Completion of repairs or the replacement of Protection System and/or RAS that misoperated.

C. Measures

Each measure below applies directly to the requirement by number.

M1. Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that they reported and analyzed all Protection System and RAS operations.

M1.1 Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that System Operating personnel reviewed all operations of Protection System and RAS within 24 hours.

M1.2 Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that System Protection personnel analyzed all operations of Protection System and RAS for correctness within 20 business days.

M2. Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence for the following.

M2.1 Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that they removed the Protection System or RAS that misoperated from service within 22 hours following identification of the Protection System or RAS Misoperation.

M2.2 Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that they removed from service and repaired the Protection System or RAS that misoperated per measurements M2.2.1 through M2.2.2.

M2.2.1 Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that they removed the Protection System or RAS that misoperated from service within 22 hours following identification of the Protection System or RAS Misoperation.

M2.2.2 Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that they repaired or replaced the Protection System or RAS that misoperated within 20 business days or either removed the Element from service or disabled the RAS.

M2.3 The Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that they repaired the Protection System or RAS that misoperated within 22 hours following identification of the Protection System or RAS Misoperation.

M2.3.1 The Transmission Owner shall have evidence that it removed the associated Element from service.

M2.3.2 The Generator Owners and Transmission Operators shall have documentation describing all actions taken that adjusted generation or SOLs and operated facilities within established limits.

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- M2.4** Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that they repaired or replaced the Protection System or RAS that misoperated including documentation that describes the actions taken.
 - M2.4.1** Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that they repaired or replaced the Protection System or RAS that misoperated within 20 business days of the misoperation identification.
 - M2.4.2** Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that they removed the associated Element or RAS from service.
- M3.** Transmission Owners and Generation Owners shall have evidence that they reported the following within 10 business days.
 - M3.1** Identification of all Protection System and RAS Misoperations and corrective actions taken or planned.
 - M3.2** Completion of repair or replacement of Protection System and/or RAS that misoperated.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1 Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Compliance Enforcement Authority

1.2 Compliance Monitoring Period

Compliance Enforcement Authority may use one or more of the following methods to assess compliance:

- Misoperation Reports
- Reports submitted quarterly
- Spot check audits conducted anytime with 30 days notice given to prepare
- Periodic audit as scheduled by the Compliance Enforcement Authority
- Investigations
- Other methods as provided for in the Compliance Monitoring Enforcement Program

1.2.1 The Performance-reset Period is one calendar month.

1.3 Data Retention

Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, and Generation Owners shall keep evidence for Measures M1 and M2 for five calendar years plus year to date.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Violation Severity Levels

R1

| | | | |
|--------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------|
| Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|--------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------|

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| | | | |
|---|---|--|--|
| System Operating personnel of the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner did not review the Protection System Operation or RAS operation within 24 hours but did review the Protection System Operation or RAS operation within six business days. | System Operating personnel of the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner did not review the Protection System operation or RAS operation within six business days. | System Protection personnel of the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not analyze the Protection System operation or RAS operation within 20 business days but did analyze the Protection System operation or RAS operation within 25 business days. | System Protection personnel of the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner did not analyze the Protection System operation or RAS operation within 25 business days. |
|---|---|--|--|

R2.1 and R2.2.1

| Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|--|--|---|--|
| The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not remove from service, repair, or implement other compliance measures for the Protection System or RAS that misoperated as required within 22 hours but did perform the requirements within 24 hours. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not remove from service, repair, or implement other compliance measures for the Protection System or RAS that misoperated as required in less than 24 hours but did perform the requirements within 28 hours. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not perform the removal from service, repair, or implement other compliance measures for the Protection System or RAS that misoperated as required in less than 28 hours but did perform the requirements within 32 hours. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not perform the removal from service, repair, or implement other compliance measures for the Protection System or RAS that misoperated as required within 32 hours. |

R2.3

| Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|---|---|---|--|
| The Transmission Operator and Generator Owner did not adjust generation to a reliable operating level, adjust the SOL and operate the facilities within established limits or implement other compliance measures for the Protection System or RAS that misoperated as required within 22 hours but did perform the requirements within 24 hours. | The Transmission Operator and Generator Owner did not adjust generation to a reliable operating level, adjust the SOL and operate the facilities within established limits or implement other compliance measures for the Protection System or RAS that misoperated as required in less than 24 hours but did perform the requirements within 28 hours. | The Transmission Operator and Generator Owner did not adjust generation to a reliable operating level, adjust the SOL and operate the facilities within established limits or implement other compliance measures for the Protection System or RAS that misoperated as required in less than 28 hours but did perform the requirements within 32 hours. | The Transmission Operator and Generator Owner did not adjust generation to a reliable operating level, adjust the SOL and operate the facilities within established limits or implement other compliance measures for the Protection System or RAS that misoperated as required within 32 hours. |

R2.2.2 and R2.4

| Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------|----------|------|--------|
| | | | |

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WECC Standard PRC-004-WECC-1(X) — Protection System and Remedial Action Scheme Misoperation

| | | | |
|--|---|---|--|
| The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not perform the required repairs, replacement, or system operation adjustments to comply with the requirements within 20 business days but did perform the required activities within 25 business days. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not perform the required repairs, replacement, or system operation adjustment to comply with the requirements within 25 business days but did perform the required activities within 28 business days. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not perform the required repairs, replacement, or system operation adjustment to comply with the requirements within 28 business days but did perform the required activities within 30 business days. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not perform the required repairs, replacement, or system operation adjustments to comply with the requirements within 30 business days. |
|--|---|---|--|

R3.1

| Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not report the Misoperation and corrective actions taken or planned to comply with the requirements within 10 business days but did perform the required activities within 15 business days. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not report the Misoperation and corrective actions taken or planned to comply with the requirements within 15 business days but did perform the required activities within 20 business days. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not report the Misoperation and corrective actions taken or planned to comply with the requirements within 20 business days but did perform the required activities within 25 business days. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not report the Misoperation and corrective actions taken or planned to comply with the requirements within 25 business days. |

R3.2

| Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not report the completion of repair or replacement of Protection System and/or RAS that misoperated to comply with the requirements within 10 business days of the completion but did perform the required activities within 15 business days. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not report the completion of repair or replacement of Protection System and/or RAS that misoperated to comply with the requirements within 15 business days of the completion but did perform the required activities within 20 business days. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not report the completion of repair or replacement of Protection System and/or RAS that misoperated to comply with the requirements within 20 business days of the completion but did perform the required activities within 25 business days. | The Transmission Owner and Generator Owner did not report the completion of repair or replacement of Protection System and/or RAS that misoperated to comply with the requirements within 25 business days of the completion. |

Version History — Shows Approval History and Summary of Changes in the Action Field

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|----------------|--|-----------------|
| 1 | April 16, 2008 | Permanent Replacement Standard for PRC-STD-001-1 and PRC-STD-003-1 | |

Deleted: Adopted by Board of Trustees: October 29, 2008

WECC Standard PRC-004-WECC-1(X) — Protection System and Remedial Action Scheme Misoperation

| | | | |
|-------------|----------------|---|---|
| 1 | April 21, 2011 | FERC Order issued approving PRC-004-WECC-1 (approval effective June 27, 2011) | |
| <u>1(X)</u> | <u>TBD</u> | <u>Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees</u> | <u>Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS</u> |

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A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Protection System Maintenance
2. **Number:** PRC-005-2(X)
3. **Purpose:** To document and implement programs for the maintenance of all Protection Systems affecting the reliability of the Bulk Electric System (BES) so that these Protection Systems are kept in working order.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. **Functional Entities:**
 - 4.1.1 Transmission Owner
 - 4.1.2 Generator Owner
 - 4.1.3 Distribution Provider
 - 4.2. **Facilities:**
 - 4.2.1 Protection Systems that are installed for the purpose of detecting Faults on BES Elements (lines, buses, transformers, etc.)
 - 4.2.2 Protection Systems used for underfrequency load-shedding systems installed per ERO underfrequency load-shedding requirements.
 - 4.2.3 Protection Systems used for undervoltage load-shedding systems installed to prevent system voltage collapse or voltage instability for BES reliability.
 - 4.2.4 Protection Systems installed as a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) for BES reliability.
 - 4.2.5 Protection Systems for generator Facilities that are part of the BES, including:
 - 4.2.5.1 Protection Systems that act to trip the generator either directly or via lockout or auxiliary tripping relays.
 - 4.2.5.2 Protection Systems for generator step-up transformers for generators that are part of the BES.
 - 4.2.5.3 Protection Systems for transformers connecting aggregated generation, where the aggregated generation is part of the BES (e.g., transformers connecting facilities such as wind-farms to the BES).
 - 4.2.5.4 Protection Systems for station service or excitation transformers connected to the generator bus of generators which are part of the BES, that act to trip the generator either directly or via lockout or tripping auxiliary relays.
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction. (See the Implementation Plan for additional detail)

B. Requirements

- R1.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall establish a Protection System Maintenance Program (PSMP) for its Protection Systems identified in Section 4.2. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*

Component Type - Any one of the five specific elements of the Protection System definition.

The PSMP shall:

- 1.1.** Identify which maintenance method (time-based, performance-based per PRC-005 Attachment A, or a combination) is used to address each Protection System Component Type. All batteries associated with the station dc supply Component Type of a Protection System shall be included in a time-based program as described in Table 1-4 and Table 3.
- 1.2.** Include the applicable monitored Component attributes applied to each Protection System Component Type consistent with the maintenance intervals specified in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, and Table 3 where monitoring is used to extend the maintenance intervals beyond those specified for unmonitored Protection System Components.

Component – A component is any individual discrete piece of equipment included in a Protection System, including but not limited to a protective relay or current sensing device. The designation of what constitutes a control circuit component is very dependent upon how an entity performs and tracks the testing of the control circuitry. Some entities test their control circuits on a breaker basis whereas others test their circuitry on a local zone of protection basis. Thus, entities are allowed the latitude to designate their own definitions of control circuit components. Another example of where the entity has some discretion on determining what constitutes a single component is the voltage and current sensing devices, where the entity may choose either to designate a full three-phase set of such devices or a single device as a single component.

- R2.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that uses performance-based maintenance intervals in its PSMP shall follow the procedure established in PRC-005 Attachment A to establish and maintain its performance-based intervals. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*

- R3.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that utilizes time-based maintenance program(s) shall maintain its Protection System Components that are included within the time-based maintenance program in accordance with the minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance intervals prescribed within Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, and Table 3. *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*

Unresolved Maintenance Issue - A deficiency identified during a maintenance activity that causes the component to not meet the intended performance, cannot be corrected during the maintenance interval, and requires follow-up corrective action.

- R4.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that utilizes performance-based maintenance program(s) in accordance with Requirement R2 shall implement and follow its PSMP for its Protection System Components that are included within the performance-based program(s). *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*

- R5.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall demonstrate efforts to correct identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues. [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*]
[*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

C. Measures

- M1.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner and Distribution Provider shall have a documented Protection System Maintenance Program in accordance with Requirement R1.

For each Protection System Component Type, the documentation shall include the type of maintenance method applied (time-based, performance-based, or a combination of these maintenance methods), and shall include all batteries associated with the station dc supply Component Types in a time-based program as described in Table 1-4 and Table 3. (Part 1.1)

For Component Types that use monitoring to extend the maintenance intervals, the responsible entity(s) shall have evidence for each protection Component Type (such as manufacturer’s specifications or engineering drawings) of the appropriate monitored Component attributes as specified in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, and Table 3. (Part 1.2)
- M2.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that uses performance-based maintenance intervals shall have evidence that its current performance-based maintenance program(s) is in accordance with Requirement R2, which may include but is not limited to Component lists, dated maintenance records, and dated analysis records and results.
- M3.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that utilizes time-based maintenance program(s) shall have evidence that it has maintained its Protection System Components included within its time-based program in accordance with Requirement R3. The evidence may include but is not limited to dated maintenance records, dated maintenance summaries, dated check-off lists, dated inspection records, or dated work orders.
- M4.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that utilizes performance-based maintenance intervals in accordance with Requirement R2 shall have evidence that it has implemented the Protection System Maintenance Program for the Protection System Components included in its performance-based program in accordance with Requirement R4. The evidence may include but is not limited to dated maintenance records, dated maintenance summaries, dated check-off lists, dated inspection records, or dated work orders.
- M5.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall have evidence that it has undertaken efforts to correct identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues in accordance with Requirement R5. The evidence may include but is not limited to work orders, replacement Component orders, invoices, project schedules with completed milestones, return material authorizations (RMAs) or purchase orders.

D. Compliance

- 1. Compliance Monitoring Process**

 - 1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority**

 - Regional Entity
 - 1.2. Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Processes:**

 - Compliance Audit
 - Self-Certification
 - Spot Checking
 - Compliance Investigation
 - Self-Reporting
 - Complaint

1.3. Evidence Retention

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall each keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

For Requirement R1, the Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall each keep its current dated Protection System Maintenance Program, as well as any superseded versions since the preceding compliance audit, including the documentation that specifies the type of maintenance program applied for each Protection System Component Type.

For Requirement R2, Requirement R3, Requirement R4, and Requirement R5, the Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall each keep documentation of the two most recent performances of each distinct maintenance activity for the Protection System Component, or all performances of each distinct maintenance activity for the Protection System Component since the previous scheduled audit date, whichever is longer.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Violation Severity Levels

| Requirement Number | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|--------------------|---|---|--|--|
| R1 | <p>The responsible entity’s PSMP failed to specify whether one Component Type is being addressed by time-based or performance-based maintenance, or a combination of both. (Part 1.1)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p>The responsible entity’s PSMP failed to include applicable station batteries in a time-based program. (Part 1.1)</p> | <p>The responsible entity’s PSMP failed to specify whether two Component Types are being addressed by time-based or performance-based maintenance, or a combination of both. (Part 1.1)</p> | <p>The responsible entity’s PSMP failed to include the applicable monitoring attributes applied to each Protection System Component Type consistent with the maintenance intervals specified in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, and Table 3 where monitoring is used to extend the maintenance intervals beyond those specified for unmonitored Protection System Components. (Part 1.2).</p> | <p>The responsible entity failed to establish a PSMP.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p>The responsible entity failed to specify whether three or more Component Types are being addressed by time-based or performance-based maintenance, or a combination of both. (Part 1.1).</p> |
| R2 | <p>The responsible entity uses performance-based maintenance intervals in its PSMP but failed to reduce Countable Events to no more than 4% within three years.</p> | <p style="text-align: center;">NA</p> | <p>The responsible entity uses performance-based maintenance intervals in its PSMP but failed to reduce Countable Events to no more than 4% within four years.</p> | <p>The responsible entity uses performance-based maintenance intervals in its PSMP but:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Failed to establish the technical justification described within Requirement R2 for the initial use of the performance-based PSMP <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2) Failed to reduce Countable Events to no more than 4% within five years <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3) Maintained a Segment with less than 60 Components <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4) Failed to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annually update the list of Components, <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> |

Standard PRC-005-2(X) — Protection System Maintenance

| Requirement Number | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|--------------------|--|--|---|---|
| | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annually perform maintenance on the greater of 5% of the segment population or 3 Components, <li style="text-align: center;">OR • Annually analyze the program activities and results for each Segment. |
| R3 | For Protection System Components included within a time-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain 5% or less of the total Components included within a specific Protection System Component Type, in accordance with the minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance intervals prescribed within Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, and Table 3. | For Protection System Components included within a time-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 5% but 10% or less of the total Components included within a specific Protection System Component Type, in accordance with the minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance intervals prescribed within Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, and Table 3. | For Protection System Components included within a time-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 10% but 15% or less of the total Components included within a specific Protection System Component Type, in accordance with the minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance intervals prescribed within Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, and Table 3. | For Protection System Components included within a time-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 15% of the total Components included within a specific Protection System Component Type, in accordance with the minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance intervals prescribed within Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, and Table 3. |
| R4 | For Protection System Components included within a performance-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain 5% or less of the annual scheduled maintenance for a specific Protection System Component Type in accordance with their performance-based PSMP. | For Protection System Components included within a performance-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 5% but 10% or less of the annual scheduled maintenance for a specific Protection System Component Type in accordance with their performance-based PSMP. | For Protection System Components included within a performance-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 10% but 15% or less of the annual scheduled maintenance for a specific Protection System Component Type in accordance with their performance-based PSMP. | For Protection System Components included within a performance-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 15% of the annual scheduled maintenance for a specific Protection System Component Type in accordance with their performance-based PSMP. |
| R5 | The responsible entity failed to undertake efforts to correct 5 or | The responsible entity failed to undertake efforts to correct greater than 5, but less than or equal to 10 | The responsible entity failed to undertake efforts to correct greater than 10, but less than or equal to 15 | The responsible entity failed to undertake efforts to correct greater |

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| Requirement Number | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|--------------------|---|---|---|---|
| | fewer identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues. | identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues. | identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues. | than 15 identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues. |

E. Regional Variances

None

F. Supplemental Reference Document

The following documents present a detailed discussion about determination of maintenance intervals and other useful information regarding establishment of a maintenance program.

1. PRC-005-2(X) Protection System Maintenance Supplementary Reference and FAQ — July 2012.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|----------------|--------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 1 | December 1, 2005 | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Changed incorrect use of certain hyphens (-) to “en dash” (–) and “em dash (—).” 2. Added “periods” to items where appropriate. 3. Changed “Timeframe” to “Time Frame” in item D, 1.2. | 01/20/05 |
| 1a | February 17, 2011 | Added Appendix 1 - Interpretation regarding applicability of standard to protection of radially connected transformers | Project 2009-17 interpretation |
| 1a | February 17, 2011 | Adopted by Board of Trustees | |
| 1a | September 26, 2011 | FERC Order issued approving interpretation of R1 and R2 (FERC’s Order is effective as of September 26, 2011) | |
| 1.1a | February 1, 2012 | Errata change: Clarified inclusion of generator interconnection Facility in Generator Owner’s responsibility | Revision under Project 2010-07 |
| 1b | February 3, 2012 | FERC Order issued approving interpretation of R1, R1.1, and R1.2 (FERC’s Order dated March 14, 2012). Updated version from 1a to 1b. | Project 2009-10 Interpretation |
| 1.1b | April 23, 2012 | Updated standard version to 1.1b to reflect FERC approval of PRC-005-1b. | Revision under Project 2010-07 |

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| | | | |
|------|-------------------|--|--|
| 1.1b | May 9, 2012 | PRC-005-1.1b was adopted by the Board of Trustees as part of Project 2010-07 (GOTO). | |
| 2 | November 7, 2012 | Adopted by Board of Trustees | Complete revision, absorbing maintenance requirements from PRC-005-1b, PRC-008-0, PRC-011-0, PRC-017-0 |
| 2 | October 17, 2013 | Errata Change: The Standards Committee approved an errata change to the implementation plan for PRC-005-2 to add the phrase “or as otherwise made effective pursuant to the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities;” to the second sentence under the “Retirement of Existing Standards” section. | |
| 2 | December 19, 2013 | FERC Order issued approving PRC-005-2. (The enforcement date for PRC-005-2 will be April 1, 2015, which is the first date entities must be compliant with part of the standard. The implementation plan for PRC-005-2 includes specific compliance dates and timeframes for each of the Requirements. The regulatory approval date in the U.S. is February 24, 2014. | |
| 2(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

| Table 1-1 Component Type - Protective Relay Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|--|---|---|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval ¹ | Maintenance Activities |
| Any unmonitored protective relay not having all the monitoring attributes of a category below. | 6 calendar years | For all unmonitored relays: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Verify that settings are as specified For non-microprocessor relays: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Test and, if necessary calibrate For microprocessor relays: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Verify operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. • Verify acceptable measurement of power system input values. |
| Monitored microprocessor protective relay with the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal self-diagnosis and alarming (see Table 2). • Voltage and/or current waveform sampling three or more times per power cycle, and conversion of samples to numeric values for measurement calculations by microprocessor electronics. • Alarming for power supply failure (see Table 2). | 12 calendar years | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Settings are as specified. • Operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. • Acceptable measurement of power system input values. |

¹ For the tables in this standard, a calendar year starts on the first day of a new year (January 1) after a maintenance activity has been completed. For the tables in this standard, a calendar month starts on the first day of the first month after a maintenance activity has been completed.

| Table 1-1 Component Type - Protective Relay Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|--|---|---|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval ¹ | Maintenance Activities |
| Monitored microprocessor protective relay with preceding row attributes and the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ac measurements are continuously verified by comparison to an independent ac measurement source, with alarming for excessive error (See Table 2). • Some or all binary or status inputs and control outputs are monitored by a process that continuously demonstrates ability to perform as designed, with alarming for failure (See Table 2). • Alarming for change of settings (See Table 2). | 12 calendar years | Verify only the unmonitored relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. |

| Table 1-2 Component Type - Communications Systems Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|---|------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any unmonitored communications system necessary for correct operation of protective functions, and not having all the monitoring attributes of a category below. | 4 calendar months | Verify that the communications system is functional. |
| | 6 calendar years | Verify that the communications system meets performance criteria pertinent to the communications technology applied (e.g. signal level, reflected power, or data error rate). Verify operation of communications system inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. |
| Any communications system with continuous monitoring or periodic automated testing for the presence of the channel function, and alarming for loss of function (See Table 2). | 12 calendar years | Verify that the communications system meets performance criteria pertinent to the communications technology applied (e.g. signal level, reflected power, or data error rate). Verify operation of communications system inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. |
| Any communications system with all of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continuous monitoring or periodic automated testing for the performance of the channel using criteria pertinent to the communications technology applied (e.g. signal level, reflected power, or data error rate, and alarming for excessive performance degradation). (See Table 2) • Some or all binary or status inputs and control outputs are monitored by a process that continuously demonstrates ability to perform as designed, with alarming for failure (See Table 2). | 12 calendar years | Verify only the unmonitored communications system inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System |

| Table 1-3 Component Type - Voltage and Current Sensing Devices Providing Inputs to Protective Relays Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|--|-----------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any voltage and current sensing devices not having monitoring attributes of the category below. | 12 calendar years | Verify that current and voltage signal values are provided to the protective relays. |
| Voltage and Current Sensing devices connected to microprocessor relays with AC measurements are continuously verified by comparison of sensing input value, as measured by the microprocessor relay, to an independent ac measurement source, with alarming for unacceptable error or failure (see Table 2). | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |

Table 1-4(a)
Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) Batteries
Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)

Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-BES interrupting devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS systems, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)).

| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
|---|--|--|
| Protection System Station dc supply using Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) batteries not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f). | 4 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Station dc supply voltage Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electrolyte level • For unintentional grounds |
| | 18 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Float voltage of battery charger • Battery continuity • Battery terminal connection resistance • Battery intercell or unit-to-unit connection resistance Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cell condition of all individual battery cells where cells are visible – or measure battery cell/unit internal ohmic values where the cells are not visible • Physical condition of battery rack |
| | 18 Calendar Months -or- 6 Calendar Years | Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by evaluating cell/unit measurements indicative of battery performance (e.g. internal ohmic values or float current) against the station battery baseline. -or- Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by conducting a performance or modified performance capacity test of the entire battery bank. |

| Table 1-4(b) Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Valve-Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) Batteries Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|---|---|---|
| Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-BES interrupting devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS systems, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)). | | |
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Protection System Station dc supply with Valve Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) batteries not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f). | 4 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Station dc supply voltage Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For unintentional grounds |
| | 6 Calendar Months | Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Condition of all individual units by measuring battery cell/unit internal ohmic values. |
| | 18 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Float voltage of battery charger • Battery continuity • Battery terminal connection resistance • Battery intercell or unit-to-unit connection resistance Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Physical condition of battery rack |
| | 6 Calendar Months -or- 3 Calendar Years | Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by evaluating cell/unit measurements indicative of battery performance (e.g. internal ohmic values or float current) against the station battery baseline. -or- Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by conducting a performance or modified performance capacity test of the entire battery bank. |

| Table 1-4(c) Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Nickel-Cadmium (NiCad) Batteries Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|--|------------------------------|--|
| Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-BES interrupting devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS system, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)). | | |
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Protection System Station dc supply Nickel-Cadmium (NiCad) batteries not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f). | 4 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Station dc supply voltage Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electrolyte level • For unintentional grounds |
| | 18 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Float voltage of battery charger • Battery continuity • Battery terminal connection resistance • Battery intercell or unit-to-unit connection resistance Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cell condition of all individual battery cells. • Physical condition of battery rack |
| | 6 Calendar Years | Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by conducting a performance or modified performance capacity test of the entire battery bank. |

| Table 1-4(d) Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Non Battery Based Energy Storage Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|---|------------------------------|--|
| Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-BES interrupting devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS system, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)). | | |
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any Protection System station dc supply not using a battery and not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f). | 4 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Station dc supply voltage Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For unintentional grounds |
| | 18 Calendar Months | Inspect: Condition of non-battery based dc supply |
| | 6 Calendar Years | Verify that the dc supply can perform as manufactured when ac power is not present. |

| Table 1-4(e) Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply for non-BES Interrupting Devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS, and non-distributed UVLS systems | | |
|--|--|-----------------------------------|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any Protection System dc supply used for tripping only non-BES interrupting devices as part of a RAS, non-distributed UFLS, or non-distributed UVLS system and not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f). | When control circuits are verified (See Table 1-5) | Verify Station dc supply voltage. |

| Table 1-4(f) Exclusions for Protection System Station dc Supply Monitoring Devices and Systems | | |
|--|-----------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any station dc supply with high and low voltage monitoring and alarming of the battery charger voltage to detect charger overvoltage and charger failure (See Table 2). | No periodic maintenance specified | No periodic verification of station dc supply voltage is required. |
| Any battery based station dc supply with electrolyte level monitoring and alarming in every cell (See Table 2). | | No periodic inspection of the electrolyte level for each cell is required. |
| Any station dc supply with unintentional dc ground monitoring and alarming (See Table 2). | | No periodic inspection of unintentional dc grounds is required. |
| Any station dc supply with charger float voltage monitoring and alarming to ensure correct float voltage is being applied on the station dc supply (See Table 2). | | No periodic verification of float voltage of battery charger is required. |
| Any battery based station dc supply with monitoring and alarming of battery string continuity (See Table 2). | | No periodic verification of the battery continuity is required. |
| Any battery based station dc supply with monitoring and alarming of the intercell and/or terminal connection detail resistance of the entire battery (See Table 2). | | No periodic verification of the intercell and terminal connection resistance is required. |
| Any Valve Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) or Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) station battery with internal ohmic value or float current monitoring and alarming, and evaluating present values relative to baseline internal ohmic values for every cell/unit (See Table 2). | | No periodic evaluation relative to baseline of battery cell/unit measurements indicative of battery performance is required to verify the station battery can perform as manufactured. |
| Any Valve Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) or Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) station battery with monitoring and alarming of each cell/unit internal ohmic value (See Table 2). | | No periodic inspection of the condition of all individual units by measuring battery cell/unit internal ohmic values of a station VRLA or Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) battery is required. |

| Table 1-5 Component Type - Control Circuitry Associated With Protective Functions Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) Note: Table requirements apply to all Control Circuitry Components of Protection Systems, and RASs except as noted. | | |
|--|-----------------------------------|---|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Trip coils or actuators of circuit breakers, interrupting devices, or mitigating devices (regardless of any monitoring of the control circuitry). | 6 calendar years | Verify that each trip coil is able to operate the circuit breaker, interrupting device, or mitigating device. |
| Electromechanical lockout devices which are directly in a trip path from the protective relay to the interrupting device trip coil (regardless of any monitoring of the control circuitry). | 6 calendar years | Verify electrical operation of electromechanical lockout devices. |
| Unmonitored control circuitry associated with RAS. | 12 calendar years | Verify all paths of the control circuits essential for proper operation of the RAS. |
| Unmonitored control circuitry associated with protective functions inclusive of all auxiliary relays. | 12 calendar years | Verify all paths of the trip circuits inclusive of all auxiliary relays through the trip coil(s) of the circuit breakers or other interrupting devices. |
| Control circuitry associated with protective functions and/or RAS whose integrity is monitored and alarmed (See Table 2). | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |

| Table 2 – Alarming Paths and Monitoring In Tables 1-1 through 1-5 and Table 3, alarm attributes used to justify extended maximum maintenance intervals and/or reduced maintenance activities are subject to the following maintenance requirements | | |
|--|-----------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any alarm path through which alarms in Tables 1-1 through 1-5 and Table 3 are conveyed from the alarm origin to the location where corrective action can be initiated, and not having all the attributes of the “Alarm Path with monitoring” category below. Alarms are reported within 24 hours of detection to a location where corrective action can be initiated. | 12 Calendar Years | Verify that the alarm path conveys alarm signals to a location where corrective action can be initiated. |
| Alarm Path with monitoring: The location where corrective action is taken receives an alarm within 24 hours for failure of any portion of the alarming path from the alarm origin to the location where corrective action can be initiated. | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |

| Table 3 Maintenance Activities and Intervals for distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS Systems | | |
|---|------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any unmonitored protective relay not having all the monitoring attributes of a category below. | 6 calendar years | <p>Verify that settings are as specified</p> <p>For non-microprocessor relays:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Test and, if necessary calibrate <p>For microprocessor relays:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Verify operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. • Verify acceptable measurement of power system input values. |
| <p>Monitored microprocessor protective relay with the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal self diagnosis and alarming (See Table 2). • Voltage and/or current waveform sampling three or more times per power cycle, and conversion of samples to numeric values for measurement calculations by microprocessor electronics. <p>Alarming for power supply failure (See Table 2).</p> | 12 calendar years | <p>Verify:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Settings are as specified. • Operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. • Acceptable measurement of power system input values |
| <p>Monitored microprocessor protective relay with preceding row attributes and the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ac measurements are continuously verified by comparison to an independent ac measurement source, with alarming for excessive error (See Table 2). • Some or all binary or status inputs and control outputs are monitored by a process that continuously demonstrates ability to perform as designed, with alarming for failure (See Table 2). <p>Alarming for change of settings (See Table 2).</p> | 12 calendar years | <p>Verify only the unmonitored relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System.</p> |

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| Table 3 Maintenance Activities and Intervals for distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS Systems | | |
|--|-------------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Voltage and/or current sensing devices associated with UFLS or UVLS systems. | 12 calendar years | Verify that current and/or voltage signal values are provided to the protective relays. |
| Protection System dc supply for tripping non-BES interrupting devices used only for a UFLS or UVLS system. | 12 calendar years | Verify Protection System dc supply voltage. |
| Control circuitry between the UFLS or UVLS relays and electromechanical lockout and/or tripping auxiliary devices (excludes non-BES interrupting device trip coils). | 12 calendar years | Verify the path from the relay to the lockout and/or tripping auxiliary relay (including essential supervisory logic). |
| Electromechanical lockout and/or tripping auxiliary devices associated only with UFLS or UVLS systems (excludes non-BES interrupting device trip coils). | 12 calendar years | Verify electrical operation of electromechanical lockout and/or tripping auxiliary devices. |
| Control circuitry between the electromechanical lockout and/or tripping auxiliary devices and the non-BES interrupting devices in UFLS or UVLS systems, or between UFLS or UVLS relays (with no interposing electromechanical lockout or auxiliary device) and the non-BES interrupting devices (excludes non-BES interrupting device trip coils). | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |
| Trip coils of non-BES interrupting devices in UFLS or UVLS systems. | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |

PRC-005 — Attachment A

Criteria for a Performance-Based Protection System Maintenance Program

Purpose: To establish a technical basis for initial and continued use of a performance-based Protection System Maintenance Program (PSMP).

To establish the technical justification for the initial use of a performance-based PSMP:

1. Develop a list with a description of Components included in each designated Segment of the Protection System Component population, with a minimum **Segment** population of 60 Components.
2. Maintain the Components in each Segment according to the time-based maximum allowable intervals established in Tables 1-1 through 1-5 and Table 3 until results of maintenance activities for the Segment are available for a minimum of 30 individual Components of the Segment.
3. Document the maintenance program activities and results for each Segment, including maintenance dates and Countable Events for each included Component.
4. Analyze the maintenance program activities and results for each Segment to determine the overall performance of the Segment and develop maintenance intervals.
5. Determine the maximum allowable maintenance interval for each Segment such that the Segment experiences **Countable Events** on no more than 4% of the Components within the Segment, for the greater of either the last 30 Components maintained or all Components maintained in the previous year.

Segment – *Protection Systems or components of a consistent design standard, or a particular model or type from a single manufacturer that typically share other common elements. Consistent performance is expected across the entire population of a Segment. A Segment must contain at least sixty (60) individual components.*

Countable Event – *A failure of a component requiring repair or replacement, any condition discovered during the maintenance activities in Tables 1-1 through 1-5 and Table 3 which requires corrective action, or a Misoperation attributed to hardware failure or calibration failure. Misoperations due to product design errors, software errors, relay settings different from specified settings, Protection System component configuration errors, or Protection System application errors are not included in Countable Events.*

To maintain the technical justification for the ongoing use of a performance-based PSMP:

1. At least annually, update the list of Protection System Components and Segments and/or description if any changes occur within the Segment.
2. Perform maintenance on the greater of 5% of the Components (addressed in the performance based PSMP) in each Segment or 3 individual Components within the Segment in each year.
3. For the prior year, analyze the maintenance program activities and results for each Segment to determine the overall performance of the Segment.

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4. Using the prior year's data, determine the maximum allowable maintenance interval for each Segment such that the Segment experiences Countable Events on no more than 4% of the Components within the Segment, for the greater of either the last 30 Components maintained or all Components maintained in the previous year.
5. If the Components in a Protection System Segment maintained through a performance-based PSMP experience 4% or more Countable Events, develop, document, and implement an action plan to reduce the Countable Events to less than 4% of the Segment population within 3 years.

Standard PRC-005-2(X) — Protection System Maintenance

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Protection System Maintenance
2. **Number:** PRC-005-2(X)
3. **Purpose:** To document and implement programs for the maintenance of all Protection Systems affecting the reliability of the Bulk Electric System (BES) so that these Protection Systems are kept in working order.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. **Functional Entities:**
 - 4.1.1 Transmission Owner
 - 4.1.2 Generator Owner
 - 4.1.3 Distribution Provider
 - 4.2. **Facilities:**
 - 4.2.1 Protection Systems that are installed for the purpose of detecting Faults on BES Elements (lines, buses, transformers, etc.)
 - 4.2.2 Protection Systems used for underfrequency load-shedding systems installed per ERO underfrequency load-shedding requirements.
 - 4.2.3 Protection Systems used for undervoltage load-shedding systems installed to prevent system voltage collapse or voltage instability for BES reliability.
 - 4.2.4 Protection Systems installed as a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) for BES reliability.
 - 4.2.5 Protection Systems for generator Facilities that are part of the BES, including:
 - 4.2.5.1 Protection Systems that act to trip the generator either directly or via lockout or auxiliary tripping relays.
 - 4.2.5.2 Protection Systems for generator step-up transformers for generators that are part of the BES.
 - 4.2.5.3 Protection Systems for transformers connecting aggregated generation, where the aggregated generation is part of the BES (e.g., transformers connecting facilities such as wind-farms to the BES).
 - 4.2.5.4 Protection Systems for station service or excitation transformers connected to the generator bus of generators which are part of the BES, that act to trip the generator either directly or via lockout or tripping auxiliary relays.
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction. (See the [Implementation Plan for additional detail](#))

Deleted: Special Protection System (SPS)

Deleted: See Implementation Plan

Standard PRC-005-2(X) — Protection System Maintenance

B. Requirements

- R1.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall establish a Protection System Maintenance Program (PSMP) for its Protection Systems identified in Section 4.2. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*

Component Type - Any one of the five specific elements of the Protection System definition.

The PSMP shall:

- 1.1.** Identify which maintenance method (time-based, performance-based per PRC-005 Attachment A, or a combination) is used to address each Protection System Component Type. All batteries associated with the station dc supply Component Type of a Protection System shall be included in a time-based program as described in Table 1-4 and Table 3.
- 1.2.** Include the applicable monitored Component attributes applied to each Protection System Component Type consistent with the maintenance intervals specified in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, and Table 3 where monitoring is used to extend the maintenance intervals beyond those specified for unmonitored Protection System Components.

Component – A component is any individual discrete piece of equipment included in a Protection System, including but not limited to a protective relay or current sensing device. The designation of what constitutes a control circuit component is very dependent upon how an entity performs and tracks the testing of the control circuitry. Some entities test their control circuits on a breaker basis whereas others test their circuitry on a local zone of protection basis. Thus, entities are allowed the latitude to designate their own definitions of control circuit components. Another example of where the entity has some discretion on determining what constitutes a single component is the voltage and current sensing devices, where the entity may choose either to designate a full three-phase set of such devices or a single device as a single component.

- R2.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that uses performance-based maintenance intervals in its PSMP shall follow the procedure established in PRC-005 Attachment A to establish and maintain its performance-based intervals. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*

- R3.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that utilizes time-based maintenance program(s) shall maintain its Protection System Components that are included within the time-based maintenance program in accordance with the minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance intervals prescribed within Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, and Table 3. *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*

Unresolved Maintenance Issue - A deficiency identified during a maintenance activity that causes the component to not meet the intended performance, cannot be corrected during the maintenance interval, and requires follow-up corrective action.

- R4.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that utilizes performance-based maintenance program(s) in accordance with Requirement R2 shall implement and follow its PSMP for its Protection System Components that are included within the performance-based program(s). *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*

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- R5.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall demonstrate efforts to correct identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues. [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*]
[*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

Standard PRC-005-2(X) — Protection System Maintenance

C. Measures

- M1.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner and Distribution Provider shall have a documented Protection System Maintenance Program in accordance with Requirement R1.
- For each Protection System Component Type, the documentation shall include the type of maintenance method applied (time-based, performance-based, or a combination of these maintenance methods), and shall include all batteries associated with the station dc supply Component Types in a time-based program as described in Table 1-4 and Table 3. (Part 1.1)
- For Component Types that use monitoring to extend the maintenance intervals, the responsible entity(s) shall have evidence for each protection Component Type (such as manufacturer’s specifications or engineering drawings) of the appropriate monitored Component attributes as specified in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, and Table 3. (Part 1.2)
- M2.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that uses performance-based maintenance intervals shall have evidence that its current performance-based maintenance program(s) is in accordance with Requirement R2, which may include but is not limited to Component lists, dated maintenance records, and dated analysis records and results.
- M3.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that utilizes time-based maintenance program(s) shall have evidence that it has maintained its Protection System Components included within its time-based program in accordance with Requirement R3. The evidence may include but is not limited to dated maintenance records, dated maintenance summaries, dated check-off lists, dated inspection records, or dated work orders.
- M4.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that utilizes performance-based maintenance intervals in accordance with Requirement R2 shall have evidence that it has implemented the Protection System Maintenance Program for the Protection System Components included in its performance-based program in accordance with Requirement R4. The evidence may include but is not limited to dated maintenance records, dated maintenance summaries, dated check-off lists, dated inspection records, or dated work orders.
- M5.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall have evidence that it has undertaken efforts to correct identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues in accordance with Requirement R5. The evidence may include but is not limited to work orders, replacement Component orders, invoices, project schedules with completed milestones, return material authorizations (RMAs) or purchase orders.

D. Compliance

1. **Compliance Monitoring Process**
 - 1.1. **Compliance Enforcement Authority**
 - Regional Entity
 - 1.2. **Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Processes:**
 - Compliance Audit
 - Self-Certification
 - Spot Checking
 - Compliance Investigation
 - Self-Reporting
 - Complaint

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1.3. Evidence Retention

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall each keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

For Requirement R1, the Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall each keep its current dated Protection System Maintenance Program, as well as any superseded versions since the preceding compliance audit, including the documentation that specifies the type of maintenance program applied for each Protection System Component Type.

For Requirement R2, Requirement R3, Requirement R4, and Requirement R5, the Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall each keep documentation of the two most recent performances of each distinct maintenance activity for the Protection System Component, or all performances of each distinct maintenance activity for the Protection System Component since the previous scheduled audit date, whichever is longer.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

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2. Violation Severity Levels

| Requirement Number | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|--------------------|---|---|--|--|
| R1 | <p>The responsible entity’s PSMP failed to specify whether one Component Type is being addressed by time-based or performance-based maintenance, or a combination of both. (Part 1.1)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p>The responsible entity’s PSMP failed to include applicable station batteries in a time-based program. (Part 1.1)</p> | <p>The responsible entity’s PSMP failed to specify whether two Component Types are being addressed by time-based or performance-based maintenance, or a combination of both. (Part 1.1)</p> | <p>The responsible entity’s PSMP failed to include the applicable monitoring attributes applied to each Protection System Component Type consistent with the maintenance intervals specified in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, and Table 3 where monitoring is used to extend the maintenance intervals beyond those specified for unmonitored Protection System Components. (Part 1.2).</p> | <p>The responsible entity failed to establish a PSMP.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p>The responsible entity failed to specify whether three or more Component Types are being addressed by time-based or performance-based maintenance, or a combination of both. (Part 1.1).</p> |
| R2 | <p>The responsible entity uses performance-based maintenance intervals in its PSMP but failed to reduce Countable Events to no more than 4% within three years.</p> | <p style="text-align: center;">NA</p> | <p>The responsible entity uses performance-based maintenance intervals in its PSMP but failed to reduce Countable Events to no more than 4% within four years.</p> | <p>The responsible entity uses performance-based maintenance intervals in its PSMP but:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Failed to establish the technical justification described within Requirement R2 for the initial use of the performance-based PSMP <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2) Failed to reduce Countable Events to no more than 4% within five years <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3) Maintained a Segment with less than 60 Components <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4) Failed to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annually update the list of Components, <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> |

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| Requirement Number | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|--------------------|--|--|---|---|
| | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Annually perform maintenance on the greater of 5% of the segment population or 3 Components, <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Annually analyze the program activities and results for each Segment. |
| R3 | For Protection System Components included within a time-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain 5% or less of the total Components included within a specific Protection System Component Type, in accordance with the minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance intervals prescribed within Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, and Table 3. | For Protection System Components included within a time-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 5% but 10% or less of the total Components included within a specific Protection System Component Type, in accordance with the minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance intervals prescribed within Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, and Table 3. | For Protection System Components included within a time-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 10% but 15% or less of the total Components included within a specific Protection System Component Type, in accordance with the minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance intervals prescribed within Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, and Table 3. | For Protection System Components included within a time-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 15% of the total Components included within a specific Protection System Component Type, in accordance with the minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance intervals prescribed within Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, and Table 3. |
| R4 | For Protection System Components included within a performance-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain 5% or less of the annual scheduled maintenance for a specific Protection System Component Type in accordance with their performance-based PSMP. | For Protection System Components included within a performance-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 5% but 10% or less of the annual scheduled maintenance for a specific Protection System Component Type in accordance with their performance-based PSMP. | For Protection System Components included within a performance-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 10% but 15% or less of the annual scheduled maintenance for a specific Protection System Component Type in accordance with their performance-based PSMP. | For Protection System Components included within a performance-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 15% of the annual scheduled maintenance for a specific Protection System Component Type in accordance with their performance-based PSMP. |
| R5 | The responsible entity failed to undertake efforts to correct 5 or | The responsible entity failed to undertake efforts to correct greater than 5, but less than or equal to 10 | The responsible entity failed to undertake efforts to correct greater than 10, but less than or equal to 15 | The responsible entity failed to undertake efforts to correct greater |

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| Requirement Number | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|--------------------|---|---|---|---|
| | fewer identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues. | identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues. | identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues. | than 15 identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues. |

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E. Regional Variances

None

F. Supplemental Reference Document

The following documents present a detailed discussion about determination of maintenance intervals and other useful information regarding establishment of a maintenance program.

1. PRC-005-2(X) Protection System Maintenance Supplementary Reference and FAQ — July 2012.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|--------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 1 | December 1, 2005 | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Changed incorrect use of certain hyphens (-) to “en dash” (–) and “em dash (—).” 2. Added “periods” to items where appropriate. 3. Changed “Timeframe” to “Time Frame” in item D, 1.2. | 01/20/05 |
| 1a | February 17, 2011 | Added Appendix 1 - Interpretation regarding applicability of standard to protection of radially connected transformers | Project 2009-17 interpretation |
| 1a | February 17, 2011 | Adopted by Board of Trustees | |
| 1a | September 26, 2011 | FERC Order issued approving interpretation of R1 and R2 (FERC’s Order is effective as of September 26, 2011) | |
| 1.1a | February 1, 2012 | Errata change: Clarified inclusion of generator interconnection Facility in Generator Owner’s responsibility | Revision under Project 2010-07 |
| 1b | February 3, 2012 | FERC Order issued approving interpretation of R1, R1.1, and R1.2 (FERC’s Order dated March 14, 2012). Updated version from 1a to 1b. | Project 2009-10 Interpretation |
| 1.1b | April 23, 2012 | Updated standard version to 1.1b to reflect FERC approval of PRC-005-1b. | Revision under Project 2010-07 |

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| | | | |
|-------------|-------------------|--|--|
| 1.1b | May 9, 2012 | PRC-005-1.1b was adopted by the Board of Trustees as part of Project 2010-07 (GOTO). | |
| 2 | November 7, 2012 | Adopted by Board of Trustees | Complete revision, absorbing maintenance requirements from PRC-005-1b, PRC-008-0, PRC-011-0, PRC-017-0 |
| 2 | October 17, 2013 | Errata Change: The Standards Committee approved an errata change to the implementation plan for PRC-005-2 to add the phrase “or as otherwise made effective pursuant to the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities;” to the second sentence under the “Retirement of Existing Standards” section. | |
| 2 | December 19, 2013 | FERC Order issued approving PRC-005-2. (The enforcement date for PRC-005-2 will be April 1, 2015, which is the first date entities must be compliant with part of the standard. The implementation plan for PRC-005-2 includes specific compliance dates and timeframes for each of the Requirements. The regulatory approval date in the U.S. is February 24, 2014. | |
| <u>2(X)</u> | <u>TBD</u> | <u>Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees</u> | <u>Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS</u> |

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**Table 1-1
Component Type - Protective Relay
Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)**

| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval ¹ | Maintenance Activities |
|--|---|---|
| Any unmonitored protective relay not having all the monitoring attributes of a category below. | 6 calendar years | For all unmonitored relays: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Verify that settings are as specified For non-microprocessor relays: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Test and, if necessary calibrate For microprocessor relays: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Verify operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. • Verify acceptable measurement of power system input values. |
| Monitored microprocessor protective relay with the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal self-diagnosis and alarming (see Table 2). • Voltage and/or current waveform sampling three or more times per power cycle, and conversion of samples to numeric values for measurement calculations by microprocessor electronics. • Alarming for power supply failure (see Table 2). | 12 calendar years | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Settings are as specified. • Operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. • Acceptable measurement of power system input values. |

¹ For the tables in this standard, a calendar year starts on the first day of a new year (January 1) after a maintenance activity has been completed. For the tables in this standard, a calendar month starts on the first day of the first month after a maintenance activity has been completed.

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**Table 1-1
Component Type - Protective Relay
Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)**

| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval ¹ | Maintenance Activities |
|---|---|--|
| <p>Monitored microprocessor protective relay with preceding row attributes and the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ac measurements are continuously verified by comparison to an independent ac measurement source, with alarming for excessive error (See Table 2). • Some or all binary or status inputs and control outputs are monitored by a process that continuously demonstrates ability to perform as designed, with alarming for failure (See Table 2). • Alarming for change of settings (See Table 2). | <p>12 calendar years</p> | <p>Verify only the unmonitored relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System.</p> |

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**Table 1-2
Component Type - Communications Systems
Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)**

| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
|---|------------------------------|--|
| Any unmonitored communications system necessary for correct operation of protective functions, and not having all the monitoring attributes of a category below. | 4 calendar months | Verify that the communications system is functional. |
| | 6 calendar years | Verify that the communications system meets performance criteria pertinent to the communications technology applied (e.g. signal level, reflected power, or data error rate). Verify operation of communications system inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. |
| Any communications system with continuous monitoring or periodic automated testing for the presence of the channel function, and alarming for loss of function (See Table 2). | 12 calendar years | Verify that the communications system meets performance criteria pertinent to the communications technology applied (e.g. signal level, reflected power, or data error rate). Verify operation of communications system inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. |
| Any communications system with all of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continuous monitoring or periodic automated testing for the performance of the channel using criteria pertinent to the communications technology applied (e.g. signal level, reflected power, or data error rate, and alarming for excessive performance degradation). (See Table 2) • Some or all binary or status inputs and control outputs are monitored by a process that continuously demonstrates ability to perform as designed, with alarming for failure (See Table 2). | 12 calendar years | Verify only the unmonitored communications system inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System |

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| Table 1-3 Component Type - Voltage and Current Sensing Devices Providing Inputs to Protective Relays Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|--|-------------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any voltage and current sensing devices not having monitoring attributes of the category below. | 12 calendar years | Verify that current and voltage signal values are provided to the protective relays. |
| Voltage and Current Sensing devices connected to microprocessor relays with AC measurements are continuously verified by comparison of sensing input value, as measured by the microprocessor relay, to an independent ac measurement source, with alarming for unacceptable error or failure (see Table 2). | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |

Table 1-4(a)
Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) Batteries
Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)

Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-BES interrupting devices for **RAS**, non-distributed UFLS systems, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)).

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| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
|---|--|--|
| Protection System Station dc supply using Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) batteries not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f). | 4 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Station dc supply voltage Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electrolyte level • For unintentional grounds |
| | 18 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Float voltage of battery charger • Battery continuity • Battery terminal connection resistance • Battery intercell or unit-to-unit connection resistance Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cell condition of all individual battery cells where cells are visible – or measure battery cell/unit internal ohmic values where the cells are not visible • Physical condition of battery rack |
| | 18 Calendar Months -or- 6 Calendar Years | Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by evaluating cell/unit measurements indicative of battery performance (e.g. internal ohmic values or float current) against the station battery baseline. -or- Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by conducting a performance or modified performance capacity test of the entire battery bank. |

Table 1-4(b)

**Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Valve-Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) Batteries
Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)**

Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-BES interrupting devices for **RAS**, non-distributed UFLS systems, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)).

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| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
|--|---|---|
| Protection System Station dc supply with Valve Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) batteries not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f). | 4 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Station dc supply voltage Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For unintentional grounds |
| | 6 Calendar Months | Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Condition of all individual units by measuring battery cell/unit internal ohmic values. |
| | 18 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Float voltage of battery charger • Battery continuity • Battery terminal connection resistance • Battery intercell or unit-to-unit connection resistance Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Physical condition of battery rack |
| | 6 Calendar Months -or- 3 Calendar Years | Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by evaluating cell/unit measurements indicative of battery performance (e.g. internal ohmic values or float current) against the station battery baseline. -or- Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by conducting a performance or modified performance capacity test of the entire battery bank. |

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| Table 1-4(c) Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Nickel-Cadmium (NiCad) Batteries Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|--|------------------------------|--|
| Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-BES interrupting devices for <u>RAS</u> , non-distributed UFLS system, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)). | | |
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Protection System Station dc supply Nickel-Cadmium (NiCad) batteries not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f). | 4 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Station dc supply voltage Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electrolyte level • For unintentional grounds |
| | 18 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Float voltage of battery charger • Battery continuity • Battery terminal connection resistance • Battery intercell or unit-to-unit connection resistance Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cell condition of all individual battery cells. • Physical condition of battery rack |
| | 6 Calendar Years | Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by conducting a performance or modified performance capacity test of the entire battery bank. |

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| Table 1-4(d) Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Non Battery Based Energy Storage Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|--|------------------------------|--|
| Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-BES interrupting devices for RAS , non-distributed UFLS system, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)). | | |
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any Protection System station dc supply not using a battery and not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f). | 4 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Station dc supply voltage Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For unintentional grounds |
| | 18 Calendar Months | Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Condition of non-battery based dc supply |
| | 6 Calendar Years | Verify that the dc supply can perform as manufactured when ac power is not present. |

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| Table 1-4(e) Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply for non-BES Interrupting Devices for <u>RAS</u> , non-distributed UFLS, and non-distributed UVLS systems | | |
|--|--|-----------------------------------|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any Protection System dc supply used for tripping only non-BES interrupting devices as part of a <u>RAS</u> , non-distributed UFLS, or non-distributed UVLS system and not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f). | When control circuits are verified (See Table 1-5) | Verify Station dc supply voltage. |

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| Table 1-4(f) Exclusions for Protection System Station dc Supply Monitoring Devices and Systems | | |
|--|-----------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any station dc supply with high and low voltage monitoring and alarming of the battery charger voltage to detect charger overvoltage and charger failure (See Table 2). | No periodic maintenance specified | No periodic verification of station dc supply voltage is required. |
| Any battery based station dc supply with electrolyte level monitoring and alarming in every cell (See Table 2). | | No periodic inspection of the electrolyte level for each cell is required. |
| Any station dc supply with unintentional dc ground monitoring and alarming (See Table 2). | | No periodic inspection of unintentional dc grounds is required. |
| Any station dc supply with charger float voltage monitoring and alarming to ensure correct float voltage is being applied on the station dc supply (See Table 2). | | No periodic verification of float voltage of battery charger is required. |
| Any battery based station dc supply with monitoring and alarming of battery string continuity (See Table 2). | | No periodic verification of the battery continuity is required. |
| Any battery based station dc supply with monitoring and alarming of the intercell and/or terminal connection detail resistance of the entire battery (See Table 2). | | No periodic verification of the intercell and terminal connection resistance is required. |
| Any Valve Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) or Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) station battery with internal ohmic value or float current monitoring and alarming, and evaluating present values relative to baseline internal ohmic values for every cell/unit (See Table 2). | | No periodic evaluation relative to baseline of battery cell/unit measurements indicative of battery performance is required to verify the station battery can perform as manufactured. |
| Any Valve Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) or Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) station battery with monitoring and alarming of each cell/unit internal ohmic value (See Table 2). | | No periodic inspection of the condition of all individual units by measuring battery cell/unit internal ohmic values of a station VRLA or Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) battery is required. |

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| Table 1-5 Component Type - Control Circuitry Associated With Protective Functions Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) Note: Table requirements apply to all Control Circuitry Components of Protection Systems, and RASs except as noted. | | |
|--|-----------------------------------|---|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Trip coils or actuators of circuit breakers, interrupting devices, or mitigating devices (regardless of any monitoring of the control circuitry). | 6 calendar years | Verify that each trip coil is able to operate the circuit breaker, interrupting device, or mitigating device. |
| Electromechanical lockout devices which are directly in a trip path from the protective relay to the interrupting device trip coil (regardless of any monitoring of the control circuitry). | 6 calendar years | Verify electrical operation of electromechanical lockout devices. |
| Unmonitored control circuitry associated with RAS . | 12 calendar years | Verify all paths of the control circuits essential for proper operation of the RAS . |
| Unmonitored control circuitry associated with protective functions inclusive of all auxiliary relays. | 12 calendar years | Verify all paths of the trip circuits inclusive of all auxiliary relays through the trip coil(s) of the circuit breakers or other interrupting devices. |
| Control circuitry associated with protective functions and/or RAS whose integrity is monitored and alarmed (See Table 2). | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |

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| Table 2 – Alarming Paths and Monitoring | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|--|
| In Tables 1-1 through 1-5 and Table 3, alarm attributes used to justify extended maximum maintenance intervals and/or reduced maintenance activities are subject to the following maintenance requirements | | |
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| <p>Any alarm path through which alarms in Tables 1-1 through 1-5 and Table 3 are conveyed from the alarm origin to the location where corrective action can be initiated, and not having all the attributes of the “Alarm Path with monitoring” category below.</p> <p>Alarms are reported within 24 hours of detection to a location where corrective action can be initiated.</p> | 12 Calendar Years | Verify that the alarm path conveys alarm signals to a location where corrective action can be initiated. |
| <p>Alarm Path with monitoring:</p> <p>The location where corrective action is taken receives an alarm within 24 hours for failure of any portion of the alarming path from the alarm origin to the location where corrective action can be initiated.</p> | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |

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| Table 3 Maintenance Activities and Intervals for distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS Systems | | |
|---|------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any unmonitored protective relay not having all the monitoring attributes of a category below. | 6 calendar years | Verify that settings are as specified For non-microprocessor relays: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Test and, if necessary calibrate For microprocessor relays: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Verify operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. • Verify acceptable measurement of power system input values. |
| Monitored microprocessor protective relay with the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal self diagnosis and alarming (See Table 2). • Voltage and/or current waveform sampling three or more times per power cycle, and conversion of samples to numeric values for measurement calculations by microprocessor electronics. Alarming for power supply failure (See Table 2). | 12 calendar years | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Settings are as specified. • Operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. • Acceptable measurement of power system input values |
| Monitored microprocessor protective relay with preceding row attributes and the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ac measurements are continuously verified by comparison to an independent ac measurement source, with alarming for excessive error (See Table 2). • Some or all binary or status inputs and control outputs are monitored by a process that continuously demonstrates ability to perform as designed, with alarming for failure (See Table 2). Alarming for change of settings (See Table 2). | 12 calendar years | Verify only the unmonitored relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. |

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| Table 3 Maintenance Activities and Intervals for distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS Systems | | |
|--|-----------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Voltage and/or current sensing devices associated with UFLS or UVLS systems. | 12 calendar years | Verify that current and/or voltage signal values are provided to the protective relays. |
| Protection System dc supply for tripping non-BES interrupting devices used only for a UFLS or UVLS system. | 12 calendar years | Verify Protection System dc supply voltage. |
| Control circuitry between the UFLS or UVLS relays and electromechanical lockout and/or tripping auxiliary devices (excludes non-BES interrupting device trip coils). | 12 calendar years | Verify the path from the relay to the lockout and/or tripping auxiliary relay (including essential supervisory logic). |
| Electromechanical lockout and/or tripping auxiliary devices associated only with UFLS or UVLS systems (excludes non-BES interrupting device trip coils). | 12 calendar years | Verify electrical operation of electromechanical lockout and/or tripping auxiliary devices. |
| Control circuitry between the electromechanical lockout and/or tripping auxiliary devices and the non-BES interrupting devices in UFLS or UVLS systems, or between UFLS or UVLS relays (with no interposing electromechanical lockout or auxiliary device) and the non-BES interrupting devices (excludes non-BES interrupting device trip coils). | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |
| Trip coils of non-BES interrupting devices in UFLS or UVLS systems. | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |

PRC-005 — Attachment A

Criteria for a Performance-Based Protection System Maintenance Program

Purpose: To establish a technical basis for initial and continued use of a performance-based Protection System Maintenance Program (PSMP).

To establish the technical justification for the initial use of a performance-based PSMP:

1. Develop a list with a description of Components included in each designated Segment of the Protection System Component population, with a minimum **Segment** population of 60 Components.
2. Maintain the Components in each Segment according to the time-based maximum allowable intervals established in Tables 1-1 through 1-5 and Table 3 until results of maintenance activities for the Segment are available for a minimum of 30 individual Components of the Segment.
3. Document the maintenance program activities and results for each Segment, including maintenance dates and Countable Events for each included Component.
4. Analyze the maintenance program activities and results for each Segment to determine the overall performance of the Segment and develop maintenance intervals.
5. Determine the maximum allowable maintenance interval for each Segment such that the Segment experiences **Countable Events** on no more than 4% of the Components within the Segment, for the greater of either the last 30 Components maintained or all Components maintained in the previous year.

Segment – Protection Systems or components of a consistent design standard, or a particular model or type from a single manufacturer that typically share other common elements. Consistent performance is expected across the entire population of a Segment. A Segment must contain at least sixty (60) individual components.

Countable Event – A failure of a component requiring repair or replacement, any condition discovered during the maintenance activities in Tables 1-1 through 1-5 and Table 3 which requires corrective action, or a Misoperation attributed to hardware failure or calibration failure. Misoperations due to product design errors, software errors, relay settings different from specified settings, Protection System component configuration errors, or Protection System application errors are not included in Countable Events.

To maintain the technical justification for the ongoing use of a performance-based PSMP:

1. At least annually, update the list of Protection System Components and Segments and/or description if any changes occur within the Segment.
2. Perform maintenance on the greater of 5% of the Components (addressed in the performance based PSMP) in each Segment or 3 individual Components within the Segment in each year.
3. For the prior year, analyze the maintenance program activities and results for each Segment to determine the overall performance of the Segment.

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4. Using the prior year's data, determine the maximum allowable maintenance interval for each Segment such that the Segment experiences Countable Events on no more than 4% of the Components within the Segment, for the greater of either the last 30 Components maintained or all Components maintained in the previous year.
5. If the Components in a Protection System Segment maintained through a performance-based PSMP experience 4% or more Countable Events, develop, document, and implement an action plan to reduce the Countable Events to less than 4% of the Segment population within 3 years.

A. Introduction

- 1. Title:** Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Maintenance
- 2. Number:** PRC-005-3(X)
- 3. Purpose:** To document and implement programs for the maintenance of all Protection Systems and Automatic Reclosing affecting the reliability of the Bulk Electric System (BES) so that they are kept in working order.
- 4. Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Functional Entities:**
 - 4.1.1** Transmission Owner
 - 4.1.2** Generator Owner
 - 4.1.3** Distribution Provider
 - 4.2. Facilities:**
 - 4.2.1** Protection Systems that are installed for the purpose of detecting Faults on BES Elements (lines, buses, transformers, etc.)
 - 4.2.2** Protection Systems used for underfrequency load-shedding systems installed per ERO underfrequency load-shedding requirements.
 - 4.2.3** Protection Systems used for undervoltage load-shedding systems installed to prevent system voltage collapse or voltage instability for BES reliability.
 - 4.2.4** Protection Systems installed as a Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) for BES reliability.
 - 4.2.5** Protection Systems for generator Facilities that are part of the BES, including:
 - 4.2.5.1** Protection Systems that act to trip the generator either directly or via lockout or auxiliary tripping relays.
 - 4.2.5.2** Protection Systems for generator step-up transformers for generators that are part of the BES.
 - 4.2.5.3** Protection Systems for transformers connecting aggregated generation, where the aggregated generation is part of the BES (e.g., transformers connecting facilities such as wind-farms to the BES).
 - 4.2.5.4** Protection Systems for station service or excitation transformers connected to the generator bus of generators which are part of the BES, that act to trip the generator either directly or via lockout or tripping auxiliary relays.
 - 4.2.6** Automatic Reclosing¹, including:
 - 4.2.6.1** Automatic Reclosing applied on the terminals of Elements connected to the BES bus located at generating plant substations where the total installed

¹ Automatic Reclosing addressed in Section 4.2.6.1 and 4.2.6.2 may be excluded if the equipment owner can demonstrate that a close-in three-phase fault present for twice the normal clearing time (capturing a minimum trip-close-trip time delay) does not result in a total loss of gross generation in the Interconnection exceeding the gross capacity of the largest BES generating unit within the Balancing Authority Area where the Automatic Reclosing is applied.

gross generating plant capacity is greater than the gross capacity of the largest BES generating unit within the Balancing Authority Area.

4.2.6.2 Automatic Reclosing applied on the terminals of all BES Elements at substations one bus away from generating plants specified in Section 4.2.6.1 when the substation is less than 10 circuit-miles from the generating plant substation.

4.2.6.3 Automatic Reclosing applied as an integral part of a RAS specified in Section 4.2.4.

5. Effective Date: This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction. (See the Implementation Plan for additional detail)

6. Definitions Used in this Standard: The following terms are defined for use only within PRC-005-3, and should remain with the standard upon approval rather than being moved to the Glossary of Terms.

Automatic Reclosing – Includes the following Components:

- Reclosing relay
- Control circuitry associated with the reclosing relay.

Unresolved Maintenance Issue – A deficiency identified during a maintenance activity that causes the component to not meet the intended performance, cannot be corrected during the maintenance interval, and requires follow-up corrective action.

Segment – Components of a consistent design standard, or a particular model or type from a single manufacturer that typically share other common elements. Consistent performance is expected across the entire population of a Segment. A Segment must contain at least sixty (60) individual Components.

Component Type – Either any one of the five specific elements of the Protection System definition or any one of the two specific elements of the Automatic Reclosing definition.

Component – A Component is any individual discrete piece of equipment included in a Protection System or in Automatic Reclosing, including but not limited to a protective relay, reclosing relay, or current sensing device. The designation of what constitutes a control circuit Component is dependent upon how an entity performs and tracks the testing of the control circuitry. Some entities test their control circuits on a breaker basis whereas others test their circuitry on a local zone of protection basis. Thus, entities are allowed the latitude to designate their own definitions of control circuit Components. Another example of where the entity has some discretion on determining what constitutes a single Component is the voltage and current sensing devices, where the entity may choose either to designate a full three-phase set of such devices or a single device as a single Component.

Countable Event – A failure of a Component requiring repair or replacement, any condition discovered during the maintenance activities in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 3, and Tables 4-1 through 4-2 which requires corrective action or a Protection System Misoperation attributed to hardware failure or calibration failure. Misoperations due to product design errors, software errors, relay settings different from specified settings, Protection System Component or Automatic Reclosing configuration or application errors are not included in Countable Events.

B. Requirements

- R1.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall establish a Protection System Maintenance Program (PSMP) for its Protection Systems and Automatic Reclosing identified in Facilities Section 4.2. [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

The PSMP shall:

- 1.1.** Identify which maintenance method (time-based, performance-based per PRC-005 Attachment A, or a combination) is used to address each Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Component Type. All batteries associated with the station dc supply Component Type of a Protection System shall be included in a time-based program as described in Table 1-4 and Table 3.
 - 1.2.** Include the applicable monitored Component attributes applied to each Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Component Type consistent with the maintenance intervals specified in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4-1 through 4-2 where monitoring is used to extend the maintenance intervals beyond those specified for unmonitored Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Components.
- R2.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that uses performance-based maintenance intervals in its PSMP shall follow the procedure established in PRC-005 Attachment A to establish and maintain its performance-based intervals. [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
- R3.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that utilizes time-based maintenance program(s) shall maintain its Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Components that are included within the time-based maintenance program in accordance with the minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance intervals prescribed within Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4-1 through 4-2. [*Violation Risk Factor: High*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
- R4.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that utilizes performance-based maintenance program(s) in accordance with Requirement R2 shall implement and follow its PSMP for its Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Components that are included within the performance-based program(s). [*Violation Risk Factor: High*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]
- R5.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall demonstrate efforts to correct identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues. [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Operations Planning*]

C. Measures

- M1.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner and Distribution Provider shall have a documented Protection System Maintenance Program in accordance with Requirement R1.

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For each Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Component Type, the documentation shall include the type of maintenance method applied (time-based, performance-based, or a combination of these maintenance methods), and shall include all batteries associated with the station dc supply Component Types in a time-based program as described in Table 1-4 and Table 3. (Part 1.1)

For Component Types that use monitoring to extend the maintenance intervals, the responsible entity(s) shall have evidence for each Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Component Type (such as manufacturer's specifications or engineering drawings) of the appropriate monitored Component attributes as specified in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4-1 through 4-2. (Part 1.2)

- M2.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that uses performance-based maintenance intervals shall have evidence that its current performance-based maintenance program(s) is in accordance with Requirement R2, which may include but is not limited to Component lists, dated maintenance records, and dated analysis records and results.
- M3.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that utilizes time-based maintenance program(s) shall have evidence that it has maintained its Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Components included within its time-based program in accordance with Requirement R3. The evidence may include but is not limited to dated maintenance records, dated maintenance summaries, dated check-off lists, dated inspection records, or dated work orders.
- M4.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that utilizes performance-based maintenance intervals in accordance with Requirement R2 shall have evidence that it has implemented the Protection System Maintenance Program for the Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Components included in its performance-based program in accordance with Requirement R4. The evidence may include but is not limited to dated maintenance records, dated maintenance summaries, dated check-off lists, dated inspection records, or dated work orders.
- M5.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall have evidence that it has undertaken efforts to correct identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues in accordance with Requirement R5. The evidence may include but is not limited to work orders, replacement Component orders, invoices, project schedules with completed milestones, return material authorizations (RMAs) or purchase orders.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, "Compliance Enforcement Authority" means NERC or the Regional Entity in their respective roles of monitoring and enforcing compliance with the NERC Reliability Standards.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Processes:

- Compliance Audit
- Self-Certification
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Investigation
- Self-Reporting

Complaint

1.3. Evidence Retention

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall each keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

For Requirement R1, the Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall each keep its current dated Protection System Maintenance Program, as well as any superseded versions since the preceding compliance audit, including the documentation that specifies the type of maintenance program applied for each Protection System Component Type.

For Requirement R2, Requirement R3, Requirement R4, and Requirement R5, the Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall each keep documentation of the two most recent performances of each distinct maintenance activity for the Protection System or Automatic Reclosing Component, or all performances of each distinct maintenance activity for the Protection System or Automatic Reclosing Component since the previous scheduled audit date, whichever is longer.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

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2. Violation Severity Levels

| Requirement Number | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|--------------------|---|---|---|--|
| R1 | <p>The responsible entity’s PSMP failed to specify whether one Component Type is being addressed by time-based or performance-based maintenance, or a combination of both. (Part 1.1)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p>The responsible entity’s PSMP failed to include applicable station batteries in a time-based program. (Part 1.1)</p> | <p>The responsible entity’s PSMP failed to specify whether two Component Types are being addressed by time-based or performance-based maintenance, or a combination of both. (Part 1.1)</p> | <p>The responsible entity’s PSMP failed to specify whether three Component Types are being addressed by time-based or performance-based maintenance, or a combination of both. (Part 1.1).</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p>The responsible entity’s PSMP failed to include the applicable monitoring attributes applied to each Component Type consistent with the maintenance intervals specified in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, Table 3, and Tables 4-1 through 4-2 where monitoring is used to extend the maintenance intervals beyond those specified for unmonitored Components. (Part 1.2).</p> | <p>The responsible entity failed to establish a PSMP.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p>The responsible entity’s PSMP failed to specify whether four or more Component Types are being addressed by time-based or performance-based maintenance, or a combination of both. (Part 1.1).</p> |
| R2 | <p>The responsible entity uses performance-based maintenance intervals in its PSMP but failed to reduce Countable Events to no more than 4% within three years.</p> | <p style="text-align: center;">NA</p> | <p>The responsible entity uses performance-based maintenance intervals in its PSMP but failed to reduce Countable Events to no more than 4% within four years.</p> | <p>The responsible entity uses performance-based maintenance intervals in its PSMP but:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Failed to establish the technical justification described within Requirement R2 for the initial use of the performance-based PSMP <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2) Failed to reduce Countable Events to no more than 4% within five years <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> |

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| Requirement Number | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|--------------------|--|--|---|--|
| | | | | 3) Maintained a Segment with less than 60 Components OR 4) Failed to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annually update the list of Components, OR • Annually perform maintenance on the greater of 5% of the Segment population or 3 Components, OR • Annually analyze the program activities and results for each Segment. |
| R3 | For Components included within a time-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain 5% or less of the total Components included within a specific Component Type, in accordance with the minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance intervals prescribed within Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, Table 3, and Tables 4-1 through 4-2. | For Components included within a time-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 5% but 10% or less of the total Components included within a specific Component Type, in accordance with the minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance intervals prescribed within Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, Table 3, and Tables 4-1 through 4-2. | For Components included within a time-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 10% but 15% or less of the total Components included within a specific Component Type, in accordance with the minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance intervals prescribed within Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, Table 3, and Tables 4-1 through 4-2. | For Components included within a time-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 15% of the total Components included within a specific Component Type, in accordance with the minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance intervals prescribed within Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, Table 3, and Tables 4-1 through 4-2. |
| R4 | For Components included within a performance-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain 5% or less of the annual scheduled maintenance for a specific | For Components included within a performance-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 5% but 10% or less of the annual scheduled maintenance for a specific | For Components included within a performance-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 10% but 15% or less of the annual scheduled maintenance for a specific | For Components included within a performance-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 15% of the annual scheduled maintenance for a specific |

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| Requirement Number | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|--------------------|--|--|---|---|
| | Component Type in accordance with their performance-based PSMP. | Component Type in accordance with their performance-based PSMP. | Component Type in accordance with their performance-based PSMP. | Component Type in accordance with their performance-based PSMP. |
| R5 | The responsible entity failed to undertake efforts to correct 5 or fewer identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues. | The responsible entity failed to undertake efforts to correct greater than 5, but less than or equal to 10 identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues. | The responsible entity failed to undertake efforts to correct greater than 10, but less than or equal to 15 identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues. | The responsible entity failed to undertake efforts to correct greater than 15 identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues. |

E. Regional Variances

None

F. Supplemental Reference Document

The following documents present a detailed discussion about determination of maintenance intervals and other useful information regarding establishment of a maintenance program.

1. PRC-005-2 Protection System Maintenance Supplementary Reference and FAQ — March 2013.
2. Considerations for Maintenance and Testing of Autoreclosing Schemes — November 2012.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|----------------|--------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 1 | December 1, 2005 | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Changed incorrect use of certain hyphens (-) to “en dash” (–) and “em dash (—).” 2. Added “periods” to items where appropriate. 3. Changed “Timeframe” to “Time Frame” in item D, 1.2. | 01/20/05 |
| 1a | February 17, 2011 | Added Appendix 1 - Interpretation regarding applicability of standard to protection of radially connected transformers | Project 2009-17 interpretation |
| 1a | February 17, 2011 | Adopted by Board of Trustees | |
| 1a | September 26, 2011 | FERC Order issued approving interpretation of R1 and R2 (FERC’s Order is effective as of September 26, 2011) | |
| 1.1a | February 1, 2012 | Errata change: Clarified inclusion of generator interconnection Facility in Generator Owner’s responsibility | Revision under Project 2010-07 |
| 1b | February 3, 2012 | FERC Order issued approving interpretation of R1, R1.1, and R1.2 (FERC’s Order dated March 14, 2012). Updated version from 1a to 1b. | Project 2009-10 Interpretation |
| 1.1b | April 23, 2012 | Updated standard version to 1.1b to reflect FERC approval of PRC-005-1b. | Revision under Project 2010-07 |

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| | | | |
|------|------------------|---|--|
| 1.1b | May 9, 2012 | PRC-005-1.1b was adopted by the Board of Trustees as part of Project 2010-07 (GOTO). | |
| 2 | November 7, 2012 | Adopted by Board of Trustees | Project 2007-17 - Complete revision, absorbing maintenance requirements from PRC-005-1.1b, PRC-008-0, PRC-011-0, PRC-017-0 |
| 2 | October 17, 2013 | Errata Change: The Standards Committee approved an errata change to the implementation plan for PRC-005-2 to add the phrase “or as otherwise made effective pursuant to the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities;” to the second sentence under the “Retirement of Existing | |
| 3 | November 7, 2013 | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Revised to address the FERC directive in Order No.758 to include Automatic Reclosing in maintenance programs. |
| 3(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

| Table 1-1 Component Type - Protective Relay Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|--|---|---|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval ² | Maintenance Activities |
| Any unmonitored protective relay not having all the monitoring attributes of a category below. | 6 Calendar Years | For all unmonitored relays: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Verify that settings are as specified For non-microprocessor relays: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Test and, if necessary calibrate For microprocessor relays: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Verify operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. • Verify acceptable measurement of power system input values. |
| Monitored microprocessor protective relay with the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal self-diagnosis and alarming (see Table 2). • Voltage and/or current waveform sampling three or more times per power cycle, and conversion of samples to numeric values for measurement calculations by microprocessor electronics. • Alarming for power supply failure (see Table 2). | 12 Calendar Years | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Settings are as specified. • Operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. • Acceptable measurement of power system input values. |

² For the tables in this standard, a calendar year starts on the first day of a new year (January 1) after a maintenance activity has been completed. For the tables in this standard, a calendar month starts on the first day of the first month after a maintenance activity has been completed.

| Table 1-1 Component Type - Protective Relay Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|--|---|---|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval ² | Maintenance Activities |
| Monitored microprocessor protective relay with preceding row attributes and the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ac measurements are continuously verified by comparison to an independent ac measurement source, with alarming for excessive error (See Table 2). • Some or all binary or status inputs and control outputs are monitored by a process that continuously demonstrates ability to perform as designed, with alarming for failure (See Table 2). • Alarming for change of settings (See Table 2). | 12 Calendar Years | Verify only the unmonitored relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. |

| Table 1-2 Component Type - Communications Systems Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|---|------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any unmonitored communications system necessary for correct operation of protective functions, and not having all the monitoring attributes of a category below. | 4 Calendar Months | Verify that the communications system is functional. |
| | 6 Calendar Years | Verify that the communications system meets performance criteria pertinent to the communications technology applied (e.g. signal level, reflected power, or data error rate). Verify operation of communications system inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. |
| Any communications system with continuous monitoring or periodic automated testing for the presence of the channel function, and alarming for loss of function (See Table 2). | 12 Calendar Years | Verify that the communications system meets performance criteria pertinent to the communications technology applied (e.g. signal level, reflected power, or data error rate). Verify operation of communications system inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. |
| Any communications system with all of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continuous monitoring or periodic automated testing for the performance of the channel using criteria pertinent to the communications technology applied (e.g. signal level, reflected power, or data error rate, and alarming for excessive performance degradation). (See Table 2) • Some or all binary or status inputs and control outputs are monitored by a process that continuously demonstrates ability to perform as designed, with alarming for failure (See Table 2). | 12 Calendar Years | Verify only the unmonitored communications system inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System |

| Table 1-3 Component Type - Voltage and Current Sensing Devices Providing Inputs to Protective Relays Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|--|-----------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any voltage and current sensing devices not having monitoring attributes of the category below. | 12 Calendar Years | Verify that current and voltage signal values are provided to the protective relays. |
| Voltage and Current Sensing devices connected to microprocessor relays with AC measurements are continuously verified by comparison of sensing input value, as measured by the microprocessor relay, to an independent ac measurement source, with alarming for unacceptable error or failure (see Table 2). | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |

| Table 1-4(a) Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) Batteries Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-BES interrupting devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS systems, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)). | | |
|---|------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Protection System Station dc supply using Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) batteries not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f). | 4 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Station dc supply voltage Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electrolyte level • For unintentional grounds |
| | 18 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Float voltage of battery charger • Battery continuity • Battery terminal connection resistance • Battery intercell or unit-to-unit connection resistance Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cell condition of all individual battery cells where cells are visible – or measure battery cell/unit internal ohmic values where the cells are not visible • Physical condition of battery rack |

| Table 1-4(a) Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) Batteries Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-BES interrupting devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS systems, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)). | | |
|---|--|---|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| | 18 Calendar Months -or- 6 Calendar Years | Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by evaluating cell/unit measurements indicative of battery performance (e.g. internal ohmic values or float current) against the station battery baseline. -or- Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by conducting a performance or modified performance capacity test of the entire battery bank. |

| Table 1-4(b) Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Valve-Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) Batteries Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|--|------------------------------|---|
| Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-BES interrupting devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS systems, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)). | | |
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Protection System Station dc supply with Valve Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) batteries not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f). | 4 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Station dc supply voltage Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For unintentional grounds |
| | 6 Calendar Months | Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Condition of all individual units by measuring battery cell/unit internal ohmic values. |
| | 18 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Float voltage of battery charger • Battery continuity • Battery terminal connection resistance • Battery intercell or unit-to-unit connection resistance Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Physical condition of battery rack |

| Table 1-4(b) Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Valve-Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) Batteries Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-BES interrupting devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS systems, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)). | | |
|---|---|---|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| | 6 Calendar Months -or- 3 Calendar Years | Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by evaluating cell/unit measurements indicative of battery performance (e.g. internal ohmic values or float current) against the station battery baseline. -or- Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by conducting a performance or modified performance capacity test of the entire battery bank. |

| Table 1-4(c) Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Nickel-Cadmium (NiCad) Batteries Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|--|------------------------------|--|
| Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-BES interrupting devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS system, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)). | | |
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Protection System Station dc supply Nickel-Cadmium (NiCad) batteries not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f). | 4 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Station dc supply voltage Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electrolyte level • For unintentional grounds |
| | 18 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Float voltage of battery charger • Battery continuity • Battery terminal connection resistance • Battery intercell or unit-to-unit connection resistance Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cell condition of all individual battery cells. • Physical condition of battery rack |
| | 6 Calendar Years | Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by conducting a performance or modified performance capacity test of the entire battery bank. |

| Table 1-4(d) Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Non Battery Based Energy Storage Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|--|------------------------------|--|
| Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-BES interrupting devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS system, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)). | | |
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any Protection System station dc supply not using a battery and not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f). | 4 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Station dc supply voltage Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For unintentional grounds |
| | 18 Calendar Months | Inspect: Condition of non-battery based dc supply |
| | 6 Calendar Years | Verify that the dc supply can perform as manufactured when ac power is not present. |

| Table 1-4(e) Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply for non-BES Interrupting Devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS, and non-distributed UVLS systems | | |
|--|--|-----------------------------------|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any Protection System dc supply used for tripping only non-BES interrupting devices as part of a RAS, non-distributed UFLS, or non-distributed UVLS system and not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f). | When control circuits are verified (See Table 1-5) | Verify Station dc supply voltage. |

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| Table 1-4(f) Exclusions for Protection System Station dc Supply Monitoring Devices and Systems | | |
|--|-------------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any station dc supply with high and low voltage monitoring and alarming of the battery charger voltage to detect charger overvoltage and charger failure (See Table 2). | No periodic maintenance specified | No periodic verification of station dc supply voltage is required. |
| Any battery based station dc supply with electrolyte level monitoring and alarming in every cell (See Table 2). | | No periodic inspection of the electrolyte level for each cell is required. |
| Any station dc supply with unintentional dc ground monitoring and alarming (See Table 2). | | No periodic inspection of unintentional dc grounds is required. |
| Any station dc supply with charger float voltage monitoring and alarming to ensure correct float voltage is being applied on the station dc supply (See Table 2). | | No periodic verification of float voltage of battery charger is required. |
| Any battery based station dc supply with monitoring and alarming of battery string continuity (See Table 2). | | No periodic verification of the battery continuity is required. |
| Any battery based station dc supply with monitoring and alarming of the intercell and/or terminal connection detail resistance of the entire battery (See Table 2). | | No periodic verification of the intercell and terminal connection resistance is required. |
| Any Valve Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) or Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) station battery with internal ohmic value or float current monitoring and alarming, and evaluating present values relative to baseline internal ohmic values for every cell/unit (See Table 2). | | No periodic evaluation relative to baseline of battery cell/unit measurements indicative of battery performance is required to verify the station battery can perform as manufactured. |
| Any Valve Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) or Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) station battery with monitoring and alarming of each cell/unit internal ohmic value (See Table 2). | | No periodic inspection of the condition of all individual units by measuring battery cell/unit internal ohmic values of a station VRLA or Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) battery is required. |

| Table 1-5 Component Type - Control Circuitry Associated With Protective Functions Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) Note: Table requirements apply to all Control Circuitry Components of Protection Systems, and RAS except as noted. | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|---|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Trip coils or actuators of circuit breakers, interrupting devices, or mitigating devices (regardless of any monitoring of the control circuitry). | 6 Calendar Years | Verify that each trip coil is able to operate the circuit breaker, interrupting device, or mitigating device. |
| Electromechanical lockout devices which are directly in a trip path from the protective relay to the interrupting device trip coil (regardless of any monitoring of the control circuitry). | 6 Calendar Years | Verify electrical operation of electromechanical lockout devices. |
| Unmonitored control circuitry associated with RAS. (See Table 4-2(b) for RAS which include Automatic Reclosing.) | 12 Calendar Years | Verify all paths of the control circuits essential for proper operation of the RAS. |
| Unmonitored control circuitry associated with protective functions inclusive of all auxiliary relays. | 12 Calendar Years | Verify all paths of the trip circuits inclusive of all auxiliary relays through the trip coil(s) of the circuit breakers or other interrupting devices. |
| Control circuitry associated with protective functions and/or RAS whose integrity is monitored and alarmed (See Table 2). | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |

| Table 2 – Alarming Paths and Monitoring In Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 3, and Tables 4-1 through 4-2, alarm attributes used to justify extended maximum maintenance intervals and/or reduced maintenance activities are subject to the following maintenance requirements | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any alarm path through which alarms in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 3, and Tables 4-1 through 4-2 are conveyed from the alarm origin to the location where corrective action can be initiated, and not having all the attributes of the “Alarm Path with monitoring” category below. Alarms are reported within 24 hours of detection to a location where corrective action can be initiated. | 12 Calendar Years | Verify that the alarm path conveys alarm signals to a location where corrective action can be initiated. |
| Alarm Path with monitoring: The location where corrective action is taken receives an alarm within 24 hours for failure of any portion of the alarming path from the alarm origin to the location where corrective action can be initiated. | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |

| Table 3 Maintenance Activities and Intervals for distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS Systems | | |
|---|------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any unmonitored protective relay not having all the monitoring attributes of a category below. | 6 Calendar Years | <p>Verify that settings are as specified.</p> <p>For non-microprocessor relays:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Test and, if necessary calibrate. <p>For microprocessor relays:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Verify operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. • Verify acceptable measurement of power system input values. |
| <p>Monitored microprocessor protective relay with the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal self-diagnosis and alarming (See Table 2). • Voltage and/or current waveform sampling three or more times per power cycle, and conversion of samples to numeric values for measurement calculations by microprocessor electronics. <p>Alarming for power supply failure (See Table 2).</p> | 12 Calendar Years | <p>Verify:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Settings are as specified. • Operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. • Acceptable measurement of power system input values |
| <p>Monitored microprocessor protective relay with preceding row attributes and the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ac measurements are continuously verified by comparison to an independent ac measurement source, with alarming for excessive error (See Table 2). • Some or all binary or status inputs and control outputs are monitored by a process that continuously demonstrates ability to perform as designed, with alarming for failure (See Table 2). <p>Alarming for change of settings (See Table 2).</p> | 12 Calendar Years | <p>Verify only the unmonitored relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System.</p> |

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| Table 3 Maintenance Activities and Intervals for distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS Systems | | |
|--|-------------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Voltage and/or current sensing devices associated with UFLS or UVLS systems. | 12 Calendar Years | Verify that current and/or voltage signal values are provided to the protective relays. |
| Protection System dc supply for tripping non-BES interrupting devices used only for a UFLS or UVLS system. | 12 Calendar Years | Verify Protection System dc supply voltage. |
| Control circuitry between the UFLS or UVLS relays and electromechanical lockout and/or tripping auxiliary devices (excludes non-BES interrupting device trip coils). | 12 Calendar Years | Verify the path from the relay to the lockout and/or tripping auxiliary relay (including essential supervisory logic). |
| Electromechanical lockout and/or tripping auxiliary devices associated only with UFLS or UVLS systems (excludes non-BES interrupting device trip coils). | 12 Calendar Years | Verify electrical operation of electromechanical lockout and/or tripping auxiliary devices. |
| Control circuitry between the electromechanical lockout and/or tripping auxiliary devices and the non-BES interrupting devices in UFLS or UVLS systems, or between UFLS or UVLS relays (with no interposing electromechanical lockout or auxiliary device) and the non-BES interrupting devices (excludes non-BES interrupting device trip coils). | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |
| Trip coils of non-BES interrupting devices in UFLS or UVLS systems. | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |

| Table 4-1 Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Automatic Reclosing Components Component Type – Reclosing Relay | | |
|--|------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any unmonitored reclosing relay not having all the monitoring attributes of a category below. | 6 Calendar Years | Verify that settings are as specified. For non-microprocessor relays: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Test and, if necessary calibrate For microprocessor relays: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Verify operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Automatic Reclosing. |
| Monitored microprocessor reclosing relay with the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal self-diagnosis and alarming (See Table 2). • Alarming for power supply failure (See Table 2). | 12 Calendar Years | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Settings are as specified. • Operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Automatic Reclosing. |

| Table 4-2(a) Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Automatic Reclosing Components Component Type – Control Circuitry Associated with Reclosing Relays that are NOT an Integral Part of a RAS | | |
|--|-------------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Unmonitored Control circuitry associated with Automatic Reclosing that is not an integral part of a RAS. | 12 Calendar Years | Verify that Automatic Reclosing, upon initiation, does not issue a premature closing command to the close circuitry. |
| Control circuitry associated with Automatic Reclosing that is not part of a RAS and is monitored and alarmed for conditions that would result in a premature closing command. (See Table 2) | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |

| Table 4-2(b) Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Automatic Reclosing Components Component Type – Control Circuitry Associated with Reclosing Relays that ARE an Integral Part of a RAS | | |
|--|-------------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Close coils or actuators of circuit breakers or similar devices that are used in conjunction with Automatic Reclosing as part of a RAS (regardless of any monitoring of the control circuitry). | 6 Calendar Years | Verify that each close coil or actuator is able to operate the circuit breaker or mitigating device. |
| Unmonitored close control circuitry associated with Automatic Reclosing used as an integral part of a RAS. | 12 Calendar Years | Verify all paths of the control circuits associated with Automatic Reclosing that are essential for proper operation of the RAS. |
| Control circuitry associated with Automatic Reclosing that is an integral part of a RAS whose integrity is monitored and alarmed. (See Table 2) | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |

PRC-005 — Attachment A

Criteria for a Performance-Based Protection System Maintenance Program

Purpose: To establish a technical basis for initial and continued use of a performance-based Protection System Maintenance Program (PSMP).

To establish the technical justification for the initial use of a performance-based PSMP:

1. Develop a list with a description of Components included in each designated Segment, with a minimum **Segment** population of 60 Components.
2. Maintain the Components in each Segment according to the time-based maximum allowable intervals established in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 3, and Tables 4-1 through 4-2 until results of maintenance activities for the Segment are available for a minimum of 30 individual Components of the Segment.
3. Document the maintenance program activities and results for each Segment, including maintenance dates and Countable Events for each included Component.
4. Analyze the maintenance program activities and results for each Segment to determine the overall performance of the Segment and develop maintenance intervals.
5. Determine the maximum allowable maintenance interval for each Segment such that the Segment experiences **Countable Events** on no more than 4% of the Components within the Segment, for the greater of either the last 30 Components maintained or all Components maintained in the previous year.

To maintain the technical justification for the ongoing use of a performance-based PSMP:

1. At least annually, update the list of Components and Segments and/or description if any changes occur within the Segment.
2. Perform maintenance on the greater of 5% of the Components (addressed in the performance based PSMP) in each Segment or 3 individual Components within the Segment in each year.
3. For the prior year, analyze the maintenance program activities and results for each Segment to determine the overall performance of the Segment.
4. Using the prior year's data, determine the maximum allowable maintenance interval for each Segment such that the Segment experiences Countable Events on no more than 4% of the Components within the Segment, for the greater of either the last 30 Components maintained or all Components maintained in the previous year.
5. If the Components in a Segment maintained through a performance-based PSMP experience 4% or more Countable Events, develop, document, and implement an action plan to reduce the Countable Events to less than 4% of the Segment population within 3 years.

Standard PRC-005-3(X) — Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Maintenance

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Maintenance
2. **Number:** PRC-005-3(X)
3. **Purpose:** To document and implement programs for the maintenance of all Protection Systems and Automatic Reclosing affecting the reliability of the Bulk Electric System (BES) so that they are kept in working order.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. **Functional Entities:**
 - 4.1.1 Transmission Owner
 - 4.1.2 Generator Owner
 - 4.1.3 Distribution Provider
 - 4.2. **Facilities:**
 - 4.2.1 Protection Systems that are installed for the purpose of detecting Faults on BES Elements (lines, buses, transformers, etc.)
 - 4.2.2 Protection Systems used for underfrequency load-shedding systems installed per ERO underfrequency load-shedding requirements.
 - 4.2.3 Protection Systems used for undervoltage load-shedding systems installed to prevent system voltage collapse or voltage instability for BES reliability.
 - 4.2.4 Protection Systems installed as a [Remedial Action Schemes \(RAS\)](#) for BES reliability.
 - 4.2.5 Protection Systems for generator Facilities that are part of the BES, including:
 - 4.2.5.1 Protection Systems that act to trip the generator either directly or via lockout or auxiliary tripping relays.
 - 4.2.5.2 Protection Systems for generator step-up transformers for generators that are part of the BES.
 - 4.2.5.3 Protection Systems for transformers connecting aggregated generation, where the aggregated generation is part of the BES (e.g., transformers connecting facilities such as wind-farms to the BES).
 - 4.2.5.4 Protection Systems for station service or excitation transformers connected to the generator bus of generators which are part of the BES, that act to trip the generator either directly or via lockout or tripping auxiliary relays.
 - 4.2.6 Automatic Reclosing¹, including:
 - 4.2.6.1 Automatic Reclosing applied on the terminals of Elements connected to the BES bus located at generating plant substations where the total installed

Deleted: Special Protection System (SPS)

¹ Automatic Reclosing addressed in Section 4.2.6.1 and 4.2.6.2 may be excluded if the equipment owner can demonstrate that a close-in three-phase fault present for twice the normal clearing time (capturing a minimum trip-close-trip time delay) does not result in a total loss of gross generation in the Interconnection exceeding the gross capacity of the largest BES generating unit within the Balancing Authority Area where the Automatic Reclosing is applied.

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gross generating plant capacity is greater than the gross capacity of the largest BES generating unit within the Balancing Authority Area.

4.2.6.2 Automatic Reclosing applied on the terminals of all BES Elements at substations one bus away from generating plants specified in Section 4.2.6.1 when the substation is less than 10 circuit-miles from the generating plant substation.

4.2.6.3 Automatic Reclosing applied as an integral part of a RAS specified in Section 4.2.4.

5. Effective Date: This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction. (See the Implementation Plan for additional detail)

Deleted: n SPS

Deleted: See Implementation Plan

6. Definitions Used in this Standard: The following terms are defined for use only within PRC-005-3, and should remain with the standard upon approval rather than being moved to the Glossary of Terms.

Automatic Reclosing – Includes the following Components:

- Reclosing relay
- Control circuitry associated with the reclosing relay.

Unresolved Maintenance Issue – A deficiency identified during a maintenance activity that causes the component to not meet the intended performance, cannot be corrected during the maintenance interval, and requires follow-up corrective action.

Segment – Components of a consistent design standard, or a particular model or type from a single manufacturer that typically share other common elements. Consistent performance is expected across the entire population of a Segment. A Segment must contain at least sixty (60) individual Components.

Component Type – Either any one of the five specific elements of the Protection System definition or any one of the two specific elements of the Automatic Reclosing definition.

Component – A Component is any individual discrete piece of equipment included in a Protection System or in Automatic Reclosing, including but not limited to a protective relay, reclosing relay, or current sensing device. The designation of what constitutes a control circuit Component is dependent upon how an entity performs and tracks the testing of the control circuitry. Some entities test their control circuits on a breaker basis whereas others test their circuitry on a local zone of protection basis. Thus, entities are allowed the latitude to designate their own definitions of control circuit Components. Another example of where the entity has some discretion on determining what constitutes a single Component is the voltage and current sensing devices, where the entity may choose either to designate a full three-phase set of such devices or a single device as a single Component.

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Countable Event – A failure of a Component requiring repair or replacement, any condition discovered during the maintenance activities in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 3, and Tables 4-1 through 4-2 which requires corrective action or a Protection System Misoperation attributed to hardware failure or calibration failure. Misoperations due to product design errors, software errors, relay settings different from specified settings, Protection System Component or Automatic Reclosing configuration or application errors are not included in Countable Events.

B. Requirements

- R1.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall establish a Protection System Maintenance Program (PSMP) for its Protection Systems and Automatic Reclosing identified in Facilities Section 4.2. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*

The PSMP shall:

- 1.1.** Identify which maintenance method (time-based, performance-based per PRC-005 Attachment A, or a combination) is used to address each Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Component Type. All batteries associated with the station dc supply Component Type of a Protection System shall be included in a time-based program as described in Table 1-4 and Table 3.
 - 1.2.** Include the applicable monitored Component attributes applied to each Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Component Type consistent with the maintenance intervals specified in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4-1 through 4-2 where monitoring is used to extend the maintenance intervals beyond those specified for unmonitored Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Components.
- R2.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that uses performance-based maintenance intervals in its PSMP shall follow the procedure established in PRC-005 Attachment A to establish and maintain its performance-based intervals. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*
- R3.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that utilizes time-based maintenance program(s) shall maintain its Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Components that are included within the time-based maintenance program in accordance with the minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance intervals prescribed within Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4-1 through 4-2. *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*
- R4.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that utilizes performance-based maintenance program(s) in accordance with Requirement R2 shall implement and follow its PSMP for its Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Components that are included within the performance-based program(s). *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*
- R5.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall demonstrate efforts to correct identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*

C. Measures

- M1.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner and Distribution Provider shall have a documented Protection System Maintenance Program in accordance with Requirement R1.

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For each Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Component Type, the documentation shall include the type of maintenance method applied (time-based, performance-based, or a combination of these maintenance methods), and shall include all batteries associated with the station dc supply Component Types in a time-based program as described in Table 1-4 and Table 3. (Part 1.1)

For Component Types that use monitoring to extend the maintenance intervals, the responsible entity(s) shall have evidence for each Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Component Type (such as manufacturer's specifications or engineering drawings) of the appropriate monitored Component attributes as specified in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4-1 through 4-2. (Part 1.2)

- M2.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that uses performance-based maintenance intervals shall have evidence that its current performance-based maintenance program(s) is in accordance with Requirement R2, which may include but is not limited to Component lists, dated maintenance records, and dated analysis records and results.
- M3.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that utilizes time-based maintenance program(s) shall have evidence that it has maintained its Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Components included within its time-based program in accordance with Requirement R3. The evidence may include but is not limited to dated maintenance records, dated maintenance summaries, dated check-off lists, dated inspection records, or dated work orders.
- M4.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that utilizes performance-based maintenance intervals in accordance with Requirement R2 shall have evidence that it has implemented the Protection System Maintenance Program for the Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Components included in its performance-based program in accordance with Requirement R4. The evidence may include but is not limited to dated maintenance records, dated maintenance summaries, dated check-off lists, dated inspection records, or dated work orders.
- M5.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall have evidence that it has undertaken efforts to correct identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues in accordance with Requirement R5. The evidence may include but is not limited to work orders, replacement Component orders, invoices, project schedules with completed milestones, return material authorizations (RMAs) or purchase orders.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, "Compliance Enforcement Authority" means NERC or the Regional Entity in their respective roles of monitoring and enforcing compliance with the NERC Reliability Standards.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Processes:

- Compliance Audit
- Self-Certification
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Investigation
- Self-Reporting

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Complaint

1.3. Evidence Retention

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall each keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

For Requirement R1, the Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall each keep its current dated Protection System Maintenance Program, as well as any superseded versions since the preceding compliance audit, including the documentation that specifies the type of maintenance program applied for each Protection System Component Type.

For Requirement R2, Requirement R3, Requirement R4, and Requirement R5, the Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall each keep documentation of the two most recent performances of each distinct maintenance activity for the Protection System or Automatic Reclosing Component, or all performances of each distinct maintenance activity for the Protection System or Automatic Reclosing Component since the previous scheduled audit date, whichever is longer.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

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2. Violation Severity Levels

| Requirement Number | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|--------------------|---|---|---|--|
| R1 | <p>The responsible entity's PSMP failed to specify whether one Component Type is being addressed by time-based or performance-based maintenance, or a combination of both. (Part 1.1)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p>The responsible entity's PSMP failed to include applicable station batteries in a time-based program. (Part 1.1)</p> | <p>The responsible entity's PSMP failed to specify whether two Component Types are being addressed by time-based or performance-based maintenance, or a combination of both. (Part 1.1)</p> | <p>The responsible entity's PSMP failed to specify whether three Component Types are being addressed by time-based or performance-based maintenance, or a combination of both. (Part 1.1).</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p>The responsible entity's PSMP failed to include the applicable monitoring attributes applied to each Component Type consistent with the maintenance intervals specified in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, Table 3, and Tables 4-1 through 4-2 where monitoring is used to extend the maintenance intervals beyond those specified for unmonitored Components. (Part 1.2).</p> | <p>The responsible entity failed to establish a PSMP.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p>The responsible entity's PSMP failed to specify whether four or more Component Types are being addressed by time-based or performance-based maintenance, or a combination of both. (Part 1.1).</p> |
| R2 | <p>The responsible entity uses performance-based maintenance intervals in its PSMP but failed to reduce Countable Events to no more than 4% within three years.</p> | <p style="text-align: center;">NA</p> | <p>The responsible entity uses performance-based maintenance intervals in its PSMP but failed to reduce Countable Events to no more than 4% within four years.</p> | <p>The responsible entity uses performance-based maintenance intervals in its PSMP but:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Failed to establish the technical justification described within Requirement R2 for the initial use of the performance-based PSMP <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2) Failed to reduce Countable Events to no more than 4% within five years <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> |

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| Requirement Number | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|--------------------|--|--|---|--|
| | | | | 3) Maintained a Segment with less than 60 Components OR 4) Failed to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annually update the list of Components, OR • Annually perform maintenance on the greater of 5% of the Segment population or 3 Components, OR • Annually analyze the program activities and results for each Segment. |
| R3 | For Components included within a time-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain 5% or less of the total Components included within a specific Component Type, in accordance with the minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance intervals prescribed within Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, Table 3, and Tables 4-1 through 4-2. | For Components included within a time-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 5% but 10% or less of the total Components included within a specific Component Type, in accordance with the minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance intervals prescribed within Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, Table 3, and Tables 4-1 through 4-2. | For Components included within a time-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 10% but 15% or less of the total Components included within a specific Component Type, in accordance with the minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance intervals prescribed within Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, Table 3, and Tables 4-1 through 4-2. | For Components included within a time-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 15% of the total Components included within a specific Component Type, in accordance with the minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance intervals prescribed within Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 2, Table 3, and Tables 4-1 through 4-2. |
| R4 | For Components included within a performance-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain 5% or less of the annual scheduled maintenance for a specific | For Components included within a performance-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 5% but 10% or less of the annual scheduled maintenance for a specific | For Components included within a performance-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 10% but 15% or less of the annual scheduled maintenance for a specific | For Components included within a performance-based maintenance program, the responsible entity failed to maintain more than 15% of the annual scheduled maintenance for a specific |

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| Requirement Number | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|--------------------|--|--|---|---|
| | Component Type in accordance with their performance-based PSMP. | Component Type in accordance with their performance-based PSMP. | Component Type in accordance with their performance-based PSMP. | Component Type in accordance with their performance-based PSMP. |
| R5 | The responsible entity failed to undertake efforts to correct 5 or fewer identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues. | The responsible entity failed to undertake efforts to correct greater than 5, but less than or equal to 10 identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues. | The responsible entity failed to undertake efforts to correct greater than 10, but less than or equal to 15 identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues. | The responsible entity failed to undertake efforts to correct greater than 15 identified Unresolved Maintenance Issues. |

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E. Regional Variances

None

F. Supplemental Reference Document

The following documents present a detailed discussion about determination of maintenance intervals and other useful information regarding establishment of a maintenance program.

1. PRC-005-2 Protection System Maintenance Supplementary Reference and FAQ — March 2013.
2. Considerations for Maintenance and Testing of Autoreclosing Schemes — November 2012.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|--------------------|---|--------------------------------|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 1 | December 1, 2005 | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Changed incorrect use of certain hyphens (-) to “en dash” (–) and “em dash (—).” 2. Added “periods” to items where appropriate. 3. Changed “Timeframe” to “Time Frame” in item D, 1.2. | 01/20/05 |
| 1a | February 17, 2011 | Added Appendix 1 - Interpretation regarding applicability of standard to protection of radially connected transformers | Project 2009-17 interpretation |
| 1a | February 17, 2011 | Adopted by Board of Trustees | |
| 1a | September 26, 2011 | FERC Order issued approving interpretation of R1 and R2 (FERC’s Order is effective as of September 26, 2011) | |
| 1.1a | February 1, 2012 | Errata change: Clarified inclusion of generator interconnection Facility in Generator Owner’s responsibility | Revision under Project 2010-07 |
| 1b | February 3, 2012 | FERC Order issued approving interpretation of R1, R1.1, and R1.2 (FERC’s Order dated March 14, 2012). Updated version from 1a to 1b. | Project 2009-10 Interpretation |
| 1.1b | April 23, 2012 | Updated standard version to 1.1b to reflect FERC approval of PRC-005-1b. | Revision under Project 2010-07 |

Standard PRC-005-3 — Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Maintenance

| | | | |
|-------------|------------------|---|--|
| 1.1b | May 9, 2012 | PRC-005-1.1b was adopted by the Board of Trustees as part of Project 2010-07 (GOTO). | |
| 2 | November 7, 2012 | Adopted by Board of Trustees | Project 2007-17 - Complete revision, absorbing maintenance requirements from PRC-005-1.1b, PRC-008-0, PRC-011-0, PRC-017-0 |
| 2 | October 17, 2013 | Errata Change: The Standards Committee approved an errata change to the implementation plan for PRC-005-2 to add the phrase “or as otherwise made effective pursuant to the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities;” to the second sentence under the “Retirement of Existing | |
| 3 | November 7, 2013 | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Revised to address the FERC directive in Order No.758 to include Automatic Reclosing in maintenance programs. |
| <u>3(X)</u> | <u>TBD</u> | <u>Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees</u> | <u>Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS</u> |

Standard PRC-005-3 — Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Maintenance

**Table 1-1
Component Type - Protective Relay
Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)**

| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval ² | Maintenance Activities |
|--|---|---|
| Any unmonitored protective relay not having all the monitoring attributes of a category below. | 6 Calendar Years | For all unmonitored relays: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Verify that settings are as specified For non-microprocessor relays: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Test and, if necessary calibrate For microprocessor relays: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Verify operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. • Verify acceptable measurement of power system input values. |
| Monitored microprocessor protective relay with the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal self-diagnosis and alarming (see Table 2). • Voltage and/or current waveform sampling three or more times per power cycle, and conversion of samples to numeric values for measurement calculations by microprocessor electronics. • Alarming for power supply failure (see Table 2). | 12 Calendar Years | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Settings are as specified. • Operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. • Acceptable measurement of power system input values. |

² For the tables in this standard, a calendar year starts on the first day of a new year (January 1) after a maintenance activity has been completed. For the tables in this standard, a calendar month starts on the first day of the first month after a maintenance activity has been completed.

Standard PRC-005-3 — Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Maintenance

**Table 1-1
Component Type - Protective Relay
Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)**

| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval ² | Maintenance Activities |
|---|---|--|
| <p>Monitored microprocessor protective relay with preceding row attributes and the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ac measurements are continuously verified by comparison to an independent ac measurement source, with alarming for excessive error (See Table 2). • Some or all binary or status inputs and control outputs are monitored by a process that continuously demonstrates ability to perform as designed, with alarming for failure (See Table 2). • Alarming for change of settings (See Table 2). | <p align="center">12 Calendar Years</p> | <p>Verify only the unmonitored relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System.</p> |

Standard PRC-005-3 — Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Maintenance

**Table 1-2
Component Type - Communications Systems
Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)**

| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
|---|------------------------------|--|
| Any unmonitored communications system necessary for correct operation of protective functions, and not having all the monitoring attributes of a category below. | 4 Calendar Months | Verify that the communications system is functional. |
| | 6 Calendar Years | Verify that the communications system meets performance criteria pertinent to the communications technology applied (e.g. signal level, reflected power, or data error rate). Verify operation of communications system inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. |
| Any communications system with continuous monitoring or periodic automated testing for the presence of the channel function, and alarming for loss of function (See Table 2). | 12 Calendar Years | Verify that the communications system meets performance criteria pertinent to the communications technology applied (e.g. signal level, reflected power, or data error rate). Verify operation of communications system inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. |
| Any communications system with all of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continuous monitoring or periodic automated testing for the performance of the channel using criteria pertinent to the communications technology applied (e.g. signal level, reflected power, or data error rate, and alarming for excessive performance degradation). (See Table 2) • Some or all binary or status inputs and control outputs are monitored by a process that continuously demonstrates ability to perform as designed, with alarming for failure (See Table 2). | 12 Calendar Years | Verify only the unmonitored communications system inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System |

Standard PRC-005-3 — Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Maintenance

| Table 1-3 Component Type - Voltage and Current Sensing Devices Providing Inputs to Protective Relays Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|--|---|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any voltage and current sensing devices not having monitoring attributes of the category below. | 12 Calendar Years | Verify that current and voltage signal values are provided to the protective relays. |
| Voltage and Current Sensing devices connected to microprocessor relays with AC measurements are continuously verified by comparison of sensing input value, as measured by the microprocessor relay, to an independent ac measurement source, with alarming for unacceptable error or failure (see Table 2). | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |

Standard PRC-005-3 — Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Maintenance

| Table 1-4(a) Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) Batteries Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|--|------------------------------|--|
| Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-BES interrupting devices for RAS , non-distributed UFLS systems, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)). | | |
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Protection System Station dc supply using Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) batteries not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f). | 4 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Station dc supply voltage Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electrolyte level • For unintentional grounds |
| | 18 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Float voltage of battery charger • Battery continuity • Battery terminal connection resistance • Battery intercell or unit-to-unit connection resistance Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cell condition of all individual battery cells where cells are visible – or measure battery cell/unit internal ohmic values where the cells are not visible • Physical condition of battery rack |

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Standard PRC-005-3 — Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Maintenance

Table 1-4(a)
Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) Batteries
Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3)

Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-BES interrupting devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS systems, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)).

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| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
|----------------------|--|---|
| | 18 Calendar Months -or- 6 Calendar Years | Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by evaluating cell/unit measurements indicative of battery performance (e.g. internal ohmic values or float current) against the station battery baseline. -or- Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by conducting a performance or modified performance capacity test of the entire battery bank. |

Standard PRC-005-3 — Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Maintenance

| Table 1-4(b) Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Valve-Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) Batteries Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|--|------------------------------|---|
| Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-BES interrupting devices for RAS , non-distributed UFLS systems, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)). | | |
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Protection System Station dc supply with Valve Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) batteries not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f). | 4 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Station dc supply voltage Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For unintentional grounds |
| | 6 Calendar Months | Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Condition of all individual units by measuring battery cell/unit internal ohmic values. |
| | 18 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Float voltage of battery charger • Battery continuity • Battery terminal connection resistance • Battery intercell or unit-to-unit connection resistance Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Physical condition of battery rack |

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Standard PRC-005-3 — Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Maintenance

| Table 1-4(b) Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Valve-Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) Batteries Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|--|---|---|
| Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-BES interrupting devices for RAS , non-distributed UFLS systems, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)). | | |
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| | 6 Calendar Months -or- 3 Calendar Years | Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by evaluating cell/unit measurements indicative of battery performance (e.g. internal ohmic values or float current) against the station battery baseline. -or- Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by conducting a performance or modified performance capacity test of the entire battery bank. |

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Standard PRC-005-3 — Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Maintenance

| Table 1-4(c) Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Nickel-Cadmium (NiCad) Batteries Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|--|------------------------------|--|
| Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-BES interrupting devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS system, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)). | | |
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Protection System Station dc supply Nickel-Cadmium (NiCad) batteries not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f). | 4 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Station dc supply voltage Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electrolyte level • For unintentional grounds |
| | 18 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Float voltage of battery charger • Battery continuity • Battery terminal connection resistance • Battery intercell or unit-to-unit connection resistance Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cell condition of all individual battery cells. • Physical condition of battery rack |
| | 6 Calendar Years | Verify that the station battery can perform as manufactured by conducting a performance or modified performance capacity test of the entire battery bank. |

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Standard PRC-005-3 — Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Maintenance

| Table 1-4(d) Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply Using Non Battery Based Energy Storage Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|--|------------------------------|--|
| Protection System Station dc supply used only for non-BES interrupting devices for RAS, non-distributed UFLS system, or non-distributed UVLS systems is excluded (see Table 1-4(e)). | | |
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any Protection System station dc supply not using a battery and not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f). | 4 Calendar Months | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Station dc supply voltage Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For unintentional grounds |
| | 18 Calendar Months | Inspect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Condition of non-battery based dc supply |
| | 6 Calendar Years | Verify that the dc supply can perform as manufactured when ac power is not present. |

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| Table 1-4(e) Component Type – Protection System Station dc Supply for non-BES Interrupting Devices for <u>RAS</u> , non-distributed UFLS, and non-distributed UVLS systems | | |
|--|--|-----------------------------------|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any Protection System dc supply used for tripping only non-BES interrupting devices as part of a <u>RAS</u> , non-distributed UFLS, or non-distributed UVLS system and not having monitoring attributes of Table 1-4(f). | When control circuits are verified (See Table 1-5) | Verify Station dc supply voltage. |

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Standard PRC-005-3 — Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Maintenance

| Table 1-4(f) Exclusions for Protection System Station dc Supply Monitoring Devices and Systems | | |
|--|-----------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any station dc supply with high and low voltage monitoring and alarming of the battery charger voltage to detect charger overvoltage and charger failure (See Table 2). | No periodic maintenance specified | No periodic verification of station dc supply voltage is required. |
| Any battery based station dc supply with electrolyte level monitoring and alarming in every cell (See Table 2). | | No periodic inspection of the electrolyte level for each cell is required. |
| Any station dc supply with unintentional dc ground monitoring and alarming (See Table 2). | | No periodic inspection of unintentional dc grounds is required. |
| Any station dc supply with charger float voltage monitoring and alarming to ensure correct float voltage is being applied on the station dc supply (See Table 2). | | No periodic verification of float voltage of battery charger is required. |
| Any battery based station dc supply with monitoring and alarming of battery string continuity (See Table 2). | | No periodic verification of the battery continuity is required. |
| Any battery based station dc supply with monitoring and alarming of the intercell and/or terminal connection detail resistance of the entire battery (See Table 2). | | No periodic verification of the intercell and terminal connection resistance is required. |
| Any Valve Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) or Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) station battery with internal ohmic value or float current monitoring and alarming, and evaluating present values relative to baseline internal ohmic values for every cell/unit (See Table 2). | | No periodic evaluation relative to baseline of battery cell/unit measurements indicative of battery performance is required to verify the station battery can perform as manufactured. |
| Any Valve Regulated Lead-Acid (VRLA) or Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) station battery with monitoring and alarming of each cell/unit internal ohmic value (See Table 2). | | No periodic inspection of the condition of all individual units by measuring battery cell/unit internal ohmic values of a station VRLA or Vented Lead-Acid (VLA) battery is required. |

Standard PRC-005-3 — Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Maintenance

| Table 1-5 Component Type - Control Circuitry Associated With Protective Functions Excluding distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS (see Table 3) | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|---|
| Note: Table requirements apply to all Control Circuitry Components of Protection Systems, and <u>RAS</u> except as noted. | | |
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Trip coils or actuators of circuit breakers, interrupting devices, or mitigating devices (regardless of any monitoring of the control circuitry). | 6 Calendar Years | Verify that each trip coil is able to operate the circuit breaker, interrupting device, or mitigating device. |
| Electromechanical lockout devices which are directly in a trip path from the protective relay to the interrupting device trip coil (regardless of any monitoring of the control circuitry). | 6 Calendar Years | Verify electrical operation of electromechanical lockout devices. |
| Unmonitored control circuitry associated with <u>RAS</u> . (See Table 4-2(b) for <u>RAS</u> which include Automatic Reclosing.) | 12 Calendar Years | Verify all paths of the control circuits essential for proper operation of the <u>RAS</u> . |
| Unmonitored control circuitry associated with protective functions inclusive of all auxiliary relays. | 12 Calendar Years | Verify all paths of the trip circuits inclusive of all auxiliary relays through the trip coil(s) of the circuit breakers or other interrupting devices. |
| Control circuitry associated with protective functions and/or <u>RAS</u> whose integrity is monitored and alarmed (See Table 2). | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |

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Standard PRC-005-3 — Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Maintenance

| Table 2 – Alarming Paths and Monitoring In Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 3, and Tables 4-1 through 4-2, alarm attributes used to justify extended maximum maintenance intervals and/or reduced maintenance activities are subject to the following maintenance requirements | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Any alarm path through which alarms in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 3, and Tables 4-1 through 4-2 are conveyed from the alarm origin to the location where corrective action can be initiated, and not having all the attributes of the “Alarm Path with monitoring” category below. Alarms are reported within 24 hours of detection to a location where corrective action can be initiated. | 12 Calendar Years | Verify that the alarm path conveys alarm signals to a location where corrective action can be initiated. |
| Alarm Path with monitoring: The location where corrective action is taken receives an alarm within 24 hours for failure of any portion of the alarming path from the alarm origin to the location where corrective action can be initiated. | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |

Standard PRC-005-3 — Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Maintenance

**Table 3
Maintenance Activities and Intervals for distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS Systems**

| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
|---|------------------------------|--|
| Any unmonitored protective relay not having all the monitoring attributes of a category below. | 6 Calendar Years | Verify that settings are as specified. For non-microprocessor relays: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Test and, if necessary calibrate. For microprocessor relays: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Verify operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. • Verify acceptable measurement of power system input values. |
| Monitored microprocessor protective relay with the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal self-diagnosis and alarming (See Table 2). • Voltage and/or current waveform sampling three or more times per power cycle, and conversion of samples to numeric values for measurement calculations by microprocessor electronics. Alarming for power supply failure (See Table 2). | 12 Calendar Years | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Settings are as specified. • Operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. • Acceptable measurement of power system input values |
| Monitored microprocessor protective relay with preceding row attributes and the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ac measurements are continuously verified by comparison to an independent ac measurement source, with alarming for excessive error (See Table 2). • Some or all binary or status inputs and control outputs are monitored by a process that continuously demonstrates ability to perform as designed, with alarming for failure (See Table 2). Alarming for change of settings (See Table 2). | 12 Calendar Years | Verify only the unmonitored relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Protection System. |

Standard PRC-005-3 — Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Maintenance

**Table 3
Maintenance Activities and Intervals for distributed UFLS and distributed UVLS Systems**

| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
|--|-----------------------------------|--|
| Voltage and/or current sensing devices associated with UFLS or UVLS systems. | 12 Calendar Years | Verify that current and/or voltage signal values are provided to the protective relays. |
| Protection System dc supply for tripping non-BES interrupting devices used only for a UFLS or UVLS system. | 12 Calendar Years | Verify Protection System dc supply voltage. |
| Control circuitry between the UFLS or UVLS relays and electromechanical lockout and/or tripping auxiliary devices (excludes non-BES interrupting device trip coils). | 12 Calendar Years | Verify the path from the relay to the lockout and/or tripping auxiliary relay (including essential supervisory logic). |
| Electromechanical lockout and/or tripping auxiliary devices associated only with UFLS or UVLS systems (excludes non-BES interrupting device trip coils). | 12 Calendar Years | Verify electrical operation of electromechanical lockout and/or tripping auxiliary devices. |
| Control circuitry between the electromechanical lockout and/or tripping auxiliary devices and the non-BES interrupting devices in UFLS or UVLS systems, or between UFLS or UVLS relays (with no interposing electromechanical lockout or auxiliary device) and the non-BES interrupting devices (excludes non-BES interrupting device trip coils). | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |
| Trip coils of non-BES interrupting devices in UFLS or UVLS systems. | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |

Standard PRC-005-3 — Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Maintenance

**Table 4-1
Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Automatic Reclosing Components
Component Type – Reclosing Relay**

| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
|--|------------------------------|--|
| Any unmonitored reclosing relay not having all the monitoring attributes of a category below. | 6 Calendar Years | Verify that settings are as specified. For non-microprocessor relays: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Test and, if necessary calibrate For microprocessor relays: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Verify operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Automatic Reclosing. |
| Monitored microprocessor reclosing relay with the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal self-diagnosis and alarming (See Table 2). • Alarming for power supply failure (See Table 2). | 12 Calendar Years | Verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Settings are as specified. • Operation of the relay inputs and outputs that are essential to proper functioning of the Automatic Reclosing. |

Standard PRC-005-3 — Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Maintenance

| Table 4-2(a) Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Automatic Reclosing Components Component Type – Control Circuitry Associated with Reclosing Relays that are NOT an Integral Part of a <u>RAS</u> | | |
|--|-----------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Unmonitored Control circuitry associated with Automatic Reclosing that is not an integral part of a <u>RAS</u> . | 12 Calendar Years | Verify that Automatic Reclosing, upon initiation, does not issue a premature closing command to the close circuitry. |
| Control circuitry associated with Automatic Reclosing that is not part of a <u>RAS</u> and is monitored and alarmed for conditions that would result in a premature closing command. (See Table 2) | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |

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Standard PRC-005-3 — Protection System and Automatic Reclosing Maintenance

| Table 4-2(b) Maintenance Activities and Intervals for Automatic Reclosing Components Component Type – Control Circuitry Associated with Reclosing Relays that ARE an Integral Part of a <u>RAS</u> | | |
|--|-----------------------------------|--|
| Component Attributes | Maximum Maintenance Interval | Maintenance Activities |
| Close coils or actuators of circuit breakers or similar devices that are used in conjunction with Automatic Reclosing as part of a <u>RAS</u> (regardless of any monitoring of the control circuitry). | 6 Calendar Years | Verify that each close coil or actuator is able to operate the circuit breaker or mitigating device. |
| Unmonitored close control circuitry associated with Automatic Reclosing used as an integral part of a <u>RAS</u> . | 12 Calendar Years | Verify all paths of the control circuits associated with Automatic Reclosing that are essential for proper operation of the <u>RAS</u> . |
| Control circuitry associated with Automatic Reclosing that is an integral part of a <u>RAS</u> whose integrity is monitored and alarmed. (See Table 2) | No periodic maintenance specified | None. |

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PRC-005 — Attachment A

Criteria for a Performance-Based Protection System Maintenance Program

Purpose: To establish a technical basis for initial and continued use of a performance-based Protection System Maintenance Program (PSMP).

To establish the technical justification for the initial use of a performance-based PSMP:

1. Develop a list with a description of Components included in each designated Segment, with a minimum **Segment** population of 60 Components.
2. Maintain the Components in each Segment according to the time-based maximum allowable intervals established in Tables 1-1 through 1-5, Table 3, and Tables 4-1 through 4-2 until results of maintenance activities for the Segment are available for a minimum of 30 individual Components of the Segment.
3. Document the maintenance program activities and results for each Segment, including maintenance dates and Countable Events for each included Component.
4. Analyze the maintenance program activities and results for each Segment to determine the overall performance of the Segment and develop maintenance intervals.
5. Determine the maximum allowable maintenance interval for each Segment such that the Segment experiences **Countable Events** on no more than 4% of the Components within the Segment, for the greater of either the last 30 Components maintained or all Components maintained in the previous year.

To maintain the technical justification for the ongoing use of a performance-based PSMP:

1. At least annually, update the list of Components and Segments and/or description if any changes occur within the Segment.
2. Perform maintenance on the greater of 5% of the Components (addressed in the performance based PSMP) in each Segment or 3 individual Components within the Segment in each year.
3. For the prior year, analyze the maintenance program activities and results for each Segment to determine the overall performance of the Segment.
4. Using the prior year's data, determine the maximum allowable maintenance interval for each Segment such that the Segment experiences Countable Events on no more than 4% of the Components within the Segment, for the greater of either the last 30 Components maintained or all Components maintained in the previous year.
5. If the Components in a Segment maintained through a performance-based PSMP experience 4% or more Countable Events, develop, document, and implement an action plan to reduce the Countable Events to less than 4% of the Segment population within 3 years.

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Automatic Underfrequency Load Shedding
2. **Number:** PRC-006-1(X)
3. **Purpose:** To establish design and documentation requirements for automatic underfrequency load shedding (UFLS) programs to arrest declining frequency, assist recovery of frequency following underfrequency events and provide last resort system preservation measures.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Planning Coordinators
 - 4.2. UFLS entities shall mean all entities that are responsible for the ownership, operation, or control of UFLS equipment as required by the UFLS program established by the Planning Coordinators. Such entities may include one or more of the following:
 - 4.2.1 Transmission Owners
 - 4.2.2 Distribution Providers
 - 4.3. Transmission Owners that own Elements identified in the UFLS program established by the Planning Coordinators.
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1. Each Planning Coordinator shall develop and document criteria, including consideration of historical events and system studies, to select portions of the Bulk Electric System (BES), including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas and Regional Entity areas that may form islands. [*VRF: Medium*][*Time Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
- R2. Each Planning Coordinator shall identify one or more islands to serve as a basis for designing its UFLS program including: [*VRF: Medium*][*Time Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
 - 2.1. Those islands selected by applying the criteria in Requirement R1, and

- 2.2. Any portions of the BES designed to detach from the Interconnection (planned islands) as a result of the operation of a relay scheme or Remedial Action Scheme, and
 - 2.3. A single island that includes all portions of the BES in either the Regional Entity area or the Interconnection in which the Planning Coordinator's area resides. If a Planning Coordinator's area resides in multiple Regional Entity areas, each of those Regional Entity areas shall be identified as an island. Planning Coordinators may adjust island boundaries to differ from Regional Entity area boundaries by mutual consent where necessary for the sole purpose of producing contiguous regional islands more suitable for simulation.
- R3.** Each Planning Coordinator shall develop a UFLS program, including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, that meets the following performance characteristics in simulations of underfrequency conditions resulting from an imbalance scenario, where an imbalance = [(load — actual generation output) / (load)], of up to 25 percent within the identified island(s). [*VRF: High*][*Time Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
- 3.1. Frequency shall remain above the Underfrequency Performance Characteristic curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1, either for 60 seconds or until a steady-state condition between 59.3 Hz and 60.7 Hz is reached, and
 - 3.2. Frequency shall remain below the Overfrequency Performance Characteristic curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1, either for 60 seconds or until a steady-state condition between 59.3 Hz and 60.7 Hz is reached, and
 - 3.3. Volts per Hz (V/Hz) shall not exceed 1.18 per unit for longer than two seconds cumulatively per simulated event, and shall not exceed 1.10 per unit for longer than 45 seconds cumulatively per simulated event at each generator bus and generator step-up transformer high-side bus associated with each of the following:
 - 3.3.1. Individual generating units greater than 20 MVA (gross nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES
 - 3.3.2. Generating plants/facilities greater than 75 MVA (gross aggregate nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES
 - 3.3.3. Facilities consisting of one or more units connected to the BES at a common bus with total generation above 75 MVA gross nameplate rating.
- R4.** Each Planning Coordinator shall conduct and document a UFLS design assessment at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement R3 for each island identified in Requirement R2. The simulation shall model each of the following: [*VRF: High*][*Time Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
- 4.1. Underfrequency trip settings of individual generating units greater than 20 MVA (gross nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip above the

- Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1.
- 4.2. Underfrequency trip settings of generating plants/facilities greater than 75 MVA (gross aggregate nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip above the Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1.
 - 4.3. Underfrequency trip settings of any facility consisting of one or more units connected to the BES at a common bus with total generation above 75 MVA (gross nameplate rating) that trip above the Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1.
 - 4.4. Overfrequency trip settings of individual generating units greater than 20 MVA (gross nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip below the Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) — Attachment 1.
 - 4.5. Overfrequency trip settings of generating plants/facilities greater than 75 MVA (gross aggregate nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip below the Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) — Attachment 1.
 - 4.6. Overfrequency trip settings of any facility consisting of one or more units connected to the BES at a common bus with total generation above 75 MVA (gross nameplate rating) that trip below the Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) — Attachment 1.
 - 4.7. Any automatic Load restoration that impacts frequency stabilization and operates within the duration of the simulations run for the assessment.
- R5. Each Planning Coordinator, whose area or portions of whose area is part of an island identified by it or another Planning Coordinator which includes multiple Planning Coordinator areas or portions of those areas, shall coordinate its UFLS program design with all other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas are also part of the same identified island through one of the following: *[VRF: High][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- Develop a common UFLS program design and schedule for implementation per Requirement R3 among the Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas are part of the same identified island, or
 - Conduct a joint UFLS design assessment per Requirement R4 among the Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas are part of the same identified island, or
 - Conduct an independent UFLS design assessment per Requirement R4 for the identified island, and in the event the UFLS design assessment fails to meet Requirement R3, identify modifications to the UFLS program(s) to meet

Requirement R3 and report these modifications as recommendations to the other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas are also part of the same identified island and the ERO.

- R6.** Each Planning Coordinator shall maintain a UFLS database containing data necessary to model its UFLS program for use in event analyses and assessments of the UFLS program at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between maintenance activities. *[VRF: Lower][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- R7.** Each Planning Coordinator shall provide its UFLS database containing data necessary to model its UFLS program to other Planning Coordinators within its Interconnection within 30 calendar days of a request. *[VRF: Lower][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- R8.** Each UFLS entity shall provide data to its Planning Coordinator(s) according to the format and schedule specified by the Planning Coordinator(s) to support maintenance of each Planning Coordinator's UFLS database. *[VRF: Lower][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- R9.** Each UFLS entity shall provide automatic tripping of Load in accordance with the UFLS program design and schedule for application determined by its Planning Coordinator(s) in each Planning Coordinator area in which it owns assets. *[VRF: High][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- R10.** Each Transmission Owner shall provide automatic switching of its existing capacitor banks, Transmission Lines, and reactors to control over-voltage as a result of underfrequency load shedding if required by the UFLS program and schedule for application determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) in each Planning Coordinator area in which the Transmission Owner owns transmission. *[VRF: High][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- R11.** Each Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event results in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, shall conduct and document an assessment of the event within one year of event actuation to evaluate: *[VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Operations Assessment]*
 - 11.1.** The performance of the UFLS equipment,
 - 11.2.** The effectiveness of the UFLS program.
- R12.** Each Planning Coordinator, in whose islanding event assessment (per R11) UFLS program deficiencies are identified, shall conduct and document a UFLS design assessment to consider the identified deficiencies within two years of event actuation. *[VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Operations Assessment]*
- R13.** Each Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event occurred that also included the area(s) or portions of area(s) of other Planning Coordinator(s) in the same islanding event and that resulted in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, shall coordinate its event assessment (in accordance

with Requirement R11) with all other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event through one of the following: *[VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Operations Assessment]*

- Conduct a joint event assessment per Requirement R11 among the Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were included in the same islanding event, or
- Conduct an independent event assessment per Requirement R11 that reaches conclusions and recommendations consistent with those of the event assessments of the other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were included in the same islanding event, or
- Conduct an independent event assessment per Requirement R11 and where the assessment fails to reach conclusions and recommendations consistent with those of the event assessments of the other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were included in the same islanding event, identify differences in the assessments that likely resulted in the differences in the conclusions and recommendations and report these differences to the other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were included in the same islanding event and the ERO.

R14. Each Planning Coordinator shall respond to written comments submitted by UFLS entities and Transmission Owners within its Planning Coordinator area following a comment period and before finalizing its UFLS program, indicating in the written response to comments whether changes will be made or reasons why changes will not be made to the following *[VRF: Lower][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*:

14.1. UFLS program, including a schedule for implementation

14.2. UFLS design assessment

14.3. Format and schedule of UFLS data submittal

C. Measures

M1. Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as reports, or other documentation of its criteria to select portions of the Bulk Electric System that may form islands including how system studies and historical events were considered to develop the criteria per Requirement R1.

M2. Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as reports, memorandums, e-mails, or other documentation supporting its identification of an island(s) as a basis for designing a UFLS program that meet the criteria in Requirement R2, Parts 2.1 through 2.3.

M3. Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as reports, memorandums, e-mails, program plans, or other documentation of its UFLS program, including the notification of the UFLS entities of implementation schedule, that meet the criteria in Requirement R3, Parts 3.1 through 3.3.

- M4.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as reports, dynamic simulation models and results, or other dated documentation of its UFLS design assessment that demonstrates it meets Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.7.
- M5.** Each Planning Coordinator, whose area or portions of whose area is part of an island identified by it or another Planning Coordinator which includes multiple Planning Coordinator areas or portions of those areas, shall have dated evidence such as joint UFLS program design documents, reports describing a joint UFLS design assessment, letters that include recommendations, or other dated documentation demonstrating that it coordinated its UFLS program design with all other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas are also part of the same identified island per Requirement R5.
- M6.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as a UFLS database, data requests, data input forms, or other dated documentation to show that it maintained a UFLS database for use in event analyses and assessments of the UFLS program per Requirement R6 at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between maintenance activities.
- M7.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as letters, memorandums, e-mails or other dated documentation that it provided their UFLS database to other Planning Coordinators within their Interconnection within 30 calendar days of a request per Requirement R7.
- M8.** Each UFLS Entity shall have dated evidence such as responses to data requests, spreadsheets, letters or other dated documentation that it provided data to its Planning Coordinator according to the format and schedule specified by the Planning Coordinator to support maintenance of the UFLS database per Requirement R8.
- M9.** Each UFLS Entity shall have dated evidence such as spreadsheets summarizing feeder load armed with UFLS relays, spreadsheets with UFLS relay settings, or other dated documentation that it provided automatic tripping of load in accordance with the UFLS program design and schedule for application per Requirement R9.
- M10.** Each Transmission Owner shall have dated evidence such as relay settings, tripping logic or other dated documentation that it provided automatic switching of its existing capacitor banks, Transmission Lines, and reactors in order to control over-voltage as a result of underfrequency load shedding if required by the UFLS program and schedule for application per Requirement R10.
- M11.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as reports, data gathered from an historical event, or other dated documentation to show that it conducted an event assessment of the performance of the UFLS equipment and the effectiveness of the UFLS program per Requirement R11.
- M12.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as reports, data gathered from an historical event, or other dated documentation to show that it conducted a

UFLS design assessment per Requirements R12 and R4 if UFLS program deficiencies are identified in R11.

- M13.** Each Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event occurred that also included the area(s) or portions of area(s) of other Planning Coordinator(s) in the same islanding event and that resulted in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, shall have dated evidence such as a joint assessment report, independent assessment reports and letters describing likely reasons for differences in conclusions and recommendations, or other dated documentation demonstrating it coordinated its event assessment (per Requirement R11) with all other Planning Coordinator(s) whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event per Requirement R13.
- M14.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence of responses, such as e-mails and letters, to written comments submitted by UFLS entities and Transmission Owners within its Planning Coordinator area following a comment period and before finalizing its UFLS program per Requirement R14.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

Regional Entity

1.2. Data Retention

Each Planning Coordinator and UFLS entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

- Each Planning Coordinator shall retain the current evidence of Requirements R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R12, and R14, Measures M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, M12, and M14 as well as any evidence necessary to show compliance since the last compliance audit.
- Each Planning Coordinator shall retain the current evidence of UFLS database update in accordance with Requirement R6, Measure M6, and evidence of the prior year's UFLS database update.
- Each Planning Coordinator shall retain evidence of any UFLS database transmittal to another Planning Coordinator since the last compliance audit in accordance with Requirement R7, Measure M7.
- Each UFLS entity shall retain evidence of UFLS data transmittal to the Planning Coordinator(s) since the last compliance audit in accordance with Requirement R8, Measure M8.

- Each UFLS entity shall retain the current evidence of adherence with the UFLS program in accordance with Requirement R9, Measure M9, and evidence of adherence since the last compliance audit.
- Transmission Owner shall retain the current evidence of adherence with the UFLS program in accordance with Requirement R10, Measure M10, and evidence of adherence since the last compliance audit.
- Each Planning Coordinator shall retain evidence of Requirements R11, and R13, and Measures M11, and M13 for 6 calendar years.

If a Planning Coordinator or UFLS entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until found compliant or for the retention period specified above, whichever is longer.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes

- Compliance Audit
- Self-Certification
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Violation Investigation
- Self-Reporting
- Complaint

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

Not applicable.

2. Violation Severity Levels

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----|-----------|---|---|--|
| R1 | N/A | <p>The Planning Coordinator developed and documented criteria but failed to include the consideration of historical events, to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas and Regional Entity areas that may form islands.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator developed and documented criteria but failed to include the consideration of system studies, to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas and Regional Entity areas, that may form islands.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator developed and documented criteria but failed to include the consideration of historical events and system studies, to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas and Regional Entity areas, that may form islands.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator failed to develop and document criteria to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas and Regional Entity areas, that may form islands.</p> |
| R2 | N/A | <p>The Planning Coordinator identified an island(s) to serve as a basis for designing its UFLS program but failed to include one (1) of the Parts as specified in Requirement R2, Parts 2.1, 2.2, or 2.3.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator identified an island(s) to serve as a basis for designing its UFLS program but failed to include two (2) of the Parts as specified in Requirement R2, Parts 2.1, 2.2, or 2.3.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator identified an island(s) to serve as a basis for designing its UFLS program but failed to include all of the Parts as specified in Requirement R2, Parts 2.1, 2.2, or 2.3.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator failed to identify any island(s) to serve as a basis for designing its UFLS program.</p> |

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----------|--|--|---|--|
| R3 | N/A | <p>The Planning Coordinator developed a UFLS program, including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area where imbalance = [(load — actual generation output) / (load)], of up to 25 percent within the identified island(s)., but failed to meet one (1) of the performance characteristic in Requirement R3, Parts 3.1, 3.2, or 3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator developed a UFLS program including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area where imbalance = [(load — actual generation output) / (load)], of up to 25 percent within the identified island(s)., but failed to meet two (2) of the performance characteristic in Requirement R3, Parts 3.1, 3.2, or 3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator developed a UFLS program including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area where imbalance = [(load — actual generation output) / (load)], of up to 25 percent within the identified island(s).,but failed to meet all the performance characteristic in Requirement R3, Parts 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator failed to develop a UFLS program including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area</p> |
| R4 | <p>The Planning Coordinator conducted and documented a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determined through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design met the performance characteristics in Requirement R3 for each island identified in Requirement R2 but the simulation failed to include one (1) of the items as specified in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.7.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator conducted and documented a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determined through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design met the performance characteristics in Requirement R3 for each island identified in Requirement R2 but the simulation failed to include two (2) of the items as specified in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.7.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator conducted and documented a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determined through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design met the performance characteristics in Requirement R3 for each island identified in Requirement R2 but the simulation failed to include three (3) of the items as specified in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.7.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator conducted and documented a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determined through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design met the performance characteristics in Requirement R3 but simulation failed to include four (4) or more of the items as specified in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.7.</p> <p>OR</p> |

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----|---|---|---|--|
| | | | | The Planning Coordinator failed to conduct and document a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement R3 for each island identified in Requirement R2 |
| R5 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Planning Coordinator, whose area or portions of whose area is part of an island identified by it or another Planning Coordinator which includes multiple Planning Coordinator areas or portions of those areas, failed to coordinate its UFLS program design through one of the manners described in Requirement R5. |
| R6 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Planning Coordinator failed to maintain a UFLS database for use in event analyses and assessments of the UFLS program at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between maintenance activities. |
| R7 | The Planning Coordinator provided its UFLS database to other Planning Coordinators more than 30 calendar days and up to and including 40 calendar days following the request. | The Planning Coordinator provided its UFLS database to other Planning Coordinators more than 40 calendar days but less than and including 50 calendar days following the request. | The Planning Coordinator provided its UFLS database to other Planning Coordinators more than 50 calendar days but less than and including 60 calendar days following the request. | The Planning Coordinator provided its UFLS database to other Planning Coordinators more than 60 calendar days following the request. OR |

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|------------|---|--|---|--|
| | | | | The Planning Coordinator failed to provide its UFLS database to other Planning Coordinators. |
| R8 | The UFLS entity provided data to its Planning Coordinator(s) less than or equal to 10 calendar days following the schedule specified by the Planning Coordinator(s) to support maintenance of each Planning Coordinator's UFLS database. | The UFLS entity provided data to its Planning Coordinator(s) more than 10 calendar days but less than or equal to 15 calendar days following the schedule specified by the Planning Coordinator(s) to support maintenance of each Planning Coordinator's UFLS database. OR The UFLS entity provided data to its Planning Coordinator(s) but the data was not according to the format specified by the Planning Coordinator(s) to support maintenance of each Planning Coordinator's UFLS database. | The UFLS entity provided data to its Planning Coordinator(s) more than 15 calendar days but less than or equal to 20 calendar days following the schedule specified by the Planning Coordinator(s) to support maintenance of each Planning Coordinator's UFLS database. | The UFLS entity provided data to its Planning Coordinator(s) more than 20 calendar days following the schedule specified by the Planning Coordinator(s) to support maintenance of each Planning Coordinator's UFLS database. OR The UFLS entity failed to provide data to its Planning Coordinator(s) to support maintenance of each Planning Coordinator's UFLS database. |
| R9 | The UFLS entity provided less than 100% but more than (and including) 95% of automatic tripping of Load in accordance with the UFLS program design and schedule for application determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) area in which it owns assets. | The UFLS entity provided less than 95% but more than (and including) 90% of automatic tripping of Load in accordance with the UFLS program design and schedule for application determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) area in which it owns assets. | The UFLS entity provided less than 90% but more than (and including) 85% of automatic tripping of Load in accordance with the UFLS program design and schedule for application determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) area in which it owns assets. | The UFLS entity provided less than 85% of automatic tripping of Load in accordance with the UFLS program design and schedule for application determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) area in which it owns assets. |
| R10 | The Transmission Owner provided less than 100% but more than (and including) 95% automatic switching | The Transmission Owner provided less than 95% but more than (and including) 90% automatic switching | The Transmission Owner provided less than 90% but more than (and including) 85% automatic switching | The Transmission Owner provided less than 85% automatic switching of its existing capacitor banks, |

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-------------------|---|--|--|---|
| | <p>of its existing capacitor banks, Transmission Lines, and reactors to control over-voltage if required by the UFLS program and schedule for application determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) in each Planning Coordinator area in which the Transmission Owner owns transmission</p> | <p>of its existing capacitor banks, Transmission Lines, and reactors to control over-voltage if required by the UFLS program and schedule for application determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) in each Planning Coordinator area in which the Transmission Owner owns transmission</p> | <p>of its existing capacitor banks, Transmission Lines, and reactors to control over-voltage if required by the UFLS program and schedule for application determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) in each Planning Coordinator area in which the Transmission Owner owns transmission</p> | <p>Transmission Lines, and reactors to control over-voltage if required by the UFLS program and schedule for application determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) in each Planning Coordinator area in which the Transmission Owner owns transmission</p> |
| <p>R11</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, conducted and documented an assessment of the event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 and 11.2 within a time greater than one year but less than or equal to 13 months of actuation.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, conducted and documented an assessment of the event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 and 11.2 within a time greater than 13 months but less than or equal to 14 months of actuation.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, conducted and documented an assessment of the event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 and 11.2 within a time greater than 14 months but less than or equal to 15 months of actuation.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area an islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, conducted and documented an assessment of the event within one year of event actuation but failed to evaluate one (1) of the Parts as</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, conducted and documented an assessment of the event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 and 11.2 within a time greater than 15 months of actuation.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area an islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, failed to conduct and document an assessment of the event and evaluate the Parts as specified in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 and 11.2.</p> <p>OR</p> |

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|------------|-----------|--|--|--|
| | | | specified in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 or 11.2. | The Planning Coordinator, in whose area an islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, conducted and documented an assessment of the event within one year of event actuation but failed to evaluate all of the Parts as specified in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 and 11.2. |
| R12 | N/A | The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement R11, conducted and documented a UFLS design assessment to consider the identified deficiencies greater than two years but less than or equal to 25 months of event actuation. | The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement R11, conducted and documented a UFLS design assessment to consider the identified deficiencies greater than 25 months but less than or equal to 26 months of event actuation. | The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement R11, conducted and documented a UFLS design assessment to consider the identified deficiencies greater than 26 months of event actuation. OR The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement R11, failed to conduct and document a UFLS design assessment to consider the identified deficiencies. |
| R13 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event occurred that also included the area(s) or portions of area(s) of other Planning Coordinator(s) in the same islanding event and that resulted in system frequency |

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|------------|-----------|--------------|----------|--|
| | | | | excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, failed to coordinate its UFLS event assessment with all other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event in one of the manners described in Requirement R13 |
| R14 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Planning Coordinator failed to respond to written comments submitted by UFLS entities and Transmission Owners within its Planning Coordinator area following a comment period and before finalizing its UFLS program, indicating in the written response to comments whether changes were made or reasons why changes were not made to the items in Parts 14.1 through 14.3. |

E. Regional Variances

E.A. Regional Variance for the Quebec Interconnection

The following Interconnection-wide variance shall be applicable in the Quebec Interconnection and replaces, in their entirety, Requirements R3 and R4 and the violation severity levels associated with Requirements R3 and R4.

- E.A.3.** Each Planning Coordinator shall develop a UFLS program, including a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, that meets the following performance characteristics in simulations of underfrequency conditions resulting from an imbalance scenario, where an imbalance = $[(\text{load} - \text{actual generation output}) / (\text{load})]$, of up to 25 percent within the identified island(s).
[VRF: High][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- E.A.3.1.** Frequency shall remain above the Underfrequency Performance Characteristic curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1A, either for 30 seconds or until a steady-state condition between 59.3 Hz and 60.7 Hz is reached, and
- E.A.3.2.** Frequency shall remain below the Overfrequency Performance Characteristic curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1A, either for 30 seconds or until a steady-state condition between 59.3 Hz and 60.7 Hz is reached, and
- E.A.3.3.** Volts per Hz (V/Hz) shall not exceed 1.18 per unit for longer than two seconds cumulatively per simulated event, and shall not exceed 1.10 per unit for longer than 45 seconds cumulatively per simulated event at each generator bus and generator step-up transformer high-side bus associated with each of the following:
- EA.3.3.1.** Individual generating unit greater than 50 MVA (gross nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES
- EA.3.3.2.** Generating plants/facilities greater than 50 MVA (gross aggregate nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES
- EA.3.3.3.** Facilities consisting of one or more units connected to the BES at a common bus with total generation above 50 MVA gross nameplate rating.
- E.A.4.** Each Planning Coordinator shall conduct and document a UFLS design assessment at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement E.A.3 for each island identified in Requirement R2. The simulation shall model each of the following; *[VRF: High][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- E.A.4.1** Underfrequency trip settings of individual generating units that are part of plants/facilities with a capacity of 50 MVA or more individually or cumulatively (gross nameplate rating), directly

connected to the BES that trip above the Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1A, and

E.A.4.2 Overfrequency trip settings of individual generating units that are part of plants/facilities with a capacity of 50 MVA or more individually or cumulatively (gross nameplate rating), directly connected to the BES that trip below the Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 2A, and

E.A.4.3 Any automatic Load restoration that impacts frequency stabilization and operates within the duration of the simulations run for the assessment.

M.E.A.3. Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as reports, memorandums, e-mails, program plans, or other documentation of its UFLS program, including the notification of the UFLS entities of implementation schedule, that meet the criteria in Requirement E.A.3 Parts E.A.3.1 through EA3.3.

M.E.A.4. Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as reports, dynamic simulation models and results, or other dated documentation of its UFLS design assessment that demonstrates it meets Requirement E.A.4 Parts E.A.4.1 through E.A.4.3.

| E # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|------------|-----------|---|--|---|
| EA3 | N/A | The Planning Coordinator developed a UFLS program, including a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, but failed to meet one (1) of the performance characteristic in Parts E.A.3.1, E.A.3.2, or E.A.3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions | The Planning Coordinator developed a UFLS program including a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, but failed to meet two (2) of the performance characteristic in Parts E.A.3.1, E.A.3.2, or E.A.3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions | The Planning Coordinator developed a UFLS program including a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, but failed to meet all the performance characteristic in Parts E.A.3.1, E.A.3.2, and E.A.3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions OR The Planning Coordinator failed to develop a UFLS program. |
| EA4 | N/A | The Planning Coordinator conducted and documented a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement E.A.3 but simulation failed to include one (1) of the items as specified in Parts E.A.4.1, E.A.4.2 or E.A.4.3. | The Planning Coordinator conducted and documented a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement E3 but simulation failed to include two (2) of the items as specified in Parts E.A.4.1, E.A.4.2 or E.A.4.3. | The Planning Coordinator conducted and documented a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement E3 but simulation failed to include all of the items as specified in Parts E.A.4.1, E.A.4.2 and E.A.4.3. OR The Planning Coordinator failed to conduct and document a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement E.A.3 |

E.B. Regional Variance for the Western Electricity Coordinating Council

The following Interconnection-wide variance shall be applicable in the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) and replaces, in their entirety, Requirements R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R11, R12, and R13.

- E.B.1.** Each Planning Coordinator shall participate in a joint regional review with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area that develops and documents criteria, including consideration of historical events and system studies, to select portions of the Bulk Electric System (BES) that may form islands. *[VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- E.B.2.** Each Planning Coordinator shall identify one or more islands from the regional review (per E.B.1) to serve as a basis for designing a region-wide coordinated UFLS program including: *[VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- E.B.2.1.** Those islands selected by applying the criteria in Requirement E.B.1, and
- E.B.2.2.** Any portions of the BES designed to detach from the Interconnection (planned islands) as a result of the operation of a relay scheme or Remedial Action Scheme.
- EB.3.** Each Planning Coordinator shall adopt a UFLS program, coordinated across the WECC Regional Entity area, including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, that meets the following performance characteristics in simulations of underfrequency conditions resulting from an imbalance scenario, where an imbalance = [(load — actual generation output) / (load)], of up to 25 percent within the identified island(s). *[VRF: High][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- E.B.3.1.** Frequency shall remain above the Underfrequency Performance Characteristic curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1, either for 60 seconds or until a steady-state condition between 59.3 Hz and 60.7 Hz is reached, and
- E.B.3.2.** Frequency shall remain below the Overfrequency Performance Characteristic curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1, either for 60 seconds or until a steady-state condition between 59.3 Hz and 60.7 Hz is reached, and
- E.B.3.3.** Volts per Hz (V/Hz) shall not exceed 1.18 per unit for longer than two seconds cumulatively per simulated event, and shall not exceed 1.10 per unit for longer than 45 seconds cumulatively per simulated event at each generator bus and generator step-up transformer high-side bus associated with each of the following:
- E.B.3.3.1.** Individual generating units greater than 20 MVA (gross nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES
- E.B.3.3.2.** Generating plants/facilities greater than 75 MVA (gross aggregate nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES

- E.B.3.3.3.** Facilities consisting of one or more units connected to the BES at a common bus with total generation above 75 MVA gross nameplate rating.
- E.B.4.** Each Planning Coordinator shall participate in and document a coordinated UFLS design assessment with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement E.B.3 for each island identified in Requirement E.B.2. The simulation shall model each of the following: *[VRF: High][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- E.B.4.1.** Underfrequency trip settings of individual generating units greater than 20 MVA (gross nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip above the Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1.
- E.B.4.2.** Underfrequency trip settings of generating plants/facilities greater than 75 MVA (gross aggregate nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip above the Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1.
- E.B.4.3.** Underfrequency trip settings of any facility consisting of one or more units connected to the BES at a common bus with total generation above 75 MVA (gross nameplate rating) that trip above the Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1.
- E.B.4.4.** Overfrequency trip settings of individual generating units greater than 20 MVA (gross nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip below the Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) — Attachment 1.
- E.B.4.5.** Overfrequency trip settings of generating plants/facilities greater than 75 MVA (gross aggregate nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip below the Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) — Attachment 1.
- E.B.4.6.** Overfrequency trip settings of any facility consisting of one or more units connected to the BES at a common bus with total generation above 75 MVA (gross nameplate rating) that trip below the Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) — Attachment 1.
- E.B.4.7.** Any automatic Load restoration that impacts frequency stabilization and operates within the duration of the simulations run for the assessment.
- E.B.11.** Each Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event results in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, shall participate in and document a coordinated event assessment with all affected Planning Coordinators to conduct and document an assessment of the

event within one year of event actuation to evaluate: *[VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Operations Assessment]*

E.B.11.1. The performance of the UFLS equipment,

E.B.11.2 The effectiveness of the UFLS program

E.B.12. Each Planning Coordinator, in whose islanding event assessment (per E.B.11) UFLS program deficiencies are identified, shall participate in and document a coordinated UFLS design assessment of the UFLS program with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area to consider the identified deficiencies within two years of event actuation. *[VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Operations Assessment]*

M.E.B.1. Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as reports, or other documentation of its criteria, developed as part of the joint regional review with other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area to select portions of the Bulk Electric System that may form islands including how system studies and historical events were considered to develop the criteria per Requirement E.B.1.

M.E.B.2. Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as reports, memorandums, e-mails, or other documentation supporting its identification of an island(s), from the regional review (per E.B.1), as a basis for designing a region-wide coordinated UFLS program that meet the criteria in Requirement E.B.2 Parts E.B.2.1 and E.B.2.2.

M.E.B.3. Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as reports, memorandums, e-mails, program plans, or other documentation of its adoption of a UFLS program, coordinated across the WECC Regional Entity area, including the notification of the UFLS entities of implementation schedule, that meet the criteria in Requirement E.B.3 Parts E.B.3.1 through E.B.3.3.

M.E.B.4. Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as reports, dynamic simulation models and results, or other dated documentation of its participation in a coordinated UFLS design assessment with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area that demonstrates it meets Requirement E.B.4 Parts E.B.4.1 through E.B.4.7.

M.E.B.11. Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as reports, data gathered from an historical event, or other dated documentation to show that it participated in a coordinated event assessment of the performance of the UFLS equipment and the effectiveness of the UFLS program per Requirement E.B.11.

M.E.B.12. Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as reports, data gathered from an historical event, or other dated documentation to show that it participated in a UFLS design assessment per Requirements E.B.12 and E.B.4 if UFLS program deficiencies are identified in E.B.11.

| E # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|--------------|-----------|--|---|--|
| E.B.1 | N/A | <p>The Planning Coordinator participated in a joint regional review with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area that developed and documented criteria but failed to include the consideration of historical events, to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas, that may form islands</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator participated in a joint regional review with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area that developed and documented criteria but failed to include the consideration of system studies, to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas, that may form islands</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator participated in a joint regional review with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area that developed and documented criteria but failed to include the consideration of historical events and system studies, to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas, that may form islands</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator failed to participate in a joint regional review with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area that developed and documented criteria to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas that may form islands</p> |
| E.B.2 | N/A | N/A | <p>The Planning Coordinator identified an island(s) from the regional review to serve as a basis for designing its UFLS program but failed to include one (1) of the parts as specified in Requirement E.B.2, Parts E.B.2.1 or E.B.2.2</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator identified an island(s) from the regional review to serve as a basis for designing its UFLS program but failed to include all of the parts as specified in Requirement E.B.2, Parts E.B.2.1 or E.B.2.2</p> <p>OR</p> |

| E # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|--------------|---|--|--|--|
| | | | | <p>The Planning Coordinator failed to identify any island(s) from the regional review to serve as a basis for designing its UFLS program.</p> |
| E.B.3 | N/A | <p>The Planning Coordinator adopted a UFLS program, coordinated across the WECC Regional Entity area that included notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, but failed to meet one (1) of the performance characteristic in Requirement E.B.3, Parts E.B.3.1, E.B.3.2, or E.B.3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator adopted a UFLS program, coordinated across the WECC Regional Entity area that included notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, but failed to meet two (2) of the performance characteristic in Requirement E.B.3, Parts E.B.3.1, E.B.3.2, or E.B.3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator adopted a UFLS program, coordinated across the WECC Regional Entity area that included notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, but failed to meet all the performance characteristic in Requirement E.B.3, Parts E.B.3.1, E.B.3.2, and E.B.3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator failed to adopt a UFLS program, coordinated across the WECC Regional Entity area, including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area.</p> |
| E.B.4 | <p>The Planning Coordinator participated in and documented a coordinated UFLS assessment with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement E.B.3 for each island</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator participated in and documented a coordinated UFLS assessment with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement E.B.3 for each island</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator participated in and documented a coordinated UFLS assessment with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement E.B.3 for each island</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator participated in and documented a coordinated UFLS assessment with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement E.B.3 for each island</p> |

| E # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|---------------|---|--|--|--|
| | <p>identified in Requirement E.B.2 but the simulation failed to include one (1) of the items as specified in Requirement E.B.4, Parts E.B.4.1 through E.B.4.7.</p> | <p>identified in Requirement E.B.2 but the simulation failed to include two (2) of the items as specified in Requirement E.B.4, Parts E.B.4.1 through E.B.4.7.</p> | <p>identified in Requirement E.B.2 but the simulation failed to include three (3) of the items as specified in Requirement E.B.4, Parts E.B.4.1 through E.B.4.7.</p> | <p>identified in Requirement E.B.2 but the simulation failed to include four (4) or more of the items as specified in Requirement E.B.4, Parts E.B.4.1 through E.B.4.7.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator failed to participate in and document a coordinated UFLS assessment with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement E.B.3 for each island identified in Requirement E.B.2</p> |
| E.B.11 | <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, participated in and documented a coordinated event assessment with all Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement E.B.11, Parts E.B.11.1 and E.B.11.2 within a time greater than one year but less than or equal to 13 months of actuation.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, participated in and documented a coordinated event assessment with all Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement E.B.11, Parts E.B.11.1 and E.B.11.2 within a time greater than 13 months but less than or equal to 14 months of actuation.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, participated in and documented a coordinated event assessment with all Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement E.B.11, Parts E.B.11.1 and E.B.11.2 within a time greater than 14 months but less than or equal to 15 months of actuation.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, participated in and documented a coordinated event assessment with all Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement E.B.11, Parts E.B.11.1 and E.B.11.2 within a time greater than 15 months of actuation.</p> <p>OR</p> |

| E # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|---------------|-----------|---|---|--|
| | | | <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area an islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, participated in and documented a coordinated event assessment with all Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event within one year of event actuation but failed to evaluate one (1) of the parts as specified in Requirement E.B.11, Parts E.B.11.1 or E.B.11.2.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area an islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, failed to participate in and document a coordinated event assessment with all Planning Coordinators whose areas or portion of whose areas were also included in the same island event and evaluate the parts as specified in Requirement E.B.11, Parts E.B.11.1 and E.B.11.2.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area an islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, participated in and documented a coordinated event assessment with all Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event within one year of event actuation but failed to evaluate all of the parts as specified in Requirement E.B.11, Parts E.B.11.1 and E.B.11.2.</p> |
| E.B.12 | N/A | The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement E.B.11, participated in and documented a coordinated UFLS design | The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement E.B.11, participated in and documented a coordinated UFLS design | The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement E.B.11, participated in and documented a coordinated UFLS design |

| E # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----|-----------|---|---|--|
| | | <p>assessment of the coordinated UFLS program with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area to consider the identified deficiencies in greater than two years but less than or equal to 25 months of event actuation.</p> | <p>assessment of the coordinated UFLS program with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area to consider the identified deficiencies in greater than 25 months but less than or equal to 26 months of event actuation.</p> | <p>assessment of the coordinated UFLS program with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area to consider the identified deficiencies in greater than 26 months of event actuation.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement E.B.11, failed to participate in and document a coordinated UFLS design assessment of the coordinated UFLS program with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area to consider the identified deficiencies</p> |


Associated Documents

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|----------------|------------------|--|--|
| 1 | May 25, 2010 | Completed revision, merging and updating PRC-006-0, PRC-007-0 and PRC-009-0. | |
| 1 | November 4, 2010 | Adopted by the Board of Trustees | |
| 1 | May 7, 2012 | FERC Order issued approving PRC-006-1 (approval becomes effective July 10, 2012) | |
| 1 | November 9, 2012 | FERC Letter Order issued accepting the modification of the VRF in R5 from (Medium to High) and the modification of the VSL language in R8. | |
| 1(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

PRC-006-1(X) – Attachment 1


Underfrequency Load Shedding Program Design Performance and Modeling Curves for Requirements R3 Parts 3.1-3.2 and R4 Parts 4.1-4.6



Curve Definitions

| Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling | | Overfrequency Performance Characteristic | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|--|--|-----------------------|
| $t \leq 2 \text{ s}$ | $t > 2 \text{ s}$ | $t \leq 4 \text{ s}$ | $4 \text{ s} < t \leq 30 \text{ s}$ | $t > 30 \text{ s}$ |
| $f = 62.2 \text{ Hz}$ | $f = -0.686\log(t) + 62.41 \text{ Hz}$ | $f = 61.8 \text{ Hz}$ | $f = -0.686\log(t) + 62.21 \text{ Hz}$ | $f = 60.7 \text{ Hz}$ |

| Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling | | Underfrequency Performance Characteristic | | |
|--|---------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| $t \leq 2 \text{ s}$ | $t > 2 \text{ s}$ | $t \leq 2 \text{ s}$ | $2 \text{ s} < t \leq 60 \text{ s}$ | $t > 60 \text{ s}$ |
| $f = 57.8 \text{ Hz}$ | $f = 0.575\log(t) + 57.63 \text{ Hz}$ | $f = 58.0 \text{ Hz}$ | $f = 0.575\log(t) + 57.83 \text{ Hz}$ | $f = 59.3 \text{ Hz}$ |



A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Automatic Underfrequency Load Shedding
2. **Number:** PRC-006-1(X)
3. **Purpose:** To establish design and documentation requirements for automatic underfrequency load shedding (UFLS) programs to arrest declining frequency, assist recovery of frequency following underfrequency events and provide last resort system preservation measures.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Planning Coordinators
 - 4.2. UFLS entities shall mean all entities that are responsible for the ownership, operation, or control of UFLS equipment as required by the UFLS program established by the Planning Coordinators. Such entities may include one or more of the following:
 - 4.2.1 Transmission Owners
 - 4.2.2 Distribution Providers
 - 4.3. Transmission Owners that own Elements identified in the UFLS program established by the Planning Coordinators.

5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Deleted: (Proposed)

B. Requirements

- R1. Each Planning Coordinator shall develop and document criteria, including consideration of historical events and system studies, to select portions of the Bulk Electric System (BES), including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas and Regional Entity areas that may form islands. [VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- R2. Each Planning Coordinator shall identify one or more islands to serve as a basis for designing its UFLS program including: [VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - 2.1. Those islands selected by applying the criteria in Requirement R1, and

Deleted: <#>The standard, with the exception of Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.6, is effective the first day of the first calendar quarter one year after applicable regulatory approvals. ¶
Parts 4.1 through 4.6 of Requirement R4 shall become effective and enforceable one year following the receipt of generation data as required in PRC-024-1(X), but no sooner than one year following the first day of the first calendar quarter after applicable regulatory approvals of PRC-006-1(X).¶

- 2.2. Any portions of the BES designed to detach from the Interconnection (planned islands) as a result of the operation of a relay scheme or Remedial Action Scheme, and
 - 2.3. A single island that includes all portions of the BES in either the Regional Entity area or the Interconnection in which the Planning Coordinator's area resides. If a Planning Coordinator's area resides in multiple Regional Entity areas, each of those Regional Entity areas shall be identified as an island. Planning Coordinators may adjust island boundaries to differ from Regional Entity area boundaries by mutual consent where necessary for the sole purpose of producing contiguous regional islands more suitable for simulation.
- R3.** Each Planning Coordinator shall develop a UFLS program, including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, that meets the following performance characteristics in simulations of underfrequency conditions resulting from an imbalance scenario, where an imbalance = [(load — actual generation output) / (load)], of up to 25 percent within the identified island(s). [*VRF: High*][*Time Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
- 3.1. Frequency shall remain above the Underfrequency Performance Characteristic curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1, either for 60 seconds or until a steady-state condition between 59.3 Hz and 60.7 Hz is reached, and
 - 3.2. Frequency shall remain below the Overfrequency Performance Characteristic curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1, either for 60 seconds or until a steady-state condition between 59.3 Hz and 60.7 Hz is reached, and
 - 3.3. Volts per Hz (V/Hz) shall not exceed 1.18 per unit for longer than two seconds cumulatively per simulated event, and shall not exceed 1.10 per unit for longer than 45 seconds cumulatively per simulated event at each generator bus and generator step-up transformer high-side bus associated with each of the following:
 - 3.3.1. Individual generating units greater than 20 MVA (gross nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES
 - 3.3.2. Generating plants/facilities greater than 75 MVA (gross aggregate nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES
 - 3.3.3. Facilities consisting of one or more units connected to the BES at a common bus with total generation above 75 MVA gross nameplate rating.
- R4.** Each Planning Coordinator shall conduct and document a UFLS design assessment at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement R3 for each island identified in Requirement R2. The simulation shall model each of the following: [*VRF: High*][*Time Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
- 4.1. Underfrequency trip settings of individual generating units greater than 20 MVA (gross nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip above the

Deleted: Special Protection System

- Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1.
- 4.2. Underfrequency trip settings of generating plants/facilities greater than 75 MVA (gross aggregate nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip above the Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1.
 - 4.3. Underfrequency trip settings of any facility consisting of one or more units connected to the BES at a common bus with total generation above 75 MVA (gross nameplate rating) that trip above the Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1.
 - 4.4. Overfrequency trip settings of individual generating units greater than 20 MVA (gross nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip below the Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) — Attachment 1.
 - 4.5. Overfrequency trip settings of generating plants/facilities greater than 75 MVA (gross aggregate nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip below the Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) — Attachment 1.
 - 4.6. Overfrequency trip settings of any facility consisting of one or more units connected to the BES at a common bus with total generation above 75 MVA (gross nameplate rating) that trip below the Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) — Attachment 1.
 - 4.7. Any automatic Load restoration that impacts frequency stabilization and operates within the duration of the simulations run for the assessment.
- R5. Each Planning Coordinator, whose area or portions of whose area is part of an island identified by it or another Planning Coordinator which includes multiple Planning Coordinator areas or portions of those areas, shall coordinate its UFLS program design with all other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas are also part of the same identified island through one of the following: *[VRF: High][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- Develop a common UFLS program design and schedule for implementation per Requirement R3 among the Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas are part of the same identified island, or
 - Conduct a joint UFLS design assessment per Requirement R4 among the Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas are part of the same identified island, or
 - Conduct an independent UFLS design assessment per Requirement R4 for the identified island, and in the event the UFLS design assessment fails to meet Requirement R3, identify modifications to the UFLS program(s) to meet

Requirement R3 and report these modifications as recommendations to the other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas are also part of the same identified island and the ERO.

- R6.** Each Planning Coordinator shall maintain a UFLS database containing data necessary to model its UFLS program for use in event analyses and assessments of the UFLS program at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between maintenance activities. *[VRF: Lower][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- R7.** Each Planning Coordinator shall provide its UFLS database containing data necessary to model its UFLS program to other Planning Coordinators within its Interconnection within 30 calendar days of a request. *[VRF: Lower][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- R8.** Each UFLS entity shall provide data to its Planning Coordinator(s) according to the format and schedule specified by the Planning Coordinator(s) to support maintenance of each Planning Coordinator's UFLS database. *[VRF: Lower][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- R9.** Each UFLS entity shall provide automatic tripping of Load in accordance with the UFLS program design and schedule for application determined by its Planning Coordinator(s) in each Planning Coordinator area in which it owns assets. *[VRF: High][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- R10.** Each Transmission Owner shall provide automatic switching of its existing capacitor banks, Transmission Lines, and reactors to control over-voltage as a result of underfrequency load shedding if required by the UFLS program and schedule for application determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) in each Planning Coordinator area in which the Transmission Owner owns transmission. *[VRF: High][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- R11.** Each Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event results in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, shall conduct and document an assessment of the event within one year of event actuation to evaluate: *[VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Operations Assessment]*
 - 11.1.** The performance of the UFLS equipment,
 - 11.2.** The effectiveness of the UFLS program.
- R12.** Each Planning Coordinator, in whose islanding event assessment (per R11) UFLS program deficiencies are identified, shall conduct and document a UFLS design assessment to consider the identified deficiencies within two years of event actuation. *[VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Operations Assessment]*
- R13.** Each Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event occurred that also included the area(s) or portions of area(s) of other Planning Coordinator(s) in the same islanding event and that resulted in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, shall coordinate its event assessment (in accordance

with Requirement R11) with all other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event through one of the following: *[VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Operations Assessment]*

- Conduct a joint event assessment per Requirement R11 among the Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were included in the same islanding event, or
- Conduct an independent event assessment per Requirement R11 that reaches conclusions and recommendations consistent with those of the event assessments of the other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were included in the same islanding event, or
- Conduct an independent event assessment per Requirement R11 and where the assessment fails to reach conclusions and recommendations consistent with those of the event assessments of the other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were included in the same islanding event, identify differences in the assessments that likely resulted in the differences in the conclusions and recommendations and report these differences to the other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were included in the same islanding event and the ERO.

R14. Each Planning Coordinator shall respond to written comments submitted by UFLS entities and Transmission Owners within its Planning Coordinator area following a comment period and before finalizing its UFLS program, indicating in the written response to comments whether changes will be made or reasons why changes will not be made to the following *[VRF: Lower][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*:

14.1. UFLS program, including a schedule for implementation

14.2. UFLS design assessment

14.3. Format and schedule of UFLS data submittal

C. Measures

- M1.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as reports, or other documentation of its criteria to select portions of the Bulk Electric System that may form islands including how system studies and historical events were considered to develop the criteria per Requirement R1.
- M2.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as reports, memorandums, e-mails, or other documentation supporting its identification of an island(s) as a basis for designing a UFLS program that meet the criteria in Requirement R2, Parts 2.1 through 2.3.
- M3.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as reports, memorandums, e-mails, program plans, or other documentation of its UFLS program, including the notification of the UFLS entities of implementation schedule, that meet the criteria in Requirement R3, Parts 3.1 through 3.3.

- M4.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as reports, dynamic simulation models and results, or other dated documentation of its UFLS design assessment that demonstrates it meets Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.7.
- M5.** Each Planning Coordinator, whose area or portions of whose area is part of an island identified by it or another Planning Coordinator which includes multiple Planning Coordinator areas or portions of those areas, shall have dated evidence such as joint UFLS program design documents, reports describing a joint UFLS design assessment, letters that include recommendations, or other dated documentation demonstrating that it coordinated its UFLS program design with all other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas are also part of the same identified island per Requirement R5.
- M6.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as a UFLS database, data requests, data input forms, or other dated documentation to show that it maintained a UFLS database for use in event analyses and assessments of the UFLS program per Requirement R6 at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between maintenance activities.
- M7.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as letters, memorandums, e-mails or other dated documentation that it provided their UFLS database to other Planning Coordinators within their Interconnection within 30 calendar days of a request per Requirement R7.
- M8.** Each UFLS Entity shall have dated evidence such as responses to data requests, spreadsheets, letters or other dated documentation that it provided data to its Planning Coordinator according to the format and schedule specified by the Planning Coordinator to support maintenance of the UFLS database per Requirement R8.
- M9.** Each UFLS Entity shall have dated evidence such as spreadsheets summarizing feeder load armed with UFLS relays, spreadsheets with UFLS relay settings, or other dated documentation that it provided automatic tripping of load in accordance with the UFLS program design and schedule for application per Requirement R9.
- M10.** Each Transmission Owner shall have dated evidence such as relay settings, tripping logic or other dated documentation that it provided automatic switching of its existing capacitor banks, Transmission Lines, and reactors in order to control over-voltage as a result of underfrequency load shedding if required by the UFLS program and schedule for application per Requirement R10.
- M11.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as reports, data gathered from an historical event, or other dated documentation to show that it conducted an event assessment of the performance of the UFLS equipment and the effectiveness of the UFLS program per Requirement R11.
- M12.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as reports, data gathered from an historical event, or other dated documentation to show that it conducted a

UFLS design assessment per Requirements R12 and R4 if UFLS program deficiencies are identified in R11.

- M13.** Each Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event occurred that also included the area(s) or portions of area(s) of other Planning Coordinator(s) in the same islanding event and that resulted in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, shall have dated evidence such as a joint assessment report, independent assessment reports and letters describing likely reasons for differences in conclusions and recommendations, or other dated documentation demonstrating it coordinated its event assessment (per Requirement R11) with all other Planning Coordinator(s) whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event per Requirement R13.
- M14.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence of responses, such as e-mails and letters, to written comments submitted by UFLS entities and Transmission Owners within its Planning Coordinator area following a comment period and before finalizing its UFLS program per Requirement R14.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

Regional Entity

1.2. Data Retention

Each Planning Coordinator and UFLS entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

- Each Planning Coordinator shall retain the current evidence of Requirements R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R12, and R14, Measures M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, M12, and M14 as well as any evidence necessary to show compliance since the last compliance audit.
- Each Planning Coordinator shall retain the current evidence of UFLS database update in accordance with Requirement R6, Measure M6, and evidence of the prior year's UFLS database update.
- Each Planning Coordinator shall retain evidence of any UFLS database transmittal to another Planning Coordinator since the last compliance audit in accordance with Requirement R7, Measure M7.
- Each UFLS entity shall retain evidence of UFLS data transmittal to the Planning Coordinator(s) since the last compliance audit in accordance with Requirement R8, Measure M8.

- Each UFLS entity shall retain the current evidence of adherence with the UFLS program in accordance with Requirement R9, Measure M9, and evidence of adherence since the last compliance audit.
- Transmission Owner shall retain the current evidence of adherence with the UFLS program in accordance with Requirement R10, Measure M10, and evidence of adherence since the last compliance audit.
- Each Planning Coordinator shall retain evidence of Requirements R11, and R13, and Measures M11, and M13 for 6 calendar years.

If a Planning Coordinator or UFLS entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until found compliant or for the retention period specified above, whichever is longer.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes

- Compliance Audit
- Self-Certification
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Violation Investigation
- Self-Reporting
- Complaint

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

Not applicable.

2. Violation Severity Levels

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----|-----------|---|---|--|
| R1 | N/A | <p>The Planning Coordinator developed and documented criteria but failed to include the consideration of historical events, to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas and Regional Entity areas that may form islands.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator developed and documented criteria but failed to include the consideration of system studies, to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas and Regional Entity areas, that may form islands.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator developed and documented criteria but failed to include the consideration of historical events and system studies, to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas and Regional Entity areas, that may form islands.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator failed to develop and document criteria to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas and Regional Entity areas, that may form islands.</p> |
| R2 | N/A | <p>The Planning Coordinator identified an island(s) to serve as a basis for designing its UFLS program but failed to include one (1) of the Parts as specified in Requirement R2, Parts 2.1, 2.2, or 2.3.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator identified an island(s) to serve as a basis for designing its UFLS program but failed to include two (2) of the Parts as specified in Requirement R2, Parts 2.1, 2.2, or 2.3.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator identified an island(s) to serve as a basis for designing its UFLS program but failed to include all of the Parts as specified in Requirement R2, Parts 2.1, 2.2, or 2.3.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator failed to identify any island(s) to serve as a basis for designing its UFLS program.</p> |

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----|--|---|--|--|
| R3 | N/A | <p>The Planning Coordinator developed a UFLS program, including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area where imbalance = [(load — actual generation output) / (load)], of up to 25 percent within the identified island(s), but failed to meet one (1) of the performance characteristic in Requirement R3, Parts 3.1, 3.2, or 3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator developed a UFLS program including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area where imbalance = [(load — actual generation output) / (load)], of up to 25 percent within the identified island(s), but failed to meet two (2) of the performance characteristic in Requirement R3, Parts 3.1, 3.2, or 3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator developed a UFLS program including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area where imbalance = [(load — actual generation output) / (load)], of up to 25 percent within the identified island(s), but failed to meet all the performance characteristic in Requirement R3, Parts 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator failed to develop a UFLS program including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area</p> |
| R4 | <p>The Planning Coordinator conducted and documented a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determined through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design met the performance characteristics in Requirement R3 for each island identified in Requirement R2 but the simulation failed to include one (1) of the items as specified in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.7.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator conducted and documented a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determined through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design met the performance characteristics in Requirement R3 for each island identified in Requirement R2 but the simulation failed to include two (2) of the items as specified in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.7.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator conducted and documented a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determined through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design met the performance characteristics in Requirement R3 for each island identified in Requirement R2 but the simulation failed to include three (3) of the items as specified in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.7.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator conducted and documented a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determined through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design met the performance characteristics in Requirement R3 but simulation failed to include four (4) or more of the items as specified in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.7.</p> <p>OR</p> |

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----|---|---|---|--|
| | | | | The Planning Coordinator failed to conduct and document a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement R3 for each island identified in Requirement R2 |
| R5 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Planning Coordinator, whose area or portions of whose area is part of an island identified by it or another Planning Coordinator which includes multiple Planning Coordinator areas or portions of those areas, failed to coordinate its UFLS program design through one of the manners described in Requirement R5. |
| R6 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Planning Coordinator failed to maintain a UFLS database for use in event analyses and assessments of the UFLS program at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between maintenance activities. |
| R7 | The Planning Coordinator provided its UFLS database to other Planning Coordinators more than 30 calendar days and up to and including 40 calendar days following the request. | The Planning Coordinator provided its UFLS database to other Planning Coordinators more than 40 calendar days but less than and including 50 calendar days following the request. | The Planning Coordinator provided its UFLS database to other Planning Coordinators more than 50 calendar days but less than and including 60 calendar days following the request. | The Planning Coordinator provided its UFLS database to other Planning Coordinators more than 60 calendar days following the request. OR |

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|------------|---|--|---|--|
| | | | | The Planning Coordinator failed to provide its UFLS database to other Planning Coordinators. |
| R8 | The UFLS entity provided data to its Planning Coordinator(s) less than or equal to 10 calendar days following the schedule specified by the Planning Coordinator(s) to support maintenance of each Planning Coordinator's UFLS database. | The UFLS entity provided data to its Planning Coordinator(s) more than 10 calendar days but less than or equal to 15 calendar days following the schedule specified by the Planning Coordinator(s) to support maintenance of each Planning Coordinator's UFLS database. OR The UFLS entity provided data to its Planning Coordinator(s) but the data was not according to the format specified by the Planning Coordinator(s) to support maintenance of each Planning Coordinator's UFLS database. | The UFLS entity provided data to its Planning Coordinator(s) more than 15 calendar days but less than or equal to 20 calendar days following the schedule specified by the Planning Coordinator(s) to support maintenance of each Planning Coordinator's UFLS database. | The UFLS entity provided data to its Planning Coordinator(s) more than 20 calendar days following the schedule specified by the Planning Coordinator(s) to support maintenance of each Planning Coordinator's UFLS database. OR The UFLS entity failed to provide data to its Planning Coordinator(s) to support maintenance of each Planning Coordinator's UFLS database. |
| R9 | The UFLS entity provided less than 100% but more than (and including) 95% of automatic tripping of Load in accordance with the UFLS program design and schedule for application determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) area in which it owns assets. | The UFLS entity provided less than 95% but more than (and including) 90% of automatic tripping of Load in accordance with the UFLS program design and schedule for application determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) area in which it owns assets. | The UFLS entity provided less than 90% but more than (and including) 85% of automatic tripping of Load in accordance with the UFLS program design and schedule for application determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) area in which it owns assets. | The UFLS entity provided less than 85% of automatic tripping of Load in accordance with the UFLS program design and schedule for application determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) area in which it owns assets. |
| R10 | The Transmission Owner provided less than 100% but more than (and including) 95% automatic switching | The Transmission Owner provided less than 95% but more than (and including) 90% automatic switching | The Transmission Owner provided less than 90% but more than (and including) 85% automatic switching | The Transmission Owner provided less than 85% automatic switching of its existing capacitor banks, |

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-------------------|---|--|--|---|
| | <p>of its existing capacitor banks, Transmission Lines, and reactors to control over-voltage if required by the UFLS program and schedule for application determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) in each Planning Coordinator area in which the Transmission Owner owns transmission</p> | <p>of its existing capacitor banks, Transmission Lines, and reactors to control over-voltage if required by the UFLS program and schedule for application determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) in each Planning Coordinator area in which the Transmission Owner owns transmission</p> | <p>of its existing capacitor banks, Transmission Lines, and reactors to control over-voltage if required by the UFLS program and schedule for application determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) in each Planning Coordinator area in which the Transmission Owner owns transmission</p> | <p>Transmission Lines, and reactors to control over-voltage if required by the UFLS program and schedule for application determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) in each Planning Coordinator area in which the Transmission Owner owns transmission</p> |
| <p>R11</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, conducted and documented an assessment of the event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 and 11.2 within a time greater than one year but less than or equal to 13 months of actuation.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, conducted and documented an assessment of the event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 and 11.2 within a time greater than 13 months but less than or equal to 14 months of actuation.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, conducted and documented an assessment of the event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 and 11.2 within a time greater than 14 months but less than or equal to 15 months of actuation.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area an islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, conducted and documented an assessment of the event within one year of event actuation but failed to evaluate one (1) of the Parts as</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, conducted and documented an assessment of the event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 and 11.2 within a time greater than 15 months of actuation.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area an islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, failed to conduct and document an assessment of the event and evaluate the Parts as specified in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 and 11.2.</p> <p>OR</p> |

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|------------|-----------|--|--|--|
| | | | specified in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 or 11.2. | The Planning Coordinator, in whose area an islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, conducted and documented an assessment of the event within one year of event actuation but failed to evaluate all of the Parts as specified in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 and 11.2. |
| R12 | N/A | The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement R11, conducted and documented a UFLS design assessment to consider the identified deficiencies greater than two years but less than or equal to 25 months of event actuation. | The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement R11, conducted and documented a UFLS design assessment to consider the identified deficiencies greater than 25 months but less than or equal to 26 months of event actuation. | The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement R11, conducted and documented a UFLS design assessment to consider the identified deficiencies greater than 26 months of event actuation. OR The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement R11, failed to conduct and document a UFLS design assessment to consider the identified deficiencies. |
| R13 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event occurred that also included the area(s) or portions of area(s) of other Planning Coordinator(s) in the same islanding event and that resulted in system frequency |

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|------------|-----------|--------------|----------|--|
| | | | | excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, failed to coordinate its UFLS event assessment with all other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event in one of the manners described in Requirement R13 |
| R14 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Planning Coordinator failed to respond to written comments submitted by UFLS entities and Transmission Owners within its Planning Coordinator area following a comment period and before finalizing its UFLS program, indicating in the written response to comments whether changes were made or reasons why changes were not made to the items in Parts 14.1 through 14.3. |

E. Regional Variances

E.A. Regional Variance for the Quebec Interconnection

The following Interconnection-wide variance shall be applicable in the Quebec Interconnection and replaces, in their entirety, Requirements R3 and R4 and the violation severity levels associated with Requirements R3 and R4.

- E.A.3.** Each Planning Coordinator shall develop a UFLS program, including a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, that meets the following performance characteristics in simulations of underfrequency conditions resulting from an imbalance scenario, where an imbalance = [(load — actual generation output) / (load)], of up to 25 percent within the identified island(s).
[VRF: High][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- E.A.3.1.** Frequency shall remain above the Underfrequency Performance Characteristic curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1A, either for 30 seconds or until a steady-state condition between 59.3 Hz and 60.7 Hz is reached, and
- E.A.3.2.** Frequency shall remain below the Overfrequency Performance Characteristic curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1A, either for 30 seconds or until a steady-state condition between 59.3 Hz and 60.7 Hz is reached, and
- E.A.3.3.** Volts per Hz (V/Hz) shall not exceed 1.18 per unit for longer than two seconds cumulatively per simulated event, and shall not exceed 1.10 per unit for longer than 45 seconds cumulatively per simulated event at each generator bus and generator step-up transformer high-side bus associated with each of the following:
- EA.3.3.1.** Individual generating unit greater than 50 MVA (gross nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES
 - EA.3.3.2.** Generating plants/facilities greater than 50 MVA (gross aggregate nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES
 - EA.3.3.3.** Facilities consisting of one or more units connected to the BES at a common bus with total generation above 50 MVA gross nameplate rating.
- E.A.4.** Each Planning Coordinator shall conduct and document a UFLS design assessment at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement E.A.3 for each island identified in Requirement R2. The simulation shall model each of the following; *[VRF: High][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- E.A.4.1** Underfrequency trip settings of individual generating units that are part of plants/facilities with a capacity of 50 MVA or more individually or cumulatively (gross nameplate rating), directly

connected to the BES that trip above the Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1A, and

- E.A.4.2** Overfrequency trip settings of individual generating units that are part of plants/facilities with a capacity of 50 MVA or more individually or cumulatively (gross nameplate rating), directly connected to the BES that trip below the Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 2A, and
 - E.A.4.3** Any automatic Load restoration that impacts frequency stabilization and operates within the duration of the simulations run for the assessment.
- M.E.A.3.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as reports, memorandums, e-mails, program plans, or other documentation of its UFLS program, including the notification of the UFLS entities of implementation schedule, that meet the criteria in Requirement E.A.3 Parts E.A.3.1 through EA3.3.
- M.E.A.4.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as reports, dynamic simulation models and results, or other dated documentation of its UFLS design assessment that demonstrates it meets Requirement E.A.4 Parts E.A.4.1 through E.A.4.3.

| E # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----|-----------|---|--|---|
| EA3 | N/A | The Planning Coordinator developed a UFLS program, including a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, but failed to meet one (1) of the performance characteristic in Parts E.A.3.1, E.A.3.2, or E.A.3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions | The Planning Coordinator developed a UFLS program including a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, but failed to meet two (2) of the performance characteristic in Parts E.A.3.1, E.A.3.2, or E.A.3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions | The Planning Coordinator developed a UFLS program including a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, but failed to meet all the performance characteristic in Parts E.A.3.1, E.A.3.2, and E.A.3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions OR The Planning Coordinator failed to develop a UFLS program. |
| EA4 | N/A | The Planning Coordinator conducted and documented a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement E.A.3 but simulation failed to include one (1) of the items as specified in Parts E.A.4.1, E.A.4.2 or E.A.4.3. | The Planning Coordinator conducted and documented a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement E3 but simulation failed to include two (2) of the items as specified in Parts E.A.4.1, E.A.4.2 or E.A.4.3. | The Planning Coordinator conducted and documented a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement E3 but simulation failed to include all of the items as specified in Parts E.A.4.1, E.A.4.2 and E.A.4.3. OR The Planning Coordinator failed to conduct and document a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement E.A.3 |

E.B. Regional Variance for the Western Electricity Coordinating Council

The following Interconnection-wide variance shall be applicable in the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) and replaces, in their entirety, Requirements R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R11, R12, and R13.

E.B.1. Each Planning Coordinator shall participate in a joint regional review with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area that develops and documents criteria, including consideration of historical events and system studies, to select portions of the Bulk Electric System (BES) that may form islands. [VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

E.B.2. Each Planning Coordinator shall identify one or more islands from the regional review (per E.B.1) to serve as a basis for designing a region-wide coordinated UFLS program including: [VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

E.B.2.1. Those islands selected by applying the criteria in Requirement E.B.1, and

E.B.2.2. Any portions of the BES designed to detach from the Interconnection (planned islands) as a result of the operation of a relay scheme or Remedial Action Scheme.

Deleted: Special Protection System

EB.3. Each Planning Coordinator shall adopt a UFLS program, coordinated across the WECC Regional Entity area, including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, that meets the following performance characteristics in simulations of underfrequency conditions resulting from an imbalance scenario, where an imbalance = [(load — actual generation output) / (load)], of up to 25 percent within the identified island(s). [VRF: High][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

E.B.3.1. Frequency shall remain above the Underfrequency Performance Characteristic curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1, either for 60 seconds or until a steady-state condition between 59.3 Hz and 60.7 Hz is reached, and

E.B.3.2. Frequency shall remain below the Overfrequency Performance Characteristic curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1, either for 60 seconds or until a steady-state condition between 59.3 Hz and 60.7 Hz is reached, and

E.B.3.3. Volts per Hz (V/Hz) shall not exceed 1.18 per unit for longer than two seconds cumulatively per simulated event, and shall not exceed 1.10 per unit for longer than 45 seconds cumulatively per simulated event at each generator bus and generator step-up transformer high-side bus associated with each of the following:

E.B.3.3.1. Individual generating units greater than 20 MVA (gross nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES

E.B.3.3.2. Generating plants/facilities greater than 75 MVA (gross aggregate nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES

- E.B.3.3.3.** Facilities consisting of one or more units connected to the BES at a common bus with total generation above 75 MVA gross nameplate rating.
- E.B.4.** Each Planning Coordinator shall participate in and document a coordinated UFLS design assessment with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement E.B.3 for each island identified in Requirement E.B.2. The simulation shall model each of the following: [*VRF: High*][*Time Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
- E.B.4.1.** Underfrequency trip settings of individual generating units greater than 20 MVA (gross nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip above the Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1.
- E.B.4.2.** Underfrequency trip settings of generating plants/facilities greater than 75 MVA (gross aggregate nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip above the Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1.
- E.B.4.3.** Underfrequency trip settings of any facility consisting of one or more units connected to the BES at a common bus with total generation above 75 MVA (gross nameplate rating) that trip above the Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) - Attachment 1.
- E.B.4.4.** Overfrequency trip settings of individual generating units greater than 20 MVA (gross nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip below the Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) — Attachment 1.
- E.B.4.5.** Overfrequency trip settings of generating plants/facilities greater than 75 MVA (gross aggregate nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip below the Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) — Attachment 1.
- E.B.4.6.** Overfrequency trip settings of any facility consisting of one or more units connected to the BES at a common bus with total generation above 75 MVA (gross nameplate rating) that trip below the Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-1(X) — Attachment 1.
- E.B.4.7.** Any automatic Load restoration that impacts frequency stabilization and operates within the duration of the simulations run for the assessment.
- E.B.11.** Each Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event results in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, shall participate in and document a coordinated event assessment with all affected Planning Coordinators to conduct and document an assessment of the

event within one year of event actuation to evaluate: *[VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Operations Assessment]*

E.B.11.1. The performance of the UFLS equipment,

E.B.11.2 The effectiveness of the UFLS program

E.B.12. Each Planning Coordinator, in whose islanding event assessment (per E.B.11) UFLS program deficiencies are identified, shall participate in and document a coordinated UFLS design assessment of the UFLS program with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area to consider the identified deficiencies within two years of event actuation. *[VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Operations Assessment]*

- M.E.B.1.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as reports, or other documentation of its criteria, developed as part of the joint regional review with other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area to select portions of the Bulk Electric System that may form islands including how system studies and historical events were considered to develop the criteria per Requirement E.B.1.
- M.E.B.2.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as reports, memorandums, e-mails, or other documentation supporting its identification of an island(s), from the regional review (per E.B.1), as a basis for designing a region-wide coordinated UFLS program that meet the criteria in Requirement E.B.2 Parts E.B.2.1 and E.B.2.2.
- M.E.B.3.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as reports, memorandums, e-mails, program plans, or other documentation of its adoption of a UFLS program, coordinated across the WECC Regional Entity area, including the notification of the UFLS entities of implementation schedule, that meet the criteria in Requirement E.B.3 Parts E.B.3.1 through E.B.3.3.
- M.E.B.4.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as reports, dynamic simulation models and results, or other dated documentation of its participation in a coordinated UFLS design assessment with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area that demonstrates it meets Requirement E.B.4 Parts E.B.4.1 through E.B.4.7.
- M.E.B.11.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as reports, data gathered from an historical event, or other dated documentation to show that it participated in a coordinated event assessment of the performance of the UFLS equipment and the effectiveness of the UFLS program per Requirement E.B.11.
- M.E.B.12.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as reports, data gathered from an historical event, or other dated documentation to show that it participated in a UFLS design assessment per Requirements E.B.12 and E.B.4 if UFLS program deficiencies are identified in E.B.11.

| E # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-------|-----------|--|---|--|
| E.B.1 | N/A | <p>The Planning Coordinator participated in a joint regional review with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area that developed and documented criteria but failed to include the consideration of historical events, to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas, that may form islands</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator participated in a joint regional review with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area that developed and documented criteria but failed to include the consideration of system studies, to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas, that may form islands</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator participated in a joint regional review with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area that developed and documented criteria but failed to include the consideration of historical events and system studies, to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas, that may form islands</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator failed to participate in a joint regional review with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area that developed and documented criteria to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas that may form islands</p> |
| E.B.2 | N/A | N/A | <p>The Planning Coordinator identified an island(s) from the regional review to serve as a basis for designing its UFLS program but failed to include one (1) of the parts as specified in Requirement E.B.2, Parts E.B.2.1 or E.B.2.2</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator identified an island(s) from the regional review to serve as a basis for designing its UFLS program but failed to include all of the parts as specified in Requirement E.B.2, Parts E.B.2.1 or E.B.2.2</p> <p>OR</p> |

| E # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|--------------|--|---|---|---|
| | | | | The Planning Coordinator failed to identify any island(s) from the regional review to serve as a basis for designing its UFLS program. |
| E.B.3 | N/A | The Planning Coordinator adopted a UFLS program, coordinated across the WECC Regional Entity area that included notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, but failed to meet one (1) of the performance characteristic in Requirement E.B.3, Parts E.B.3.1, E.B.3.2, or E.B.3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions | The Planning Coordinator adopted a UFLS program, coordinated across the WECC Regional Entity area that included notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, but failed to meet two (2) of the performance characteristic in Requirement E.B.3, Parts E.B.3.1, E.B.3.2, or E.B.3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions | The Planning Coordinator adopted a UFLS program, coordinated across the WECC Regional Entity area that included notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, but failed to meet all the performance characteristic in Requirement E.B.3, Parts E.B.3.1, E.B.3.2, and E.B.3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions OR The Planning Coordinator failed to adopt a UFLS program, coordinated across the WECC Regional Entity area, including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area. |
| E.B.4 | The Planning Coordinator participated in and documented a coordinated UFLS assessment with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement E.B.3 for each island | The Planning Coordinator participated in and documented a coordinated UFLS assessment with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement E.B.3 for each island | The Planning Coordinator participated in and documented a coordinated UFLS assessment with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement E.B.3 for each island | The Planning Coordinator participated in and documented a coordinated UFLS assessment with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement E.B.3 for each island |

| E # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|----------------------|---|--|--|--|
| | <p>identified in Requirement E.B.2 but the simulation failed to include one (1) of the items as specified in Requirement E.B.4, Parts E.B.4.1 through E.B.4.7.</p> | <p>identified in Requirement E.B.2 but the simulation failed to include two (2) of the items as specified in Requirement E.B.4, Parts E.B.4.1 through E.B.4.7.</p> | <p>identified in Requirement E.B.2 but the simulation failed to include three (3) of the items as specified in Requirement E.B.4, Parts E.B.4.1 through E.B.4.7.</p> | <p>identified in Requirement E.B.2 but the simulation failed to include four (4) or more of the items as specified in Requirement E.B.4, Parts E.B.4.1 through E.B.4.7.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator failed to participate in and document a coordinated UFLS assessment with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement E.B.3 for each island identified in Requirement E.B.2</p> |
| <p>E.B.11</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, participated in and documented a coordinated event assessment with all Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement E.B.11, Parts E.B.11.1 and E.B.11.2 within a time greater than one year but less than or equal to 13 months of actuation.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, participated in and documented a coordinated event assessment with all Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement E.B.11, Parts E.B.11.1 and E.B.11.2 within a time greater than 13 months but less than or equal to 14 months of actuation.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, participated in and documented a coordinated event assessment with all Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement E.B.11, Parts E.B.11.1 and E.B.11.2 within a time greater than 14 months but less than or equal to 15 months of actuation.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, participated in and documented a coordinated event assessment with all Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement E.B.11, Parts E.B.11.1 and E.B.11.2 within a time greater than 15 months of actuation.</p> <p>OR</p> |

| E # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|--------|-----------|---|---|--|
| | | | <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area an islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, participated in and documented a coordinated event assessment with all Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event within one year of event actuation but failed to evaluate one (1) of the parts as specified in Requirement E.B.11, Parts E.B.11.1 or E.B.11.2.</p> | <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area an islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, failed to participate in and document a coordinated event assessment with all Planning Coordinators whose areas or portion of whose areas were also included in the same island event and evaluate the parts as specified in Requirement E.B.11, Parts E.B.11.1 and E.B.11.2.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator, in whose area an islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, participated in and documented a coordinated event assessment with all Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event within one year of event actuation but failed to evaluate all of the parts as specified in Requirement E.B.11, Parts E.B.11.1 and E.B.11.2.</p> |
| E.B.12 | N/A | The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement E.B.11, participated in and documented a coordinated UFLS design | The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement E.B.11, participated in and documented a coordinated UFLS design | The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement E.B.11, participated in and documented a coordinated UFLS design |


| E # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----|-----------|--|--|---|
| | | assessment of the coordinated UFLS program with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area to consider the identified deficiencies in greater than two years but less than or equal to 25 months of event actuation. | assessment of the coordinated UFLS program with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area to consider the identified deficiencies in greater than 25 months but less than or equal to 26 months of event actuation. | assessment of the coordinated UFLS program with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area to consider the identified deficiencies in greater than 26 months of event actuation. OR The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement E.B.11, failed to participate in and document a coordinated UFLS design assessment of the coordinated UFLS program with the other Planning Coordinators in the WECC Regional Entity area to consider the identified deficiencies |

Associated Documents

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|----------------------|---------------------|--|--|
| 1 | May 25, 2010 | Completed revision, merging and updating PRC-006-0, PRC-007-0 and PRC-009-0. | |
| 1 | November 4, 2010 | Adopted by the Board of Trustees | |
| 1 | May 7, 2012 | FERC Order issued approving PRC-006-1 (approval becomes effective July 10, 2012) | |
| 1 | November 9, 2012 | FERC Letter Order issued accepting the modification of the VRF in R5 from (Medium to High) and the modification of the VSL language in R8. | |
| 1(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |


PRC-006-1(X) – Attachment 1
Underfrequency Load Shedding Program
Design Performance and Modeling Curves for
Requirements R3 Parts 3.1-3.2 and R4 Parts 4.1-4.6



Curve Definitions

| Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling | | Overfrequency Performance Characteristic | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|--|--|-----------------------|
| $t \leq 2 \text{ s}$ | $t > 2 \text{ s}$ | $t \leq 4 \text{ s}$ | $4 \text{ s} < t \leq 30 \text{ s}$ | $t > 30 \text{ s}$ |
| $f = 62.2 \text{ Hz}$ | $f = -0.686\log(t) + 62.41 \text{ Hz}$ | $f = 61.8 \text{ Hz}$ | $f = -0.686\log(t) + 62.21 \text{ Hz}$ | $f = 60.7 \text{ Hz}$ |

| Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling | | Underfrequency Performance Characteristic | | |
|--|---------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| $t \leq 2 \text{ s}$ | $t > 2 \text{ s}$ | $t \leq 2 \text{ s}$ | $2 \text{ s} < t \leq 60 \text{ s}$ | $t > 60 \text{ s}$ |
| $f = 57.8 \text{ Hz}$ | $f = 0.575\log(t) + 57.63 \text{ Hz}$ | $f = 58.0 \text{ Hz}$ | $f = 0.575\log(t) + 57.83 \text{ Hz}$ | $f = 59.3 \text{ Hz}$ |



A. Introduction

- 1. Title:** Remedial Action Scheme Review Procedure
- 2. Number:** PRC-012-0(X)
- 3. Purpose:** To ensure that all Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) are properly designed, meet performance requirements, and are coordinated with other protection systems. To ensure that maintenance and testing programs are developed and misoperations are analyzed and corrected.
- 4. Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Regional Reliability Organization**
- 5. Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1.** Each Regional Reliability Organization with a Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Providers that uses or is planning to use a RAS shall have a documented Regional Reliability Organization RAS review procedure to ensure that RAS comply with Regional criteria and NERC Reliability Standards. The Regional RAS review procedure shall include:
 - R1.1.** Description of the process for submitting a proposed RAS for Regional Reliability Organization review.
 - R1.2.** Requirements to provide data that describes design, operation, and modeling of a RAS.
 - R1.3.** Requirements to demonstrate that the RAS shall be designed so that a single RAS component failure, when the RAS was intended to operate, does not prevent the interconnected transmission system from meeting the performance requirements defined in Reliability Standards TPL-001-0, TPL-002-0, and TPL-003-0.
 - R1.4.** Requirements to demonstrate that the inadvertent operation of a RAS shall meet the same performance requirement (TPL-001-0, TPL-002-0, and TPL-003-0) as that required of the contingency for which it was designed, and not exceed TPL-003-0.
 - R1.5.** Requirements to demonstrate the proposed RAS will coordinate with other protection and control systems and applicable Regional Reliability Organization Emergency procedures.
 - R1.6.** Regional Reliability Organization definition of misoperation.
 - R1.7.** Requirements for analysis and documentation of corrective action plans for all RAS misoperations.
 - R1.8.** Identification of the Regional Reliability Organization group responsible for the Regional Reliability Organization's review procedure and the process for Regional Reliability Organization approval of the procedure.
 - R1.9.** Determination, as appropriate, of maintenance and testing requirements.

- R2.** The Regional Reliability Organization shall provide affected Regional Reliability Organizations and NERC with documentation of its RAS review procedure on request (within 30 calendar days).

C. Measures

- M1.** The Regional Reliability Organization with a Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Provider using or planning to use a RAS shall have a documented Regional review procedure as defined in Reliability Standard PRC-012-0(X)_R1.
- M2.** The Regional Reliability Organization shall have evidence it provided affected Regional Reliability Organizations and NERC with documentation of its RAS review procedure on request (within 30 calendar days).

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Compliance Monitor: NERC.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Timeframe

On request (within 30 calendar days.)

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. Level 1: Documentation of the Regional Reliability Organization’s procedure is missing one of the items listed in Reliability Standard PRC-012-0(X)_R1.

2.2. Level 2: Documentation of the Regional Reliability Organization’s procedure is missing two of the items listed in Reliability Standard PRC-012-0(X)_R1.

2.3. Level 3: Documentation of the Regional Reliability Organization’s procedure is missing three of the items listed in Reliability Standard PRC-012-0(X)_R1.

2.4. Level 4: Documentation of the Regional Reliability Organization’s procedure was not provided or is missing four or more of the items listed in Reliability Standard PRC-012-0(X)_R1.

E. Regional Differences

- 1.** None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|---------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

Standard PRC-012-0(X) — Remedial Action Scheme Review Procedure

A. Introduction

- 1. Title: Remedial Action Scheme Review Procedure
- 2. Number: PRC-012-0(X)
- 3. Purpose: To ensure that all Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) are properly designed, meet performance requirements, and are coordinated with other protection systems. To ensure that maintenance and testing programs are developed and misoperations are analyzed and corrected.
- 4. Applicability:
 - 4.1. Regional Reliability Organization
- 5. Effective Date: This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Deleted: [Redacted]

Deleted: Special Protection System

Deleted: Special Protection Systems (SPS)

Deleted: April 1, 2005

B. Requirements

- R1. Each Regional Reliability Organization with a Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Providers that uses or is planning to use a RAS shall have a documented Regional Reliability Organization RAS review procedure to ensure that RAS comply with Regional criteria and NERC Reliability Standards. The Regional RAS review procedure shall include:
 - R1.1. Description of the process for submitting a proposed RAS for Regional Reliability Organization review.
 - R1.2. Requirements to provide data that describes design, operation, and modeling of a RAS.
 - R1.3. Requirements to demonstrate that the RAS shall be designed so that a single RAS component failure, when the RAS was intended to operate, does not prevent the interconnected transmission system from meeting the performance requirements defined in Reliability Standards TPL-001-0, TPL-002-0, and TPL-003-0.
 - R1.4. Requirements to demonstrate that the inadvertent operation of a RAS shall meet the same performance requirement (TPL-001-0, TPL-002-0, and TPL-003-0) as that required of the contingency for which it was designed, and not exceed TPL-003-0.
 - R1.5. Requirements to demonstrate the proposed RAS will coordinate with other protection and control systems and applicable Regional Reliability Organization Emergency procedures.
 - R1.6. Regional Reliability Organization definition of misoperation.
 - R1.7. Requirements for analysis and documentation of corrective action plans for all RAS misoperations.
 - R1.8. Identification of the Regional Reliability Organization group responsible for the Regional Reliability Organization's review procedure and the process for Regional Reliability Organization approval of the procedure.
 - R1.9. Determination, as appropriate, of maintenance and testing requirements.

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Deleted: Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees: February 8, 2005

Deleted: ¶ Effective Date: April 1, 2005

Standard PRC-012-0(X) — Remedial Action Scheme Review Procedure

R2. The Regional Reliability Organization shall provide affected Regional Reliability Organizations and NERC with documentation of its **RAS** review procedure on request (within 30 calendar days).

Deleted: SPS

Deleted: Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees: February 8, 2005

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Effective Date: April 1, 2005

Standard PRC-012-0(X) — Remedial Action Scheme Review Procedure

C. Measures

- M1.** The Regional Reliability Organization with a Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Provider using or planning to use a RAS shall have a documented Regional review procedure as defined in Reliability Standard PRC-012-0(X) R1.
- M2.** The Regional Reliability Organization shall have evidence it provided affected Regional Reliability Organizations and NERC with documentation of its RAS review procedure on request (within 30 calendar days).

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D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Compliance Monitor: NERC.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Timeframe

On request (within 30 calendar days.)

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

- 2.1. Level 1:** Documentation of the Regional Reliability Organization’s procedure is missing one of the items listed in Reliability Standard PRC-012-0(X) R1.
- 2.2. Level 2:** Documentation of the Regional Reliability Organization’s procedure is missing two of the items listed in Reliability Standard PRC-012-0(X) R1.
- 2.3. Level 3:** Documentation of the Regional Reliability Organization’s procedure is missing three of the items listed in Reliability Standard PRC-012-0(X) R1.
- 2.4. Level 4:** Documentation of the Regional Reliability Organization’s procedure was not provided or is missing four or more of the items listed in Reliability Standard PRC-012-0(X) R1.

E. Regional Differences

- 1. None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|---------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

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Deleted: Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees: February 8, 2005

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Effective Date: April 1, 2005

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Remedial Action Scheme Database.
2. **Number:** PRC-013-0(X)
3. **Purpose:** To ensure that all Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) are properly designed, meet performance requirements, and are coordinated with other protection systems.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Regional Reliability Organization
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1. The Regional Reliability Organization that has a Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Provider with a RAS installed shall maintain a RAS database. The database shall include the following types of information:
 - R1.1. Design Objectives — Contingencies and system conditions for which the RAS was designed,
 - R1.2. Operation — The actions taken by the RAS in response to Disturbance conditions, and
 - R1.3. Modeling — Information on detection logic or relay settings that control operation of the RAS.
- R2. The Regional Reliability Organization shall provide to affected Regional Reliability Organization(s) and NERC documentation of its database or the information therein on request (within 30 calendar days).

C. Measures

- M1. The Regional Reliability Organization that has a Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Providers with a RAS installed, shall have a RAS database as defined in PRC-013-0(X)_R1 of this Reliability Standard.
- M2. The Regional Reliability Organization shall have evidence it provided documentation of its database or the information therein, to affected Regional Reliability Organization(s) and NERC on request (within 30 calendar days).

D. Compliance

1. **Compliance Monitoring Process**
 - 1.1. **Compliance Monitoring Responsibility**

Compliance Monitor: NERC.
 - 1.2. **Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Timeframe**

On request (within 30 calendar days.)

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. Level 1: The Regional Reliability Organization’s database is missing one of the items listed in Reliability Standard PRC-013-0(X)_R1.

2.2. Level 2: The Regional Reliability Organization’s database is missing two of the items listed in Reliability Standard PRC-013-0(X)_R1.

2.3. Level 3: Not applicable.

2.4. Level 4: The Regional Reliability Organization’s database was not provided or is missing all of the elements listed in Reliability Standard PRC-013-0(X)_R1.

E. Regional Differences

1. None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|---------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Dave | New |
| 0(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |
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| | | | |

Standard PRC-013-0(X) — Remedial Action Scheme Database

A. Introduction

- 1. Title: Remedial Action Scheme Database.
- 2. Number: PRC-013-0(X)
- 3. Purpose: To ensure that all Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) are properly designed, meet performance requirements, and are coordinated with other protection systems.
- 4. Applicability:
 - 4.1. Regional Reliability Organization
- 5. Effective Date: This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Deleted: Special Protection System

Deleted: Special Protection Systems (SPSs)

B. Requirements

- R1. The Regional Reliability Organization that has a Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Provider with a RAS installed shall maintain a RAS database. The database shall include the following types of information:
 - R1.1. Design Objectives — Contingencies and system conditions for which the RAS was designed,
 - R1.2. Operation — The actions taken by the RAS in response to Disturbance conditions, and
 - R1.3. Modeling — Information on detection logic or relay settings that control operation of the RAS.
- R2. The Regional Reliability Organization shall provide to affected Regional Reliability Organization(s) and NERC documentation of its database or the information therein on request (within 30 calendar days).

Deleted: April 1, 2005

Deleted: n SPS

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Deleted: SPS

C. Measures

- M1. The Regional Reliability Organization that has a Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Providers with a RAS installed, shall have a RAS database as defined in PRC-013-0(X) R1 of this Reliability Standard.
- M2. The Regional Reliability Organization shall have evidence it provided documentation of its database or the information therein, to affected Regional Reliability Organization(s) and NERC on request (within 30 calendar days).

Deleted: n SPS

Deleted: n SPS

D. Compliance

- 1. Compliance Monitoring Process
 - 1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility
 - Compliance Monitor: NERC.
 - 1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Timeframe

Deleted: Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees: February 8, 2005

Deleted: Effective Date: April 1, 2005

Standard PRC-013-0(X) — Remedial Action Scheme Database

On request (within 30 calendar days.)

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. Level 1: The Regional Reliability Organization’s database is missing one of the items listed in Reliability Standard PRC-013-0(X)_R1.

2.2. Level 2: The Regional Reliability Organization’s database is missing two of the items listed in Reliability Standard PRC-013-0(X)_R1.

2.3. Level 3: Not applicable.

2.4. Level 4: The Regional Reliability Organization’s database was not provided or is missing all of the elements listed in Reliability Standard PRC-013-0(X)_R1.

Deleted: 9

E. Regional Differences

1. None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|---------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Dave | New |
| 0(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |
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Deleted: Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees: February 8, 2005

Deleted: Effective Date: April 1, 2005

A. Introduction

- 1. Title:** Remedial Action Scheme Assessment
- 2. Number:** PRC-014-0(X)
- 3. Purpose:** To ensure that all Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) are properly designed, meet performance requirements, and are coordinated with other protection systems. To ensure that maintenance and testing programs are developed and misoperations are analyzed and corrected.
- 4. Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Regional Reliability Organization**
- 5. Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1.** The Regional Reliability Organization shall assess the operation, coordination, and effectiveness of all RAS installed in its Region at least once every five years for compliance with NERC Reliability Standards and Regional criteria.
- R2.** The Regional Reliability Organization shall provide either a summary report or a detailed report of its assessment of the operation, coordination, and effectiveness of all RAS installed in its Region to affected Regional Reliability Organizations or NERC on request (within 30 calendar days).
- R3.** The documentation of the Regional Reliability Organization's RAS assessment shall include the following elements:
 - R3.1.** Identification of group conducting the assessment and the date the assessment was performed.
 - R3.2.** Study years, system conditions, and contingencies analyzed in the technical studies on which the assessment is based and when those technical studies were performed.
 - R3.3.** Identification of RAS that were found not to comply with NERC standards and Regional Reliability Organization criteria.
 - R3.4.** Discussion of any coordination problems found between a RAS and other protection and control systems.
 - R3.5.** Provide corrective action plans for non-compliant RAS.

C. Measures

- M1.** The Regional Reliability Organization shall assess the operation, coordination, and effectiveness of all RAS installed in its Region at least once every five years for compliance with NERC standards and Regional criteria.
- M2.** The Regional Reliability Organization shall provide either a summary report or a detailed report of this assessment to affected Regional Reliability Organizations or NERC on request (within 30 calendar days).

- M3.** The Regional Reliability Organization's documentation of the RAS assessment shall include all elements as defined in Reliability Standard PRC-014-0(X)_R3.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Compliance Monitor: NERC.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Timeframe

On request (within 30 calendar days.)

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. Level 1: The summary (or detailed) Regional RAS assessment is missing one of the items listed in Reliability Standard PRC-014-0(X)_R3.

2.2. Level 2: The summary (or detailed) Regional RAS assessment is missing two of the items listed in Reliability Standard PRC-014-0(X)_3.

2.3. Level 3: The summary (or detailed) Regional RAS assessment is missing three of the items listed in Reliability Standard PRC-014-0(X)_R3.

2.4. Level 4: The summary (or detailed) Regional RAS assessment is missing more than three of the items listed in Reliability Standard PRC-014-0(X)_R3 or was not provided.

E. Regional Differences

1. None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|---------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |
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Standard PRC-014-0(X) — Remedial Action Scheme Assessment

A. Introduction

- 1. **Title:** Remedial Action Scheme Assessment
- 2. **Number:** PRC-014-0(X)
- 3. **Purpose:** To ensure that all Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) are properly designed, meet performance requirements, and are coordinated with other protection systems. To ensure that maintenance and testing programs are developed and misoperations are analyzed and corrected.
- 4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Regional Reliability Organization
- 5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Deleted: Special Protection System

Deleted: Special Protection Systems (SPS)

Deleted: April 1, 2005

B. Requirements

- R1. The Regional Reliability Organization shall assess the operation, coordination, and effectiveness of all RAS installed in its Region at least once every five years for compliance with NERC Reliability Standards and Regional criteria.
- R2. The Regional Reliability Organization shall provide either a summary report or a detailed report of its assessment of the operation, coordination, and effectiveness of all RAS installed in its Region to affected Regional Reliability Organizations or NERC on request (within 30 calendar days).
- R3. The documentation of the Regional Reliability Organization's RAS assessment shall include the following elements:
 - R3.1. Identification of group conducting the assessment and the date the assessment was performed.
 - R3.2. Study years, system conditions, and contingencies analyzed in the technical studies on which the assessment is based and when those technical studies were performed.
 - R3.3. Identification of RAS that were found not to comply with NERC standards and Regional Reliability Organization criteria.
 - R3.4. Discussion of any coordination problems found between a RAS and other protection and control systems.
 - R3.5. Provide corrective action plans for non-compliant RAS.

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C. Measures

- M1. The Regional Reliability Organization shall assess the operation, coordination, and effectiveness of all RAS installed in its Region at least once every five years for compliance with NERC standards and Regional criteria.
- M2. The Regional Reliability Organization shall provide either a summary report or a detailed report of this assessment to affected Regional Reliability Organizations or NERC on request (within 30 calendar days).

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Deleted: Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees: February 8, 2005

Deleted: Effective Date: April 1, 2005

Standard PRC-014-0(X) — Remedial Action Scheme Assessment

M3. The Regional Reliability Organization's documentation of the RAS assessment shall include all elements as defined in Reliability Standard PRC-014-0(X)_R3.

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Deleted: Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees: February 8, 2005

Deleted: Effective Date: April 1, 2005

Standard PRC-014-0(X) — Remedial Action Scheme Assessment

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Compliance Monitor: NERC.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Timeframe

On request (within 30 calendar days.)

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. Level 1: The summary (or detailed) Regional RAS assessment is missing one of the items listed in Reliability Standard PRC-014-0(X)_R3.

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2.2. Level 2: The summary (or detailed) Regional RAS assessment is missing two of the items listed in Reliability Standard PRC-014-0(X)_3.

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2.3. Level 3: The summary (or detailed) Regional RAS assessment is missing three of the items listed in Reliability Standard PRC-014-0(X)_R3.

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2.4. Level 4: The summary (or detailed) Regional RAS assessment is missing more than three of the items listed in Reliability Standard PRC-014-0(X)_R3 or was not provided.

Deleted: SPS

E. Regional Differences

1. None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|---------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |
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Deleted: Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees: February 8, 2005

Deleted: Effective Date: April 1, 2005

A. Introduction

- 1. Title:** Remedial Action Scheme Data and Documentation
- 2. Number:** PRC-015-0(X)
- 3. Purpose:** To ensure that all Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) are properly designed, meet performance requirements, and are coordinated with other protection systems. To ensure that maintenance and testing programs are developed and misoperations are analyzed and corrected.
- 4. Applicability:**
 - 4.1.** Transmission Owner that owns a RAS
 - 4.2.** Generator Owner that owns a RAS
 - 4.3.** Distribution Provider that owns a RAS
- 5. Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1.** The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall maintain a list of and provide data for existing and proposed RAS as specified in Reliability Standard PRC-013-0(X)_R1.
- R2.** The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall have evidence it reviewed new or functionally modified RAS in accordance with the Regional Reliability Organization's procedures as defined in Reliability Standard PRC-012-0(X)_R1 prior to being placed in service.
- R3.** The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall provide documentation of RAS data and the results of Studies that show compliance of new or functionally modified RAS with NERC Reliability Standards and Regional Reliability Organization criteria to affected Regional Reliability Organizations and NERC on request (within 30 calendar days).

C. Measures

- M1.** The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall have evidence it maintains a list of and provides data for existing and proposed RAS as defined in Reliability Standard PRC-013-0(X)_R1.
- M2.** The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall have evidence it reviewed new or functionally modified RAS in accordance with the Regional Reliability Organization's procedures as defined in Reliability Standard PRC-012-0(X)_R1 prior to being placed in service.
- M3.** The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall have evidence it provided documentation of RAS data and the results of studies that show compliance of new or functionally modified RAS with NERC standards and Regional

Reliability Organization criteria to affected Regional Reliability Organizations and NERC on request (within 30 calendar days).

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Compliance Monitor: Regional Reliability Organization.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Timeframe

On request (within 30 calendar days).

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. Level 1: RAS owners provided RAS data, but was incomplete according to the Regional Reliability Organization RAS database requirements.

2.2. Level 2: RAS owners provided results of studies that show compliance of new or functionally modified RAS with the NERC Planning Standards and Regional Reliability Organization criteria, but were incomplete according to the Regional Reliability Organization procedures for Reliability Standard PRC-012-0(X)_R1.

2.3. Level 3: Not applicable.

2.4. Level 4: No RAS data was provided in accordance with Regional Reliability Organization RAS database requirements for Standard PRC-012-0(X)_R1, or the results of studies that show compliance of new or functionally modified RAS with the NERC Reliability Standards and Regional Reliability Organization criteria were not provided in accordance with Regional Reliability Organization procedures for Reliability Standard PRC-012-0(X)_R1.

E. Regional Differences

1. None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|---------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

Standard PRC-015-0(X) — Remedial Action Scheme Data and Documentation

A. Introduction

- 1. **Title:** Remedial Action Scheme Data and Documentation
- 2. **Number:** PRC-015-0(X)
- 3. **Purpose:** To ensure that all Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) are properly designed, meet performance requirements, and are coordinated with other protection systems. To ensure that maintenance and testing programs are developed and misoperations are analyzed and corrected.
- 4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Transmission Owner that owns a RAS
 - 4.2. Generator Owner that owns a RAS
 - 4.3. Distribution Provider that owns a RAS
- 5. **Effective Date:** [This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve \(12\) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve \(12\) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.](#)

Deleted: [Redacted]

Deleted: Special Protection System

Deleted: Special Protection Systems (SPS)

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Deleted: April 1, 2005

B. Requirements

- R1. The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall maintain a list of and provide data for existing and proposed RAS as specified in Reliability Standard PRC-013-0(X)_R1.
- R2. The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall have evidence it reviewed new or functionally modified RAS in accordance with the Regional Reliability Organization’s procedures as defined in Reliability Standard PRC-012-0(X)_R1 prior to being placed in service.
- R3. The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall provide documentation of RAS data and the results of Studies that show compliance of new or functionally modified RAS with NERC Reliability Standards and Regional Reliability Organization criteria to affected Regional Reliability Organizations and NERC on request (within 30 calendar days).

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C. Measures

- M1. The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall have evidence it maintains a list of and provides data for existing and proposed RAS as defined in Reliability Standard PRC-013-0(X)_R1.
- M2. The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall have evidence it reviewed new or functionally modified RAS in accordance with the Regional Reliability Organization’s procedures as defined in Reliability Standard PRC-012-0(X)_R1 prior to being placed in service.
- M3. The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall have evidence it provided documentation of RAS data and the results of studies that show compliance of new or functionally modified RAS with NERC standards and Regional

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Deleted: Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees: February 8, 2005

Deleted: Effective Date: April 1, 2005

Standard PRC-015-0(X) — Remedial Action Scheme Data and Documentation

Reliability Organization criteria to affected Regional Reliability Organizations and NERC on request (within 30 calendar days).

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Compliance Monitor: Regional Reliability Organization.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Timeframe

On request (within 30 calendar days).

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. Level 1: RAS owners provided RAS data, but was incomplete according to the Regional Reliability Organization RAS database requirements.

2.2. Level 2: RAS owners provided results of studies that show compliance of new or functionally modified RAS with the NERC Planning Standards and Regional Reliability Organization criteria, but were incomplete according to the Regional Reliability Organization procedures for Reliability Standard PRC-012-0(X)_R1.

2.3. Level 3: Not applicable.

2.4. Level 4: No RAS data was provided in accordance with Regional Reliability Organization RAS database requirements for Standard PRC-012-0(X)_R1, or the results of studies that show compliance of new or functionally modified RAS with the NERC Reliability Standards and Regional Reliability Organization criteria were not provided in accordance with Regional Reliability Organization procedures for Reliability Standard PRC-012-0(X)_R1.

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E. Regional Differences

1. None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|-------------|---------------|--|---|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| <u>0(X)</u> | <u>TBD</u> | <u>Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees</u> | <u>Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS</u> |

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Deleted: Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees: February 8, 2005

Deleted: Effective Date: April 1, 2005

A. Introduction

1. **Title: Remedial Action Scheme Misoperations**
2. **Number:** PRC-016-0.1(X)
3. **Purpose:** To ensure that all Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) are properly designed, meet performance requirements, and are coordinated with other protection systems. To ensure that maintenance and testing programs are developed and misoperations are analyzed and corrected.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Transmission Owner that owns a RAS.
 - 4.2. Generator Owner that owns a RAS.
 - 4.3. Distribution Provider that owns a RAS.
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1. The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall analyze its RAS operations and maintain a record of all misoperations in accordance with the Regional RAS review procedure specified in Reliability Standard PRC-012-0(X)_R1.
- R2. The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall take corrective actions to avoid future misoperations.
- R3. The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall provide documentation of the misoperation analyses and the corrective action plans to its Regional Reliability Organization and NERC on request (within 90 calendar days).

C. Measures

- M1. The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall have evidence it analyzed RAS operations and maintained a record of all misoperations in accordance with the Regional RAS review procedure specified in Reliability Standard PRC-012-0(X)_R1.
- M2. The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall have evidence it took corrective actions to avoid future misoperations.

- M3.** The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall have evidence it provided documentation of the misoperation analyses and the corrective action plans to the affected Regional Reliability Organization and NERC on request (within 90 calendar days).

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Compliance Monitor: Regional Reliability Organization.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame

On request [within 90 calendar days of the incident or on request (within 30 calendar days) if requested more than 90 calendar days after the incident.]

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. Level 1: Documentation of RAS misoperations is complete but documentation of corrective actions taken for all identified RAS misoperations is incomplete.

2.2. Level 2: Documentation of corrective actions taken for RAS misoperations is complete but documentation of RAS misoperations is incomplete.

2.3. Level 3: Documentation of RAS misoperations and corrective actions is incomplete.

2.4. Level 4: No documentation of RAS misoperations or corrective actions.

E. Regional Differences

None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|----------------|------------------|--|------------------------|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0 | February 8, 2005 | Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees | New |
| 0 | July 3, 2007 | Change reference in Measure 1 from “PRC-016-0_R1” to “PRC-012-1_R1.” | Errata |

Standard PRC-016-0.1(X) — Remedial Action Scheme Misoperations

| | | | |
|--------|------------------|---|--|
| 0.1 | October 29, 2008 | BOT adopted errata changes; updated version number to “0.1” | Errata |
| 0.1 | May 13, 2009 | FERC Approved – Updated Effective Date | Revised |
| 0.1(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

Standard PRC-016-0.1(X) — Remedial Action Scheme Misoperations

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Remedial Action Scheme Misoperations
2. **Number:** PRC-016-0.1(X)
3. **Purpose:** To ensure that all Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) are properly designed, meet performance requirements, and are coordinated with other protection systems. To ensure that maintenance and testing programs are developed and misoperations are analyzed and corrected.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Transmission Owner that owns a RAS.
 - 4.2. Generator Owner that owns a RAS.
 - 4.3. Distribution Provider that owns a RAS.
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

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Deleted: Special Protection System

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Deleted: n SPS

Deleted: n SPS

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B. Requirements

- R1. The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall analyze its RAS operations and maintain a record of all misoperations in accordance with the Regional RAS review procedure specified in Reliability Standard PRC-012-0(X)_R1.
- R2. The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall take corrective actions to avoid future misoperations.
- R3. The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall provide documentation of the misoperation analyses and the corrective action plans to its Regional Reliability Organization and NERC on request (within 90 calendar days).

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C. Measures

- M1. The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall have evidence it analyzed RAS operations and maintained a record of all misoperations in accordance with the Regional RAS review procedure specified in Reliability Standard PRC-012-0(X)_R1.
- M2. The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall have evidence it took corrective actions to avoid future misoperations.

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Standard PRC-016-0.1(X) — Remedial Action Scheme Misoperations

M3. The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall have evidence it provided documentation of the misoperation analyses and the corrective action plans to the affected Regional Reliability Organization and NERC on request (within 90 calendar days).

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D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Compliance Monitor: Regional Reliability Organization.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame

On request [within 90 calendar days of the incident or on request (within 30 calendar days) if requested more than 90 calendar days after the incident.]

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. Level 1: Documentation of RAS misoperations is complete but documentation of corrective actions taken for all identified RAS misoperations is incomplete.

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2.2. Level 2: Documentation of corrective actions taken for RAS misoperations is complete but documentation of RAS misoperations is incomplete.

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2.3. Level 3: Documentation of RAS misoperations and corrective actions is incomplete.

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2.4. Level 4: No documentation of RAS misoperations or corrective actions.

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E. Regional Differences

None identified.

Deleted: ¶

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|------------------|--|-----------------|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0 | February 8, 2005 | Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees | New |
| 0 | July 3, 2007 | Change reference in Measure 1 from "PRC-016-0_R1" to "PRC-012-1_R1." | Errata |

Standard PRC-016-0.1(X) — Remedial Action Scheme Misoperations

| | | | |
|------------------------|---------------------|---|--|
| 0.1 | October 29, 2008 | BOT adopted errata changes; updated version number to “0.1” | Errata |
| 0.1 | May 13, 2009 | FERC Approved – Updated Effective Date | Revised |
| 0.1(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

A. Introduction

- 1. Title:** Remedial Action Scheme Maintenance and Testing
- 2. Number:** PRC-017-0(X)
- 3. Purpose:** To ensure that all Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) are properly designed, meet performance requirements, and are coordinated with other protection systems. To ensure that maintenance and testing programs are developed and misoperations are analyzed and corrected.
- 4. Applicability:**
 - 4.1.** Transmission Owner that owns a RAS
 - 4.2.** Generator Owner that owns a RAS
 - 4.3.** Distribution Provider that owns a RAS
- 5. Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1.** The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall have a system maintenance and testing program(s) in place. The program(s) shall include:
 - R1.1.** RAS identification shall include but is not limited to:
 - R1.1.1.** Relays.
 - R1.1.2.** Instrument transformers.
 - R1.1.3.** Communications systems, where appropriate.
 - R1.1.4.** Batteries.
 - R1.2.** Documentation of maintenance and testing intervals and their basis.
 - R1.3.** Summary of testing procedure.
 - R1.4.** Schedule for system testing.
 - R1.5.** Schedule for system maintenance.
 - R1.6.** Date last tested/maintained.
- R2.** The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall provide documentation of the program and its implementation to the appropriate Regional Reliability Organizations and NERC on request (within 30 calendar days).

C. Measures

- M1.** The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall have a system maintenance and testing program(s) in place that includes all items in Reliability Standard PRC-017-0(X)_R1.
- M2.** The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall have evidence it provided documentation of the program and its implementation to the

Standard PRC-017-0(X) — Remedial Action Scheme Maintenance and Testing

appropriate Regional Reliability Organizations and NERC on request (within 30 calendar days).

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Compliance Monitor: Regional Reliability Organization. Each Region shall report compliance and violations to NERC via the NERC Compliance Reporting process.

Timeframe:

On request (30 calendar days.)

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Timeframe

Compliance Monitor: Regional Reliability Organization.

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. Level 1: Documentation of the maintenance and testing program was incomplete, but records indicate implementation was on schedule.

2.2. Level 2: Complete documentation of the maintenance and testing program was provided, but records indicate that implementation was not on schedule.

2.3. Level 3: Documentation of the maintenance and testing program was incomplete, and records indicate implementation was not on schedule.

2.4. Level 4: Documentation of the maintenance and testing program, or its implementation, was not provided.

E. Regional Differences

1. None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|---------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

Standard PRC-017-0(X) — Remedial Action Scheme Maintenance and Testing

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Remedial Action Scheme Maintenance and Testing
2. **Number:** PRC-017-0(X)
3. **Purpose:** To ensure that all Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) are properly designed, meet performance requirements, and are coordinated with other protection systems. To ensure that maintenance and testing programs are developed and misoperations are analyzed and corrected.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Transmission Owner that owns a RAS
 - 4.2. Generator Owner that owns a RAS
 - 4.3. Distribution Provider that owns a RAS
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Deleted: Special Protection System

Deleted: Special Protection Systems (SPS)

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Deleted: n SPS

Deleted: n SPS

Deleted: April 1, 2005

B. Requirements

- R1. The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall have a system maintenance and testing program(s) in place. The program(s) shall include:
 - R1.1. RAS identification shall include but is not limited to:
 - R1.1.1. Relays.
 - R1.1.2. Instrument transformers.
 - R1.1.3. Communications systems, where appropriate.
 - R1.1.4. Batteries.
 - R1.2. Documentation of maintenance and testing intervals and their basis.
 - R1.3. Summary of testing procedure.
 - R1.4. Schedule for system testing.
 - R1.5. Schedule for system maintenance.
 - R1.6. Date last tested/maintained.
- R2. The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall provide documentation of the program and its implementation to the appropriate Regional Reliability Organizations and NERC on request (within 30 calendar days).

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C. Measures

- M1. The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall have a system maintenance and testing program(s) in place that includes all items in Reliability Standard PRC-017-0(X)_R1.
- M2. The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns a RAS shall have evidence it provided documentation of the program and its implementation to the

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Effective Date: April 1, 2005

Standard PRC-017-0(X) — Remedial Action Scheme Maintenance and Testing

appropriate Regional Reliability Organizations and NERC on request (within 30 calendar days).

Deleted: Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees: February 8, 2005

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Effective Date: April 1, 2005

Standard PRC-017-0(X) — Remedial Action Scheme Maintenance and Testing

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Compliance Monitor: Regional Reliability Organization. Each Region shall report compliance and violations to NERC via the NERC Compliance Reporting process.

Timeframe:

On request (30 calendar days.)

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Timeframe

Compliance Monitor: Regional Reliability Organization.

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. Level 1: Documentation of the maintenance and testing program was incomplete, but records indicate implementation was on schedule.

2.2. Level 2: Complete documentation of the maintenance and testing program was provided, but records indicate that implementation was not on schedule.

2.3. Level 3: Documentation of the maintenance and testing program was incomplete, and records indicate implementation was not on schedule.

2.4. Level 4: Documentation of the maintenance and testing program, or its implementation, was not provided.

E. Regional Differences

- 1. None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|----------------------|---------------------|---|--|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

Deleted: Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees: February 8, 2005

Deleted: ¶
Effective Date: April 1, 2005

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Under-Voltage Load Shedding Program Database
2. **Number:** PRC-020-1(X)
3. **Purpose:** Ensure that a regional database is maintained for Under-Voltage Load Shedding (UVLS) programs implemented by entities within the Region to mitigate the risk of voltage collapse or voltage instability in the Bulk Electric System (BES). Ensure the UVLS database is available for Regional studies and for dynamic studies and simulations of the BES.
4. **Applicability**
 - 4.1. Regional Reliability Organization with entities that own or operate a UVLS program.
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1. The Regional Reliability Organization shall establish, maintain and annually update a database for UVLS programs implemented by entities within the region to mitigate the risk of voltage collapse or voltage instability in the BES. This database shall include the following items:
 - R1.1. Owner and operator of the UVLS program.
 - R1.2. Size and location of customer load, or percent of connected load, to be interrupted.
 - R1.3. Corresponding voltage set points and overall scheme clearing times.
 - R1.4. Time delay from initiation to trip signal.
 - R1.5. Breaker operating times.
 - R1.6. Any other schemes that are part of or impact the UVLS programs such as related generation protection, islanding schemes, automatic load restoration schemes, UFLS and Remedial Action Schemes.
- R2. The Regional Reliability Organization shall provide the information in its UVLS database to the Planning Authority, the Transmission Planner, or other Regional Reliability Organizations and to NERC within 30 calendar days of a request.

C. Measures

- M1. The Regional Reliability Organization shall have evidence that it established and annually updated its UVLS database to include all elements in Requirement 1.1 through 1.6.
- M2. The Regional Reliability Organization shall have evidence that it provided the information in its UVLS database to the requesting entities and to NERC in accordance with Requirement 2.

D. Compliance

1. **Compliance Monitoring Process**
 - 1.1. **Compliance Monitoring Responsibility**

Standard PRC-020-1(X) — Under-Voltage Load Shedding Program Database

NERC

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame

One calendar year.

1.3. Data Retention

The Regional Reliability Organization shall retain the current and prior annual updated database. The Compliance Monitor shall retain all audit data for three years.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

The Regional Reliability Organization shall demonstrate compliance through self-certification or audit (periodic, as part of targeted monitoring or initiated by complaint or event), as determined by the Compliance Monitor.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. Level 1: Did not update its UVLS database annually.

2.2. Level 2: UVLS program database information provided, but did not include all of the items identified in R1.1 through R1.6.

2.3. Level 3: Not applicable.

2.4. Level 4: Did not provide information from its UVLS program database.

E. Regional Differences

None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|----------|--|--|
| 1 | 12/01/05 | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Removed comma after 2004 in “Development Steps Completed,” #1. 2. Changed incorrect use of certain hyphens (-) to “en dash” (–) and “em dash (—).” 3. Lower cased the word “region,” “board,” and “regional” throughout document where appropriate. 4. Added or removed “periods” where appropriate. 5. Changed “Timeframe” to “Time Frame” in item D, 1.2. | 01/20/06 |
| 1(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

Standard PRC-020-1(X) — Under-Voltage Load Shedding Program Database

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Under-Voltage Load Shedding Program Database
2. **Number:** PRC-020-1(X)
3. **Purpose:** Ensure that a regional database is maintained for Under-Voltage Load Shedding (UVLS) programs implemented by entities within the Region to mitigate the risk of voltage collapse or voltage instability in the Bulk Electric System (BES). Ensure the UVLS database is available for Regional studies and for dynamic studies and simulations of the BES.
4. **Applicability**
 - 4.1. Regional Reliability Organization with entities that own or operate a UVLS program.
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Deleted: May 1, 2006

B. Requirements

- R1. The Regional Reliability Organization shall establish, maintain and annually update a database for UVLS programs implemented by entities within the region to mitigate the risk of voltage collapse or voltage instability in the BES. This database shall include the following items:
 - R1.1. Owner and operator of the UVLS program.
 - R1.2. Size and location of customer load, or percent of connected load, to be interrupted.
 - R1.3. Corresponding voltage set points and overall scheme clearing times.
 - R1.4. Time delay from initiation to trip signal.
 - R1.5. Breaker operating times.
 - R1.6. Any other schemes that are part of or impact the UVLS programs such as related generation protection, islanding schemes, automatic load restoration schemes, UFLS and Remedial Action Schemes.
- R2. The Regional Reliability Organization shall provide the information in its UVLS database to the Planning Authority, the Transmission Planner, or other Regional Reliability Organizations and to NERC within 30 calendar days of a request.

Deleted: Special Protection System

C. Measures

- M1. The Regional Reliability Organization shall have evidence that it established and annually updated its UVLS database to include all elements in Requirement 1.1 through 1.6.
- M2. The Regional Reliability Organization shall have evidence that it provided the information in its UVLS database to the requesting entities and to NERC in accordance with Requirement 2.

D. Compliance

1. **Compliance Monitoring Process**
 - 1.1. **Compliance Monitoring Responsibility**

Deleted: Adopted by Board of Trustees: February 7, 2006

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Deleted: Effective Date: May 1, 2006

Standard PRC-020-1(X) — Under-Voltage Load Shedding Program Database

NERC

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame

One calendar year.

1.3. Data Retention

The Regional Reliability Organization shall retain the current and prior annual updated database. The Compliance Monitor shall retain all audit data for three years.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

The Regional Reliability Organization shall demonstrate compliance through self-certification or audit (periodic, as part of targeted monitoring or initiated by complaint or event), as determined by the Compliance Monitor.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. Level 1: Did not update its UVLS database annually.

2.2. Level 2: UVLS program database information provided, but did not include all of the items identified in R1.1 through R1.6.

2.3. Level 3: Not applicable.

2.4. Level 4: Did not provide information from its UVLS program database.

E. Regional Differences

None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|-------------|------------|--|---|
| 1 | 12/01/05 | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Removed comma after 2004 in “Development Steps Completed,” #1. 2. Changed incorrect use of certain hyphens (-) to “en dash” (–) and “em dash (—).” 3. Lower cased the word “region,” “board,” and “regional” throughout document where appropriate. 4. Added or removed “periods” where appropriate. 5. Changed “Timeframe” to “Time Frame” in item D, 1.2. | 01/20/06 |
| <u>1(X)</u> | <u>TBD</u> | <u>Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees</u> | <u>Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS</u> |

Deleted: Adopted by Board of Trustees: February 7, 2006

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Deleted: Effective Date: May 1, 2006

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Under-Voltage Load Shedding Program Data
2. **Number:** PRC-021-1(X)
3. **Purpose:** Ensure data is provided to support the Regional database maintained for Under-Voltage Load Shedding (UVLS) programs that were implemented to mitigate the risk of voltage collapse or voltage instability in the Bulk Electric System (BES).
4. **Applicability**
 - 4.1. Transmission Owner that owns a UVLS program.
 - 4.2. Distribution Provider that owns a UVLS program.
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1. Each Transmission Owner and Distribution Provider that owns a UVLS program to mitigate the risk of voltage collapse or voltage instability in the BES shall annually update its UVLS data to support the Regional UVLS program database. The following data shall be provided to the Regional Reliability Organization for each installed UVLS system:
 - R1.1. Size and location of customer load, or percent of connected load, to be interrupted.
 - R1.2. Corresponding voltage set points and overall scheme clearing times.
 - R1.3. Time delay from initiation to trip signal.
 - R1.4. Breaker operating times.
 - R1.5. Any other schemes that are part of or impact the UVLS programs such as related generation protection, islanding schemes, automatic load restoration schemes, UFLS and Remedial Action Schemes.
- R2. Each Transmission Owner and Distribution Provider that owns a UVLS program shall provide its UVLS program data to the Regional Reliability Organization within 30 calendar days of a request.

C. Measures

- M1. Each Transmission Owner and Distribution Provider that owns a UVLS program shall have documentation that its UVLS data was updated annually and includes all items specified in Requirement 1.1 through 1.5.
- M2. Each Transmission Owner and Distribution Provider that owns a UVLS program shall have evidence it provided the Regional Reliability Organization with its UVLS program data within 30 calendar days of a request.

D. Compliance

1. **Compliance Monitoring Process**
 - 1.1. **Compliance Monitoring Responsibility**

Standard PRC-021-1(X) — Under-Voltage Load Shedding Program Data

Regional Reliability Organization.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame

One calendar year.

1.3. Data Retention

Each Transmission Owner and Distribution Provider that owns a UVLS program shall retain a copy of the data submitted over the past two years.

The Compliance Monitor shall retain all audit data for three years.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

Transmission Owner and Distribution Provider shall demonstrate compliance through self-certification or audit (periodic, as part of targeted monitoring or initiated by complaint or event), as determined by the Compliance Monitor.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. Level 1: Did not update its UVLS data annually.

2.2. Level 2: UVLS data was provided, but did not address one of the items identified in R1.1 through R1.5.

2.3. Level 3: UVLS data was provided, but did not address two or more of the items identified in R1.1 through R1.5.

2.4. Level 4: Did not provide any UVLS data.

E. Regional Differences

None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|----------|---|---|
| 1 | 12/01/05 | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Removed comma after 2004 in “Development Steps Completed,” #1. 2. Changed incorrect use of certain hyphens (-) to “en dash” (–) and “em dash (—).” 3. Added heading above table “Future Development Plan.” 4. Lower cased the word “region,” “board,” and “regional” throughout document where appropriate. 5. Added or removed “periods” where appropriate. 6. Changed “Timeframe” to “Time Frame” in item D, 1.2. | 01/20/05 |
| 1(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with |

Standard PRC-021-1(X) — Under-Voltage Load Shedding Program Data

| | | | |
|--|--|--|-----------------------------------|
| | | | Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |
|--|--|--|-----------------------------------|

Standard PRC-021-1(X) — Under-Voltage Load Shedding Program Data

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Under-Voltage Load Shedding Program Data
2. **Number:** PRC-021-1(X)
3. **Purpose:** Ensure data is provided to support the Regional database maintained for Under-Voltage Load Shedding (UVLS) programs that were implemented to mitigate the risk of voltage collapse or voltage instability in the Bulk Electric System (BES).
4. **Applicability**
 - 4.1. Transmission Owner that owns a UVLS program.
 - 4.2. Distribution Provider that owns a UVLS program.
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Commented [KS1]: Deleted from footer: **Effective Date:** August 1, 2006

B. Requirements

- R1. Each Transmission Owner and Distribution Provider that owns a UVLS program to mitigate the risk of voltage collapse or voltage instability in the BES shall annually update its UVLS data to support the Regional UVLS program database. The following data shall be provided to the Regional Reliability Organization for each installed UVLS system:
 - R1.1. Size and location of customer load, or percent of connected load, to be interrupted.
 - R1.2. Corresponding voltage set points and overall scheme clearing times.
 - R1.3. Time delay from initiation to trip signal.
 - R1.4. Breaker operating times.
 - R1.5. Any other schemes that are part of or impact the UVLS programs such as related generation protection, islanding schemes, automatic load restoration schemes, UFLS and [Remedial Action Schemes](#).
- R2. Each Transmission Owner and Distribution Provider that owns a UVLS program shall provide its UVLS program data to the Regional Reliability Organization within 30 calendar days of a request.

Deleted: Special Protection System

C. Measures

- M1. Each Transmission Owner and Distribution Provider that owns a UVLS program shall have documentation that its UVLS data was updated annually and includes all items specified in Requirement 1.1 through 1.5.
- M2. Each Transmission Owner and Distribution Provider that owns a UVLS program shall have evidence it provided the Regional Reliability Organization with its UVLS program data within 30 calendar days of a request.

D. Compliance

1. **Compliance Monitoring Process**
 - 1.1. **Compliance Monitoring Responsibility**

Deleted: Adopted by Board of Trustees: February 7, 2006

Deleted: Effective Date: August 1, 2006

Standard PRC-021-1(X) — Under-Voltage Load Shedding Program Data

Regional Reliability Organization.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame

One calendar year.

1.3. Data Retention

Each Transmission Owner and Distribution Provider that owns a UVLS program shall retain a copy of the data submitted over the past two years.

The Compliance Monitor shall retain all audit data for three years.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

Transmission Owner and Distribution Provider shall demonstrate compliance through self-certification or audit (periodic, as part of targeted monitoring or initiated by complaint or event), as determined by the Compliance Monitor.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. Level 1: Did not update its UVLS data annually.

2.2. Level 2: UVLS data was provided, but did not address one of the items identified in R1.1 through R1.5.

2.3. Level 3: UVLS data was provided, but did not address two or more of the items identified in R1.1 through R1.5.

2.4. Level 4: Did not provide any UVLS data.

E. Regional Differences

None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|----------------------|---------------------|---|---|
| 1 | 12/01/05 | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Removed comma after 2004 in “Development Steps Completed,” #1. 2. Changed incorrect use of certain hyphens (-) to “en dash” (–) and “em dash (—).” 3. Added heading above table “Future Development Plan.” 4. Lower cased the word “region,” “board,” and “regional” throughout document where appropriate. 5. Added or removed “periods” where appropriate. 6. Changed “Timeframe” to “Time Frame” in item D, 1.2. | 01/20/05 |
| 1(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with |

Deleted: Adopted by Board of Trustees: February 7, 2006

Deleted: Effective Date: August 1, 2006

Standard PRC-021-1(X) — Under-Voltage Load Shedding Program Data

| | | | |
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| | | | Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |
|--|--|--|--|

Deleted: Adopted by Board of Trustees: February 7, 2006

Deleted: Effective Date: August 1, 2006

A. Introduction

1. Title: Transmission Relay Loadability

2. Number: PRC-023-2(X)

3. Purpose: Protective relay settings shall not limit transmission loadability; not interfere with system operators' ability to take remedial action to protect system reliability and; be set to reliably detect all fault conditions and protect the electrical network from these faults.

4. Applicability

4.1. Functional Entity

4.1.1 Transmission Owners with load-responsive phase protection systems as described in PRC-023-2(X) - Attachment A, applied to circuits defined in 4.2.1 (*Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 – R5*).

4.1.2 Generator Owners with load-responsive phase protection systems as described in PRC-023-2(X) - Attachment A, applied to circuits defined in 4.2.1 (*Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 – R5*).

4.1.3 Distribution Providers with load-responsive phase protection systems as described in PRC-023-2(X) - Attachment A, applied to circuits defined in 4.2.1 (*Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 – R5*), provided those circuits have bi-directional flow capabilities.

4.1.4 Planning Coordinators

4.2. Circuits

4.2.1 Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 – R5

4.2.1.1 Transmission lines operated at 200 kV and above.

4.2.1.2 Transmission lines operated at 100 kV to 200 kV selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with R6.

4.2.1.3 Transmission lines operated below 100 kV that are part of the BES and selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with R6.

4.2.1.4 Transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 200 kV and above.

4.2.1.5 Transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 100 kV to 200 kV selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with R6.

4.2.1.6 Transformers with low voltage terminals connected below 100 kV that are part of the BES and selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with R6.

4.2.2 Circuits Subject to Requirement R6

4.2.2.1 Transmission lines operated at 100 kV to 200 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 100 kV to 200 kV

4.2.2.2 Transmission lines operated below 100 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected below 100 kV that are part of the BES

5. Effective Dates: This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the

Standard PRC-023-2(X) — Transmission Relay Loadability

standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

R1. Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall use any one of the following criteria (Requirement R1, criteria 1 through 13) for any specific circuit terminal to prevent its phase protective relay settings from limiting transmission system loadability while maintaining reliable protection of the BES for all fault conditions. Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall evaluate relay loadability at 0.85 per unit voltage and a power factor angle of 30 degrees. [*Violation Risk Factor: High*] [*Time Horizon: Long Term Planning*].

Criteria:

1. Set transmission line relays so they do not operate at or below 150% of the highest seasonal Facility Rating of a circuit, for the available defined loading duration nearest 4 hours (expressed in amperes).
2. Set transmission line relays so they do not operate at or below 115% of the highest seasonal 15-minute Facility Rating¹ of a circuit (expressed in amperes).
3. Set transmission line relays so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum theoretical power transfer capability (using a 90-degree angle between the sending-end and receiving-end voltages and either reactance or complex impedance) of the circuit (expressed in amperes) using one of the following to perform the power transfer calculation:
 - An infinite source (zero source impedance) with a 1.00 per unit bus voltage at each end of the line.
 - An impedance at each end of the line, which reflects the actual system source impedance with a 1.05 per unit voltage behind each source impedance.
4. Set transmission line relays on series compensated transmission lines so they do not operate at or below the maximum power transfer capability of the line, determined as the greater of:
 - 115% of the highest emergency rating of the series capacitor.
 - 115% of the maximum power transfer capability of the circuit (expressed in amperes), calculated in accordance with Requirement R1, criterion 3, using the full line inductive reactance.
5. Set transmission line relays on weak source systems so they do not operate at or below 170% of the maximum end-of-line three-phase fault magnitude (expressed in amperes).
6. Set transmission line relays applied on transmission lines connected to generation stations remote to load so they do not operate at or below 230% of the aggregated generation nameplate capability.
7. Set transmission line relays applied at the load center terminal, remote from generation stations, so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum current flow from the load to the generation source under any system configuration.

¹ When a 15-minute rating has been calculated and published for use in real-time operations, the 15-minute rating can be used to establish the loadability requirement for the protective relays.

8. Set transmission line relays applied on the bulk system-end of transmission lines that serve load remote to the system so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum current flow from the system to the load under any system configuration.
9. Set transmission line relays applied on the load-end of transmission lines that serve load remote to the bulk system so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum current flow from the load to the system under any system configuration.
10. Set transformer fault protection relays and transmission line relays on transmission lines terminated only with a transformer so that the relays do not operate at or below the greater of:
 - 150% of the applicable maximum transformer nameplate rating (expressed in amperes), including the forced cooled ratings corresponding to all installed supplemental cooling equipment.
 - 115% of the highest operator established emergency transformer rating
- 10.1 Set load responsive transformer fault protection relays, if used, such that the protection settings do not expose the transformer to a fault level and duration that exceeds the transformer's mechanical withstand capability².
11. For transformer overload protection relays that do not comply with the loadability component of Requirement R1, criterion 10 set the relays according to one of the following:
 - Set the relays to allow the transformer to be operated at an overload level of at least 150% of the maximum applicable nameplate rating, or 115% of the highest operator established emergency transformer rating, whichever is greater, for at least 15 minutes to provide time for the operator to take controlled action to relieve the overload.
 - Install supervision for the relays using either a top oil or simulated winding hot spot temperature element set no less than 100° C for the top oil temperature or no less than 140° C for the winding hot spot temperature³.
12. When the desired transmission line capability is limited by the requirement to adequately protect the transmission line, set the transmission line distance relays to a maximum of 125% of the apparent impedance (at the impedance angle of the transmission line) subject to the following constraints:
 - a. Set the maximum torque angle (MTA) to 90 degrees or the highest supported by the manufacturer.
 - b. Evaluate the relay loadability in amperes at the relay trip point at 0.85 per unit voltage and a power factor angle of 30 degrees.

² As illustrated by the “dotted line” in IEEE C57.109-1993 - *IEEE Guide for Liquid-Immersed Transformer Through-Fault-Current Duration*, Clause 4.4, Figure 4

³ IEEE standard C57.91, Tables 7 and 8, specify that transformers are to be designed to withstand a winding hot spot temperature of 180 degrees C, and Annex A cautions that bubble formation may occur above 140 degrees C.

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- c. Include a relay setting component of 87% of the current calculated in Requirement R1, criterion 12 in the Facility Rating determination for the circuit.
- 13.** Where other situations present practical limitations on circuit capability, set the phase protection relays so they do not operate at or below 115% of such limitations.
- R2.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall set its out-of-step blocking elements to allow tripping of phase protective relays for faults that occur during the loading conditions used to verify transmission line relay loadability per Requirement R1. *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- R3.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that uses a circuit capability with the practical limitations described in Requirement R1, criterion 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, or 13 shall use the calculated circuit capability as the Facility Rating of the circuit and shall obtain the agreement of the Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with the calculated circuit capability. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- R4.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that chooses to use Requirement R1 criterion 2 as the basis for verifying transmission line relay loadability shall provide its Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with an updated list of circuits associated with those transmission line relays at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports. *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- R5.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that sets transmission line relays according to Requirement R1 criterion 12 shall provide an updated list of the circuits associated with those relays to its Regional Entity at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports, to allow the ERO to compile a list of all circuits that have protective relay settings that limit circuit capability. *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- R6.** Each Planning Coordinator shall conduct an assessment at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments, by applying the criteria in Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers must comply with Requirements R1 through R5. The Planning Coordinator shall: *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- 6.1** Maintain a list of circuits subject to PRC-023-2(X) per application of Attachment B, including identification of the first calendar year in which any criterion in Attachment B applies.
- 6.2** Provide the list of circuits to all Regional Entities, Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area within 30 calendar days of the establishment of the initial list and within 30 calendar days of any changes to that list.

C. Measures

- M1.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall have evidence such as spreadsheets or summaries of calculations to show that each of its transmission relays is set according to one of the criteria in Requirement R1, criterion 1 through 13 and shall have evidence such as coordination curves or summaries of calculations that show that relays set per criterion 10 do not expose the transformer to fault levels and durations beyond those indicated in the standard. (R1)

- M2.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall have evidence such as spreadsheets or summaries of calculations to show that each of its out-of-step blocking elements is set to allow tripping of phase protective relays for faults that occur during the loading conditions used to verify transmission line relay loadability per Requirement R1. (R2)
- M3.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider with transmission relays set according to Requirement R1, criterion 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, or 13 shall have evidence such as Facility Rating spreadsheets or Facility Rating database to show that it used the calculated circuit capability as the Facility Rating of the circuit and evidence such as dated correspondence that the resulting Facility Rating was agreed to by its associated Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator. (R3)
- M4.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Provider that sets transmission line relays according to Requirement R1, criterion 2 shall have evidence such as dated correspondence to show that it provided its Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with an updated list of circuits associated with those transmission line relays within the required timeframe. The updated list may either be a full list, a list of incremental changes to the previous list, or a statement that there are no changes to the previous list. (R4)
- M5.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Provider that sets transmission line relays according to Requirement R1, criterion 12 shall have evidence such as dated correspondence that it provided an updated list of the circuits associated with those relays to its Regional Entity within the required timeframe. The updated list may either be a full list, a list of incremental changes to the previous list, or a statement that there are no changes to the previous list. (R5)
- M6.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as power flow results, calculation summaries, or study reports that it used the criteria established within Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard as described in Requirement R6. The Planning Coordinator shall have a dated list of such circuits and shall have evidence such as dated correspondence that it provided the list to the Regional Entities, Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area within the required timeframe.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

- For entities that do not work for the Regional Entity, the Regional Entity shall serve as the Compliance Enforcement Authority.
- For functional entities that work for their Regional Entity, the ERO shall serve as the Compliance Enforcement Authority.

1.2. Data Retention

The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, Distribution Provider and Planning Coordinator shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall each retain documentation to demonstrate compliance with Requirements R1 through R5 for three calendar years.

The Planning Coordinator shall retain documentation of the most recent review process required in R6. The Planning Coordinator shall retain the most recent list of circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard, as determined per R6.

If a Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, Distribution Provider or Planning Coordinator is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until found compliant or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

The Compliance Monitor shall keep the last audit record and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes

- Compliance Audit
- Self-Certification
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Violation Investigation
- Self-Reporting
- Complaint

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Violation Severity Levels:

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|----------|------|--|
| R1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | <p>The responsible entity did not use any one of the following criteria (Requirement R1 criterion 1 through 13) for any specific circuit terminal to prevent its phase protective relay settings from limiting transmission system loadability while maintaining reliable protection of the Bulk Electric System for all fault conditions.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The responsible entity did not evaluate relay loadability at 0.85 per unit voltage and a power factor angle of 30 degrees.</p> |
| R2 | N/A | N/A | N/A | <p>The responsible entity failed to ensure that its out-of-step blocking elements allowed tripping of phase protective relays for faults that occur during the loading conditions used to verify transmission line relay loadability per Requirement R1.</p> |
| R3 | N/A | N/A | N/A | <p>The responsible entity that uses a circuit capability with the practical limitations described in Requirement R1 criterion 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, or 13 did not use the calculated circuit capability as the Facility Rating of the circuit.</p> <p>OR</p> |

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| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|--|--|--|
| | | | | The responsible entity did not obtain the agreement of the Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with the calculated circuit capability. |
| R4 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The responsible entity did not provide its Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with an updated list of circuits that have transmission line relays set according to the criteria established in Requirement R1 criterion 2 at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports. |
| R5 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The responsible entity did not provide its Regional Entity, with an updated list of circuits that have transmission line relays set according to the criteria established in Requirement R1 criterion 12 at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports. |
| R6 | N/A | The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met parts 6.1 and 6.2, but more than 15 months and less than 24 months lapsed between assessments. | The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met parts 6.1 and 6.2, but 24 months or more lapsed between assessments. | The Planning Coordinator failed to use the criteria established within Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard. OR The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within |

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| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|---|--|--|
| | | <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met 6.1 and 6.2 but failed to include the calendar year in which any criterion in Attachment B first applies.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met 6.1 and 6.2 but provided the list of circuits to the Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area between 31 days and 45 days after the list was established or updated. (part 6.2)</p> | <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met 6.1 and 6.2 but provided the list of circuits to the Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area between 46 days and 60 days after list was established or updated. (part 6.2)</p> | <p>Attachment B, at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard but failed to meet parts 6.1 and 6.2.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard but failed to maintain the list of circuits determined according to the process described in Requirement R6. (part 6.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met 6.1 but failed to provide the list of circuits to the Reliability Coordinators, Transmission</p> |

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| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|----------|------|--|
| | | | | <p>Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area or provided the list more than 60 days after the list was established or updated. (part 6.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator failed to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard.</p> |

E. Regional Differences

None

F. Supplemental Technical Reference Document

1. The following document is an explanatory supplement to the standard. It provides the technical rationale underlying the requirements in this standard. The reference document contains methodology examples for illustration purposes it does not preclude other technically comparable methodologies

“Determination and Application of Practical Relaying Loadability Ratings,” Version 1.0, June 2008, prepared by the System Protection and Control Task Force of the NERC Planning Committee, available at:

http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/Standards/Relay_Loadability_Reference_Doc_Clean_Final_2008July3.pdf

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|--|---|--|
| 1 | February 12, 2008 | Approved by Board of Trustees | New |
| 1 | March 19, 2008 | Corrected typo in last sentence of Severe VSL for Requirement 3 — “then” should be “than.” | Errata |
| 1 | March 18, 2010 | Approved by FERC | |
| 1 | Filed for approval April 19, 2010 | Changed VRF for R3 from Medium to High; changed VSLs for R1, R2, R3 to binary Severe to comply with Order 733 | Revision |
| 2 | March 10, 2011 approved by Board of Trustees | Revised to address initial set of directives from Order 733 | Revision (Project 2010-13) |
| 2 | March 15, 2012 | FERC order issued approving PRC-023-2 (approval becomes effective May 7, 2012) | |
| 2(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

PRC-023 — Attachment A

1. This standard includes any protective functions which could trip with or without time delay, on load current, including but not limited to:
 - 1.1. Phase distance.
 - 1.2. Out-of-step tripping.
 - 1.3. Switch-on-to-fault.
 - 1.4. Overcurrent relays.
 - 1.5. Communications aided protection schemes including but not limited to:
 - 1.5.1 Permissive overreach transfer trip (POTT).
 - 1.5.2 Permissive under-reach transfer trip (PUTT).
 - 1.5.3 Directional comparison blocking (DCB).
 - 1.5.4 Directional comparison unblocking (DCUB).
 - 1.6. Phase overcurrent supervisory elements (i.e., phase fault detectors) associated with current-based, communication-assisted schemes (i.e., pilot wire, phase comparison, and line current differential) where the scheme is capable of tripping for loss of communications.
2. The following protection systems are excluded from requirements of this standard:
 - 2.1. Relay elements that are only enabled when other relays or associated systems fail. For example:
 - Overcurrent elements that are only enabled during loss of potential conditions.
 - Elements that are only enabled during a loss of communications except as noted in section 1.6
 - 2.2. Protection systems intended for the detection of ground fault conditions.
 - 2.3. Protection systems intended for protection during stable power swings.
 - 2.4. Generator protection relays that are susceptible to load.
 - 2.5. Relay elements used only for Remedial Action Schemes applied and approved in accordance with NERC Reliability Standards PRC-012 through PRC-017 or their successors.
 - 2.6. Protection systems that are designed only to respond in time periods which allow 15 minutes or greater to respond to overload conditions.
 - 2.7. Thermal emulation relays which are used in conjunction with dynamic Facility Ratings.
 - 2.8. Relay elements associated with dc lines.
 - 2.9. Relay elements associated with dc converter transformers.

PRC-023 — Attachment B

Circuits to Evaluate

- Transmission lines operated at 100 kV to 200 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 100 kV to 200 kV.
- Transmission lines operated below 100 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected below 100 kV that are part of the BES.

Criteria

If any of the following criteria apply to a circuit, the applicable entity must comply with the standard for that circuit.

- B1.** The circuit is a monitored Facility of a permanent flowgate in the Eastern Interconnection, a major transfer path within the Western Interconnection as defined by the Regional Entity, or a comparable monitored Facility in the Québec Interconnection, that has been included to address reliability concerns for loading of that circuit, as confirmed by the applicable Planning Coordinator.
- B2.** The circuit is a monitored Facility of an IROL, where the IROL was determined in the planning horizon pursuant to FAC-010.
- B3.** The circuit forms a path (as agreed to by the Generator Operator and the transmission entity) to supply off-site power to a nuclear plant as established in the Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements (NPIRs) pursuant to NUC-001.
- B4.** The circuit is identified through the following sequence of power flow analyses⁴ performed by the Planning Coordinator for the one-to-five-year planning horizon:
- a. Simulate double contingency combinations selected by engineering judgment, without manual system adjustments in between the two contingencies (reflects a situation where a System Operator may not have time between the two contingencies to make appropriate system adjustments).
 - b. For circuits operated between 100 kV and 200 kV evaluate the post-contingency loading, in consultation with the Facility owner, against a threshold based on the Facility Rating assigned for that circuit and used in the power flow case by the Planning Coordinator.
 - c. When more than one Facility Rating for that circuit is available in the power flow case, the threshold for selection will be based on the Facility Rating for the loading duration nearest four hours.
 - d. The threshold for selection of the circuit will vary based on the loading duration assumed in the development of the Facility Rating.

⁴ Past analyses may be used to support the assessment if no material changes to the system have occurred since the last assessment

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- i. If the Facility Rating is based on a loading duration of up to and including four hours, the circuit must comply with the standard if the loading exceeds 115% of the Facility Rating.
 - ii. If the Facility Rating is based on a loading duration greater than four and up to and including eight hours, the circuit must comply with the standard if the loading exceeds 120% of the Facility Rating.
 - iii. If the Facility Rating is based on a loading duration of greater than eight hours, the circuit must comply with the standard if the loading exceeds 130% of the Facility Rating.
- e. Radially operated circuits serving only load are excluded.
- B5.** The circuit is selected by the Planning Coordinator based on technical studies or assessments, other than those specified in criteria B1 through B4, in consultation with the Facility owner.
- B6.** The circuit is mutually agreed upon for inclusion by the Planning Coordinator and the Facility owner.

Standard PRC-023-2(X) — Transmission Relay Loadability

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Transmission Relay Loadability
2. **Number:** PRC-023-2(X)
3. **Purpose:** Protective relay settings shall not limit transmission loadability; not interfere with system operators' ability to take remedial action to protect system reliability and; be set to reliably detect all fault conditions and protect the electrical network from these faults.
4. **Applicability**
 - 4.1. **Functional Entity**
 - 4.1.1 Transmission Owners with load-responsive phase protection systems as described in PRC-023-2(X) - Attachment A, applied to circuits defined in 4.2.1 (*Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 – R5*).
 - 4.1.2 Generator Owners with load-responsive phase protection systems as described in PRC-023-2(X) - Attachment A, applied to circuits defined in 4.2.1 (*Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 – R5*).
 - 4.1.3 Distribution Providers with load-responsive phase protection systems as described in PRC-023-2(X) - Attachment A, applied to circuits defined in 4.2.1 (*Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 – R5*), provided those circuits have bi-directional flow capabilities.
 - 4.1.4 Planning Coordinators
 - 4.2. **Circuits**
 - 4.2.1 **Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 – R5**
 - 4.2.1.1 Transmission lines operated at 200 kV and above.
 - 4.2.1.2 Transmission lines operated at 100 kV to 200 kV selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with R6.
 - 4.2.1.3 Transmission lines operated below 100 kV that are part of the BES and selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with R6.
 - 4.2.1.4 Transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 200 kV and above.
 - 4.2.1.5 Transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 100 kV to 200 kV selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with R6.
 - 4.2.1.6 Transformers with low voltage terminals connected below 100 kV that are part of the BES and selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with R6.
 - 4.2.2 **Circuits Subject to Requirement R6**
 - 4.2.2.1 Transmission lines operated at 100 kV to 200 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 100 kV to 200 kV
 - 4.2.2.2 Transmission lines operated below 100 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected below 100 kV that are part of the BES
5. **Effective Dates:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the

Standard PRC-023-2(X) — Transmission Relay Loadability

standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Commented [KS1]: Deleted: Effective Date table.

Deleted: The effective dates of the requirements in the PRC-023-2(X) standard corresponding to the applicable Functional Entities and circuits are summarized in the following table:¶

Standard PRC-023-2(X) — Transmission Relay Loadability

B. Requirements

R1. Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall use any one of the following criteria (Requirement R1, criteria 1 through 13) for any specific circuit terminal to prevent its phase protective relay settings from limiting transmission system loadability while maintaining reliable protection of the BES for all fault conditions. Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall evaluate relay loadability at 0.85 per unit voltage and a power factor angle of 30 degrees. *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning].*

Criteria:

1. Set transmission line relays so they do not operate at or below 150% of the highest seasonal Facility Rating of a circuit, for the available defined loading duration nearest 4 hours (expressed in amperes).
2. Set transmission line relays so they do not operate at or below 115% of the highest seasonal 15-minute Facility Rating¹ of a circuit (expressed in amperes).
3. Set transmission line relays so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum theoretical power transfer capability (using a 90-degree angle between the sending-end and receiving-end voltages and either reactance or complex impedance) of the circuit (expressed in amperes) using one of the following to perform the power transfer calculation:
 - An infinite source (zero source impedance) with a 1.00 per unit bus voltage at each end of the line.
 - An impedance at each end of the line, which reflects the actual system source impedance with a 1.05 per unit voltage behind each source impedance.
4. Set transmission line relays on series compensated transmission lines so they do not operate at or below the maximum power transfer capability of the line, determined as the greater of:
 - 115% of the highest emergency rating of the series capacitor.
 - 115% of the maximum power transfer capability of the circuit (expressed in amperes), calculated in accordance with Requirement R1, criterion 3, using the full line inductive reactance.
5. Set transmission line relays on weak source systems so they do not operate at or below 170% of the maximum end-of-line three-phase fault magnitude (expressed in amperes).
6. Set transmission line relays applied on transmission lines connected to generation stations remote to load so they do not operate at or below 230% of the aggregated generation nameplate capability.
7. Set transmission line relays applied at the load center terminal, remote from generation stations, so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum current flow from the load to the generation source under any system configuration.

¹ When a 15-minute rating has been calculated and published for use in real-time operations, the 15-minute rating can be used to establish the loadability requirement for the protective relays.

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8. Set transmission line relays applied on the bulk system-end of transmission lines that serve load remote to the system so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum current flow from the system to the load under any system configuration.
9. Set transmission line relays applied on the load-end of transmission lines that serve load remote to the bulk system so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum current flow from the load to the system under any system configuration.
10. Set transformer fault protection relays and transmission line relays on transmission lines terminated only with a transformer so that the relays do not operate at or below the greater of:
 - 150% of the applicable maximum transformer nameplate rating (expressed in amperes), including the forced cooled ratings corresponding to all installed supplemental cooling equipment.
 - 115% of the highest operator established emergency transformer rating
- 10.1 Set load responsive transformer fault protection relays, if used, such that the protection settings do not expose the transformer to a fault level and duration that exceeds the transformer's mechanical withstand capability².
11. For transformer overload protection relays that do not comply with the loadability component of Requirement R1, criterion 10 set the relays according to one of the following:
 - Set the relays to allow the transformer to be operated at an overload level of at least 150% of the maximum applicable nameplate rating, or 115% of the highest operator established emergency transformer rating, whichever is greater, for at least 15 minutes to provide time for the operator to take controlled action to relieve the overload.
 - Install supervision for the relays using either a top oil or simulated winding hot spot temperature element set no less than 100° C for the top oil temperature or no less than 140° C for the winding hot spot temperature³.
12. When the desired transmission line capability is limited by the requirement to adequately protect the transmission line, set the transmission line distance relays to a maximum of 125% of the apparent impedance (at the impedance angle of the transmission line) subject to the following constraints:
 - a. Set the maximum torque angle (MTA) to 90 degrees or the highest supported by the manufacturer.
 - b. Evaluate the relay loadability in amperes at the relay trip point at 0.85 per unit voltage and a power factor angle of 30 degrees.

² As illustrated by the "dotted line" in IEEE C57.109-1993 - *IEEE Guide for Liquid-Immersed Transformer Through-Fault-Current Duration*, Clause 4.4, Figure 4

³ IEEE standard C57.91, Tables 7 and 8, specify that transformers are to be designed to withstand a winding hot spot temperature of 180 degrees C, and Annex A cautions that bubble formation may occur above 140 degrees C.

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- c. Include a relay setting component of 87% of the current calculated in Requirement R1, criterion 12 in the Facility Rating determination for the circuit.
- 13.** Where other situations present practical limitations on circuit capability, set the phase protection relays so they do not operate at or below 115% of such limitations.
- R2.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall set its out-of-step blocking elements to allow tripping of phase protective relays for faults that occur during the loading conditions used to verify transmission line relay loadability per Requirement R1. *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- R3.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that uses a circuit capability with the practical limitations described in Requirement R1, criterion 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, or 13 shall use the calculated circuit capability as the Facility Rating of the circuit and shall obtain the agreement of the Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with the calculated circuit capability. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- R4.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that chooses to use Requirement R1 criterion 2 as the basis for verifying transmission line relay loadability shall provide its Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with an updated list of circuits associated with those transmission line relays at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports. *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- R5.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that sets transmission line relays according to Requirement R1 criterion 12 shall provide an updated list of the circuits associated with those relays to its Regional Entity at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports, to allow the ERO to compile a list of all circuits that have protective relay settings that limit circuit capability. *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- R6.** Each Planning Coordinator shall conduct an assessment at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments, by applying the criteria in Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers must comply with Requirements R1 through R5. The Planning Coordinator shall: *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- 6.1** Maintain a list of circuits subject to PRC-023-2(X) per application of Attachment B, including identification of the first calendar year in which any criterion in Attachment B applies.
 - 6.2** Provide the list of circuits to all Regional Entities, Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area within 30 calendar days of the establishment of the initial list and within 30 calendar days of any changes to that list.

C. Measures

- M1.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall have evidence such as spreadsheets or summaries of calculations to show that each of its transmission relays is set according to one of the criteria in Requirement R1, criterion 1 through 13 and shall have evidence such as coordination curves or summaries of calculations that show that relays set per criterion 10 do not expose the transformer to fault levels and durations beyond those indicated in the standard. (R1)

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- M2.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall have evidence such as spreadsheets or summaries of calculations to show that each of its out-of-step blocking elements is set to allow tripping of phase protective relays for faults that occur during the loading conditions used to verify transmission line relay loadability per Requirement R1. (R2)
- M3.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider with transmission relays set according to Requirement R1, criterion 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, or 13 shall have evidence such as Facility Rating spreadsheets or Facility Rating database to show that it used the calculated circuit capability as the Facility Rating of the circuit and evidence such as dated correspondence that the resulting Facility Rating was agreed to by its associated Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator. (R3)
- M4.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Provider that sets transmission line relays according to Requirement R1, criterion 2 shall have evidence such as dated correspondence to show that it provided its Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with an updated list of circuits associated with those transmission line relays within the required timeframe. The updated list may either be a full list, a list of incremental changes to the previous list, or a statement that there are no changes to the previous list. (R4)
- M5.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Provider that sets transmission line relays according to Requirement R1, criterion 12 shall have evidence such as dated correspondence that it provided an updated list of the circuits associated with those relays to its Regional Entity within the required timeframe. The updated list may either be a full list, a list of incremental changes to the previous list, or a statement that there are no changes to the previous list. (R5)
- M6.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as power flow results, calculation summaries, or study reports that it used the criteria established within Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard as described in Requirement R6. The Planning Coordinator shall have a dated list of such circuits and shall have evidence such as dated correspondence that it provided the list to the Regional Entities, Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area within the required timeframe.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

- For entities that do not work for the Regional Entity, the Regional Entity shall serve as the Compliance Enforcement Authority.
- For functional entities that work for their Regional Entity, the ERO shall serve as the Compliance Enforcement Authority.

1.2. Data Retention

The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, Distribution Provider and Planning Coordinator shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

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The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall each retain documentation to demonstrate compliance with Requirements R1 through R5 for three calendar years.

The Planning Coordinator shall retain documentation of the most recent review process required in R6. The Planning Coordinator shall retain the most recent list of circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard, as determined per R6.

If a Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, Distribution Provider or Planning Coordinator is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until found compliant or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

The Compliance Monitor shall keep the last audit record and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes

- Compliance Audit
- Self-Certification
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Violation Investigation
- Self-Reporting
- Complaint

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

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2. Violation Severity Levels:

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|----------|------|--|
| R1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | <p>The responsible entity did not use any one of the following criteria (Requirement R1 criterion 1 through 13) for any specific circuit terminal to prevent its phase protective relay settings from limiting transmission system loadability while maintaining reliable protection of the Bulk Electric System for all fault conditions.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The responsible entity did not evaluate relay loadability at 0.85 per unit voltage and a power factor angle of 30 degrees.</p> |
| R2 | N/A | N/A | N/A | <p>The responsible entity failed to ensure that its out-of-step blocking elements allowed tripping of phase protective relays for faults that occur during the loading conditions used to verify transmission line relay loadability per Requirement R1.</p> |
| R3 | N/A | N/A | N/A | <p>The responsible entity that uses a circuit capability with the practical limitations described in Requirement R1 criterion 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, or 13 did not use the calculated circuit capability as the Facility Rating of the circuit.</p> <p>OR</p> |

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| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|--|--|--|
| | | | | The responsible entity did not obtain the agreement of the Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with the calculated circuit capability. |
| R4 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The responsible entity did not provide its Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with an updated list of circuits that have transmission line relays set according to the criteria established in Requirement R1 criterion 2 at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports. |
| R5 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The responsible entity did not provide its Regional Entity, with an updated list of circuits that have transmission line relays set according to the criteria established in Requirement R1 criterion 12 at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports. |
| R6 | N/A | The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met parts 6.1 and 6.2, but more than 15 months and less than 24 months lapsed between assessments. | The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met parts 6.1 and 6.2, but 24 months or more lapsed between assessments. | The Planning Coordinator failed to use the criteria established within Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard. OR The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within |

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| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|---|--|--|
| | | <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met 6.1 and 6.2 but failed to include the calendar year in which any criterion in Attachment B first applies.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met 6.1 and 6.2 but provided the list of circuits to the Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area between 31 days and 45 days after the list was established or updated. (part 6.2)</p> | <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met 6.1 and 6.2 but provided the list of circuits to the Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area between 46 days and 60 days after list was established or updated. (part 6.2)</p> | <p>Attachment B, at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard but failed to meet parts 6.1 and 6.2.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard but failed to maintain the list of circuits determined according to the process described in Requirement R6. (part 6.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met 6.1 but failed to provide the list of circuits to the Reliability Coordinators, Transmission</p> |

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| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|----------|------|--|
| | | | | <p>Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area or provided the list more than 60 days after the list was established or updated. (part 6.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator failed to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard.</p> |

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E. Regional Differences

None

F. Supplemental Technical Reference Document

1. The following document is an explanatory supplement to the standard. It provides the technical rationale underlying the requirements in this standard. The reference document contains methodology examples for illustration purposes it does not preclude other technically comparable methodologies

“Determination and Application of Practical Relaying Loadability Ratings,” Version 1.0, June 2008, prepared by the System Protection and Control Task Force of the NERC Planning Committee, available at: http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/Standards/Relay_Loadability_Reference_Doc_Clean_Final_2008July3.pdf

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|-------------|--|---|---|
| 1 | February 12, 2008 | Approved by Board of Trustees | New |
| 1 | March 19, 2008 | Corrected typo in last sentence of Severe VSL for Requirement 3 — “then” should be “than.” | Errata |
| 1 | March 18, 2010 | Approved by FERC | |
| 1 | Filed for approval April 19, 2010 | Changed VRF for R3 from Medium to High; changed VSLs for R1, R2, R3 to binary Severe to comply with Order 733 | Revision |
| 2 | March 10, 2011 approved by Board of Trustees | Revised to address initial set of directives from Order 733 | Revision (Project 2010-13) |
| 2 | March 15, 2012 | FERC order issued approving PRC-023-2 (approval becomes effective May 7, 2012) | |
| <u>2(X)</u> | <u>TBD</u> | <u>Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees</u> | <u>Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS</u> |

Standard PRC-023-2(X) — Transmission Relay Loadability

PRC-023 — Attachment A

1. This standard includes any protective functions which could trip with or without time delay, on load current, including but not limited to:
 - 1.1. Phase distance.
 - 1.2. Out-of-step tripping.
 - 1.3. Switch-on-to-fault.
 - 1.4. Overcurrent relays.
 - 1.5. Communications aided protection schemes including but not limited to:
 - 1.5.1 Permissive overreach transfer trip (POTT).
 - 1.5.2 Permissive under-reach transfer trip (PUTT).
 - 1.5.3 Directional comparison blocking (DCB).
 - 1.5.4 Directional comparison unblocking (DCUB).
 - 1.6. Phase overcurrent supervisory elements (i.e., phase fault detectors) associated with current-based, communication-assisted schemes (i.e., pilot wire, phase comparison, and line current differential) where the scheme is capable of tripping for loss of communications.
2. The following protection systems are excluded from requirements of this standard:
 - 2.1. Relay elements that are only enabled when other relays or associated systems fail. For example:
 - Overcurrent elements that are only enabled during loss of potential conditions.
 - Elements that are only enabled during a loss of communications except as noted in section 1.6
 - 2.2. Protection systems intended for the detection of ground fault conditions.
 - 2.3. Protection systems intended for protection during stable power swings.
 - 2.4. Generator protection relays that are susceptible to load.
 - 2.5. Relay elements used only for Remedial Action Schemes applied and approved in accordance with NERC Reliability Standards PRC-012 through PRC-017 or their successors.
 - 2.6. Protection systems that are designed only to respond in time periods which allow 15 minutes or greater to respond to overload conditions.
 - 2.7. Thermal emulation relays which are used in conjunction with dynamic Facility Ratings.
 - 2.8. Relay elements associated with dc lines.
 - 2.9. Relay elements associated with dc converter transformers.

Deleted: Special Protection System

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PRC-023 — Attachment B

Circuits to Evaluate

- Transmission lines operated at 100 kV to 200 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 100 kV to 200 kV.
- Transmission lines operated below 100 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected below 100 kV that are part of the BES.

Criteria

If any of the following criteria apply to a circuit, the applicable entity must comply with the standard for that circuit.

- B1.** The circuit is a monitored Facility of a permanent flowgate in the Eastern Interconnection, a major transfer path within the Western Interconnection as defined by the Regional Entity, or a comparable monitored Facility in the Québec Interconnection, that has been included to address reliability concerns for loading of that circuit, as confirmed by the applicable Planning Coordinator.
- B2.** The circuit is a monitored Facility of an IROL, where the IROL was determined in the planning horizon pursuant to FAC-010.
- B3.** The circuit forms a path (as agreed to by the Generator Operator and the transmission entity) to supply off-site power to a nuclear plant as established in the Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements (NPIRs) pursuant to NUC-001.
- B4.** The circuit is identified through the following sequence of power flow analyses⁴ performed by the Planning Coordinator for the one-to-five-year planning horizon:
- a. Simulate double contingency combinations selected by engineering judgment, without manual system adjustments in between the two contingencies (reflects a situation where a System Operator may not have time between the two contingencies to make appropriate system adjustments).
 - b. For circuits operated between 100 kV and 200 kV evaluate the post-contingency loading, in consultation with the Facility owner, against a threshold based on the Facility Rating assigned for that circuit and used in the power flow case by the Planning Coordinator.
 - c. When more than one Facility Rating for that circuit is available in the power flow case, the threshold for selection will be based on the Facility Rating for the loading duration nearest four hours.
 - d. The threshold for selection of the circuit will vary based on the loading duration assumed in the development of the Facility Rating.

⁴ Past analyses may be used to support the assessment if no material changes to the system have occurred since the last assessment

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- i. If the Facility Rating is based on a loading duration of up to and including four hours, the circuit must comply with the standard if the loading exceeds 115% of the Facility Rating.
 - ii. If the Facility Rating is based on a loading duration greater than four and up to and including eight hours, the circuit must comply with the standard if the loading exceeds 120% of the Facility Rating.
 - iii. If the Facility Rating is based on a loading duration of greater than eight hours, the circuit must comply with the standard if the loading exceeds 130% of the Facility Rating.
- e. Radially operated circuits serving only load are excluded.
- B5.** The circuit is selected by the Planning Coordinator based on technical studies or assessments, other than those specified in criteria B1 through B4, in consultation with the Facility owner.
- B6.** The circuit is mutually agreed upon for inclusion by the Planning Coordinator and the Facility owner.

A. Introduction

- 1. Title:** Transmission Relay Loadability
- 2. Number:** PRC-023-3(X)
- 3. Purpose:** Protective relay settings shall not limit transmission loadability; not interfere with system operators' ability to take remedial action to protect system reliability and; be set to reliably detect all fault conditions and protect the electrical network from these faults.
- 4. Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Functional Entity:**
 - 4.1.1** Transmission Owner with load-responsive phase protection systems as described in PRC-023-3(X) - Attachment A, applied at the terminals of the circuits defined in 4.2.1 (*Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 – R5*).
 - 4.1.2** Generator Owner with load-responsive phase protection systems as described in PRC-023-3(X) - Attachment A, applied at the terminals of the circuits defined in 4.2.1 (*Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 – R5*).
 - 4.1.3** Distribution Provider with load-responsive phase protection systems as described in PRC-023-3(X) - Attachment A, applied at the terminals of the circuits defined in 4.2.1 (*Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 – R5*), provided those circuits have bi-directional flow capabilities.
 - 4.1.4** Planning Coordinator
 - 4.2. Circuits:**
 - 4.2.1 Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 – R5:**
 - 4.2.1.1** Transmission lines operated at 200 kV and above, except Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant loads.
 - 4.2.1.2** Transmission lines operated at 100 kV to 200 kV selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with Requirement R6.
 - 4.2.1.3** Transmission lines operated below 100 kV that are part of the BES and selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with Requirement R6.
 - 4.2.1.4** Transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 200 kV and above.
 - 4.2.1.5** Transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 100 kV to 200 kV selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with Requirement R6.
 - 4.2.1.6** Transformers with low voltage terminals connected below 100 kV that are part of the BES and selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with Requirement R6.
 - 4.2.2 Circuits Subject to Requirement R6:**
 - 4.2.2.1** Transmission lines operated at 100 kV to 200 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 100 kV to 200 kV, except Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant loads.

4.2.2.2 Transmission lines operated below 100 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected below 100 kV that are part of the BES, except Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant loads.

- 5. Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

R1. Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall use any one of the following criteria (Requirement R1, criteria 1 through 13) for any specific circuit terminal to prevent its phase protective relay settings from limiting transmission system loadability while maintaining reliable protection of the BES for all fault conditions. Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall evaluate relay loadability at 0.85 per unit voltage and a power factor angle of 30 degrees. [*Violation Risk Factor: High*] [*Time Horizon: Long Term Planning*].

Criteria:

- 1.** Set transmission line relays so they do not operate at or below 150% of the highest seasonal Facility Rating of a circuit, for the available defined loading duration nearest 4 hours (expressed in amperes).
- 2.** Set transmission line relays so they do not operate at or below 115% of the highest seasonal 15-minute Facility Rating¹ of a circuit (expressed in amperes).
- 3.** Set transmission line relays so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum theoretical power transfer capability (using a 90-degree angle between the sending-end and receiving-end voltages and either reactance or complex impedance) of the circuit (expressed in amperes) using one of the following to perform the power transfer calculation:
 - An infinite source (zero source impedance) with a 1.00 per unit bus voltage at each end of the line.
 - An impedance at each end of the line, which reflects the actual system source impedance with a 1.05 per unit voltage behind each source impedance.
- 4.** Set transmission line relays on series compensated transmission lines so they do not operate at or below the maximum power transfer capability of the line, determined as the greater of:
 - 115% of the highest emergency rating of the series capacitor.
 - 115% of the maximum power transfer capability of the circuit (expressed in amperes), calculated in accordance with Requirement R1, criterion 3, using the full line inductive reactance.

¹ When a 15-minute rating has been calculated and published for use in real-time operations, the 15-minute rating can be used to establish the loadability requirement for the protective relays.

5. Set transmission line relays on weak source systems so they do not operate at or below 170% of the maximum end-of-line three-phase fault magnitude (expressed in amperes).
6. Not used.
7. Set transmission line relays applied at the load center terminal, remote from generation stations, so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum current flow from the load to the generation source under any system configuration.
8. Set transmission line relays applied on the bulk system-end of transmission lines that serve load remote to the system so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum current flow from the system to the load under any system configuration.
9. Set transmission line relays applied on the load-end of transmission lines that serve load remote to the bulk system so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum current flow from the load to the system under any system configuration.
10. Set transformer fault protection relays and transmission line relays on transmission lines terminated only with a transformer so that the relays do not operate at or below the greater of:
 - 150% of the applicable maximum transformer nameplate rating (expressed in amperes), including the forced cooled ratings corresponding to all installed supplemental cooling equipment.
 - 115% of the highest operator established emergency transformer rating.
- 10.1 Set load-responsive transformer fault protection relays, if used, such that the protection settings do not expose the transformer to a fault level and duration that exceeds the transformer's mechanical withstand capability².
11. For transformer overload protection relays that do not comply with the loadability component of Requirement R1, criterion 10 set the relays according to one of the following:
 - Set the relays to allow the transformer to be operated at an overload level of at least 150% of the maximum applicable nameplate rating, or 115% of the highest operator established emergency transformer rating, whichever is greater, for at least 15 minutes to provide time for the operator to take controlled action to relieve the overload.
 - Install supervision for the relays using either a top oil or simulated winding hot spot temperature element set no less than 100° C for the top oil temperature or no less than 140° C for the winding hot spot temperature³.
12. When the desired transmission line capability is limited by the requirement to adequately protect the transmission line, set the transmission line distance relays to a maximum of 125% of the apparent impedance (at the impedance angle of the transmission line) subject to the following constraints:
 - a. Set the maximum torque angle (MTA) to 90 degrees or the highest supported by the manufacturer.

² As illustrated by the “dotted line” in IEEE C57.109-1993 - *IEEE Guide for Liquid-Immersed Transformer Through-Fault-Current Duration*, Clause 4.4, Figure 4.

³ IEEE standard C57.91, Tables 7 and 8, specify that transformers are to be designed to withstand a winding hot spot temperature of 180 degrees C, and Annex A cautions that bubble formation may occur above 140 degrees C.

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- b. Evaluate the relay loadability in amperes at the relay trip point at 0.85 per unit voltage and a power factor angle of 30 degrees.
 - c. Include a relay setting component of 87% of the current calculated in Requirement R1, criterion 12 in the Facility Rating determination for the circuit.
- 13.** Where other situations present practical limitations on circuit capability, set the phase protection relays so they do not operate at or below 115% of such limitations.
- R2.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall set its out-of-step blocking elements to allow tripping of phase protective relays for faults that occur during the loading conditions used to verify transmission line relay loadability per Requirement R1. *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- R3.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that uses a circuit capability with the practical limitations described in Requirement R1, criterion 7, 8, 9, 12, or 13 shall use the calculated circuit capability as the Facility Rating of the circuit and shall obtain the agreement of the Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with the calculated circuit capability. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- R4.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that chooses to use Requirement R1 criterion 2 as the basis for verifying transmission line relay loadability shall provide its Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with an updated list of circuits associated with those transmission line relays at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports. *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- R5.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that sets transmission line relays according to Requirement R1 criterion 12 shall provide an updated list of the circuits associated with those relays to its Regional Entity at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports, to allow the ERO to compile a list of all circuits that have protective relay settings that limit circuit capability. *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- R6.** Each Planning Coordinator shall conduct an assessment at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments, by applying the criteria in PRC-023-3(X), Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers must comply with Requirements R1 through R5. The Planning Coordinator shall: *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- 6.1** Maintain a list of circuits subject to PRC-023-3(X) per application of Attachment B, including identification of the first calendar year in which any criterion in PRC-023-3(X), Attachment B applies.
 - 6.2** Provide the list of circuits to all Regional Entities, Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area within 30 calendar days of the establishment of the initial list and within 30 calendar days of any changes to that list.

C. Measures

- M1.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall have evidence such as spreadsheets or summaries of calculations to show that each of its transmission relays is

set according to one of the criteria in Requirement R1, criterion 1 through 13 and shall have evidence such as coordination curves or summaries of calculations that show that relays set per criterion 10 do not expose the transformer to fault levels and durations beyond those indicated in the standard. (R1)

- M2.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall have evidence such as spreadsheets or summaries of calculations to show that each of its out-of-step blocking elements is set to allow tripping of phase protective relays for faults that occur during the loading conditions used to verify transmission line relay loadability per Requirement R1. (R2)
- M3.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider with transmission relays set according to Requirement R1, criterion 7, 8, 9, 12, or 13 shall have evidence such as Facility Rating spreadsheets or Facility Rating database to show that it used the calculated circuit capability as the Facility Rating of the circuit and evidence such as dated correspondence that the resulting Facility Rating was agreed to by its associated Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator. (R3)
- M4.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Provider that sets transmission line relays according to Requirement R1, criterion 2 shall have evidence such as dated correspondence to show that it provided its Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with an updated list of circuits associated with those transmission line relays within the required timeframe. The updated list may either be a full list, a list of incremental changes to the previous list, or a statement that there are no changes to the previous list. (R4)
- M5.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Provider that sets transmission line relays according to Requirement R1, criterion 12 shall have evidence such as dated correspondence that it provided an updated list of the circuits associated with those relays to its Regional Entity within the required timeframe. The updated list may either be a full list, a list of incremental changes to the previous list, or a statement that there are no changes to the previous list. (R5)
- M6.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as power flow results, calculation summaries, or study reports that it used the criteria established within PRC-023-3(X), Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard as described in Requirement R6. The Planning Coordinator shall have a dated list of such circuits and shall have evidence such as dated correspondence that it provided the list to the Regional Entities, Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area within the required timeframe. (R6)

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, “Compliance Enforcement Authority” means NERC or the Regional Entity in their respective roles of monitoring and enforcing compliance with the NERC Reliability Standards.

1.2. Data Retention

The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, Distribution Provider and Planning Coordinator shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall each retain documentation to demonstrate compliance with Requirements R1 through R5 for three calendar years.

The Planning Coordinator shall retain documentation of the most recent review process required in Requirement R6. The Planning Coordinator shall retain the most recent list of circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard, as determined per Requirement R6.

If a Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, Distribution Provider, or Planning Coordinator is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until found compliant or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit record and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes

- Compliance Audit
- Self-Certification
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Violation Investigation
- Self-Reporting
- Complaint

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Violation Severity Levels:

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|----------|------|---|
| R1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | <p>The responsible entity did not use any one of the following criteria (Requirement R1 criterion 1 through 13) for any specific circuit terminal to prevent its phase protective relay settings from limiting transmission system loadability while maintaining reliable protection of the BES for all fault conditions.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The responsible entity did not evaluate relay loadability at 0.85 per unit voltage and a power factor angle of 30 degrees.</p> |
| R2 | N/A | N/A | N/A | <p>The responsible entity failed to ensure that its out-of-step blocking elements allowed tripping of phase protective relays for faults that occur during the loading conditions used to verify transmission line relay loadability per Requirement R1.</p> |
| R3 | N/A | N/A | N/A | <p>The responsible entity that uses a circuit capability with the practical limitations described in Requirement R1 criterion 7, 8, 9, 12, or 13 did not use the calculated circuit capability as the Facility Rating of the circuit.</p> |

Standard PRC-023-3(X) — Transmission Relay Loadability

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|---|---|--|
| | | | | OR The responsible entity did not obtain the agreement of the Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with the calculated circuit capability. |
| R4 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The responsible entity did not provide its Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with an updated list of circuits that have transmission line relays set according to the criteria established in Requirement R1 criterion 2 at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports. |
| R5 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The responsible entity did not provide its Regional Entity, with an updated list of circuits that have transmission line relays set according to the criteria established in Requirement R1 criterion 12 at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports. |
| R6 | N/A | The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met parts 6.1 and 6.2, but more | The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met parts 6.1 and 6.2, but 24 | The Planning Coordinator failed to use the criteria established within Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard. |

Standard PRC-023-3(X) — Transmission Relay Loadability

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|---|--|---|
| | | <p>than 15 months and less than 24 months lapsed between assessments.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met 6.1 and 6.2 but failed to include the calendar year in which any criterion in Attachment B first applies.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met 6.1 and 6.2 but provided the list of circuits to the Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area between 31 days and 45 days after</p> | <p>months or more lapsed between assessments.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met 6.1 and 6.2 but provided the list of circuits to the Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area between 46 days and 60 days after list was established or updated. (part 6.2)</p> | <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B, at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard but failed to meet parts 6.1 and 6.2.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard but failed to maintain the list of circuits determined according to the process described in Requirement R6. (part 6.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met</p> |

Standard PRC-023-3(X) — Transmission Relay Loadability

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|--|------|---|
| | | <p>the list was established or updated. (part 6.2)</p> | | <p>6.1 but failed to provide the list of circuits to the Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area or provided the list more than 60 days after the list was established or updated. (part 6.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator failed to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard.</p> |

E. Regional Differences

None.

F. Supplemental Technical Reference Document

1. The following document is an explanatory supplement to the standard. It provides the technical rationale underlying the requirements in this standard. The reference document contains methodology examples for illustration purposes it does not preclude other technically comparable methodologies.

“Determination and Application of Practical Relaying Loadability Ratings,” Version 1.0, June 2008, prepared by the System Protection and Control Task Force of the NERC Planning Committee, available at:

http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/Standards/Relay_Loadability_Reference_Doc_Clean_Final_2008July3.pdf

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|--|---|---|
| 1 | February 12, 2008 | Approved by Board of Trustees | New |
| 1 | March 19, 2008 | Corrected typo in last sentence of Severe VSL for Requirement 3 — “then” should be “than.” | Errata |
| 1 | March 18, 2010 | Approved by FERC | |
| 1 | Filed for approval April 19, 2010 | Changed VRF for R3 from Medium to High; changed VSLs for R1, R2, R3 to binary Severe to comply with Order 733 | Revision |
| 2 | March 10, 2011 approved by Board of Trustees | Revised to address initial set of directives from Order 733 | Revision (Project 2010-13) |
| 2 | March 15, 2012 | FERC order issued approving PRC-023-2 (approval becomes effective May 7, 2012) | |
| 3 | November 7, 2013 | Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees | Supplemental SAR to Clarify applicability for consistency with PRC-025-1 and other minor corrections. |

Standard PRC-023-3(X) — Transmission Relay Loadability

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|------|---------------------------------------|--|
| 3(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

PRC-023-3(X) — Attachment A

1. This standard includes any protective functions which could trip with or without time delay, on load current, including but not limited to:
 - 1.1. Phase distance.
 - 1.2. Out-of-step tripping.
 - 1.3. Switch-on-to-fault.
 - 1.4. Overcurrent relays.
 - 1.5. Communications aided protection schemes including but not limited to:
 - 1.5.1 Permissive overreach transfer trip (POTT).
 - 1.5.2 Permissive under-reach transfer trip (PUTT).
 - 1.5.3 Directional comparison blocking (DCB).
 - 1.5.4 Directional comparison unblocking (DCUB).
 - 1.6. Phase overcurrent supervisory elements (i.e., phase fault detectors) associated with current-based, communication-assisted schemes (i.e., pilot wire, phase comparison, and line current differential) where the scheme is capable of tripping for loss of communications.
2. The following protection systems are excluded from requirements of this standard:
 - 2.1. Relay elements that are only enabled when other relays or associated systems fail. For example:
 - Overcurrent elements that are only enabled during loss of potential conditions.
 - Elements that are only enabled during a loss of communications except as noted in section 1.6.
 - 2.2. Protection systems intended for the detection of ground fault conditions.
 - 2.3. Protection systems intended for protection during stable power swings.
 - 2.4. Not used.
 - 2.5. Relay elements used only for Remedial Action Schemes applied and approved in accordance with NERC Reliability Standards PRC-012 through PRC-017 or their successors.
 - 2.6. Protection systems that are designed only to respond in time periods which allow 15 minutes or greater to respond to overload conditions.
 - 2.7. Thermal emulation relays which are used in conjunction with dynamic Facility Ratings.
 - 2.8. Relay elements associated with dc lines.
 - 2.9. Relay elements associated with dc converter transformers.

PRC-023-3(X) — Attachment B

Circuits to Evaluate

- Transmission lines operated at 100 kV to 200 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 100 kV to 200 kV.
- Transmission lines operated below 100 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected below 100 kV that are part of the Bulk Electric System.

Criteria

If any of the following criteria apply to a circuit, the applicable entity must comply with the standard for that circuit.

- B1.** The circuit is a monitored Facility of a permanent flowgate in the Eastern Interconnection, a major transfer path within the Western Interconnection as defined by the Regional Entity, or a comparable monitored Facility in the Québec Interconnection, that has been included to address reliability concerns for loading of that circuit, as confirmed by the applicable Planning Coordinator.
- B2.** The circuit is a monitored Facility of an Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit (IROL), where the IROL was determined in the planning horizon pursuant to FAC-010.
- B3.** The circuit forms a path (as agreed to by the Generator Operator and the transmission entity) to supply off-site power to a nuclear plant as established in the Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements (NPIRs) pursuant to NUC-001.
- B4.** The circuit is identified through the following sequence of power flow analyses⁴ performed by the Planning Coordinator for the one-to-five-year planning horizon:
- a. Simulate double contingency combinations selected by engineering judgment, without manual system adjustments in between the two contingencies (reflects a situation where a System Operator may not have time between the two contingencies to make appropriate system adjustments).
 - b. For circuits operated between 100 kV and 200 kV evaluate the post-contingency loading, in consultation with the Facility owner, against a threshold based on the Facility Rating assigned for that circuit and used in the power flow case by the Planning Coordinator.
 - c. When more than one Facility Rating for that circuit is available in the power flow case, the threshold for selection will be based on the Facility Rating for the loading duration nearest four hours.
 - d. The threshold for selection of the circuit will vary based on the loading duration assumed in the development of the Facility Rating.

⁴ Past analyses may be used to support the assessment if no material changes to the system have occurred since the last assessment

Standard PRC-023-3(X) — Transmission Relay Loadability

- i. If the Facility Rating is based on a loading duration of up to and including four hours, the circuit must comply with the standard if the loading exceeds 115% of the Facility Rating.
 - ii. If the Facility Rating is based on a loading duration greater than four and up to and including eight hours, the circuit must comply with the standard if the loading exceeds 120% of the Facility Rating.
 - iii. If the Facility Rating is based on a loading duration of greater than eight hours, the circuit must comply with the standard if the loading exceeds 130% of the Facility Rating.
- e. Radially operated circuits serving only load are excluded.
- B5.** The circuit is selected by the Planning Coordinator based on technical studies or assessments, other than those specified in criteria B1 through B4, in consultation with the Facility owner.
- B6.** The circuit is mutually agreed upon for inclusion by the Planning Coordinator and the Facility owner.

Standard PRC-023-3(X) — Transmission Relay Loadability

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Transmission Relay Loadability
2. **Number:** PRC-023-3(X)
3. **Purpose:** Protective relay settings shall not limit transmission loadability; not interfere with system operators' ability to take remedial action to protect system reliability and; be set to reliably detect all fault conditions and protect the electrical network from these faults.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. **Functional Entity:**
 - 4.1.1 Transmission Owner with load-responsive phase protection systems as described in PRC-023-3(X) - Attachment A, applied at the terminals of the circuits defined in 4.2.1 (*Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 – R5*).
 - 4.1.2 Generator Owner with load-responsive phase protection systems as described in PRC-023-3(X) - Attachment A, applied at the terminals of the circuits defined in 4.2.1 (*Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 – R5*).
 - 4.1.3 Distribution Provider with load-responsive phase protection systems as described in PRC-023-3(X) - Attachment A, applied at the terminals of the circuits defined in 4.2.1 (*Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 – R5*), provided those circuits have bi-directional flow capabilities.
 - 4.1.4 Planning Coordinator
 - 4.2. **Circuits:**
 - 4.2.1 **Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 – R5:**
 - 4.2.1.1 Transmission lines operated at 200 kV and above, except Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant loads.
 - 4.2.1.2 Transmission lines operated at 100 kV to 200 kV selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with Requirement R6.
 - 4.2.1.3 Transmission lines operated below 100 kV that are part of the BES and selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with Requirement R6.
 - 4.2.1.4 Transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 200 kV and above.
 - 4.2.1.5 Transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 100 kV to 200 kV selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with Requirement R6.
 - 4.2.1.6 Transformers with low voltage terminals connected below 100 kV that are part of the BES and selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with Requirement R6.
 - 4.2.2 **Circuits Subject to Requirement R6:**
 - 4.2.2.1 Transmission lines operated at 100 kV to 200 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 100 kV to 200 kV, except Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant loads.

Standard PRC-023-3(X) — Transmission Relay Loadability

4.2.2.2 Transmission lines operated below 100 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected below 100 kV that are part of the BES, except Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant loads.

5. Effective Date: This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Deleted: s

B. Requirements

R1. Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall use any one of the following criteria (Requirement R1, criteria 1 through 13) for any specific circuit terminal to prevent its phase protective relay settings from limiting transmission system loadability while maintaining reliable protection of the BES for all fault conditions. Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall evaluate relay loadability at 0.85 per unit voltage and a power factor angle of 30 degrees. [*Violation Risk Factor: High*] [*Time Horizon: Long Term Planning*].

Criteria:

1. Set transmission line relays so they do not operate at or below 150% of the highest seasonal Facility Rating of a circuit, for the available defined loading duration nearest 4 hours (expressed in amperes).
2. Set transmission line relays so they do not operate at or below 115% of the highest seasonal 15-minute Facility Rating¹ of a circuit (expressed in amperes).
3. Set transmission line relays so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum theoretical power transfer capability (using a 90-degree angle between the sending-end and receiving-end voltages and either reactance or complex impedance) of the circuit (expressed in amperes) using one of the following to perform the power transfer calculation:
 - An infinite source (zero source impedance) with a 1.00 per unit bus voltage at each end of the line.
 - An impedance at each end of the line, which reflects the actual system source impedance with a 1.05 per unit voltage behind each source impedance.
4. Set transmission line relays on series compensated transmission lines so they do not operate at or below the maximum power transfer capability of the line, determined as the greater of:
 - 115% of the highest emergency rating of the series capacitor.
 - 115% of the maximum power transfer capability of the circuit (expressed in amperes), calculated in accordance with Requirement R1, criterion 3, using the full line inductive reactance.

¹ When a 15-minute rating has been calculated and published for use in real-time operations, the 15-minute rating can be used to establish the loadability requirement for the protective relays.

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5. Set transmission line relays on weak source systems so they do not operate at or below 170% of the maximum end-of-line three-phase fault magnitude (expressed in amperes).
6. Not used.
7. Set transmission line relays applied at the load center terminal, remote from generation stations, so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum current flow from the load to the generation source under any system configuration.
8. Set transmission line relays applied on the bulk system-end of transmission lines that serve load remote to the system so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum current flow from the system to the load under any system configuration.
9. Set transmission line relays applied on the load-end of transmission lines that serve load remote to the bulk system so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum current flow from the load to the system under any system configuration.
10. Set transformer fault protection relays and transmission line relays on transmission lines terminated only with a transformer so that the relays do not operate at or below the greater of:
 - 150% of the applicable maximum transformer nameplate rating (expressed in amperes), including the forced cooled ratings corresponding to all installed supplemental cooling equipment.
 - 115% of the highest operator established emergency transformer rating.
- 10.1 Set load-responsive transformer fault protection relays, if used, such that the protection settings do not expose the transformer to a fault level and duration that exceeds the transformer's mechanical withstand capability².
11. For transformer overload protection relays that do not comply with the loadability component of Requirement R1, criterion 10 set the relays according to one of the following:
 - Set the relays to allow the transformer to be operated at an overload level of at least 150% of the maximum applicable nameplate rating, or 115% of the highest operator established emergency transformer rating, whichever is greater, for at least 15 minutes to provide time for the operator to take controlled action to relieve the overload.
 - Install supervision for the relays using either a top oil or simulated winding hot spot temperature element set no less than 100° C for the top oil temperature or no less than 140° C for the winding hot spot temperature³.
12. When the desired transmission line capability is limited by the requirement to adequately protect the transmission line, set the transmission line distance relays to a maximum of 125% of the apparent impedance (at the impedance angle of the transmission line) subject to the following constraints:
 - a. Set the maximum torque angle (MTA) to 90 degrees or the highest supported by the manufacturer.

² As illustrated by the "dotted line" in IEEE C57.109-1993 - *IEEE Guide for Liquid-Immersed Transformer Through-Fault-Current Duration*, Clause 4.4, Figure 4.

³ IEEE standard C57.91, Tables 7 and 8, specify that transformers are to be designed to withstand a winding hot spot temperature of 180 degrees C, and Annex A cautions that bubble formation may occur above 140 degrees C.

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- b. Evaluate the relay loadability in amperes at the relay trip point at 0.85 per unit voltage and a power factor angle of 30 degrees.
 - c. Include a relay setting component of 87% of the current calculated in Requirement R1, criterion 12 in the Facility Rating determination for the circuit.
- 13.** Where other situations present practical limitations on circuit capability, set the phase protection relays so they do not operate at or below 115% of such limitations.
- R2.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall set its out-of-step blocking elements to allow tripping of phase protective relays for faults that occur during the loading conditions used to verify transmission line relay loadability per Requirement R1. *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- R3.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that uses a circuit capability with the practical limitations described in Requirement R1, criterion 7, 8, 9, 12, or 13 shall use the calculated circuit capability as the Facility Rating of the circuit and shall obtain the agreement of the Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with the calculated circuit capability. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- R4.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that chooses to use Requirement R1 criterion 2 as the basis for verifying transmission line relay loadability shall provide its Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with an updated list of circuits associated with those transmission line relays at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports. *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- R5.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that sets transmission line relays according to Requirement R1 criterion 12 shall provide an updated list of the circuits associated with those relays to its Regional Entity at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports, to allow the ERO to compile a list of all circuits that have protective relay settings that limit circuit capability. *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- R6.** Each Planning Coordinator shall conduct an assessment at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments, by applying the criteria in PRC-023-3(X), Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers must comply with Requirements R1 through R5. The Planning Coordinator shall: *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- 6.1** Maintain a list of circuits subject to PRC-023-3(X) per application of Attachment B, including identification of the first calendar year in which any criterion in PRC-023-3(X), Attachment B applies.
 - 6.2** Provide the list of circuits to all Regional Entities, Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area within 30 calendar days of the establishment of the initial list and within 30 calendar days of any changes to that list.

C. Measures

- M1.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall have evidence such as spreadsheets or summaries of calculations to show that each of its transmission relays is

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set according to one of the criteria in Requirement R1, criterion 1 through 13 and shall have evidence such as coordination curves or summaries of calculations that show that relays set per criterion 10 do not expose the transformer to fault levels and durations beyond those indicated in the standard. (R1)

- M2.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall have evidence such as spreadsheets or summaries of calculations to show that each of its out-of-step blocking elements is set to allow tripping of phase protective relays for faults that occur during the loading conditions used to verify transmission line relay loadability per Requirement R1. (R2)
- M3.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider with transmission relays set according to Requirement R1, criterion 7, 8, 9, 12, or 13 shall have evidence such as Facility Rating spreadsheets or Facility Rating database to show that it used the calculated circuit capability as the Facility Rating of the circuit and evidence such as dated correspondence that the resulting Facility Rating was agreed to by its associated Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator. (R3)
- M4.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Provider that sets transmission line relays according to Requirement R1, criterion 2 shall have evidence such as dated correspondence to show that it provided its Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with an updated list of circuits associated with those transmission line relays within the required timeframe. The updated list may either be a full list, a list of incremental changes to the previous list, or a statement that there are no changes to the previous list. (R4)
- M5.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Provider that sets transmission line relays according to Requirement R1, criterion 12 shall have evidence such as dated correspondence to show that it provided an updated list of the circuits associated with those relays to its Regional Entity within the required timeframe. The updated list may either be a full list, a list of incremental changes to the previous list, or a statement that there are no changes to the previous list. (R5)
- M6.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as power flow results, calculation summaries, or study reports that it used the criteria established within PRC-023-3(X), Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard as described in Requirement R6. The Planning Coordinator shall have a dated list of such circuits and shall have evidence such as dated correspondence that it provided the list to the Regional Entities, Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area within the required timeframe. (R6)

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, “Compliance Enforcement Authority” means NERC or the Regional Entity in their respective roles of monitoring and enforcing compliance with the NERC Reliability Standards.

1.2. Data Retention

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The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, Distribution Provider and Planning Coordinator shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall each retain documentation to demonstrate compliance with Requirements R1 through R5 for three calendar years.

The Planning Coordinator shall retain documentation of the most recent review process required in Requirement R6. The Planning Coordinator shall retain the most recent list of circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard, as determined per Requirement R6.

If a Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, Distribution Provider, or Planning Coordinator is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until found compliant or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit record and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes

- Compliance Audit
- Self-Certification
- Spot Checking
- Compliance Violation Investigation
- Self-Reporting
- Complaint

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

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2. Violation Severity Levels:

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|----------|------|---|
| R1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | <p>The responsible entity did not use any one of the following criteria (Requirement R1 criterion 1 through 13) for any specific circuit terminal to prevent its phase protective relay settings from limiting transmission system loadability while maintaining reliable protection of the BES for all fault conditions.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The responsible entity did not evaluate relay loadability at 0.85 per unit voltage and a power factor angle of 30 degrees.</p> |
| R2 | N/A | N/A | N/A | <p>The responsible entity failed to ensure that its out-of-step blocking elements allowed tripping of phase protective relays for faults that occur during the loading conditions used to verify transmission line relay loadability per Requirement R1.</p> |
| R3 | N/A | N/A | N/A | <p>The responsible entity that uses a circuit capability with the practical limitations described in Requirement R1 criterion 7, 8, 9, 12, or 13 did not use the calculated circuit capability as the Facility Rating of the circuit.</p> |

Standard PRC-023-3(X) — Transmission Relay Loadability

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|---|---|--|
| | | | | OR The responsible entity did not obtain the agreement of the Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with the calculated circuit capability. |
| R4 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The responsible entity did not provide its Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with an updated list of circuits that have transmission line relays set according to the criteria established in Requirement R1 criterion 2 at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports. |
| R5 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The responsible entity did not provide its Regional Entity, with an updated list of circuits that have transmission line relays set according to the criteria established in Requirement R1 criterion 12 at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports. |
| R6 | N/A | The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met parts 6.1 and 6.2, but more | The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met parts 6.1 and 6.2, but 24 | The Planning Coordinator failed to use the criteria established within Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard. |

Standard PRC-023-3(X) — Transmission Relay Loadability

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|---|--|---|
| | | <p>than 15 months and less than 24 months lapsed between assessments.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met 6.1 and 6.2 but failed to include the calendar year in which any criterion in Attachment B first applies.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met 6.1 and 6.2 but provided the list of circuits to the Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area between 31 days and 45 days after</p> | <p>months or more lapsed between assessments.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met 6.1 and 6.2 but provided the list of circuits to the Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area between 46 days and 60 days after list was established or updated. (part 6.2)</p> | <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B, at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard but failed to meet parts 6.1 and 6.2.</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard but failed to maintain the list of circuits determined according to the process described in Requirement R6. (part 6.1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met</p> |

Standard PRC-023-3(X) — Transmission Relay Loadability

| Requirement | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|-------------|-------|---|------|---|
| | | the list was established or updated. (part 6.2) | | <p>6.1 but failed to provide the list of circuits to the Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area or provided the list more than 60 days after the list was established or updated. (part 6.2)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>The Planning Coordinator failed to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard.</p> |

Standard PRC-023-3(X) — Transmission Relay Loadability

E. Regional Differences

None.

F. Supplemental Technical Reference Document

1. The following document is an explanatory supplement to the standard. It provides the technical rationale underlying the requirements in this standard. The reference document contains methodology examples for illustration purposes it does not preclude other technically comparable methodologies.

“Determination and Application of Practical Relaying Loadability Ratings,” Version 1.0, June 2008, prepared by the System Protection and Control Task Force of the NERC Planning Committee, available at: http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/Standards/Relay_Loadability_Reference_Doc_Clean_Final_2008July3.pdf

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|--|---|---|
| 1 | February 12, 2008 | Approved by Board of Trustees | New |
| 1 | March 19, 2008 | Corrected typo in last sentence of Severe VSL for Requirement 3 — “then” should be “than.” | Errata |
| 1 | March 18, 2010 | Approved by FERC | |
| 1 | Filed for approval April 19, 2010 | Changed VRF for R3 from Medium to High; changed VSLs for R1, R2, R3 to binary Severe to comply with Order 733 | Revision |
| 2 | March 10, 2011 approved by Board of Trustees | Revised to address initial set of directives from Order 733 | Revision (Project 2010-13) |
| 2 | March 15, 2012 | FERC order issued approving PRC-023-2 (approval becomes effective May 7, 2012) | |
| 3 | November 7, 2013 | Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees | Supplemental SAR to Clarify applicability for consistency with PRC-025-1 and other minor corrections. |

Standard PRC-023-3(X) — Transmission Relay Loadability

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|-------------|------------|--|---|
| <u>3(X)</u> | <u>TBD</u> | <u>Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees</u> | <u>Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS</u> |

Standard PRC-023-3(X) — Transmission Relay Loadability

PRC-023-3(X) — Attachment A

1. This standard includes any protective functions which could trip with or without time delay, on load current, including but not limited to:
 - 1.1. Phase distance.
 - 1.2. Out-of-step tripping.
 - 1.3. Switch-on-to-fault.
 - 1.4. Overcurrent relays.
 - 1.5. Communications aided protection schemes including but not limited to:
 - 1.5.1 Permissive overreach transfer trip (POTT).
 - 1.5.2 Permissive under-reach transfer trip (PUTT).
 - 1.5.3 Directional comparison blocking (DCB).
 - 1.5.4 Directional comparison unblocking (DCUB).
 - 1.6. Phase overcurrent supervisory elements (i.e., phase fault detectors) associated with current-based, communication-assisted schemes (i.e., pilot wire, phase comparison, and line current differential) where the scheme is capable of tripping for loss of communications.
2. The following protection systems are excluded from requirements of this standard:
 - 2.1. Relay elements that are only enabled when other relays or associated systems fail. For example:
 - Overcurrent elements that are only enabled during loss of potential conditions.
 - Elements that are only enabled during a loss of communications except as noted in section 1.6.
 - 2.2. Protection systems intended for the detection of ground fault conditions.
 - 2.3. Protection systems intended for protection during stable power swings.
 - 2.4. Not used.
 - 2.5. Relay elements used only for [Remedial Action Schemes](#) applied and approved in accordance with NERC Reliability Standards PRC-012 through PRC-017 or their successors.
 - 2.6. Protection systems that are designed only to respond in time periods which allow 15 minutes or greater to respond to overload conditions.
 - 2.7. Thermal emulation relays which are used in conjunction with dynamic Facility Ratings.
 - 2.8. Relay elements associated with dc lines.
 - 2.9. Relay elements associated with dc converter transformers.

Deleted: Special Protection System

Standard PRC-023-3(X) — Transmission Relay Loadability

PRC-023-3(X) — Attachment B

Circuits to Evaluate

- Transmission lines operated at 100 kV to 200 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 100 kV to 200 kV.
- Transmission lines operated below 100 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected below 100 kV that are part of the Bulk Electric System.

Criteria

If any of the following criteria apply to a circuit, the applicable entity must comply with the standard for that circuit.

- B1.** The circuit is a monitored Facility of a permanent flowgate in the Eastern Interconnection, a major transfer path within the Western Interconnection as defined by the Regional Entity, or a comparable monitored Facility in the Québec Interconnection, that has been included to address reliability concerns for loading of that circuit, as confirmed by the applicable Planning Coordinator.
- B2.** The circuit is a monitored Facility of an Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit (IROL), where the IROL was determined in the planning horizon pursuant to FAC-010.
- B3.** The circuit forms a path (as agreed to by the Generator Operator and the transmission entity) to supply off-site power to a nuclear plant as established in the Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements (NPIRs) pursuant to NUC-001.
- B4.** The circuit is identified through the following sequence of power flow analyses⁴ performed by the Planning Coordinator for the one-to-five-year planning horizon:
 - a. Simulate double contingency combinations selected by engineering judgment, without manual system adjustments in between the two contingencies (reflects a situation where a System Operator may not have time between the two contingencies to make appropriate system adjustments).
 - b. For circuits operated between 100 kV and 200 kV evaluate the post-contingency loading, in consultation with the Facility owner, against a threshold based on the Facility Rating assigned for that circuit and used in the power flow case by the Planning Coordinator.
 - c. When more than one Facility Rating for that circuit is available in the power flow case, the threshold for selection will be based on the Facility Rating for the loading duration nearest four hours.
 - d. The threshold for selection of the circuit will vary based on the loading duration assumed in the development of the Facility Rating.

⁴ Past analyses may be used to support the assessment if no material changes to the system have occurred since the last assessment

Standard PRC-023-3(X) — Transmission Relay Loadability

- i. If the Facility Rating is based on a loading duration of up to and including four hours, the circuit must comply with the standard if the loading exceeds 115% of the Facility Rating.
 - ii. If the Facility Rating is based on a loading duration greater than four and up to and including eight hours, the circuit must comply with the standard if the loading exceeds 120% of the Facility Rating.
 - iii. If the Facility Rating is based on a loading duration of greater than eight hours, the circuit must comply with the standard if the loading exceeds 130% of the Facility Rating.
- e. Radially operated circuits serving only load are excluded.
- B5.** The circuit is selected by the Planning Coordinator based on technical studies or assessments, other than those specified in criteria B1 through B4, in consultation with the Facility owner.
- B6.** The circuit is mutually agreed upon for inclusion by the Planning Coordinator and the Facility owner.

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Generator Frequency and Voltage Protective Relay Settings
2. **Number:** PRC-024-1(X)
3. **Purpose:** Ensure Generator Owners set their generator protective relays such that generating units remain connected during defined frequency and voltage excursions.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Generator Owner

Effective Date: This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1.** Each Generator Owner that has generator frequency protective relaying¹ activated to trip its applicable generating unit(s) shall set its protective relaying such that the generator frequency protective relaying does not trip the applicable generating unit(s) within the “no trip zone” of PRC-024 Attachment 1, subject to the following exceptions: [*Violation Risk Factor: Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
- Generating unit(s) may trip if the protective functions (such as out-of-step functions or loss-of-field functions) operate due to an impending or actual loss of synchronism or, for asynchronous generating units, due to instability in power conversion control equipment.
 - Generating unit(s) may trip if clearing a system fault necessitates disconnecting (a) generating unit(s).
 - Generating unit(s) may trip within a portion of the “no trip zone” of PRC-024 Attachment 1 for documented and communicated regulatory or equipment limitations in accordance with Requirement R3.
- R2.** Each Generator Owner that has generator voltage protective relaying¹ activated to trip its applicable generating unit(s) shall set its protective relaying such that the generator voltage protective relaying does not trip the applicable generating unit(s) as a result of a voltage excursion (at the point of interconnection²) caused by an event on the

¹ Each Generator Owner is not required to have frequency or voltage protective relaying (including but not limited to frequency and voltage protective functions for discrete relays, volts per hertz relays evaluated at nominal frequency, multi-function protective devices or protective functions within control systems that directly trip or provide tripping signals to the generator based on frequency or voltage inputs) installed or activated on its unit.

² For the purposes of this standard, point of interconnection means the transmission (high voltage) side of the generator step-up or collector transformer.

transmission system external to the generating plant that remains within the “no trip zone” of PRC-024 Attachment 2. If the Transmission Planner allows less stringent voltage relay settings than those required to meet PRC-024 Attachment 2, then the Generator Owner shall set its protective relaying within the voltage recovery characteristics of a location-specific Transmission Planner’s study. Requirement R2 is subject to the following exceptions: *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*

- Generating unit(s) may trip in accordance with a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS).
- Generating unit(s) may trip if clearing a system fault necessitates disconnecting (a) generating unit(s).
- Generating unit(s) may trip by action of protective functions (such as out-of-step functions or loss-of-field functions) that operate due to an impending or actual loss of synchronism or, for asynchronous generating units, due to instability in power conversion control equipment.
- Generating unit(s) may trip within a portion of the “no trip zone” of PRC-024 Attachment 2 for documented and communicated regulatory or equipment limitations in accordance with Requirement R3.

R3. Each Generator Owner shall document each known regulatory or equipment limitation³ that prevents an applicable generating unit with generator frequency or voltage protective relays from meeting the relay setting criteria in Requirements R1 or R2 including (but not limited to) study results, experience from an actual event, or manufacturer’s advice. *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*

3.1. The Generator Owner shall communicate the documented regulatory or equipment limitation, or the removal of a previously documented regulatory or equipment limitation, to its Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner within 30 calendar days of any of the following:

- Identification of a regulatory or equipment limitation.
- Repair of the equipment causing the limitation that removes the limitation.
- Replacement of the equipment causing the limitation with equipment that removes the limitation.
- Creation or adjustment of an equipment limitation caused by consumption of the cumulative turbine life-time frequency excursion allowance.

R4. Each Generator Owner shall provide its applicable generator protection trip settings associated with Requirements R1 and R2 to the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner that models the associated unit within 60 calendar days of receipt of a written request for the data and within 60 calendar days of any change to those previously requested trip settings unless directed by the requesting Planning Coordinator or

³ Excludes limitations that are caused by the setting capability of the generator frequency and voltage protective relays themselves but does not exclude limitations originating in the equipment that they protect.

Transmission Planner that the reporting of relay setting changes is not required.
[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]

C. Measures

- M1.** Each Generator Owner shall have evidence that generator frequency protective relays have been set in accordance with Requirement R1 such as dated setting sheets, calibration sheets or other documentation.
- M2.** Each Generator Owner shall have evidence that generator voltage protective relays have been set in accordance with Requirement R2 such as dated setting sheets, voltage-time curves, calibration sheets, coordination plots, dynamic simulation studies or other documentation.
- M3.** Each Generator Owner shall have evidence that it has documented and communicated any known regulatory or equipment limitations (excluding limitations noted in footnote 3) that resulted in an exception to Requirements R1 or R2 in accordance with Requirement R3 such as a dated email or letter that contains such documentation as study results, experience from an actual event, or manufacturer’s advice.
- M4.** Each Generator Owner shall have evidence that it communicated applicable generator protective relay trip settings in accordance with Requirement R4, such as dated e-mails, correspondence or other evidence and copies of any requests it has received for that information.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

The Regional Entity shall serve as the Compliance Enforcement Authority (CEA) unless the applicable entity is owned, operated, or controlled by the Regional Entity. In such cases, the ERO or a Regional Entity approved by FERC or other applicable governmental authority shall serve as the CEA.

1.1. Data Retention

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Generator Owner shall retain evidence of compliance with Requirement R1 through R4; for 3 years or until the next audit, whichever is longer.

If a Generator Owner is found non-compliant, the Generator Owner shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved for the time period specified above, whichever is longer.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes

Compliance Audit

Self-Certification

Spot Checking

Compliance Investigation

Self-Reporting

Complaint

1.3. Additional Compliance Information

None

Standard PRC-024-1(X) — Generator Frequency and Voltage Protective Relay Settings

2. Violation Severity Levels

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|------------|---|---|---|---|
| R1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Generator Owner that has frequency protection activated to trip a generating unit, failed to set its generator frequency protective relaying so that it does not trip within the criteria listed in Requirement R1 unless there is a documented and communicated regulatory or equipment limitation per Requirement R3. |
| R2 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Generator Owner with voltage protective relaying activated to trip a generating unit, failed to set its voltage protective relaying so that it does not trip as a result of a voltage excursion at the point of interconnection, caused by an event external to the plant per the criteria specified in Requirement R2 unless there is a documented and communicated regulatory or equipment limitation per Requirement R3. |
| R3 | The Generator Owner documented the known non-protection system equipment limitation that prevented it from meeting the criteria in Requirement R1 or R2 and communicated the documented | The Generator Owner documented the known non-protection system equipment limitation that prevented it from meeting the criteria in Requirement R1 or R2 and communicated the documented | The Generator Owner documented the known non-protection system equipment limitation that prevented it from meeting the criteria in Requirement R1 or R2 and communicated the documented | The Generator Owner failed to document any known non-protection system equipment limitation that prevented it from meeting the criteria in Requirement R1 or R2. |

Standard PRC-024-1(X) — Generator Frequency and Voltage Protective Relay Settings

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----------|---|---|---|---|
| | limitation to its Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner more than 30 calendar days but less than or equal to 60 calendar days of identifying the limitation. | limitation to its Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner more than 60 calendar days but less than or equal to 90 calendar days of identifying the limitation. | limitation to its Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days of identifying the limitation. | OR The Generator Owner failed to communicate the documented limitation to its Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner within 120 calendar days of identifying the limitation. |
| R4 | The Generator Owner provided its generator protection trip settings more than 60 calendar days but less than or equal to 90 calendar days of any change to those trip settings. OR The Generator Owner provided trip settings more than 60 calendar days but less than or equal to 90 calendar days of a written request. | The Generator Owner provided its generator protection trip settings more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days of any change to those trip settings. OR The Generator Owner provided trip settings more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days of a written request. | The Generator Owner provided its generator protection trip settings more than 120 calendar days but less than or equal to 150 calendar days of any change to those trip settings. OR The Generator Owner provided trip settings more than 120 calendar days but less than or equal to 150 calendar days of a written request. | The Generator Owner failed to provide its generator protection trip settings within 150 calendar days of any change to those trip settings. OR The Generator Owner failed to provide trip settings within 150 calendar days of a written request. |

E. Regional Variances

None

F. Associated Documents

None

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|-------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------|
| 1 | May 9, 2013 | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | |

Standard PRC-024-1(X) — Generator Frequency and Voltage Protective Relay Settings


| | | | |
|------|----------------|---|--|
| 1 | March 20, 2014 | FERC Order issued approving PRC-024-1. (Order becomes effective on 7/1/16.) | |
| 1(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

G. References

1. “The Technical Justification for the New WECC Voltage Ride-Through (VRT) Standard, A White Paper Developed by the Wind Generation Task Force (WGTF),” dated June 13, 2007, a guideline approved by WECC Technical Studies Subcommittee.

PRC-024 — Attachment 1

OFF NOMINAL FREQUENCY CAPABILITY CURVE



Curve Data Points:

Eastern Interconnection

| High Frequency Duration | | Low Frequency Duration | |
|-------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| Frequency (Hz) | Time (Sec) | Frequency (Hz) | Time (sec) |
| ≥61.8 | Instantaneous trip | ≤57.8 | Instantaneous trip |
| ≥60.5 | $10^{(90.935-1.45713*f)}$ | ≤59.5 | $10^{(1.7373*f-100.116)}$ |
| <60.5 | Continuous operation | > 59.5 | Continuous operation |

Standard PRC-024-1(X) — Generator Frequency and Voltage Protective Relay Settings

Western Interconnection

| High Frequency Duration | | Low Frequency Duration | |
|-------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| Frequency (Hz) | Time (Sec) | Frequency (Hz) | Time (sec) |
| ≥61.7 | Instantaneous trip | ≤57.0 | Instantaneous trip |
| ≥61.6 | 30 | ≤57.3 | 0.75 |
| ≥60.6 | 180 | ≤57.8 | 7.5 |
| <60.6 | Continuous operation | ≤58.4 | 30 |
| | | ≤59.4 | 180 |
| | | >59.4 | Continuous operation |


Quebec Interconnection

| High Frequency Duration | | Low Frequency Duration | |
|-------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| Frequency (Hz) | Time (Sec) | Frequency (Hz) | Time (Sec) |
| >66.0 | Instantaneous trip | <55.5 | Instantaneous trip |
| ≥63.0 | 5 | ≤56.5 | 0.35 |
| ≥61.5 | 90 | ≤57.0 | 2 |
| ≥60.6 | 660 | ≤57.5 | 10 |
| <60.6 | Continuous operation | ≤58.5 | 90 |
| | | ≤59.4 | 660 |
| | | >59.4 | Continuous operation |

ERCOT Interconnection

| High Frequency Duration | | Low Frequency Duration | |
|-------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| Frequency (Hz) | Time (Sec) | Frequency (Hz) | Time (sec) |
| ≥61.8 | Instantaneous trip | ≤57.5 | Instantaneous trip |
| ≥61.6 | 30 | ≤58.0 | 2 |
| ≥60.6 | 540 | ≤58.4 | 30 |
| <60.6 | Continuous operation | ≤59.4 | 540 |
| | | >59.4 | Continuous operation |

PRC-024— Attachment 2



Ride Through Duration:

| High Voltage Ride Through Duration | | Low Voltage Ride Through Duration | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|------------|
| Voltage (pu) | Time (sec) | Voltage (pu) | Time (sec) |
| ≥1.200 | Instantaneous trip | <0.45 | 0.15 |
| ≥1.175 | 0.20 | <0.65 | 0.30 |
| ≥1.15 | 0.50 | <0.75 | 2.00 |
| ≥1.10 | 1.00 | <0.90 | 3.00 |

Voltage Ride-Through Curve Clarifications

Curve Details:

1. The per unit voltage base for these curves is the nominal operating voltage specified by the Transmission Planner in the analysis of the reliability of the Interconnected Transmission Systems at the point of interconnection to the Bulk Electric System (BES).
2. The curves depicted were derived based on three-phase transmission system zone 1 faults with Normal Clearing not exceeding 9 cycles. The curves apply to voltage excursions regardless of the type of initiating event.
3. The envelope within the curves represents the cumulative voltage duration at the point of interconnection with the BES. For example, if the voltage first exceeds 1.15 pu at 0.3 seconds after a fault, does not exceed 1.2 pu voltage, and returns below 1.15 pu at 0.4 seconds, then the cumulative time the voltage is above 1.15 pu voltage is 0.1 seconds and is within the no trip zone of the curve.
4. The curves depicted assume system frequency is 60 Hertz. When evaluating Volts/Hertz protection, you may adjust the magnitude of the high voltage curve in proportion to deviations of frequency below 60 Hz.
5. Voltages in the curve assume minimum fundamental frequency phase-to-ground or phase-to-phase voltage for the low voltage duration curve and the greater of maximum RMS or crest phase-to-phase voltage for the high voltage duration curve.

Evaluating Protective Relay Settings:

1. Use either the following assumptions or loading conditions that are believed to be the most probable for the unit under study to evaluate voltage protection relay setting calculations on the static case for steady state initial conditions:
 - a. All of the units connected to the same transformer are online and operating.
 - b. All of the units are at full nameplate real-power output.
 - c. Power factor is 0.95 lagging (i.e. supplying reactive power to the system) as measured at the generator terminals.
 - d. The automatic voltage regulator is in automatic voltage control mode.
2. Evaluate voltage protection relay settings assuming that additional installed generating plant reactive support equipment (such as static VAr compensators, synchronous condensers, or capacitors) is available and operating normally.
3. Evaluate voltage protection relay settings accounting for the actual tap settings of transformers between the generator terminals and the point of interconnection.

Standard PRC-024-1(X) — Generator Frequency and Voltage Protective Relay Settings

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Generator Frequency and Voltage Protective Relay Settings
2. **Number:** PRC-024-1(X)
3. **Purpose:** Ensure Generator Owners set their generator protective relays such that generating units remain connected during defined frequency and voltage excursions.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Generator Owner

Effective Date: This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1. Each Generator Owner that has generator frequency protective relaying¹ activated to trip its applicable generating unit(s) shall set its protective relaying such that the generator frequency protective relaying does not trip the applicable generating unit(s) within the “no trip zone” of PRC-024 Attachment 1, subject to the following exceptions: *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
 - Generating unit(s) may trip if the protective functions (such as out-of-step functions or loss-of-field functions) operate due to an impending or actual loss of synchronism or, for asynchronous generating units, due to instability in power conversion control equipment.
 - Generating unit(s) may trip if clearing a system fault necessitates disconnecting (a) generating unit(s).
 - Generating unit(s) may trip within a portion of the “no trip zone” of PRC-024 Attachment 1 for documented and communicated regulatory or equipment limitations in accordance with Requirement R3.
- R2. Each Generator Owner that has generator voltage protective relaying¹ activated to trip its applicable generating unit(s) shall set its protective relaying such that the generator voltage protective relaying does not trip the applicable generating unit(s) as a result of a voltage excursion (at the point of interconnection²) caused by an event on the

¹ Each Generator Owner is not required to have frequency or voltage protective relaying (including but not limited to frequency and voltage protective functions for discrete relays, volts per hertz relays evaluated at nominal frequency, multi-function protective devices or protective functions within control systems that directly trip or provide tripping signals to the generator based on frequency or voltage inputs) installed or activated on its unit.

² For the purposes of this standard, point of interconnection means the transmission (high voltage) side of the generator step-up or collector transformer.

Deleted: 5.1. In those jurisdictions where regulatory approval is required:¶
5.1.1 By the first day of the first calendar quarter, two calendar years following¶ applicable regulatory approval, or as otherwise made effective pursuant to¶ the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities, each Generator¶ Owner shall have verified at least 40 percent of its Facilities are fully¶ compliant with Requirements R1, R2, R3, and R4.¶
5.1.2 By the first day of the first calendar quarter, three calendar years following¶ applicable regulatory approval, or as otherwise made effective pursuant to¶ the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities, each Generator¶ Owner shall have verified at least 60 percent of its Facilities are fully¶ compliant with Requirements R1, R2, R3, and R4.¶
5.1.3 By the first day of the first calendar quarter, four calendar years following¶ applicable regulatory approval, or as otherwise made effective pursuant to¶ the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities, each Generator¶ Owner shall have verified at least 80 percent of its Facilities are fully¶ compliant with Requirements R1, R2, R3, and R4. **5.1.4** By the first day of the first calendar quarter, five calendar years following¶ applicable regulatory approval, or as otherwise made effective pursuant to¶ the laws applicable to such ERO governmental authorities, each Generator¶ Owner shall have verified 100 percent of its Facilities are fully compliant¶ with Requirements R1, R2, R3, and R4.¶
5.2. In those jurisdictions where regulatory approval is not required:¶
5.2.1 By the first day of the first calendar quarter, two calendar years following¶

Standard PRC-024-1 (X) — Generator Frequency and Voltage Protective Relay Settings

transmission system external to the generating plant that remains within the “no trip zone” of PRC-024 Attachment 2. If the Transmission Planner allows less stringent voltage relay settings than those required to meet PRC-024 Attachment 2, then the Generator Owner shall set its protective relaying within the voltage recovery characteristics of a location-specific Transmission Planner’s study. Requirement R2 is subject to the following exceptions: *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*

- Generating unit(s) may trip in accordance with a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS).
 - Generating unit(s) may trip if clearing a system fault necessitates disconnecting (a) generating unit(s).
 - Generating unit(s) may trip by action of protective functions (such as out-of-step functions or loss-of-field functions) that operate due to an impending or actual loss of synchronism or, for asynchronous generating units, due to instability in power conversion control equipment.
 - Generating unit(s) may trip within a portion of the “no trip zone” of PRC-024 Attachment 2 for documented and communicated regulatory or equipment limitations in accordance with Requirement R3.
- R3.** Each Generator Owner shall document each known regulatory or equipment limitation³ that prevents an applicable generating unit with generator frequency or voltage protective relays from meeting the relay setting criteria in Requirements R1 or R2 including (but not limited to) study results, experience from an actual event, or manufacturer’s advice. *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]*
- 3.1.** The Generator Owner shall communicate the documented regulatory or equipment limitation, or the removal of a previously documented regulatory or equipment limitation, to its Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner within 30 calendar days of any of the following:
- Identification of a regulatory or equipment limitation.
 - Repair of the equipment causing the limitation that removes the limitation.
 - Replacement of the equipment causing the limitation with equipment that removes the limitation.
 - Creation or adjustment of an equipment limitation caused by consumption of the cumulative turbine life-time frequency excursion allowance.
- R4.** Each Generator Owner shall provide its applicable generator protection trip settings associated with Requirements R1 and R2 to the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner that models the associated unit within 60 calendar days of receipt of a written request for the data and within 60 calendar days of any change to those previously requested trip settings unless directed by the requesting Planning Coordinator or

Deleted: Special Protection System (SPS)
or

³ Excludes limitations that are caused by the setting capability of the generator frequency and voltage protective relays themselves but does not exclude limitations originating in the equipment that they protect.

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Transmission Planner that the reporting of relay setting changes is not required.
[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]

C. Measures

- M1.** Each Generator Owner shall have evidence that generator frequency protective relays have been set in accordance with Requirement R1 such as dated setting sheets, calibration sheets or other documentation.
- M2.** Each Generator Owner shall have evidence that generator voltage protective relays have been set in accordance with Requirement R2 such as dated setting sheets, voltage-time curves, calibration sheets, coordination plots, dynamic simulation studies or other documentation.
- M3.** Each Generator Owner shall have evidence that it has documented and communicated any known regulatory or equipment limitations (excluding limitations noted in footnote 3) that resulted in an exception to Requirements R1 or R2 in accordance with Requirement R3 such as a dated email or letter that contains such documentation as study results, experience from an actual event, or manufacturer's advice.
- M4.** Each Generator Owner shall have evidence that it communicated applicable generator protective relay trip settings in accordance with Requirement R4, such as dated e-mails, correspondence or other evidence and copies of any requests it has received for that information.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

The Regional Entity shall serve as the Compliance Enforcement Authority (CEA) unless the applicable entity is owned, operated, or controlled by the Regional Entity. In such cases, the ERO or a Regional Entity approved by FERC or other applicable governmental authority shall serve as the CEA.

1.1. Data Retention

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Generator Owner shall retain evidence of compliance with Requirement R1 through R4; for 3 years or until the next audit, whichever is longer.

If a Generator Owner is found non-compliant, the Generator Owner shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved for the time period specified above, whichever is longer.

Standard PRC-024-1(X) — Generator Frequency and Voltage Protective Relay Settings

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes

Compliance Audit

Self-Certification

Spot Checking

Compliance Investigation

Self-Reporting

Complaint

1.3. Additional Compliance Information

None

Standard PRC-024-1(X) — Generator Frequency and Voltage Protective Relay Settings

2. Violation Severity Levels

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----------|---|---|---|---|
| R1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Generator Owner that has frequency protection activated to trip a generating unit, failed to set its generator frequency protective relaying so that it does not trip within the criteria listed in Requirement R1 unless there is a documented and communicated regulatory or equipment limitation per Requirement R3. |
| R2 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Generator Owner with voltage protective relaying activated to trip a generating unit, failed to set its voltage protective relaying so that it does not trip as a result of a voltage excursion at the point of interconnection, caused by an event external to the plant per the criteria specified in Requirement R2 unless there is a documented and communicated regulatory or equipment limitation per Requirement R3. |
| R3 | The Generator Owner documented the known non-protection system equipment limitation that prevented it from meeting the criteria in Requirement R1 or R2 and communicated the documented | The Generator Owner documented the known non-protection system equipment limitation that prevented it from meeting the criteria in Requirement R1 or R2 and communicated the documented | The Generator Owner documented the known non-protection system equipment limitation that prevented it from meeting the criteria in Requirement R1 or R2 and communicated the documented | The Generator Owner failed to document any known non-protection system equipment limitation that prevented it from meeting the criteria in Requirement R1 or R2. |

Standard PRC-024-1(X) — Generator Frequency and Voltage Protective Relay Settings

| R # | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
|-----------|---|---|---|---|
| | limitation to its Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner more than 30 calendar days but less than or equal to 60 calendar days of identifying the limitation. | limitation to its Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner more than 60 calendar days but less than or equal to 90 calendar days of identifying the limitation. | limitation to its Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days of identifying the limitation. | OR The Generator Owner failed to communicate the documented limitation to its Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner within 120 calendar days of identifying the limitation. |
| R4 | The Generator Owner provided its generator protection trip settings more than 60 calendar days but less than or equal to 90 calendar days of any change to those trip settings. OR The Generator Owner provided trip settings more than 60 calendar days but less than or equal to 90 calendar days of a written request. | The Generator Owner provided its generator protection trip settings more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days of any change to those trip settings. OR The Generator Owner provided trip settings more than 90 calendar days but less than or equal to 120 calendar days of a written request. | The Generator Owner provided its generator protection trip settings more than 120 calendar days but less than or equal to 150 calendar days of any change to those trip settings. OR The Generator Owner provided trip settings more than 120 calendar days but less than or equal to 150 calendar days of a written request. | The Generator Owner failed to provide its generator protection trip settings within 150 calendar days of any change to those trip settings. OR The Generator Owner failed to provide trip settings within 150 calendar days of a written request. |

E. Regional Variances

None

F. Associated Documents

None

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|-------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------|
| 1 | May 9, 2013 | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | |

Standard PRC-024-1(X) — Generator Frequency and Voltage Protective Relay Settings


| | | | |
|----------------------|---------------------|---|--|
| 1 | March 20, 2014 | FERC Order issued approving PRC-024-1. (Order becomes effective on 7/1/16.) | |
| 1(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

G. References

1. “The Technical Justification for the New WECC Voltage Ride-Through (VRT) Standard, A White Paper Developed by the Wind Generation Task Force (WGTF),” dated June 13, 2007, a guideline approved by WECC Technical Studies Subcommittee.

PRC-024 — Attachment 1

OFF NOMINAL FREQUENCY CAPABILITY CURVE



Curve Data Points:

Eastern Interconnection

| High Frequency Duration | | Low Frequency Duration | |
|-------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| Frequency (Hz) | Time (Sec) | Frequency (Hz) | Time (sec) |
| ≥61.8 | Instantaneous trip | ≤57.8 | Instantaneous trip |
| ≥60.5 | $10^{(90.935-1.45713*f)}$ | ≤59.5 | $10^{(1.7373*f-100.116)}$ |
| <60.5 | Continuous operation | > 59.5 | Continuous operation |

Standard PRC-024-1 (X) — Generator Frequency and Voltage Protective Relay Settings

Western Interconnection

| High Frequency Duration | | Low Frequency Duration | |
|-------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| Frequency (Hz) | Time (Sec) | Frequency (Hz) | Time (sec) |
| ≥61.7 | Instantaneous trip | ≤57.0 | Instantaneous trip |
| ≥61.6 | 30 | ≤57.3 | 0.75 |
| ≥60.6 | 180 | ≤57.8 | 7.5 |
| <60.6 | Continuous operation | ≤58.4 | 30 |
| | | ≤59.4 | 180 |
| | | >59.4 | Continuous operation |

Quebec Interconnection


| High Frequency Duration | | Low Frequency Duration | |
|-------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| Frequency (Hz) | Time (Sec) | Frequency (Hz) | Time (Sec) |
| >66.0 | Instantaneous trip | <55.5 | Instantaneous trip |
| ≥63.0 | 5 | ≤56.5 | 0.35 |
| ≥61.5 | 90 | ≤57.0 | 2 |
| ≥60.6 | 660 | ≤57.5 | 10 |
| <60.6 | Continuous operation | ≤58.5 | 90 |
| | | ≤59.4 | 660 |
| | | >59.4 | Continuous operation |

ERCOT Interconnection

| High Frequency Duration | | Low Frequency Duration | |
|-------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| Frequency (Hz) | Time (Sec) | Frequency (Hz) | Time (sec) |
| ≥61.8 | Instantaneous trip | ≤57.5 | Instantaneous trip |
| ≥61.6 | 30 | ≤58.0 | 2 |
| ≥60.6 | 540 | ≤58.4 | 30 |
| <60.6 | Continuous operation | ≤59.4 | 540 |
| | | >59.4 | Continuous operation |

PRC-024— Attachment 2

Voltage Ride-Through
Time Duration Curve



Ride Through Duration:

| High Voltage Ride Through Duration | | Low Voltage Ride Through Duration | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|------------|
| Voltage (pu) | Time (sec) | Voltage (pu) | Time (sec) |
| ≥ 1.200 | Instantaneous trip | < 0.45 | 0.15 |
| ≥ 1.175 | 0.20 | < 0.65 | 0.30 |
| ≥ 1.15 | 0.50 | < 0.75 | 2.00 |
| ≥ 1.10 | 1.00 | < 0.90 | 3.00 |

Voltage Ride-Through Curve Clarifications

Curve Details:

1. The per unit voltage base for these curves is the nominal operating voltage specified by the Transmission Planner in the analysis of the reliability of the Interconnected Transmission Systems at the point of interconnection to the Bulk Electric System (BES).
2. The curves depicted were derived based on three-phase transmission system zone 1 faults with Normal Clearing not exceeding 9 cycles. The curves apply to voltage excursions regardless of the type of initiating event.
3. The envelope within the curves represents the cumulative voltage duration at the point of interconnection with the BES. For example, if the voltage first exceeds 1.15 pu at 0.3 seconds after a fault, does not exceed 1.2 pu voltage, and returns below 1.15 pu at 0.4 seconds, then the cumulative time the voltage is above 1.15 pu voltage is 0.1 seconds and is within the no trip zone of the curve.
4. The curves depicted assume system frequency is 60 Hertz. When evaluating Volts/Hertz protection, you may adjust the magnitude of the high voltage curve in proportion to deviations of frequency below 60 Hz.
5. Voltages in the curve assume minimum fundamental frequency phase-to-ground or phase-to-phase voltage for the low voltage duration curve and the greater of maximum RMS or crest phase-to-phase voltage for the high voltage duration curve.

Evaluating Protective Relay Settings:

1. Use either the following assumptions or loading conditions that are believed to be the most probable for the unit under study to evaluate voltage protection relay setting calculations on the static case for steady state initial conditions:
 - a. All of the units connected to the same transformer are online and operating.
 - b. All of the units are at full nameplate real-power output.
 - c. Power factor is 0.95 lagging (i.e. supplying reactive power to the system) as measured at the generator terminals.
 - d. The automatic voltage regulator is in automatic voltage control mode.
2. Evaluate voltage protection relay settings assuming that additional installed generating plant reactive support equipment (such as static VAR compensators, synchronous condensers, or capacitors) is available and operating normally.
3. Evaluate voltage protection relay settings accounting for the actual tap settings of transformers between the generator terminals and the point of interconnection.

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Generator Relay Loadability

2. **Number:** PRC-025-1(X)

Purpose: To set load-responsive protective relays associated with generation Facilities at a level to prevent unnecessary tripping of generators during a system disturbance for conditions that do not pose a risk of damage to the associated equipment.

3. **Applicability:**

3.1. Functional Entities:

3.1.1 Generator Owner that applies load-responsive protective relays at the terminals of the Elements listed in 3.2, Facilities.

3.1.2 Transmission Owner that applies load-responsive protective relays at the terminals of the Elements listed in 3.2, Facilities.

3.1.3 Distribution Provider that applies load-responsive protective relays at the terminals of the Elements listed in 3.2, Facilities.

3.2. Facilities: The following Elements associated with Bulk Electric System (BES) generating units and generating plants, including those generating units and generating plants identified as Blackstart Resources in the Transmission Operator's system restoration plan:

3.2.1 Generating unit(s).

3.2.2 Generator step-up (i.e., GSU) transformer(s).

3.2.3 Unit auxiliary transformer(s) (UAT) that supply overall auxiliary power necessary to keep generating unit(s) online.¹

3.2.4 Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant loads.

3.2.5 Elements utilized in the aggregation of dispersed power producing resources.

4. **Background:**

After analysis of many of the major disturbances in the last 25 years on the North American interconnected power system, generators have been found to have tripped for conditions that did not apparently pose a direct risk to those generators and associated equipment within the time period where the tripping occurred. This tripping has often been determined to have expanded the scope and/or extended the duration of that

¹ These transformers are variably referred to as station power, unit auxiliary transformer(s) (UAT), or station service transformer(s) used to provide overall auxiliary power to the generator station when the generator is running. Loss of these transformers will result in removing the generator from service. Refer to the PRC-025-1(X) Guidelines and Technical Basis for more detailed information concerning unit auxiliary transformers.

disturbance. This was noted to be a serious issue in the August 2003 “blackout” in the northeastern North American continent.²

During the recoverable phase of a disturbance, the disturbance may exhibit a “voltage disturbance” behavior pattern, where system voltage may be widely depressed and may fluctuate. In order to support the system during this transient phase of a disturbance, this standard establishes criteria for setting load-responsive protective relays such that individual generators may provide Reactive Power within their dynamic capability during transient time periods to help the system recover from the voltage disturbance. The premature or unnecessary tripping of generators resulting in the removal of dynamic Reactive Power exacerbates the severity of the voltage disturbance, and as a result changes the character of the system disturbance. In addition, the loss of Real Power could initiate or exacerbate a frequency disturbance.

5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1. Each Generator Owner, Transmission Owner, and Distribution Provider shall apply settings that are in accordance with PRC-025-1(X) – Attachment 1: Relay Settings, on each load-responsive protective relay while maintaining reliable fault protection.
[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-Term Planning]
- M1. For each load-responsive protective relay, each Generator Owner, Transmission Owner, and Distribution Provider shall have evidence (e.g., summaries of calculations, spreadsheets, simulation reports, or setting sheets) that settings were applied in accordance with PRC-025-1(X) – Attachment 1: Relay Settings.

C. Compliance

1. **Compliance Monitoring Process**
 - 1.1. **Compliance Enforcement Authority**

As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, “Compliance Enforcement Authority” means NERC or the Regional Entity in their respective roles of monitoring and enforcing compliance with the NERC Reliability Standards.

² Interim Report: Causes of the August 14th Blackout in the United States and Canada, U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, November 2003 (<http://www.nerc.com/docs/docs/blackout/814BlackoutReport.pdf>)

1.2. Evidence Retention

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority (CEA) may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Generator Owner, Transmission Owner, and Distribution Provider shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its CEA to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

- The Generator Owner, Transmission Owner, and Distribution Provider shall retain evidence of Requirement R1 and Measure M1 for the most recent three calendar years.
- If a Generator Owner, Transmission Owner, or Distribution Provider is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes

Compliance Audit

Self-Certification

Spot Checking

Compliance Investigation

Self-Reporting

Complaint

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None

Table of Compliance Elements

| R # | Time Horizon | VRF | Violation Severity Levels | | | |
|-----|--------------------|------|---------------------------|--------------|----------|---|
| | | | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
| R1 | Long-Term Planning | High | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Generator Owner, Transmission Owner, and Distribution Provider did not apply settings in accordance with PRC-025-1(X) – Attachment 1: Relay Settings, on an applied load-responsive protective relay. |

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

NERC System Protection and Control Subcommittee, July 2010, “Power Plant and Transmission System Protection Coordination.”

IEEE C37.102-2006, “Guide for AC Generator Protection.”

PRC-025-1(X) – Attachment 1: Relay Settings

Introduction

This standard does not require the Generator Owner, Transmission Owner, or Distribution Provider to use any of the protective functions listed in Table 1. Each Generator Owner, Transmission Owner, and Distribution Provider that applies load-responsive protective relays on their respective Elements listed in 3.2, Facilities, shall use one of the following Options in Table 1, Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria (“Table 1”), to set each load-responsive protective relay element according to its application and relay type. The bus voltage is based on the criteria for the various applications listed in Table 1.

Generators

Synchronous generator relay pickup setting criteria values are derived from the unit’s maximum gross Real Power capability, in megawatts (MW), as reported to the Transmission Planner, and the unit’s Reactive Power capability, in megavoltampere-reactive (Mvar), is determined by calculating the MW value based on the unit’s nameplate megavoltampere (MVA) rating at rated power factor. If different seasonal capabilities are reported, the maximum capability shall be used for the purposes of this standard.

Asynchronous generator relay pickup setting criteria values (including inverter-based installations) are derived from the site’s aggregate maximum complex power capability, in MVA, as reported to the Transmission Planner, including the Mvar output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices.

For the application case where synchronous and asynchronous generator types are combined on a generator step-up transformer or on Elements that connect the generator step-up (GSU) transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant (Elements may also supply generating plant loads.), the pickup setting criteria shall be determined by vector summing the pickup setting criteria of each generator type, and using the bus voltage for the given synchronous generator application and relay type.

Transformers

Calculations using the GSU transformer turns ratio shall use the actual tap that is applied (i.e., in service) for GSU transformers with deenergized tap changers (DETC). If load tap changers (LTC) are used, the calculations shall reflect the tap that results in the lowest generator bus voltage. When the criterion specifies the use of the GSU transformer’s impedance, the nameplate impedance at the nominal GSU transformer turns ratio shall be used.

Applications that use more complex topology, such as generators connected to a multiple winding transformer, are not directly addressed by the criteria in Table 1. These topologies can result in complex power flows, and may require simulation to avoid overly conservative assumptions to simplify the calculations. Entities with these topologies should set their relays in such a way that they do not operate for the conditions being addressed in this standard.

Multiple Lines

Applications that use more complex topology, such as multiple lines that connect the generator step-up (GSU) transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant (Elements may also supply generating plant loads) are not directly addressed by the criteria in Table 1. These topologies can result in complex power flows, and it may require simulation to avoid overly conservative assumptions to simplify the calculations. Entities with these topologies should set their relays in such a way that they do not operate for the conditions being addressed in this standard.

Exclusions

The following protection systems are excluded from the requirements of this standard:

1. Any relay elements that are in service only during start up.
2. Load-responsive protective relay elements that are armed only when the generator is disconnected from the system, (e.g., non-directional overcurrent elements used in conjunction with inadvertent energization schemes, and open breaker flashover schemes).
3. Phase fault detector relay elements employed to supervise other load-responsive phase distance elements (e.g., in order to prevent false operation in the event of a loss of potential) provided the distance element is set in accordance with the criteria outlined in the standard.
4. Protective relay elements that are only enabled when other protection elements fail (e.g., overcurrent elements that are only enabled during loss of potential conditions).
5. Protective relay elements used only for Remedial Action Schemes that are subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
6. Protection systems that detect generator overloads that are designed to coordinate with the generator short time capability by utilizing an extremely inverse characteristic set to operate no faster than 7 seconds at 218% of full load current (e.g., rated armature current), and prevent operation below 115% of full-load current.³
7. Protection systems that detect transformer overloads and are designed only to respond in time periods which allow an operator 15 minutes or greater to respond to overload conditions.

Table 1

Table 1 beginning on the next page is structured and formatted to aid the reader with identifying an option for a given load-responsive protective relay.

The first column identifies the application (e.g., synchronous or asynchronous generators, generator step-up transformers, unit auxiliary transformers, Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant

³ IEEE C37.102-2006, "Guide for AC Generator Protection," Section 4.1.1.2.

loads). Dark blue horizontal bars, excluding the header which repeats at the top of each page, demarcate the various applications.

The second column identifies the load-responsive protective relay (e.g., 21, 50, 51, 51V-C, 51V-R, or 67) according to the applied application in the first column. A light blue horizontal bar between the relay types is the demarcation between relay types for a given application. These light blue bars will contain no text.

The third column uses numeric and alphabetic options (i.e., index numbering) to identify the available options for setting load-responsive protective relays according to the application and applied relay type. Another, shorter, light blue bar contains the word “OR,” and reveals to the reader that the relay for that application has one or more options (i.e., “ways”) to determine the bus voltage and pickup setting criteria in the fourth and fifth column, respectively. The bus voltage column and pickup setting criteria columns provide the criteria for determining an appropriate setting.

The table is further formatted by shading groups of relays associated with asynchronous generator applications. Synchronous generator applications and the unit auxiliary transformer applications are not shaded. Also, intentional buffers were added to the table such that similar options, as possible, would be paired together on a per page basis. Note that some applications may have an additional pairing that might occur on adjacent pages.

| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | | |
|--|--|-----------|---|---|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria | |
| Synchronous generating unit(s), or Elements utilized in the aggregation of dispersed power producing resources | Phase distance relay (21) – directional toward the Transmission system | 1a | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 0.95 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer | The impedance element shall be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the gross MW capability reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 150% of the MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor | |
| | | OR | | | |
| | | 1b | Calculated generator bus voltage corresponding to 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer (including the transformer turns ratio and impedance) | The impedance element shall be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the gross MW capability reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 150% of the MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor | |
| | | OR | | | |
| | | 1c | Simulated generator bus voltage coincident with the highest Reactive Power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer prior to field-forcing | The impedance element shall be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the gross MW capability reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output –100% of the maximum gross Mvar output during field-forcing as determined by simulation | |
| The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type | | | | | |

⁴ Calculations using the generator step-up (GSU) transformer turns ratio shall use the actual tap that is applied (i.e., in service) for GSU transformers with de-energized tap changers (DETC). If load tap changers (LTC) are used, the calculations shall reflect the tap that results in the lowest generator bus voltage. When the criterion specifies the use of the GSU transformer’s impedance, the nameplate impedance at the nominal GSU turns ratio shall be used.

| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|--|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria | |
| Synchronous generating unit(s), or Elements utilized in the aggregation of dispersed power producing resources | Phase time overcurrent relay (51) or (51V-R) – voltage-restrained | 2a | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 0.95 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the gross MW capability reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 150% of the MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor | |
| | | OR | | | |
| | | 2b | Calculated generator bus voltage corresponding to 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer (including the transformer turns ratio and impedance) | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the gross MW capability reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 150% of the MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor | |
| | | OR | | | |
| | 2c | Simulated generator bus voltage coincident with the highest Reactive Power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer prior to field-forcing | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the gross MW capability reported to the Transmission Planner or, and (2) Reactive Power output –100% of the maximum gross Mvar output during field-forcing as determined by simulation | | |
| The same application continues with a different relay type below | | | | | |
| | Phase time overcurrent relay (51V-C) – voltage controlled (Enabled to operate as a function of voltage) | 3 | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 1.0 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer | Voltage control setting shall be set less than 75% of the calculated generator bus voltage | |
| A different application starts on the next page | | | | | |

| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | |
|--|---|--------|---|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria |
| Asynchronous generating unit(s) (including inverter-based installations), or Elements utilized in the aggregation of dispersed power producing resources | Phase distance relay (21) – directional toward the Transmission system | 4 | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 1.0 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer | The impedance element shall be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 130% of the maximum aggregate nameplate MVA output at rated power factor (including the Mvar output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices) |
| | Phase time overcurrent relay (51) or (51V-R) – voltage-restrained | 5 | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 1.0 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 130% of the calculated current derived from the maximum aggregate nameplate MVA output at rated power factor (including the Mvar output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices) |
| | Phase time overcurrent relay (51V-C) – voltage controlled (Enabled to operate as a function of voltage) | 6 | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 1.0 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer | Voltage control setting shall be set less than 75% of the calculated generator bus voltage |
| A different application starts on the next page | | | | |

| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | | |
|--|--|-----------|---|--|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria | |
| Generator step-up transformer(s) connected to synchronous generators | Phase distance relay (21) – directional toward the Transmission system – installed on generator-side of the GSU transformer If the relay is installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer use Option 14 | 7a | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 0.95 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer | The impedance element shall be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 150% of the aggregate generation MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor | |
| | | OR | | | |
| | | 7b | Calculated generator bus voltage corresponding to 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer (including the transformer turns ratio and impedance) | The impedance element shall be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 150% of the aggregate generation MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor | |
| | | OR | | | |
| | | 7c | Simulated generator bus voltage coincident with the highest Reactive Power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer prior to field-forcing | The impedance element shall be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output –100% of the aggregate generation maximum gross Mvar output during field-forcing as determined by simulation | |
| The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type | | | | | |

| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | | |
|--|---|-----------|---|---|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria | |
| Generator step-up transformer(s) connected to synchronous generators | Phase time overcurrent relay (51) – installed on generator-side of the GSU transformer If the relay is installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer use Option 15 | 8a | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 0.95 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 150% of the aggregate generation MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor | |
| | | OR | | | |
| | | 8b | Calculated generator bus voltage corresponding to 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer (including the transformer turns ratio and impedance) | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 150% of the aggregate generation MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor | |
| | | OR | | | |
| | | 8c | Simulated generator bus voltage coincident with the highest Reactive Power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer prior to field-forcing | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output –100% of the aggregate generation maximum gross Mvar output during field-forcing as determined by simulation | |
| The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type | | | | | |

| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | | |
|--|--|-----------|---|---|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria | |
| Generator step-up transformer(s) connected to synchronous generators | Phase directional time overcurrent relay (67) – directional toward the Transmission system – installed on generator-side of the GSU transformer If the relay is installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer use Option 16 | 9a | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 0.95 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 150% of the aggregate generation MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor | |
| | | OR | | | |
| | | 9b | Calculated generator bus voltage corresponding to 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer (including the transformer turns ratio and impedance) | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 150% of the aggregate generation MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor | |
| | | OR | | | |
| | | 9c | Simulated generator bus voltage coincident with the highest Reactive Power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer prior to field-forcing | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output –100% of the aggregate generation maximum gross Mvar output during field-forcing as determined by simulation | |
| A different application starts on the next page | | | | | |

| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | |
|---|--|--------|--|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria |
| Generator step-up transformer(s) connected to asynchronous generators only (including inverter-based installations) | Phase distance relay (21) – directional toward the Transmission system – installed on generator-side of the GSU transformer If the relay is installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer use Option 17 | 10 | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 1.0 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer | The impedance element shall be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 130% of the maximum aggregate nameplate MVA output at rated power factor (including the Mvar output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices) |
| | Phase time overcurrent relay (51) – installed on generator-side of the GSU transformer If the relay is installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer use Option 18 | 11 | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 1.0 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer for overcurrent relays installed on the low-side | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 130% of the calculated current derived from the maximum aggregate nameplate MVA output at rated power factor (including the Mvar output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices) |
| | The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type | | | |

| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | | |
|---|--|-----------|---|--|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria | |
| Generator step-up transformer(s) connected to asynchronous generators only (including inverter-based installations) | Phase directional time overcurrent relay (67) – directional toward the Transmission system – installed on generator-side of the GSU transformer | 12 | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 1.0 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 130% of the calculated current derived from the maximum aggregate nameplate MVA output at rated power factor (including the Mvar output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices) | |
| | If the relay is installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer use Option 19 | | | | |
| A different application starts below | | | | | |
| Unit auxiliary transformer(s) (UAT) | Phase time overcurrent relay (51) applied at the high-side terminals of the UAT, for which operation of the relay will cause the associated generator to trip. | 13a | 1.0 per unit of the winding nominal voltage of the unit auxiliary transformer | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 150% of the calculated current derived from the unit auxiliary transformer maximum nameplate MVA rating | |
| | | OR | | | |
| | | 13b | Unit auxiliary transformer bus voltage corresponding to the measured current | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 150% of the unit auxiliary transformer measured current at the generator maximum gross MW capability reported to the Transmission Planner | |
| A different application starts on the next page | | | | | |

| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | |
|--|--|-----------|--|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria |
| Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant loads. – connected to synchronous generators | Phase distance relay (21) – directional toward the Transmission system – installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer | 14a | 0.85 per unit of the line nominal voltage | The impedance element shall be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 120% of the aggregate generation MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor |
| | | OR | | |
| | If the relay is installed on the generator-side of the GSU transformer use Option 7 | 14b | Simulated line voltage coincident with the highest Reactive Power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer prior to field-forcing | The impedance element shall be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output –100% of the aggregate generation maximum gross Mvar output during field-forcing as determined by simulation |
| The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type | | | | |

| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | | |
|---|--|-----------|---|--|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria | |
| <p>Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant loads. – connected to synchronous generators</p> | <p>Phase overcurrent supervisory element (50) – associated with current-based, communication-assisted schemes where the scheme is capable of tripping for loss of communications installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer or phase time overcurrent relay (51) – installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer</p> <p>If the relay is installed on the generator-side of the GSU transformer use Option 8</p> | 15a | 0.85 per unit of the line nominal voltage | <p>The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from:</p> <p>(1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and</p> <p>(2) Reactive Power output – 120% of the aggregate generation MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor</p> | |
| | | OR | | | |
| | | 15b | <p>Simulated line voltage coincident with the highest Reactive Power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer prior to field-forcing</p> | <p>The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from:</p> <p>(1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and</p> <p>(2) Reactive Power output –100% of the aggregate generation maximum gross Mvar output during field-forcing as determined by simulation</p> | |
| The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type | | | | | |

| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | | |
|---|--|-----------|--|---|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria | |
| Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant load. – connected to synchronous generators | Phase directional overcurrent supervisory element (67) – associated with current-based, communication-assisted schemes where the scheme is capable of tripping for loss of communications directional toward the Transmission system installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer or phase directional time overcurrent relay (67) – directional toward the Transmission system installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer | 16a | 0.85 per unit of the line nominal voltage | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 120% of the aggregate generation MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor | |
| | | OR | | | |
| | | 16b | Simulated line voltage coincident with the highest Reactive Power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer prior to field-forcing | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output –100% of the aggregate generation maximum gross Mvar output during field-forcing as determined by simulation | |
| A different application starts on the next page | | | | | |

| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | |
|---|---|--------|--|---|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria |
| Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant loads. – connected to asynchronous generators only (including inverter-based installations) | Phase distance relay (21) – directional toward the Transmission system– installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer | 17 | 1.0 per unit of the line nominal voltage | The impedance element shall be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 130% of the maximum aggregate nameplate MVA output at rated power factor (including the Mvar output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices) |
| | If the relay is installed on the generator-side of the GSU transformer use Option 10 | | | |
| The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type | | | | |

| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | |
|---|--|--------|--|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria |
| Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant loads. – connected to asynchronous generators only (including inverter-based installations) | Phase overcurrent supervisory element (50) – associated with current-based, communication-assisted schemes where the scheme is capable of tripping for loss of communications installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer or Phase time overcurrent relay (51) – installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer If the relay is installed on the generator-side of the GSU transformer use Option 11 | 18 | 1.0 per unit of the line nominal voltage | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 130% of the calculated current derived from the maximum aggregate nameplate MVA output at rated power factor (including the Mvar output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices) |
| | The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type | | | |

| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | |
|--|--|--------|--|---|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria |
| <p>Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant loads. – connected to asynchronous generators only (including inverter-based installations)</p> | <p>Phase directional overcurrent supervisory element (67) – associated with current-based, communication-assisted schemes where the scheme is capable of tripping for loss of communications directional toward the Transmission system installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer or Phase directional time overcurrent relay (67) – installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer</p> <p>If the relay is installed on the generator-side of the GSU transformer use Option 12</p> | 19 | 1.0 per unit of the line nominal voltage | <p>The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 130% of the calculated current derived from the maximum aggregate nameplate MVA output at rated power factor (including the Mvar output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices)</p> |
| End of Table 1 | | | | |

Rationale:

During development of this standard, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. Upon BOT approval, the text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section.

Rationale for R1:

Requirement R1 is a risk-based requirement that requires the responsible entity to be aware of each protective relay subject to the standard and applies an appropriate setting based on its calculations or simulation for the conditions established in Attachment 1.

The criteria established in Attachment 1 represent short-duration conditions during which generation Facilities are capable of providing system reactive resources, and for which generation Facilities have been historically recorded to disconnect, causing events to become more severe.

The term, “while maintaining reliable fault protection” in Requirement R1 describes that the responsible entity is to comply with this standard while achieving their desired protection goals. Refer to the Guidelines and Technical Basis, Introduction, for more information.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|-----------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| 1 | August 15, 2013 | Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees | New |
| 1(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

A. Introduction

- 1. **Title:** Generator Relay Loadability
- 2. **Number:** PRC-025-1(X)

Purpose: To set load-responsive protective relays associated with generation Facilities at a level to prevent unnecessary tripping of generators during a system disturbance for conditions that do not pose a risk of damage to the associated equipment.

3. **Applicability:**

3.1. **Functional Entities:**

- 3.1.1 Generator Owner that applies load-responsive protective relays at the terminals of the Elements listed in 3.2, Facilities.
- 3.1.2 Transmission Owner that applies load-responsive protective relays at the terminals of the Elements listed in 3.2, Facilities.
- 3.1.3 Distribution Provider that applies load-responsive protective relays at the terminals of the Elements listed in 3.2, Facilities.

3.2. **Facilities:** The following Elements associated with Bulk Electric System (BES) generating units and generating plants, including those generating units and generating plants identified as Blackstart Resources in the Transmission Operator’s system restoration plan:

- 3.2.1 Generating unit(s).
- 3.2.2 Generator step-up (i.e., GSU) transformer(s).
- 3.2.3 Unit auxiliary transformer(s) (UAT) that supply overall auxiliary power necessary to keep generating unit(s) online.¹
- 3.2.4 Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant loads.
- 3.2.5 Elements utilized in the aggregation of dispersed power producing resources.

4. **Background:**

After analysis of many of the major disturbances in the last 25 years on the North American interconnected power system, generators have been found to have tripped for conditions that did not apparently pose a direct risk to those generators and associated equipment within the time period where the tripping occurred. This tripping has often been determined to have expanded the scope and/or extended the duration of that

¹ These transformers are variably referred to as station power, unit auxiliary transformer(s) (UAT), or station service transformer(s) used to provide overall auxiliary power to the generator station when the generator is running. Loss of these transformers will result in removing the generator from service. Refer to the PRC-025-1(X) Guidelines and Technical Basis for more detailed information concerning unit auxiliary transformers.

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disturbance. This was noted to be a serious issue in the August 2003 “blackout” in the northeastern North American continent.²

During the recoverable phase of a disturbance, the disturbance may exhibit a “voltage disturbance” behavior pattern, where system voltage may be widely depressed and may fluctuate. In order to support the system during this transient phase of a disturbance, this standard establishes criteria for setting load-responsive protective relays such that individual generators may provide Reactive Power within their dynamic capability during transient time periods to help the system recover from the voltage disturbance. The premature or unnecessary tripping of generators resulting in the removal of dynamic Reactive Power exacerbates the severity of the voltage disturbance, and as a result changes the character of the system disturbance. In addition, the loss of Real Power could initiate or exacerbate a frequency disturbance.

5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Deleted: See Implementation Plan¶

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1. Each Generator Owner, Transmission Owner, and Distribution Provider shall apply settings that are in accordance with PRC-025-1(X) – Attachment 1: Relay Settings, on each load-responsive protective relay while maintaining reliable fault protection.
[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-Term Planning]
- M1. For each load-responsive protective relay, each Generator Owner, Transmission Owner, and Distribution Provider shall have evidence (e.g., summaries of calculations, spreadsheets, simulation reports, or setting sheets) that settings were applied in accordance with PRC-025-1(X) – Attachment 1: Relay Settings.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

As defined in the NERC Rules of Procedure, “Compliance Enforcement Authority” means NERC or the Regional Entity in their respective roles of monitoring and enforcing compliance with the NERC Reliability Standards.

² Interim Report: Causes of the August 14th Blackout in the United States and Canada, U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, November 2003 (<http://www.nerc.com/docs/docs/blackout/814BlackoutReport.pdf>)

1.2. Evidence Retention

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority (CEA) may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Generator Owner, Transmission Owner, and Distribution Provider shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its CEA to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

- The Generator Owner, Transmission Owner, and Distribution Provider shall retain evidence of Requirement R1 and Measure M1 for the most recent three calendar years.
- If a Generator Owner, Transmission Owner, or Distribution Provider is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

1.3. Compliance Monitoring and Assessment Processes

Compliance Audit

Self-Certification

Spot Checking

Compliance Investigation

Self-Reporting

Complaint

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None

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Table of Compliance Elements

| R # | Time Horizon | VRF | Violation Severity Levels | | | |
|-----------|--------------------|------|---------------------------|--------------|----------|---|
| | | | Lower VSL | Moderate VSL | High VSL | Severe VSL |
| R1 | Long-Term Planning | High | N/A | N/A | N/A | The Generator Owner, Transmission Owner, and Distribution Provider did not apply settings in accordance with <i>PRC-025-1(X) – Attachment 1: Relay Settings</i> , on an applied load-responsive protective relay. |

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

NERC System Protection and Control Subcommittee, July 2010, “Power Plant and Transmission System Protection Coordination.”

IEEE C37.102-2006, “Guide for AC Generator Protection.”

PRC-025-1(X) – Attachment 1: Relay Settings

Introduction

This standard does not require the Generator Owner, Transmission Owner, or Distribution Provider to use any of the protective functions listed in Table 1. Each Generator Owner, Transmission Owner, and Distribution Provider that applies load-responsive protective relays on their respective Elements listed in 3.2, Facilities, shall use one of the following Options in Table 1, Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria (“Table 1”), to set each load-responsive protective relay element according to its application and relay type. The bus voltage is based on the criteria for the various applications listed in Table 1.

Generators

Synchronous generator relay pickup setting criteria values are derived from the unit’s maximum gross Real Power capability, in megawatts (MW), as reported to the Transmission Planner, and the unit’s Reactive Power capability, in megavoltampere-reactive (Mvar), is determined by calculating the MW value based on the unit’s nameplate megavoltampere (MVA) rating at rated power factor. If different seasonal capabilities are reported, the maximum capability shall be used for the purposes of this standard.

Asynchronous generator relay pickup setting criteria values (including inverter-based installations) are derived from the site’s aggregate maximum complex power capability, in MVA, as reported to the Transmission Planner, including the Mvar output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices.

For the application case where synchronous and asynchronous generator types are combined on a generator step-up transformer or on Elements that connect the generator step-up (GSU) transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant (Elements may also supply generating plant loads.), the pickup setting criteria shall be determined by vector summing the pickup setting criteria of each generator type, and using the bus voltage for the given synchronous generator application and relay type.

Transformers

Calculations using the GSU transformer turns ratio shall use the actual tap that is applied (i.e., in service) for GSU transformers with deenergized tap changers (DETC). If load tap changers (LTC) are used, the calculations shall reflect the tap that results in the lowest generator bus voltage. When the criterion specifies the use of the GSU transformer’s impedance, the nameplate impedance at the nominal GSU transformer turns ratio shall be used.

Applications that use more complex topology, such as generators connected to a multiple winding transformer, are not directly addressed by the criteria in Table 1. These topologies can result in complex power flows, and may require simulation to avoid overly conservative assumptions to simplify the calculations. Entities with these topologies should set their relays in such a way that they do not operate for the conditions being addressed in this standard.

Multiple Lines

Applications that use more complex topology, such as multiple lines that connect the generator step-up (GSU) transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant (Elements may also supply generating plant loads) are not directly addressed by the criteria in Table 1. These topologies can result in complex power flows, and it may require simulation to avoid overly conservative assumptions to simplify the calculations. Entities with these topologies should set their relays in such a way that they do not operate for the conditions being addressed in this standard.

Exclusions

The following protection systems are excluded from the requirements of this standard:

1. Any relay elements that are in service only during start up.
2. Load-responsive protective relay elements that are armed only when the generator is disconnected from the system, (e.g., non-directional overcurrent elements used in conjunction with inadvertent energization schemes, and open breaker flashover schemes).
3. Phase fault detector relay elements employed to supervise other load-responsive phase distance elements (e.g., in order to prevent false operation in the event of a loss of potential) provided the distance element is set in accordance with the criteria outlined in the standard.
4. Protective relay elements that are only enabled when other protection elements fail (e.g., overcurrent elements that are only enabled during loss of potential conditions).
5. Protective relay elements used only for Remedial Action Schemes that are subject to one or more requirements in a NERC or Regional Reliability Standard.
6. Protection systems that detect generator overloads that are designed to coordinate with the generator short time capability by utilizing an extremely inverse characteristic set to operate no faster than 7 seconds at 218% of full load current (e.g., rated armature current), and prevent operation below 115% of full-load current.³
7. Protection systems that detect transformer overloads and are designed only to respond in time periods which allow an operator 15 minutes or greater to respond to overload conditions.

Deleted: Special Protection System

Table 1

Table 1 beginning on the next page is structured and formatted to aid the reader with identifying an option for a given load-responsive protective relay.

The first column identifies the application (e.g., synchronous or asynchronous generators, generator step-up transformers, unit auxiliary transformers, Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant

³ IEEE C37.102-2006, "Guide for AC Generator Protection," Section 4.1.1.2.

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loads). Dark blue horizontal bars, excluding the header which repeats at the top of each page, demarcate the various applications.

The second column identifies the load-responsive protective relay (e.g., 21, 50, 51, 51V-C, 51V-R, or 67) according to the applied application in the first column. A light blue horizontal bar between the relay types is the demarcation between relay types for a given application. These light blue bars will contain no text.

The third column uses numeric and alphabetic options (i.e., index numbering) to identify the available options for setting load-responsive protective relays according to the application and applied relay type. Another, shorter, light blue bar contains the word “OR,” and reveals to the reader that the relay for that application has one or more options (i.e., “ways”) to determine the bus voltage and pickup setting criteria in the fourth and fifth column, respectively. The bus voltage column and pickup setting criteria columns provide the criteria for determining an appropriate setting.

The table is further formatted by shading groups of relays associated with asynchronous generator applications. Synchronous generator applications and the unit auxiliary transformer applications are not shaded. Also, intentional buffers were added to the table such that similar options, as possible, would be paired together on a per page basis. Note that some applications may have an additional pairing that might occur on adjacent pages.

| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | | |
|--|--|-----------|---|---|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria | |
| Synchronous generating unit(s), or Elements utilized in the aggregation of dispersed power producing resources | Phase distance relay (21) – directional toward the Transmission system | 1a | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 0.95 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer | The impedance element shall be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the gross MW capability reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 150% of the MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor | |
| | | OR | | | |
| | | 1b | Calculated generator bus voltage corresponding to 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer (including the transformer turns ratio and impedance) | The impedance element shall be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the gross MW capability reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 150% of the MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor | |
| | | OR | | | |
| | | 1c | Simulated generator bus voltage coincident with the highest Reactive Power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer prior to field-forcing | The impedance element shall be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the gross MW capability reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 100% of the maximum gross Mvar output during field-forcing as determined by simulation | |
| The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type | | | | | |

⁴ Calculations using the generator step-up (GSU) transformer turns ratio shall use the actual tap that is applied (i.e., in service) for GSU transformers with de-energized tap changers (DETC). If load tap changers (LTC) are used, the calculations shall reflect the tap that results in the lowest generator bus voltage. When the criterion specifies the use of the GSU transformer’s impedance, the nameplate impedance at the nominal GSU turns ratio shall be used.

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| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | | |
|--|---|---|--|--|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria | |
| Synchronous generating unit(s), or Elements utilized in the aggregation of dispersed power producing resources | Phase time overcurrent relay (51) or (51V-R) – voltage-restrained | 2a | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 0.95 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the gross MW capability reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 150% of the MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor | |
| | | OR | | | |
| | | 2b | Calculated generator bus voltage corresponding to 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer (including the transformer turns ratio and impedance) | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the gross MW capability reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 150% of the MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor | |
| | OR | | | | |
| | 2c | Simulated generator bus voltage coincident with the highest Reactive Power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer prior to field-forcing | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the gross MW capability reported to the Transmission Planner or, and (2) Reactive Power output – 100% of the maximum gross Mvar output during field-forcing as determined by simulation | | |
| The same application continues with a different relay type below | | | | | |
| | Phase time overcurrent relay (51V-C) – voltage controlled (Enabled to operate as a function of voltage) | 3 | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 1.0 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer | Voltage control setting shall be set less than 75% of the calculated generator bus voltage | |
| A different application starts on the next page | | | | | |

| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | |
|--|---|--------|---|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria |
| Asynchronous generating unit(s) (including inverter-based installations), or Elements utilized in the aggregation of dispersed power producing resources | Phase distance relay (21) – directional toward the Transmission system | 4 | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 1.0 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer | The impedance element shall be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 130% of the maximum aggregate nameplate MVA output at rated power factor (including the Mvar output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices) |
| | Phase time overcurrent relay (51) or (51V-R) – voltage-restrained | 5 | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 1.0 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 130% of the calculated current derived from the maximum aggregate nameplate MVA output at rated power factor (including the Mvar output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices) |
| | Phase time overcurrent relay (51V-C) – voltage controlled (Enabled to operate as a function of voltage) | 6 | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 1.0 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer | Voltage control setting shall be set less than 75% of the calculated generator bus voltage |
| A different application starts on the next page | | | | |

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| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | | |
|--|--|-----------|---|--|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria | |
| Generator step-up transformer(s) connected to synchronous generators | Phase distance relay (21) – directional toward the Transmission system – installed on generator-side of the GSU transformer If the relay is installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer use Option 14 | 7a | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 0.95 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer | The impedance element shall be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 150% of the aggregate generation MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor | |
| | | OR | | | |
| | | 7b | Calculated generator bus voltage corresponding to 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer (including the transformer turns ratio and impedance) | The impedance element shall be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 150% of the aggregate generation MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor | |
| | | OR | | | |
| | | 7c | Simulated generator bus voltage coincident with the highest Reactive Power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer prior to field-forcing | The impedance element shall be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation maximum gross Mvar output during field-forcing as determined by simulation | |
| The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type | | | | | |

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| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | | |
|--|---|-----------|---|---|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria | |
| Generator step-up transformer(s) connected to synchronous generators | Phase time overcurrent relay (51) – installed on generator-side of the GSU transformer If the relay is installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer use Option 15 | 8a | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 0.95 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 150% of the aggregate generation MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor | |
| | | OR | | | |
| | | 8b | Calculated generator bus voltage corresponding to 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer (including the transformer turns ratio and impedance) | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 150% of the aggregate generation MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor | |
| | | OR | | | |
| | | 8c | Simulated generator bus voltage coincident with the highest Reactive Power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer prior to field-forcing | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation maximum gross Mvar output during field-forcing as determined by simulation | |
| The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type | | | | | |

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| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | | |
|--|--|-----------|---|---|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria | |
| Generator step-up transformer(s) connected to synchronous generators | Phase directional time overcurrent relay (67) – directional toward the Transmission system – installed on generator-side of the GSU transformer If the relay is installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer use Option 16 | 9a | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 0.95 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 150% of the aggregate generation MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor | |
| | | OR | | | |
| | | 9b | Calculated generator bus voltage corresponding to 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer (including the transformer turns ratio and impedance) | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 150% of the aggregate generation MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor | |
| | | OR | | | |
| | | 9c | Simulated generator bus voltage coincident with the highest Reactive Power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer prior to field-forcing | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation maximum gross Mvar output during field-forcing as determined by simulation | |
| A different application starts on the next page | | | | | |

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| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | |
|---|--|--------|--|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria |
| Generator step-up transformer(s) connected to asynchronous generators only (including inverter-based installations) | Phase distance relay (21) – directional toward the Transmission system – installed on generator-side of the GSU transformer If the relay is installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer use Option 17 | 10 | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 1.0 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer | The impedance element shall be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 130% of the maximum aggregate nameplate MVA output at rated power factor (including the Mvar output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices) |
| | Phase time overcurrent relay (51) – installed on generator-side of the GSU transformer If the relay is installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer use Option 18 | 11 | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 1.0 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer for overcurrent relays installed on the low-side | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 130% of the calculated current derived from the maximum aggregate nameplate MVA output at rated power factor (including the Mvar output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices) |
| | The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type | | | |

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| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | |
|---|--|--------|---|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria |
| Generator step-up transformer(s) connected to asynchronous generators only (including inverter-based installations) | Phase directional time overcurrent relay (67) – directional toward the Transmission system – installed on generator-side of the GSU transformer If the relay is installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer use Option 19 | 12 | Generator bus voltage corresponding to 1.0 per unit of the high-side nominal voltage times the turns ratio of the generator step-up transformer | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 130% of the calculated current derived from the maximum aggregate nameplate MVA output at rated power factor (including the Mvar output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices) |
| A different application starts below | | | | |
| Unit auxiliary transformer(s) (UAT) | Phase time overcurrent relay (51) applied at the high-side terminals of the UAT, for which operation of the relay will cause the associated generator to trip. | 13a | 1.0 per unit of the winding nominal voltage of the unit auxiliary transformer | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 150% of the calculated current derived from the unit auxiliary transformer maximum nameplate MVA rating |
| | | 13b | Unit auxiliary transformer bus voltage corresponding to the measured current | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 150% of the unit auxiliary transformer measured current at the generator maximum gross MW capability reported to the Transmission Planner |
| A different application starts on the next page | | | | |

| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | |
|--|--|-----------|--|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria |
| Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant loads. – connected to synchronous generators | Phase distance relay (21) – directional toward the Transmission system – installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer | 14a | 0.85 per unit of the line nominal voltage | The impedance element shall be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 120% of the aggregate generation MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor |
| | | OR | | |
| | If the relay is installed on the generator-side of the GSU transformer use Option 7 | 14b | Simulated line voltage coincident with the highest Reactive Power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer prior to field-forcing | The impedance element shall be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 115% of: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output –100% of the aggregate generation maximum gross Mvar output during field-forcing as determined by simulation |
| The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type | | | | |

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| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | |
|--|--|-----------|--|---|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria |
| Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant loads. – connected to synchronous generators | Phase overcurrent supervisory element (50) – associated with current-based, communication-assisted schemes where the scheme is capable of tripping for loss of communications installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer or phase time overcurrent relay (51) – installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer | 15a | 0.85 per unit of the line nominal voltage | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 120% of the aggregate generation MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor |
| | | OR | | |
| | If the relay is installed on the generator-side of the GSU transformer use Option 8 | 15b | Simulated line voltage coincident with the highest Reactive Power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer prior to field-forcing | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output –100% of the aggregate generation maximum gross Mvar output during field-forcing as determined by simulation |
| The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type | | | | |

| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | |
|---|--|-----------|--|---|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria |
| Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant load. – connected to synchronous generators | Phase directional overcurrent supervisory element (67) – associated with current-based, communication-assisted schemes where the scheme is capable of tripping for loss of communications directional toward the Transmission system installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer or phase directional time overcurrent relay (67) – directional toward the Transmission system installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer | 16a | 0.85 per unit of the line nominal voltage | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 120% of the aggregate generation MW value, derived from the generator nameplate MVA rating at rated power factor |
| | | OR | | |
| | If the relay is installed on the generator-side of the GSU transformer use Option 9 | 16b | Simulated line voltage coincident with the highest Reactive Power output achieved during field-forcing in response to a 0.85 per unit nominal voltage on the high-side terminals of the generator step-up transformer prior to field-forcing | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 115% of the calculated current derived from: (1) Real Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation gross MW reported to the Transmission Planner, and (2) Reactive Power output – 100% of the aggregate generation maximum gross Mvar output during field-forcing as determined by simulation |

A different application starts on the next page

| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | |
|---|---|--------|--|---|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria |
| Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant loads. – connected to asynchronous generators only (including inverter-based installations) | Phase distance relay (21) – directional toward the Transmission system– installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer | 17 | 1.0 per unit of the line nominal voltage | The impedance element shall be set less than the calculated impedance derived from 130% of the maximum aggregate nameplate MVA output at rated power factor (including the Mvar output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices) |
| | If the relay is installed on the generator-side of the GSU transformer use Option 10 | | | |
| <p>The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type</p> | | | | |

| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | |
|---|--|--------|--|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria |
| Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant loads. – connected to asynchronous generators only (including inverter-based installations) | Phase overcurrent supervisory element (50) – associated with current-based, communication-assisted schemes where the scheme is capable of tripping for loss of communications installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer or Phase time overcurrent relay (51) – installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer If the relay is installed on the generator-side of the GSU transformer use Option 11 | 18 | 1.0 per unit of the line nominal voltage | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 130% of the calculated current derived from the maximum aggregate nameplate MVA output at rated power factor (including the Mvar output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices) |
| | The same application continues on the next page with a different relay type | | | |

| Table 1. Relay Loadability Evaluation Criteria | | | | |
|--|--|--------|--|--|
| Application | Relay Type | Option | Bus Voltage ⁴ | Pickup Setting Criteria |
| <p>Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant loads. – connected to asynchronous generators only (including inverter-based installations)</p> | <p>Phase directional overcurrent supervisory element (67) – associated with current-based, communication-assisted schemes where the scheme is capable of tripping for loss of communications directional toward the Transmission system installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer or Phase directional time overcurrent relay (67) – installed on the high-side of the GSU transformer</p> <p>If the relay is installed on the generator-side of the GSU transformer use Option 12</p> | 19 | 1.0 per unit of the line nominal voltage | The overcurrent element shall be set greater than 130% of the calculated current derived from the maximum aggregate nameplate MVA output at rated power factor (including the Mvar output of any static or dynamic reactive power devices) |
| End of Table 1 | | | | |

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Rationale:

During development of this standard, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. Upon BOT approval, the text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section.

Rationale for R1:

Requirement R1 is a risk-based requirement that requires the responsible entity to be aware of each protective relay subject to the standard and applies an appropriate setting based on its calculations or simulation for the conditions established in Attachment 1.

The criteria established in Attachment 1 represent short-duration conditions during which generation Facilities are capable of providing system reactive resources, and for which generation Facilities have been historically recorded to disconnect, causing events to become more severe.

The term, “while maintaining reliable fault protection” in Requirement R1 describes that the responsible entity is to comply with this standard while achieving their desired protection goals. Refer to the Guidelines and Technical Basis, Introduction, for more information.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|-------------|-----------------|--|---|
| 1 | August 15, 2013 | Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees | New |
| <u>1(X)</u> | <u>TBD</u> | <u>Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees</u> | <u>Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS</u> |

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** **Operational Reliability Information**
2. **Number:** TOP-005-2a(X)
3. **Purpose:** To ensure reliability entities have the operating data needed to monitor system conditions within their areas.
4. **Applicability**
 - 4.1. Transmission Operators.
 - 4.2. Balancing Authorities.
 - 4.3. Purchasing Selling Entities.
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1. As a condition of receiving data from the Interregional Security Network (ISN), each ISN data recipient shall sign the NERC Confidentiality Agreement for “Electric System Reliability Data.”
- R2. Upon request, each Balancing Authority and Transmission Operator shall provide to other Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators with immediate responsibility for operational reliability, the operating data that are necessary to allow these Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators to perform operational reliability assessments and to coordinate reliable operations. Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators shall provide the types of data as listed in Attachment 1-TOP-005 “Electric System Reliability Data,” unless otherwise agreed to by the Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators with immediate responsibility for operational reliability.
- R3. Each Purchasing-Selling Entity shall provide information as requested by its Host Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators to enable them to conduct operational reliability assessments and coordinate reliable operations.

C. Measures

- M1. Evidence that the Balancing Authority, Transmission Operator, and Purchasing-Selling Entity is providing the information required, within the time intervals specified, and in a format agreed upon by the requesting entities.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Self-Certification: Entities shall annually self-certify compliance to the measures as required by its Regional Reliability Organization.

Exception Reporting: Each Region shall report compliance and violations to NERC via the NERC compliance reporting process.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame

Periodic Review: Entities will be selected for operational reviews at least every three years. One calendar year without a violation from the time of the violation.

1.3. Data Retention

Not specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

Not specified.

2. Violation Severity Levels:

| R# | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|----|--|----------|------|--|
| R1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The ISN data recipient failed to sign the NERC Confidentiality Agreement for “Electric System Reliability Data”. |
| R2 | The responsible entity failed to provide any of the data requested by other Balancing Authorities or Transmission Operators. | N/A | N/A | The responsible entity failed to provide all of the data requested by its host Balancing Authority or Transmission Operator. |
| R3 | The responsible entity failed to provide any of the data requested by other Balancing Authorities or Transmission Operators. | N/A | N/A | The responsible entity failed to provide all of the data requested by its host Balancing Authority or Transmission Operator. |

E. Regional Variances

None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|------------------|---|--|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0 | August 8, 2005 | Removed “Proposed” from Effective Date | Errata |
| 1 | | Removed the Reliability Coordinator from the list of responsible functional entities Deleted R1 and R1.1 Modified M1 to omit the reference to the Reliability Coordinator Deleted VSLs for R1 and R1.1 | Revised |
| 2 | October 17, 2008 | Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees | New |
| 2 | March 17, 2011 | Order issued by FERC approving TOP-005-2 (approval effective 5/23/11) | |
| 2a | April 21, 2011 | Added FERC approved Interpretation | |
| 2a(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

Attachment 1-TOP-005

Electric System Reliability Data

This Attachment lists the types of data that Balancing Authorities, and Transmission Operators are expected to share with other Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators.

- 1.** The following information shall be updated at least every ten minutes:
 - 1.1.** Transmission data. Transmission data for all Interconnections plus all other facilities considered key, from a reliability standpoint:
 - 1.1.1** Status.
 - 1.1.2** MW or ampere loadings.
 - 1.1.3** MVA capability.
 - 1.1.4** Transformer tap and phase angle settings.
 - 1.1.5** Key voltages.
 - 1.2.** Generator data.
 - 1.2.1** Status.
 - 1.2.2** MW and MVAR capability.
 - 1.2.3** MW and MVAR net output.
 - 1.2.4** Status of automatic voltage control facilities.
 - 1.3.** Operating reserve.
 - 1.3.1** MW reserve available within ten minutes.
 - 1.4.** Balancing Authority demand.
 - 1.4.1** Instantaneous.
 - 1.5.** Interchange.
 - 1.5.1** Instantaneous actual interchange with each Balancing Authority.
 - 1.5.2** Current Interchange Schedules with each Balancing Authority by individual Interchange Transaction, including Interchange identifiers, and reserve responsibilities.
 - 1.5.3** Interchange Schedules for the next 24 hours.
 - 1.6.** Area Control Error and frequency.
 - 1.6.1** Instantaneous area control error.
 - 1.6.2** Clock hour area control error.
 - 1.6.3** System frequency at one or more locations in the Balancing Authority.
- 2.** Other operating information updated as soon as available.
 - 2.1.** Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits and System Operating Limits in effect.
 - 2.2.** Forecast of operating reserve at peak, and time of peak for current day and next day.
 - 2.3.** Forecast peak demand for current day and next day.
 - 2.4.** Forecast changes in equipment status.

- 2.5. New facilities in place.
- 2.6. New or degraded Remedial Action Schemes.
- 2.7. Emergency operating procedures in effect.
- 2.8. Severe weather, fire, or earthquake.
- 2.9. Multi-site sabotage.

Appendix 2

| Requirement Number and Text of Requirement |
|---|
| <p>TOP-005-1 Requirement R3¹</p> <p>Upon request, each Balancing Authority and Transmission Operator shall provide to other Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators with immediate responsibility for operational reliability, the operating data that are necessary to allow these Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators to perform operational reliability assessments and to coordinate reliable operations. Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators shall provide the types of data as listed in Attachment 1-TOP-005-0 “Electric System Reliability Data,” unless otherwise agreed to by the Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators with immediate responsibility for operational reliability.</p> <p><i>The above-referenced Attachment 1 — TOP-005-0 specifies the following data as item 2.6: New or <u>degraded</u> Remedial Action Schemes. [Underline added for emphasis.]</i></p> <p>IRO-005-1 Requirement R12</p> <p>R12. Whenever a Remedial Action Scheme that may have an inter-Balancing Authority, or inter-Transmission Operator impact (e.g., could potentially affect transmission flows resulting in a SOL or IROL violation) is armed, the Reliability Coordinators shall be aware of the impact of the operation of that Remedial Action Scheme on inter-area flows. The Transmission Operator shall immediately inform the Reliability Coordinator of the status of the Remedial Action Scheme including any <u>degradation</u> or potential failure to operate as expected. [Underline added for emphasis.]</p> <p>PRC-012-0(X) Requirements R1 and R1.3</p> <p>R1. Each Regional Reliability Organization with a Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Providers that uses or is planning to use a RAS shall have a documented Regional Reliability Organization RAS review procedure to ensure that RAS comply with Regional criteria and NERC Reliability Standards. The Regional RAS review procedure shall include:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">R1.3. Requirements to demonstrate that the RAS shall be designed so that a single RAS component failure, when the RAS was intended to operate, does not prevent the interconnected transmission system from meeting the performance requirements defined in Reliability Standards TPL-001-0, TPL-002-0, and TPL-003-0.</p> |
| Background Information for Interpretation |
| <p>The TOP-005-1 standard focuses on two key obligations. The first key obligation (Requirement R1) is a “responsibility mandate.” Requirement R1 establishes who is responsible for the obligation to provide operating data “required” by a Reliability Coordinator within the framework of the Reliability Coordinator requirements defined in the IRO standards. The second key obligation (Requirement R3) is a “performance mandate.” Requirement R3 defines the obligation to provide data “requested” by other reliability entities that is needed “to perform assessments and to coordinate operations.”</p> <p>The Attachment to TOP-005-1 is provided as a guideline of what “can be shared.” The Attachment is not an obligation of “what must be shared.” Enforceable NERC Requirements must be explicitly contained within a given Standard’s approved requirements. In this case, the standard only requires data “upon request.” If a Reliability Coordinator or other reliability entity were to request data such as</p> |

¹ In the current version of the Standard (TOP-005-2a), this requirement is R2.

listed in the Attachment, then the entity being asked would be mandated by Requirements R1 and R3 to provide that data (including item 2.6, whether it is or is not in some undefined “degraded” state).

IRO-002-1 requires the Reliability Coordinator to have processes in place to support its reliability obligations (Requirement R2). Requirement R4 mandates that the Reliability Coordinator have communications processes in place to meet its reliability obligations, and Requirement R5 et al mandate the Reliability Coordinator to have the tools to carry out these reliability obligations.

IRO-003-2 (Requirements R1 and R2) requires the Reliability Coordinator to monitor the state of its system.

IRO-004-1 requires that the Reliability Coordinator carry out studies to identify Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (Requirement R1) and to be aware of system conditions via monitoring tools and information exchange.

IRO-005-1 mandates that each Reliability Coordinator monitor predefined base conditions (Requirement R1), collect additional data when operating limits are or may be exceeded (Requirement R3), and identify actual or potential threats (Requirement R5). The basis for that request is left to each Reliability Coordinator. The Purpose statement of IRO-005-1 focuses on the Reliability Coordinator’s obligation to be aware of conditions that may have a “significant” impact upon its area and to communicate that information to others (Requirements R7 and R9). Please note: it is from this communication that Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities would either obtain or would know to ask for RAS information from another Transmission Operator.

The IRO-005-1 (Requirement R12) standard implies that degraded is a condition that will result in a failure to operate as designed. If the loss of a communication channel will result in the failure of a RAS to operate as designed then the Transmission Operator would be mandated to report that information. On the other hand, if the loss of a communication channel will not result in the failure of the RAS to operate as designed, then such a condition can be, but is not mandated to be, reported.

Conclusion

The TOP-005-1 standard does not provide, nor does it require, a definition for the term “degraded.”

The IRO-005-1 (R12) standard implies that degraded is a condition that will result in a failure of a RAS to operate as designed. If the loss of a communication channel will result in the failure of a RAS to operate as designed, then the Transmission Operator would be mandated to report that information. On the other hand, if the loss of a communication channel will not result in the failure of the RAS to operate as designed, then such a condition can be, but is not mandated to be, reported.

To request a formal definition of the term degraded, the Reliability Standards Development Procedure requires the submittal of a Standards Authorization Request.

Standard TOP-005-2a(X) — Operational Reliability Information

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** Operational Reliability Information
2. **Number:** TOP-005-2a(X)
3. **Purpose:** To ensure reliability entities have the operating data needed to monitor system conditions within their areas.
4. **Applicability**
 - 4.1. Transmission Operators.
 - 4.2. Balancing Authorities.
 - 4.3. Purchasing Selling Entities.
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Deleted: Proposed

Deleted: In those jurisdictions where no regulatory approval is required, the standard shall become effective on the latter of either April 1, 2009 or the first day of the first calendar quarter, three months after BOT adoption.

B. Requirements

- R1. As a condition of receiving data from the Interregional Security Network (ISN), each ISN data recipient shall sign the NERC Confidentiality Agreement for “Electric System Reliability Data.”
- R2. Upon request, each Balancing Authority and Transmission Operator shall provide to other Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators with immediate responsibility for operational reliability, the operating data that are necessary to allow these Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators to perform operational reliability assessments and to coordinate reliable operations. Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators shall provide the types of data as listed in Attachment 1-TOP-005 “Electric System Reliability Data,” unless otherwise agreed to by the Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators with immediate responsibility for operational reliability.
- R3. Each Purchasing-Selling Entity shall provide information as requested by its Host Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators to enable them to conduct operational reliability assessments and coordinate reliable operations.

C. Measures

- M1. Evidence that the Balancing Authority, Transmission Operator, and Purchasing-Selling Entity is providing the information required, within the time intervals specified, and in a format agreed upon by the requesting entities.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Self-Certification: Entities shall annually self-certify compliance to the measures as required by its Regional Reliability Organization.

Exception Reporting: Each Region shall report compliance and violations to NERC via the NERC compliance reporting process.

Standard TOP-005-2a(X) — Operational Reliability Information

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame

Periodic Review: Entities will be selected for operational reviews at least every three years. One calendar year without a violation from the time of the violation.

1.3. Data Retention

Not specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

Not specified.

Standard TOP-005-2a(X) — Operational Reliability Information

2. Violation Severity Levels:

| R# | Lower | Moderate | High | Severe |
|----|--|----------|------|--|
| R1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | The ISN data recipient failed to sign the NERC Confidentiality Agreement for "Electric System Reliability Data". |
| R2 | The responsible entity failed to provide any of the data requested by other Balancing Authorities or Transmission Operators. | N/A | N/A | The responsible entity failed to provide all of the data requested by its host Balancing Authority or Transmission Operator. |
| R3 | The responsible entity failed to provide any of the data requested by other Balancing Authorities or Transmission Operators. | N/A | N/A | The responsible entity failed to provide all of the data requested by its host Balancing Authority or Transmission Operator. |

Standard TOP-005-2a(X) — Operational Reliability Information

E. Regional Variances

None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|-----------------------|---------------------|---|--|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0 | August 8, 2005 | Removed "Proposed" from Effective Date | Errata |
| 1 | | Removed the Reliability Coordinator from the list of responsible functional entities Deleted R1 and R1.1 Modified M1 to omit the reference to the Reliability Coordinator Deleted VSLs for R1 and R1.1 | Revised |
| 2 | October 17, 2008 | Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees | New |
| 2 | March 17, 2011 | Order issued by FERC approving TOP-005-2 (approval effective 5/23/11) | |
| 2a | April 21, 2011 | Added FERC approved Interpretation | |
| 2a(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

Attachment 1-TOP-005

Electric System Reliability Data

This Attachment lists the types of data that Balancing Authorities, and Transmission Operators are expected to share with other Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators.

1. The following information shall be updated at least every ten minutes:
 - 1.1. Transmission data. Transmission data for all Interconnections plus all other facilities considered key, from a reliability standpoint:
 - 1.1.1 Status.
 - 1.1.2 MW or ampere loadings.
 - 1.1.3 MVA capability.
 - 1.1.4 Transformer tap and phase angle settings.
 - 1.1.5 Key voltages.
 - 1.2. Generator data.
 - 1.2.1 Status.
 - 1.2.2 MW and MVAR capability.
 - 1.2.3 MW and MVAR net output.
 - 1.2.4 Status of automatic voltage control facilities.
 - 1.3. Operating reserve.
 - 1.3.1 MW reserve available within ten minutes.
 - 1.4. Balancing Authority demand.
 - 1.4.1 Instantaneous.
 - 1.5. Interchange.
 - 1.5.1 Instantaneous actual interchange with each Balancing Authority.
 - 1.5.2 Current Interchange Schedules with each Balancing Authority by individual Interchange Transaction, including Interchange identifiers, and reserve responsibilities.
 - 1.5.3 Interchange Schedules for the next 24 hours.
 - 1.6. Area Control Error and frequency.
 - 1.6.1 Instantaneous area control error.
 - 1.6.2 Clock hour area control error.
 - 1.6.3 System frequency at one or more locations in the Balancing Authority.
2. Other operating information updated as soon as available.
 - 2.1. Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits and System Operating Limits in effect.
 - 2.2. Forecast of operating reserve at peak, and time of peak for current day and next day.
 - 2.3. Forecast peak demand for current day and next day.
 - 2.4. Forecast changes in equipment status.

Standard TOP-005-2a(X) — Operational Reliability Information

- 2.5. New facilities in place.
- 2.6. New or degraded [Remedial Action Schemes](#).
- 2.7. Emergency operating procedures in effect.
- 2.8. Severe weather, fire, or earthquake.
- 2.9. Multi-site sabotage.

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Appendix 2

| Requirement Number and Text of Requirement |
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| <p>TOP-005-1 Requirement R3¹</p> <p>Upon request, each Balancing Authority and Transmission Operator shall provide to other Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators with immediate responsibility for operational reliability, the operating data that are necessary to allow these Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators to perform operational reliability assessments and to coordinate reliable operations. Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators shall provide the types of data as listed in Attachment 1-TOP-005-0 “Electric System Reliability Data,” unless otherwise agreed to by the Balancing Authorities and Transmission Operators with immediate responsibility for operational reliability.</p> <p><i>The above-referenced Attachment 1 — TOP-005-0 specifies the following data as item 2.6: New or degraded Remedial Action Schemes. [Underline added for emphasis.]</i></p> <p>IRO-005-1 Requirement R12</p> <p>R12. Whenever a Remedial Action Scheme that may have an inter-Balancing Authority, or inter-Transmission Operator impact (e.g., could potentially affect transmission flows resulting in a SOL or IROL violation) is armed, the Reliability Coordinators shall be aware of the impact of the operation of that Remedial Action Scheme on inter-area flows. The Transmission Operator shall immediately inform the Reliability Coordinator of the status of the Remedial Action Scheme including any degradation or potential failure to operate as expected. [Underline added for emphasis.]</p> <p>PRC-012-0(X) Requirements R1 and R1.3</p> <p>R1. Each Regional Reliability Organization with a Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Providers that uses or is planning to use a RAS shall have a documented Regional Reliability Organization RAS review procedure to ensure that RAS comply with Regional criteria and NERC Reliability Standards. The Regional RAS review procedure shall include:</p> <p>R1.3. Requirements to demonstrate that the RAS shall be designed so that a single RAS component failure, when the RAS was intended to operate, does not prevent the interconnected transmission system from meeting the performance requirements defined in Reliability Standards TPL-001-0, TPL-002-0, and TPL-003-0.</p> |
| <p>Background Information for Interpretation</p> <p>The TOP-005-1 standard focuses on two key obligations. The first key obligation (Requirement R1) is a “responsibility mandate.” Requirement R1 establishes who is responsible for the obligation to provide operating data “required” by a Reliability Coordinator within the framework of the Reliability Coordinator requirements defined in the IRO standards. The second key obligation (Requirement R3) is a “performance mandate.” Requirement R3 defines the obligation to provide data “requested” by other reliability entities that is needed “to perform assessments and to coordinate operations.”</p> <p>The Attachment to TOP-005-1 is provided as a guideline of what “can be shared.” The Attachment is not an obligation of “what must be shared.” Enforceable NERC Requirements must be explicitly contained within a given Standard’s approved requirements. In this case, the standard only requires data “upon request.” If a Reliability Coordinator or other reliability entity were to request data such as</p> |

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¹ In the current version of the Standard (TOP-005-2a), this requirement is R2.

Standard TOP-005-2a(X) — Operational Reliability Information

listed in the Attachment, then the entity being asked would be mandated by Requirements R1 and R3 to provide that data (including item 2.6, whether it is or is not in some undefined “degraded” state).

IRO-002-1 requires the Reliability Coordinator to have processes in place to support its reliability obligations (Requirement R2). Requirement R4 mandates that the Reliability Coordinator have communications processes in place to meet its reliability obligations, and Requirement R5 et al mandate the Reliability Coordinator to have the tools to carry out these reliability obligations.

IRO-003-2 (Requirements R1 and R2) requires the Reliability Coordinator to monitor the state of its system.

IRO-004-1 requires that the Reliability Coordinator carry out studies to identify Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (Requirement R1) and to be aware of system conditions via monitoring tools and information exchange.

IRO-005-1 mandates that each Reliability Coordinator monitor predefined base conditions (Requirement R1), collect additional data when operating limits are or may be exceeded (Requirement R3), and identify actual or potential threats (Requirement R5). The basis for that request is left to each Reliability Coordinator. The Purpose statement of IRO-005-1 focuses on the Reliability Coordinator’s obligation to be aware of conditions that may have a “significant” impact upon its area and to communicate that information to others (Requirements R7 and R9). Please note: it is from this communication that Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities would either obtain or would know to ask for RAS information from another Transmission Operator.

The IRO-005-1 (Requirement R12) standard implies that degraded is a condition that will result in a failure to operate as designed. If the loss of a communication channel will result in the failure of a RAS to operate as designed then the Transmission Operator would be mandated to report that information. On the other hand, if the loss of a communication channel will not result in the failure of the RAS to operate as designed, then such a condition can be, but is not mandated to be, reported.

Conclusion

The TOP-005-1 standard does not provide, nor does it require, a definition for the term “degraded.”

The IRO-005-1 (R12) standard implies that degraded is a condition that will result in a failure of a RAS to operate as designed. If the loss of a communication channel will result in the failure of a RAS to operate as designed, then the Transmission Operator would be mandated to report that information. On the other hand, if the loss of a communication channel will not result in the failure of the RAS to operate as designed, then such a condition can be, but is not mandated to be, reported.

To request a formal definition of the term degraded, the Reliability Standards Development Procedure requires the submittal of a Standards Authorization Request.

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A. Introduction

1. **Title:** System Performance Under Normal (No Contingency) Conditions (Category A)
2. **Number:** TPL-001-0.1(X)
3. **Purpose:** System simulations and associated assessments are needed periodically to ensure that reliable systems are developed that meet specified performance requirements with sufficient lead time, and continue to be modified or upgraded as necessary to meet present and future system needs.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Planning Authority
 - 4.2. Transmission Planner
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall each demonstrate through a valid assessment that its portion of the interconnected transmission system is planned such that, with all transmission facilities in service and with normal (pre-contingency) operating procedures in effect, the Network can be operated to supply projected customer demands and projected Firm (non-recallable reserved) Transmission Services at all Demand levels over the range of forecast system demands, under the conditions defined in Category A of Table I. To be considered valid, the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner assessments shall:
 - R1.1.** Be made annually.
 - R1.2.** Be conducted for near-term (years one through five) and longer-term (years six through ten) planning horizons.
 - R1.3.** Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category A of Table 1 (no contingencies). The specific elements selected (from each of the following categories) shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).
 - R1.3.1.** Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the entity performing the study.
 - R1.3.2.** Be conducted annually unless changes to system conditions do not warrant such analyses.

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Compliance Monitor: Regional Reliability Organization.

Each Compliance Monitor shall report compliance and violations to NERC via the NERC Compliance Reporting Process.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame

Annually

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. Level 1: Not applicable.

2.2. Level 2: A valid assessment and corrective plan for the longer-term planning horizon is not available.

2.3. Level 3: Not applicable.

2.4. Level 4: A valid assessment and corrective plan for the near-term planning horizon is not available.

E. Regional Differences

1. None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|----------------|------------------|---|--|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0 | February 8, 2005 | BOT Approval | Revised |
| 0 | June 3, 2005 | Fixed reference in M1 to read TPL-001-0 R2.1 and TPL-001-0 R2.2 | Errata |
| 0 | July 24, 2007 | Corrected reference in M1. to read TPL-001-0 R1 and TPL-001-0 R2. | Errata |
| 0.1 | October 29, 2008 | BOT adopted errata changes; updated version number to "0.1" | Errata |
| 0.1 | May 13, 2009 | FERC Approved – Updated Effective Date | Revised |
| 0.1(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

Standard TPL-001-0.1(X) — System Performance Under Normal Conditions

Table I. Transmission System Standards – Normal and Emergency Conditions

| Category | Contingencies | System Limits or Impacts | | |
|--|--|---|--|----------------------|
| | | System Stable and both Thermal and Voltage Limits within Applicable Rating ^a | Loss of Demand or Curtailed Firm Transfers | Cascading Outages |
| A No Contingencies | All Facilities in Service | Yes | No | No |
| B Event resulting in the loss of a single element. | Single Line Ground (SLG) or 3-Phase (3Ø) Fault, with Normal Clearing: 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer Loss of an Element without a Fault | Yes Yes Yes Yes | No ^b No ^b No ^b No ^b | No No No No |
| | Single Pole Block, Normal Clearing ^c : 4. Single Pole (dc) Line | Yes | No ^b | No |
| C Event(s) resulting in the loss of two or more (multiple) elements. | SLG Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c : 1. Bus Section | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c | No |
| | 2. Breaker (failure or internal Fault) | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c | No |
| | SLG or 3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c , Manual System Adjustments, followed by another SLG or 3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c : 3. Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency, manual system adjustments, followed by another Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c | No |
| | Bipolar Block, with Normal Clearing ^c : 4. Bipolar (dc) Line Fault (non 3Ø), with Normal Clearing ^c : 5. Any two circuits of a multiple circuit towerline ^f | Yes Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c Planned/ Controlled ^c | No No |
| | SLG Fault, with Delayed Clearing ^c (stuck breaker or protection system failure): 6. Generator 7. Transformer 8. Transmission Circuit 9. Bus Section | Yes Yes Yes Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c Planned/ Controlled ^c Planned/ Controlled ^c Planned/ Controlled ^c | No No No No |

Standard TPL-001-0.1(X) — System Performance Under Normal Conditions

| | | | | | | |
|--|---|----------------|----------------|-------------------------|----------------|--|
| <p>D^d</p> <p>Extreme event resulting in two or more (multiple) elements removed or Cascading out of service.</p> | <p>3Ø Fault, with Delayed Clearing^e (stuck breaker or protection system failure):</p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>1. Generator</td> <td>3. Transformer</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. Transmission Circuit</td> <td>4. Bus Section</td> </tr> </table> | 1. Generator | 3. Transformer | 2. Transmission Circuit | 4. Bus Section | <p>Evaluate for risks and consequences.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ May involve substantial loss of customer Demand and generation in a widespread area or areas. ▪ Portions or all of the interconnected systems may or may not achieve a new, stable operating point. ▪ Evaluation of these events may require joint studies with neighboring systems. |
| | 1. Generator | 3. Transformer | | | | |
| 2. Transmission Circuit | 4. Bus Section | | | | | |
| <p>3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing^e:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Breaker (failure or internal Fault) 6. Loss of towerline with three or more circuits 7. All transmission lines on a common right-of way 8. Loss of a substation (one voltage level plus transformers) 9. Loss of a switching station (one voltage level plus transformers) 10. Loss of all generating units at a station 11. Loss of a large Load or major Load center 12. Failure of a fully redundant Remedial Action Scheme to operate when required 13. Operation, partial operation, or misoperation of a fully redundant Remedial Action Scheme in response to an event or abnormal system condition for which it was not intended to operate 14. Impact of severe power swings or oscillations from Disturbances in another Regional Reliability Organization. | | | | | | |

- a) Applicable rating refers to the applicable Normal and Emergency facility thermal Rating or system voltage limit as determined and consistently applied by the system or facility owner. Applicable Ratings may include Emergency Ratings applicable for short durations as required to permit operating steps necessary to maintain system control. All Ratings must be established consistent with applicable NERC Reliability Standards addressing Facility Ratings.
- b) Planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to radial customers or some local Network customers, connected to or supplied by the Faulted element or by the affected area, may occur in certain areas without impacting the overall reliability of the interconnected transmission systems. To prepare for the next contingency, system adjustments are permitted, including curtailments of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power Transfers.
- c) Depending on system design and expected system impacts, the controlled interruption of electric supply to customers (load shedding), the planned removal from service of certain generators, and/or the curtailment of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power Transfers may be necessary to maintain the overall reliability of the interconnected transmission systems.
- d) A number of extreme contingencies that are listed under Category D and judged to be critical by the transmission planning entity(ies) will be selected for evaluation. It is not expected that all possible facility outages under each listed contingency of Category D will be evaluated.
- e) Normal clearing is when the protection system operates as designed and the Fault is cleared in the time normally expected with proper functioning of the installed protection systems. Delayed clearing of a Fault is due to failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.
- f) System assessments may exclude these events where multiple circuit towers are used over short distances (e.g., station entrance, river crossings) in accordance with Regional exemption criteria.

Standard TPL-001-0.1(X) — System Performance Under Normal Conditions

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** System Performance Under Normal (No Contingency) Conditions (Category A)
2. **Number:** TPL-001-0.1(X)
3. **Purpose:** System simulations and associated assessments are needed periodically to ensure that reliable systems are developed that meet specified performance requirements with sufficient lead time, and continue to be modified or upgraded as necessary to meet present and future system needs.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Planning Authority
 - 4.2. Transmission Planner
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Deleted: May 13, 2009

B. Requirements

- R1.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall each demonstrate through a valid assessment that its portion of the interconnected transmission system is planned such that, with all transmission facilities in service and with normal (pre-contingency) operating procedures in effect, the Network can be operated to supply projected customer demands and projected Firm (non-recallable reserved) Transmission Services at all Demand levels over the range of forecast system demands, under the conditions defined in Category A of Table I. To be considered valid, the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner assessments shall:
- R1.1.** Be made annually.
 - R1.2.** Be conducted for near-term (years one through five) and longer-term (years six through ten) planning horizons.
 - R1.3.** Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category A of Table 1 (no contingencies). The specific elements selected (from each of the following categories) shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).
 - R1.3.1.** Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the entity performing the study.
 - R1.3.2.** Be conducted annually unless changes to system conditions do not warrant such analyses.

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- R1.3.3.** Be conducted beyond the five-year horizon only as needed to address identified marginal conditions that may have longer lead-time solutions.
 - R1.3.4.** Have established normal (pre-contingency) operating procedures in place.
 - R1.3.5.** Have all projected firm transfers modeled.
 - R1.3.6.** Be performed for selected demand levels over the range of forecast system demands.
 - R1.3.7.** Demonstrate that system performance meets Table 1 for Category A (no contingencies).
 - R1.3.8.** Include existing and planned facilities.
 - R1.3.9.** Include Reactive Power resources to ensure that adequate reactive resources are available to meet system performance.
- R1.4.** Address any planned upgrades needed to meet the performance requirements of Category A.
- R2.** When system simulations indicate an inability of the systems to respond as prescribed in Reliability Standard TPL-001-0.1(X)_R1, the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall each:
 - R2.1.** Provide a written summary of its plans to achieve the required system performance as described above throughout the planning horizon.
 - R2.1.1.** Including a schedule for implementation.
 - R2.1.2.** Including a discussion of expected required in-service dates of facilities.
 - R2.1.3.** Consider lead times necessary to implement plans.
 - R2.2.** Review, in subsequent annual assessments, (where sufficient lead time exists), the continuing need for identified system facilities. Detailed implementation plans are not needed.
- R3.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall each document the results of these reliability assessments and corrective plans and shall annually provide these to its respective NERC Regional Reliability Organization(s), as required by the Regional Reliability Organization.

C. Measures

- M1.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall have a valid assessment and corrective plans as specified in Reliability Standard TPL-001-0.1(X)_R1 and TPL-001-0.1(X)_R2.
- M2.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall have evidence it reported documentation of results of its Reliability Assessments and corrective plans per Reliability Standard TPL-001-0.1(X)_R3.

D. Compliance

Standard TPL-001-0.1(X) — System Performance Under Normal Conditions

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Compliance Monitor: Regional Reliability Organization.

Each Compliance Monitor shall report compliance and violations to NERC via the NERC Compliance Reporting Process.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Time Frame

Annually

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. Level 1: Not applicable.

2.2. Level 2: A valid assessment and corrective plan for the longer-term planning horizon is not available.

2.3. Level 3: Not applicable.

2.4. Level 4: A valid assessment and corrective plan for the near-term planning horizon is not available.

E. Regional Differences

1. None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|-------------------|------------------|---|---|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0 | February 8, 2005 | BOT Approval | Revised |
| 0 | June 3, 2005 | Fixed reference in M1 to read TPL-001-0 R2.1 and TPL-001-0 R2.2 | Errata |
| 0 | July 24, 2007 | Corrected reference in M1. to read TPL-001-0 R1 and TPL-001-0 R2. | Errata |
| 0.1 | October 29, 2008 | BOT adopted errata changes; updated version number to "0.1" | Errata |
| 0.1 | May 13, 2009 | FERC Approved – Updated Effective Date | Revised |
| 0.1(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

Deleted: X

Standard TPL-001-0.1(X) — System Performance Under Normal Conditions

Table I. Transmission System Standards – Normal and Emergency Conditions

| Category | Contingencies | System Limits or Impacts | | |
|--|--|---|--|----------------------|
| | Initiating Event(s) and Contingency Element(s) | System Stable and both Thermal and Voltage Limits within Applicable Rating ^a | Loss of Demand or Curtailed Firm Transfers | Cascading Outages |
| A No Contingencies | All Facilities in Service | Yes | No | No |
| B Event resulting in the loss of a single element. | Single Line Ground (SLG) or 3-Phase (3Ø) Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c : 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer | Yes Yes Yes Yes | No ^b No ^b No ^b No ^b | No No No No |
| | Loss of an Element without a Fault Single Pole Block, Normal Clearing ^c : 4. Single Pole (dc) Line | Yes | No ^b | No |
| C Event(s) resulting in the loss of two or more (multiple) elements. | SLG Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c : 1. Bus Section | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| | 2. Breaker (failure or internal Fault) | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| | SLG or 3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c , Manual System Adjustments, followed by another SLG or 3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c : 3. Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency, manual system adjustments, followed by another Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| | Bipolar Block, with Normal Clearing ^c : 4. Bipolar (dc) Line Fault (non 3Ø), with Normal Clearing ^c : | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| | 5. Any two circuits of a multiple circuit towerline ^f | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| | SLG Fault, with Delayed Clearing ^e (stuck breaker or protection system failure): 6. Generator | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| 7. Transformer | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No | |
| 8. Transmission Circuit | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No | |
| 9. Bus Section | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No | |

Standard TPL-001-0.1(X) — System Performance Under Normal Conditions

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|----------------|----------------|-------------------------|----------------|--|
| <p>D^d</p> <p>Extreme event resulting in two or more (multiple) elements removed or Cascading out of service.</p> | <p>3Ø Fault, with Delayed Clearing^c (stuck breaker or protection system failure):</p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>1. Generator</td> <td>3. Transformer</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. Transmission Circuit</td> <td>4. Bus Section</td> </tr> </table> | 1. Generator | 3. Transformer | 2. Transmission Circuit | 4. Bus Section | <p>Evaluate for risks and consequences.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ May involve substantial loss of customer Demand and generation in a widespread area or areas. ▪ Portions or all of the interconnected systems may or may not achieve a new, stable operating point. ▪ Evaluation of these events may require joint studies with neighboring systems. |
| | 1. Generator | 3. Transformer | | | | |
| 2. Transmission Circuit | 4. Bus Section | | | | | |
| <p>3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing^c:</p> <p>5. Breaker (failure or internal Fault)</p> <hr/> <p>6. Loss of towerline with three or more circuits</p> <p>7. All transmission lines on a common right-of way</p> <p>8. Loss of a substation (one voltage level plus transformers)</p> <p>9. Loss of a switching station (one voltage level plus transformers)</p> <p>10. Loss of all generating units at a station</p> <p>11. Loss of a large Load or major Load center</p> <p>12. Failure of a fully redundant Remedial Action Scheme to operate when required</p> <p>13. Operation, partial operation, or misoperation of a fully redundant Remedial Action Scheme in response to an event or abnormal system condition for which it was not intended to operate</p> <p>14. Impact of severe power swings or oscillations from Disturbances in another Regional Reliability Organization.</p> | | | | | | |

- Deleted: Special Protection System
- Deleted: (or remedial action scheme)
- Deleted: Special Protection System
- Deleted: (or Remedial Action Scheme)

- a) Applicable rating refers to the applicable Normal and Emergency facility thermal Rating or system voltage limit as determined and consistently applied by the system or facility owner. Applicable Ratings may include Emergency Ratings applicable for short durations as required to permit operating steps necessary to maintain system control. All Ratings must be established consistent with applicable NERC Reliability Standards addressing Facility Ratings.
- b) Planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to radial customers or some local Network customers, connected to or supplied by the Faulted element or by the affected area, may occur in certain areas without impacting the overall reliability of the interconnected transmission systems. To prepare for the next contingency, system adjustments are permitted, including curtailments of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power Transfers.
- c) Depending on system design and expected system impacts, the controlled interruption of electric supply to customers (load shedding), the planned removal from service of certain generators, and/or the curtailment of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power Transfers may be necessary to maintain the overall reliability of the interconnected transmission systems.
- d) A number of extreme contingencies that are listed under Category D and judged to be critical by the transmission planning entity(ies) will be selected for evaluation. It is not expected that all possible facility outages under each listed contingency of Category D will be evaluated.
- e) Normal clearing is when the protection system operates as designed and the Fault is cleared in the time normally expected with proper functioning of the installed protection systems. Delayed clearing of a Fault is due to failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.
- f) System assessments may exclude these events where multiple circuit towers are used over short distances (e.g., station entrance, river crossings) in accordance with Regional exemption criteria.

A. Introduction

- 1. Title:** System Performance Following Loss of a Single Bulk Electric System Element (Category B)
- 2. Number:** TPL-002-0b(X)
- 3. Purpose:** System simulations and associated assessments are needed periodically to ensure that reliable systems are developed that meet specified performance requirements with sufficient lead time, and continue to be modified or upgraded as necessary to meet present and future system needs.
- 4. Applicability:**
 - 4.1.** Planning Authority
 - 4.2.** Transmission Planner
- 5. Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall each demonstrate through a valid assessment that its portion of the interconnected transmission system is planned such that the Network can be operated to supply projected customer demands and projected Firm (non-recallable reserved) Transmission Services, at all demand levels over the range of forecast system demands, under the contingency conditions as defined in Category B of Table I. To be valid, the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner assessments shall:
 - R1.1.** Be made annually.
 - R1.2.** Be conducted for near-term (years one through five) and longer-term (years six through ten) planning horizons.
 - R1.3.** Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category B of Table 1 (single contingencies). The specific elements selected (from each of the following categories) for inclusion in these studies and simulations shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).
 - R1.3.1.** Be performed and evaluated only for those Category B contingencies that would produce the more severe System results or impacts. The rationale for the contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. An explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results shall be available as supporting information.
 - R1.3.2.** Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the responsible entity.
 - R1.3.3.** Be conducted annually unless changes to system conditions do not warrant such analyses.

Standard TPL-002-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of a Single BES Element

- R1.3.4.** Be conducted beyond the five-year horizon only as needed to address identified marginal conditions that may have longer lead-time solutions.
- R1.3.5.** Have all projected firm transfers modeled.
- R1.3.6.** Be performed and evaluated for selected demand levels over the range of forecast system Demands.
- R1.3.7.** Demonstrate that system performance meets Category B contingencies.
- R1.3.8.** Include existing and planned facilities.
- R1.3.9.** Include Reactive Power resources to ensure that adequate reactive resources are available to meet system performance.
- R1.3.10.** Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems.
- R1.3.11.** Include the effects of existing and planned control devices.
- R1.3.12.** Include the planned (including maintenance) outage of any bulk electric equipment (including protection systems or their components) at those demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed.
- R1.4.** Address any planned upgrades needed to meet the performance requirements of Category B of Table I.
- R1.5.** Consider all contingencies applicable to Category B.
- R2.** When System simulations indicate an inability of the systems to respond as prescribed in Reliability Standard TPL-002-0b(X)_R1, the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall each:
 - R2.1.** Provide a written summary of its plans to achieve the required system performance as described above throughout the planning horizon:
 - R2.1.1.** Including a schedule for implementation.
 - R2.1.2.** Including a discussion of expected required in-service dates of facilities.
 - R2.1.3.** Consider lead times necessary to implement plans.
 - R2.2.** Review, in subsequent annual assessments, (where sufficient lead time exists), the continuing need for identified system facilities. Detailed implementation plans are not needed.
- R3.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall each document the results of its Reliability Assessments and corrective plans and shall annually provide the results to its respective Regional Reliability Organization(s), as required by the Regional Reliability Organization.

C. Measures

- M1.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall have a valid assessment and corrective plans as specified in Reliability Standard TPL-002-0b(X)_R1 and TPL-002-0b(X)_R2.
- M2.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall have evidence it reported documentation of results of its reliability assessments and corrective plans per Reliability Standard TPL-002-0b(X)_R3.

D. Compliance

Standard TPL-002-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of a Single BES Element

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Compliance Monitor: Regional Reliability Organizations.

Each Compliance Monitor shall report compliance and violations to NERC via the NERC Compliance Reporting Process.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Timeframe

Annually.

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. Level 1: Not applicable.

2.2. Level 2: A valid assessment and corrective plan for the longer-term planning horizon is not available.

2.3. Level 3: Not applicable.

2.4. Level 4: A valid assessment and corrective plan for the near-term planning horizon is not available.

E. Regional Differences

1. None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|----------------|--------------------|--|------------------------|
| 0 | February 8, 2005 | Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees | New |
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0a | July 30, 2008 | Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees | New |
| 0a | October 23, 2008 | Added Appendix 1 – Interpretation of TPL-002-0 Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12 and TPL-003-0 Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12 for Ameren and MISO | Revised |
| 0b | November 5, 2009 | Added Appendix 2 – Interpretation of R1.3.10 approved by BOT on November 5, 2009 | Interpretation |
| 0b | September 15, 2011 | FERC Order issued approving the Interpretation of R1.3.10 (FERC Order becomes effective October 24, 2011) | Interpretation |

Standard TPL-002-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of a Single BES Element

| | | | |
|-------|-----|---------------------------------------|--|
| 0b(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |
|-------|-----|---------------------------------------|--|

Standard TPL-002-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of a Single BES Element

Table I. Transmission System Standards — Normal and Emergency Conditions

| Category | Contingencies | System Limits or Impacts | | |
|---|--|---|--|----------------------|
| | Initiating Event(s) and Contingency Element(s) | System Stable and both Thermal and Voltage Limits within Applicable Rating ^a | Loss of Demand or Curtailed Firm Transfers | Cascading Outages |
| A No Contingencies | All Facilities in Service | Yes | No | No |
| B Event resulting in the loss of a single element. | Single Line Ground (SLG) or 3-Phase (3Ø) Fault, with Normal Clearing: 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer Loss of an Element without a Fault. | Yes Yes Yes Yes | No ^b No ^b No ^b No ^b | No No No No |
| | Single Pole Block, Normal Clearing ^c : 4. Single Pole (dc) Line | Yes | No ^b | No |
| C Event(s) resulting in the loss of two or more (multiple) elements. | SLG Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c : 1. Bus Section | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c | No |
| | 2. Breaker (failure or internal Fault) | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c | No |
| | SLG or 3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c , Manual System Adjustments, followed by another SLG or 3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c : 3. Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency, manual system adjustments, followed by another Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c | No |
| | Bipolar Block, with Normal Clearing ^c : 4. Bipolar (dc) Line Fault (non 3Ø), with Normal Clearing ^c : | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c | No |
| | 5. Any two circuits of a multiple circuit towerline ^f | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c | No |
| SLG Fault, with Delayed Clearing ^e (stuck breaker or protection system failure): | 6. Generator | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c | No |
| | 7. Transformer | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c | No |
| | 8. Transmission Circuit | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c | No |
| | 9. Bus Section | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c | No |

Standard TPL-002-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of a Single BES Element

| | | |
|---|--|---|
| <p>D^d</p> <p>Extreme event resulting in two or more (multiple) elements removed or Cascading out of service</p> | <p>3Ø Fault, with Delayed Clearing^e (stuck breaker or protection system failure):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer 4. Bus Section | <p>Evaluate for risks and consequences.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ May involve substantial loss of customer Demand and generation in a widespread area or areas. |
| | <p>3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing^e:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Breaker (failure or internal Fault) 6. Loss of towerline with three or more circuits 7. All transmission lines on a common right-of way 8. Loss of a substation (one voltage level plus transformers) 9. Loss of a switching station (one voltage level plus transformers) 10. Loss of all generating units at a station 11. Loss of a large Load or major Load center 12. Failure of a fully redundant Remedial Action Scheme to operate when required 13. Operation, partial operation, or misoperation of a fully redundant Remedial Action Scheme in response to an event or abnormal system condition for which it was not intended to operate 14. Impact of severe power swings or oscillations from Disturbances in another Regional Reliability Organization. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Portions or all of the interconnected systems may or may not achieve a new, stable operating point. ▪ Evaluation of these events may require joint studies with neighboring systems. |

- a) Applicable rating refers to the applicable Normal and Emergency facility thermal Rating or system voltage limit as determined and consistently applied by the system or facility owner. Applicable Ratings may include Emergency Ratings applicable for short durations as required to permit operating steps necessary to maintain system control. All Ratings must be established consistent with applicable NERC Reliability Standards addressing Facility Ratings.
- b) Planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to radial customers or some local Network customers, connected to or supplied by the Faulted element or by the affected area, may occur in certain areas without impacting the overall reliability of the interconnected transmission systems. To prepare for the next contingency, system adjustments are permitted, including curtailments of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power Transfers.
- c) Depending on system design and expected system impacts, the controlled interruption of electric supply to customers (load shedding), the planned removal from service of certain generators, and/or the curtailment of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power Transfers may be necessary to maintain the overall reliability of the interconnected transmission systems.
- d) A number of extreme contingencies that are listed under Category D and judged to be critical by the transmission planning entity(ies) will be selected for evaluation. It is not expected that all possible facility outages under each listed contingency of Category D will be evaluated.
- e) Normal clearing is when the protection system operates as designed and the Fault is cleared in the time normally expected with proper functioning of the installed protection systems. Delayed clearing of a Fault is due to failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.
- f) System assessments may exclude these events where multiple circuit towers are used over short distances (e.g., station entrance, river crossings) in accordance with Regional exemption criteria.

Appendix 1

Interpretation of TPL-002-0 Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12 and TPL-003-0 Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12 for Ameren and MISO

NERC received two requests for interpretation of identical requirements (Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12) in TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 from the Midwest ISO and Ameren. These requirements state:

TPL-002-0:

[To be valid, the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner assessments shall:]

- R1.3** Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category B of Table 1 (single contingencies). The specific elements selected (from each of the following categories) for inclusion in these studies and simulations shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).
- R1.3.2** Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the responsible entity.
- R1.3.12** Include the planned (including maintenance) outage of any bulk electric equipment (including protection systems or their components) at those demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed.

TPL-003-0:

[To be valid, the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner assessments shall:]

- R1.3** Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category C of Table 1 (multiple contingencies). The specific elements selected (from each of the following categories) for inclusion in these studies and simulations shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).
- R1.3.2** Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the responsible entity.
- R1.3.12** Include the planned (including maintenance) outage of any bulk electric equipment (including protection systems or their components) at those demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed.

Requirement R1.3.2

Request for Interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.2 Received from Ameren on July 25, 2007:

Ameren specifically requests clarification on the phrase, 'critical system conditions' in R1.3.2. Ameren asks if compliance with R1.3.2 requires multiple contingent generating unit Outages as part of possible generation dispatch scenarios describing critical system conditions for which the system shall be planned and modeled in accordance with the contingency definitions included in Table 1.

**Request for Interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.2
Received from MISO on August 9, 2007:**

MISO asks if the TPL standards require that any specific dispatch be applied, other than one that is representative of supply of firm demand and transmission service commitments, in the modeling of system contingencies specified in Table 1 in the TPL standards.

MISO then asks if a variety of possible dispatch patterns should be included in planning analyses including a probabilistically based dispatch that is representative of generation deficiency scenarios, would it be an appropriate application of the TPL standard to apply the transmission contingency conditions in Category B of Table 1 to these possible dispatch pattern.

The following interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.2 was developed by the NERC Planning Committee on March 13, 2008:

The selection of a credible generation dispatch for the modeling of critical system conditions is within the discretion of the Planning Authority. The Planning Authority was renamed “Planning Coordinator” (PC) in the Functional Model dated February 13, 2007. (TPL -002 and -003 use the former “Planning Authority” name, and the Functional Model terminology was a change in name only and did not affect responsibilities.)

- Under the Functional Model, the Planning Coordinator “Provides and informs Resource Planners, Transmission Planners, and adjacent Planning Coordinators of the methodologies and tools for the simulation of the transmission system” while the Transmission Planner “Receives from the Planning Coordinator methodologies and tools for the analysis and development of transmission expansion plans.” A PC’s selection of “critical system conditions” and its associated generation dispatch falls within the purview of “methodology.”

Furthermore, consistent with this interpretation, a Planning Coordinator would formulate critical system conditions that may involve a range of critical generator unit outages as part of the possible generator dispatch scenarios.

Both TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 have a similar measure M1:

- M1.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall have a valid assessment and corrective plans as specified in Reliability Standard TPL-002-0_R1 [or TPL-003-0_R1] and TPL-002-0_R2 [or TPL-003-0_R2].”

The Regional Reliability Organization (RRO) is named as the Compliance Monitor in both standards. Pursuant to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order 693, FERC eliminated the RRO as the appropriate Compliance Monitor for standards and replaced it with the Regional Entity (RE). See paragraph 157 of Order 693. Although the referenced TPL standards still include the reference to the RRO, to be consistent with Order 693, the RRO is replaced by the RE as the Compliance Monitor for this interpretation. As the Compliance Monitor, the RE determines what a “valid assessment” means when evaluating studies based upon specific sub-requirements in R1.3 selected by the Planning Coordinator and the Transmission Planner. If a PC has Transmission Planners in more than one region, the REs must coordinate among themselves on compliance matters.

Requirement R1.3.12

**Request for Interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.12
Received from Ameren on July 25, 2007:**

Ameren also asks how the inclusion of planned outages should be interpreted with respect to the contingency definitions specified in Table 1 for Categories B and C. Specifically, Ameren asks if R1.3.12 requires that the system be planned to be operated during those conditions associated with planned outages consistent with the performance requirements described in Table 1 plus any unidentified outage.

**Request for Interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.12
Received from MISO on August 9, 2007:**

MISO asks if the term “planned outages” means only already known/scheduled planned outages that may continue into the planning horizon, or does it include potential planned outages not yet scheduled that may occur at those demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed?

If the requirement does include not yet scheduled but potential planned outages that could occur in the planning horizon, is the following a proper interpretation of this provision?

The system is adequately planned and in accordance with the standard if, in order for a system operator to potentially schedule such a planned outage on the future planned system, planning studies show that a system adjustment (load shed, re-dispatch of generating units in the interconnection, or system reconfiguration) would be required concurrent with taking such a planned outage in order to prepare for a Category B contingency (single element forced out of service)? In other words, should the system in effect be planned to be operated as for a Category C3 n-2 event, even though the first event is a planned base condition?

If the requirement is intended to mean only known and scheduled planned outages that will occur or may continue into the planning horizon, is this interpretation consistent with the original interpretation by NERC of the standard as provided by NERC in response to industry questions in the Phase I development of this standard?

The following interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.12 was developed by the NERC Planning Committee on March 13, 2008:

This provision was not previously interpreted by NERC since its approval by FERC and other regulatory authorities. TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 explicitly provide that the inclusion of planned (including maintenance) outages of any bulk electric equipment at demand levels for which the planned outages are required. For studies that include planned outages, compliance with the contingency assessment for TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 as outlined in Table 1 would include any necessary system adjustments which might be required to accommodate planned outages since a planned outage is not a “contingency” as defined in the *NERC Glossary of Terms Used in Standards*.

Appendix 2

| Requirement Number and Text of Requirement |
|--|
| <p>R1.3. Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category B of Table 1 (single contingencies). The specific elements selected (from each of the following categories) for inclusion in these studies and simulations shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).</p> <p>R1.3.10. Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems.</p> |
| Background Information for Interpretation |
| <p>Requirement R1.3 and sub-requirement R1.3.10 of standard TPL-002-0a contain three key obligations:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. That the assessment is supported by “study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each the following categories, showing system performance following Category B of Table 1 (single contingencies).” 2. “...these studies and simulations shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).” 3. “Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems.” <p><i>Category B of Table 1 (single Contingencies) specifies:</i></p> <p>Single Line Ground (SLG) or 3-Phase (3Ø) Fault, with Normal Clearing:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer <p>Loss of an Element without a Fault.</p> <p>Single Pole Block, Normal Clearing^e:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Single Pole (dc) Line <p><i>Note e specifies:</i></p> <p>e) Normal Clearing is when the protection system operates as designed and the Fault is cleared in the time normally expected with proper functioning of the installed protection systems. Delayed clearing of a Fault is due to failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.</p> <p>The NERC Glossary of Terms defines Normal Clearing as “A protection system operates as designed and the fault is cleared in the time normally expected with proper functioning of the installed protection systems.”</p> |
| Conclusion |
| <p>TPL-002-0a requires that System studies or simulations be made to assess the impact of single Contingency operation with Normal Clearing. TPL-002-0a R1.3.10 does require that all elements expected to be removed from service through normal operations of the Protection Systems be removed in simulations.</p> <p>This standard does not require an assessment of the Transmission System performance due to a Protection System failure or Protection System misoperation. Protection System failure or Protection System misoperation is addressed in TPL-003-0 — System Performance following Loss of Two or</p> |

More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category C) and TPL-004-0 — System Performance Following Extreme Events Resulting in the Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category D).

TPL-002-0a R1.3.10 does not require simulating anything other than Normal Clearing when assessing the impact of a Single Line Ground (SLG) or 3-Phase (3Ø) Fault on the performance of the Transmission System.

In regards to PacifiCorp’s comments on the material impact associated with this interpretation, the interpretation team has the following comment:

Requirement R2.1 requires “a written summary of plans to achieve the required system performance,” including a schedule for implementation and an expected in-service date that considers lead times necessary to implement the plan. Failure to provide such summary may lead to noncompliance that could result in penalties and sanctions.

Standard TPL-002-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of a Single BES Element

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** System Performance Following Loss of a Single Bulk Electric System Element (Category B)
2. **Number:** TPL-002-0b(X)
3. **Purpose:** System simulations and associated assessments are needed periodically to ensure that reliable systems are developed that meet specified performance requirements with sufficient lead time, and continue to be modified or upgraded as necessary to meet present and future system needs.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Planning Authority
 - 4.2. Transmission Planner

5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Deleted: Immediately after approval of applicable regulatory authorities.

B. Requirements

- R1. The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall each demonstrate through a valid assessment that its portion of the interconnected transmission system is planned such that the Network can be operated to supply projected customer demands and projected Firm (non-recallable reserved) Transmission Services, at all demand levels over the range of forecast system demands, under the contingency conditions as defined in Category B of Table I. To be valid, the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner assessments shall:
 - R1.1. Be made annually.
 - R1.2. Be conducted for near-term (years one through five) and longer-term (years six through ten) planning horizons.
 - R1.3. Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category B of Table 1 (single contingencies). The specific elements selected (from each of the following categories) for inclusion in these studies and simulations shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).
 - R1.3.1. Be performed and evaluated only for those Category B contingencies that would produce the more severe System results or impacts. The rationale for the contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. An explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results shall be available as supporting information.
 - R1.3.2. Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the responsible entity.
 - R1.3.3. Be conducted annually unless changes to system conditions do not warrant such analyses.

Standard TPL-002-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of a Single BES Element

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Compliance Monitor: Regional Reliability Organizations.
Each Compliance Monitor shall report compliance and violations to NERC via the NERC Compliance Reporting Process.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Timeframe

Annually.

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. Level 1: Not applicable.

2.2. Level 2: A valid assessment and corrective plan for the longer-term planning horizon is not available.

2.3. Level 3: Not applicable.

2.4. Level 4: A valid assessment and corrective plan for the near-term planning horizon is not available.

E. Regional Differences

1. None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|--------------------|--|-----------------|
| 0 | February 8, 2005 | Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees | New |
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0a | July 30, 2008 | Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees | New |
| 0a | October 23, 2008 | Added Appendix 1 – Interpretation of TPL-002-0 Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12 and TPL-003-0 Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12 for Ameren and MISO | Revised |
| 0b | November 5, 2009 | Added Appendix 2 – Interpretation of R1.3.10 approved by BOT on November 5, 2009 | Interpretation |
| 0b | September 15, 2011 | FERC Order issued approving the Interpretation of R1.3.10 (FERC Order becomes effective October 24, 2011) | Interpretation |

Standard TPL-002-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of a Single BES Element

| | | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------|---|--|
| 0b(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |
|-----------------------|---------------------|---|--|

Standard TPL-002-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of a Single BES Element

Table I. Transmission System Standards — Normal and Emergency Conditions

| Category | Contingencies | System Limits or Impacts | | |
|--|--|---|--|----------------------|
| | Initiating Event(s) and Contingency Element(s) | System Stable and both Thermal and Voltage Limits within Applicable Rating ^a | Loss of Demand or Curtailed Firm Transfers | Cascading Outages |
| A No Contingencies | All Facilities in Service | Yes | No | No |
| B Event resulting in the loss of a single element. | Single Line Ground (SLG) or 3-Phase (3Ø) Fault, with Normal Clearing: 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer Loss of an Element without a Fault. | Yes Yes Yes Yes | No ^b No ^b No ^b No ^b | No No No No |
| | Single Pole Block, Normal Clearing ^c : 4. Single Pole (dc) Line | Yes | No ^b | No |
| C Event(s) resulting in the loss of two or more (multiple) elements. | SLG Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c : 1. Bus Section | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| | 2. Breaker (failure or internal Fault) | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| | SLG or 3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c , Manual System Adjustments, followed by another SLG or 3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c : 3. Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency, manual system adjustments, followed by another Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| | Bipolar Block, with Normal Clearing ^c : 4. Bipolar (dc) Line Fault (non 3Ø), with Normal Clearing ^c : | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| | 5. Any two circuits of a multiple circuit towerline ^e | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| | SLG Fault, with Delayed Clearing ^e (stuck breaker or protection system failure): 6. Generator | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| 7. Transformer | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No | |
| 8. Transmission Circuit | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No | |
| 9. Bus Section | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No | |

Standard TPL-002-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of a Single BES Element

| | | |
|---|--|---|
| <p>D^d</p> <p>Extreme event resulting in two or more (multiple) elements removed or Cascading out of service</p> | <p>3Ø Fault, with Delayed Clearing^c (stuck breaker or protection system failure):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer 4. Bus Section | <p>Evaluate for risks and consequences.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ May involve substantial loss of customer Demand and generation in a widespread area or areas |
| | <p>3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing^e:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Breaker (failure or internal Fault) 6. Loss of towerline with three or more circuits 7. All transmission lines on a common right-of way 8. Loss of a substation (one voltage level plus transformers) 9. Loss of a switching station (one voltage level plus transformers) 10. Loss of all generating units at a station 11. Loss of a large Load or major Load center 12. Failure of a fully redundant Remedial Action Scheme to operate when required 13. Operation, partial operation, or misoperation of a fully redundant Remedial Action Scheme in response to an event or abnormal system condition for which it was not intended to operate 14. Impact of severe power swings or oscillations from Disturbances in another Regional Reliability Organization. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Portions or all of the interconnected systems may or may not achieve a new, stable operating point. ▪ Evaluation of these events may require joint studies with neighboring systems. |

- a) Applicable rating refers to the applicable Normal and Emergency facility thermal Rating or system voltage limit as determined and consistently applied by the system or facility owner. Applicable Ratings may include Emergency Ratings applicable for short durations as required to permit operating steps necessary to maintain system control. All Ratings must be established consistent with applicable NERC Reliability Standards addressing Facility Ratings.
- b) Planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to radial customers or some local Network customers, connected to or supplied by the Faulted element or by the affected area, may occur in certain areas without impacting the overall reliability of the interconnected transmission systems. To prepare for the next contingency, system adjustments are permitted, including curtailments of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power Transfers.
- c) Depending on system design and expected system impacts, the controlled interruption of electric supply to customers (load shedding), the planned removal from service of certain generators, and/or the curtailment of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power Transfers may be necessary to maintain the overall reliability of the interconnected transmission systems.
- d) A number of extreme contingencies that are listed under Category D and judged to be critical by the transmission planning entity(ies) will be selected for evaluation. It is not expected that all possible facility outages under each listed contingency of Category D will be evaluated.
- e) Normal clearing is when the protection system operates as designed and the Fault is cleared in the time normally expected with proper functioning of the installed protection systems. Delayed clearing of a Fault is due to failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.
- f) System assessments may exclude these events where multiple circuit towers are used over short distances (e.g., station entrance, river crossings) in accordance with Regional exemption criteria.

- Deleted: Special Protection System
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- Deleted: Special Protection
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Standard TPL-002-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of a Single BES Element

Appendix 1

Interpretation of TPL-002-0 Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12 and TPL-003-0 Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12 for Ameren and MISO

NERC received two requests for interpretation of identical requirements (Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12) in TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 from the Midwest ISO and Ameren. These requirements state:

TPL-002-0:

[To be valid, the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner assessments shall:]

- R1.3** Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category B of Table 1 (single contingencies). The specific elements selected (from each of the following categories) for inclusion in these studies and simulations shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).
 - R1.3.2** Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the responsible entity.
 - R1.3.12** Include the planned (including maintenance) outage of any bulk electric equipment (including protection systems or their components) at those demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed.

TPL-003-0:

[To be valid, the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner assessments shall:]

- R1.3** Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category C of Table 1 (multiple contingencies). The specific elements selected (from each of the following categories) for inclusion in these studies and simulations shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).
 - R1.3.2** Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the responsible entity.
 - R1.3.12** Include the planned (including maintenance) outage of any bulk electric equipment (including protection systems or their components) at those demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed.

Requirement R1.3.2

Request for Interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.2 Received from Ameren on July 25, 2007:

Ameren specifically requests clarification on the phrase, 'critical system conditions' in R1.3.2. Ameren asks if compliance with R1.3.2 requires multiple contingent generating unit Outages as part of possible generation dispatch scenarios describing critical system conditions for which the system shall be planned and modeled in accordance with the contingency definitions included in Table 1.

Standard TPL-002-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of a Single BES Element

Request for Interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.2 Received from MISO on August 9, 2007:

MISO asks if the TPL standards require that any specific dispatch be applied, other than one that is representative of supply of firm demand and transmission service commitments, in the modeling of system contingencies specified in Table 1 in the TPL standards.

MISO then asks if a variety of possible dispatch patterns should be included in planning analyses including a probabilistically based dispatch that is representative of generation deficiency scenarios, would it be an appropriate application of the TPL standard to apply the transmission contingency conditions in Category B of Table 1 to these possible dispatch pattern.

The following interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.2 was developed by the NERC Planning Committee on March 13, 2008:

The selection of a credible generation dispatch for the modeling of critical system conditions is within the discretion of the Planning Authority. The Planning Authority was renamed “Planning Coordinator” (PC) in the Functional Model dated February 13, 2007. (TPL -002 and -003 use the former “Planning Authority” name, and the Functional Model terminology was a change in name only and did not affect responsibilities.)

- Under the Functional Model, the Planning Coordinator “Provides and informs Resource Planners, Transmission Planners, and adjacent Planning Coordinators of the methodologies and tools for the simulation of the transmission system” while the Transmission Planner “Receives from the Planning Coordinator methodologies and tools for the analysis and development of transmission expansion plans.” A PC’s selection of “critical system conditions” and its associated generation dispatch falls within the purview of “methodology.”

Furthermore, consistent with this interpretation, a Planning Coordinator would formulate critical system conditions that may involve a range of critical generator unit outages as part of the possible generator dispatch scenarios.

Both TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 have a similar measure M1:

- M1.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall have a valid assessment and corrective plans as specified in Reliability Standard TPL-002-0_R1 [or TPL-003-0_R1] and TPL-002-0_R2 [or TPL-003-0_R2].”

The Regional Reliability Organization (RRO) is named as the Compliance Monitor in both standards. Pursuant to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order 693, FERC eliminated the RRO as the appropriate Compliance Monitor for standards and replaced it with the Regional Entity (RE). See paragraph 157 of Order 693. Although the referenced TPL standards still include the reference to the RRO, to be consistent with Order 693, the RRO is replaced by the RE as the Compliance Monitor for this interpretation. As the Compliance Monitor, the RE determines what a “valid assessment” means when evaluating studies based upon specific sub-requirements in R1.3 selected by the Planning Coordinator and the Transmission Planner. If a PC has Transmission Planners in more than one region, the REs must coordinate among themselves on compliance matters.

Standard TPL-002-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of a Single BES Element

Requirement R1.3.12

Request for Interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.12

Received from Ameren on July 25, 2007:

Ameren also asks how the inclusion of planned outages should be interpreted with respect to the contingency definitions specified in Table 1 for Categories B and C. Specifically, Ameren asks if R1.3.12 requires that the system be planned to be operated during those conditions associated with planned outages consistent with the performance requirements described in Table 1 plus any unidentified outage.

Request for Interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.12

Received from MISO on August 9, 2007:

MISO asks if the term “planned outages” means only already known/scheduled planned outages that may continue into the planning horizon, or does it include potential planned outages not yet scheduled that may occur at those demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed?

If the requirement does include not yet scheduled but potential planned outages that could occur in the planning horizon, is the following a proper interpretation of this provision?

The system is adequately planned and in accordance with the standard if, in order for a system operator to potentially schedule such a planned outage on the future planned system, planning studies show that a system adjustment (load shed, re-dispatch of generating units in the interconnection, or system reconfiguration) would be required concurrent with taking such a planned outage in order to prepare for a Category B contingency (single element forced out of service)? In other words, should the system in effect be planned to be operated as for a Category C3 n-2 event, even though the first event is a planned base condition?

If the requirement is intended to mean only known and scheduled planned outages that will occur or may continue into the planning horizon, is this interpretation consistent with the original interpretation by NERC of the standard as provided by NERC in response to industry questions in the Phase I development of this standard?

The following interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.12 was developed by the NERC Planning Committee on March 13, 2008:

This provision was not previously interpreted by NERC since its approval by FERC and other regulatory authorities. TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 explicitly provide that the inclusion of planned (including maintenance) outages of any bulk electric equipment at demand levels for which the planned outages are required. For studies that include planned outages, compliance with the contingency assessment for TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 as outlined in Table 1 would include any necessary system adjustments which might be required to accommodate planned outages since a planned outage is not a “contingency” as defined in the *NERC Glossary of Terms Used in Standards*.

Standard TPL-002-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of a Single BES Element

Appendix 2

| Requirement Number and Text of Requirement |
|--|
| <p>R1.3. Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category B of Table 1 (single contingencies). The specific elements selected (from each of the following categories) for inclusion in these studies and simulations shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).</p> <p>R1.3.10. Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems.</p> |
| Background Information for Interpretation |
| <p>Requirement R1.3 and sub-requirement R1.3.10 of standard TPL-002-0a contain three key obligations:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. That the assessment is supported by “study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each the following categories, showing system performance following Category B of Table 1 (single contingencies).”2. “...these studies and simulations shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).”3. “Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems.” <p><i>Category B of Table 1 (single Contingencies) specifies:</i></p> <p>Single Line Ground (SLG) or 3-Phase (3Ø) Fault, with Normal Clearing:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Generator2. Transmission Circuit3. Transformer <p>Loss of an Element without a Fault.</p> <p>Single Pole Block, Normal Clearing^e:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">4. Single Pole (dc) Line <p><i>Note e specifies:</i></p> <p>e) Normal Clearing is when the protection system operates as designed and the Fault is cleared in the time normally expected with proper functioning of the installed protection systems. Delayed clearing of a Fault is due to failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.</p> <p>The NERC Glossary of Terms defines Normal Clearing as “A protection system operates as designed and the fault is cleared in the time normally expected with proper functioning of the installed protection systems.”</p> |
| Conclusion |
| <p>TPL-002-0a requires that System studies or simulations be made to assess the impact of single Contingency operation with Normal Clearing. TPL-002-0a R1.3.10 does require that all elements expected to be removed from service through normal operations of the Protection Systems be removed in simulations.</p> <p>This standard does not require an assessment of the Transmission System performance due to a Protection System failure or Protection System misoperation. Protection System failure or Protection System misoperation is addressed in TPL-003-0 — System Performance following Loss of Two or</p> |

Standard TPL-002-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of a Single BES Element

More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category C) and TPL-004-0 — System Performance Following Extreme Events Resulting in the Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category D). TPL-002-0a R1.3.10 does not require simulating anything other than Normal Clearing when assessing the impact of a Single Line Ground (SLG) or 3-Phase (3Ø) Fault on the performance of the Transmission System.

In regards to PacifiCorp’s comments on the material impact associated with this interpretation, the interpretation team has the following comment:

Requirement R2.1 requires “a written summary of plans to achieve the required system performance,” including a schedule for implementation and an expected in-service date that considers lead times necessary to implement the plan. Failure to provide such summary may lead to noncompliance that could result in penalties and sanctions.

Standard TPL-003-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of Two or More BES Elements

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** System Performance Following Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category C)
2. **Number:** TPL-003-0b(X)
3. **Purpose:** System simulations and associated assessments are needed periodically to ensure that reliable systems are developed that meet specified performance requirements, with sufficient lead time and continue to be modified or upgraded as necessary to meet present and future System needs.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Planning Authority
 - 4.2. Transmission Planner

Effective Date: This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1. The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall each demonstrate through a valid assessment that its portion of the interconnected transmission systems is planned such that the network can be operated to supply projected customer demands and projected Firm (non-recallable reserved) Transmission Services, at all demand Levels over the range of forecast system demands, under the contingency conditions as defined in Category C of Table I (attached). The controlled interruption of customer Demand, the planned removal of generators, or the Curtailment of firm (non-recallable reserved) power transfers may be necessary to meet this standard. To be valid, the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner assessments shall:
 - R1.1. Be made annually.
 - R1.2. Be conducted for near-term (years one through five) and longer-term (years six through ten) planning horizons.
 - R1.3. Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category C of Table 1 (multiple contingencies). The specific elements selected (from each of the following categories) for inclusion in these studies and simulations shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).
 - R1.3.1. Be performed and evaluated only for those Category C contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. An explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results shall be available as supporting information.
 - R1.3.2. Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the responsible entity.

Standard TPL-003-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of Two or More BES Elements

- R1.3.3.** Be conducted annually unless changes to system conditions do not warrant such analyses.
 - R1.3.4.** Be conducted beyond the five-year horizon only as needed to address identified marginal conditions that may have longer lead-time solutions.
 - R1.3.5.** Have all projected firm transfers modeled.
 - R1.3.6.** Be performed and evaluated for selected demand levels over the range of forecast system demands.
 - R1.3.7.** Demonstrate that System performance meets Table 1 for Category C contingencies.
 - R1.3.8.** Include existing and planned facilities.
 - R1.3.9.** Include Reactive Power resources to ensure that adequate reactive resources are available to meet System performance.
 - R1.3.10.** Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems.
 - R1.3.11.** Include the effects of existing and planned control devices.
 - R1.3.12.** Include the planned (including maintenance) outage of any bulk electric equipment (including protection systems or their components) at those Demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed.
- R1.4.** Address any planned upgrades needed to meet the performance requirements of Category C.
- R1.5.** Consider all contingencies applicable to Category C.
- R2.** When system simulations indicate an inability of the systems to respond as prescribed in Reliability Standard TPL-003-0b(X)_R1, the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall each:
 - R2.1.** Provide a written summary of its plans to achieve the required system performance as described above throughout the planning horizon:
 - R2.1.1.** Including a schedule for implementation.
 - R2.1.2.** Including a discussion of expected required in-service dates of facilities.
 - R2.1.3.** Consider lead times necessary to implement plans.
 - R2.2.** Review, in subsequent annual assessments, (where sufficient lead time exists), the continuing need for identified system facilities. Detailed implementation plans are not needed.
- R3.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall each document the results of these Reliability Assessments and corrective plans and shall annually provide these to its respective NERC Regional Reliability Organization(s), as required by the Regional Reliability Organization.

C. Measures

- M1.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall have a valid assessment and corrective plans as specified in Reliability Standard TPL-003-0b(X)_R1 and TPL-003-0b(X)_R2.

Standard TPL-003-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of Two or More BES Elements

- M2.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall have evidence it reported documentation of results of its reliability assessments and corrective plans per Reliability Standard TPL-003-0b(X)_R3.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Compliance Monitor: Regional Reliability Organizations.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Timeframe

Annually.

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. Level 1: Not applicable.

2.2. Level 2: A valid assessment and corrective plan for the longer-term planning horizon is not available.

2.3. Level 3: Not applicable.

2.4. Level 4: A valid assessment and corrective plan for the near-term planning horizon is not available.

E. Regional Differences

- 1.** None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|----------------|------------------|--|------------------------|
| 0 | February 8, 2005 | Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees | New |
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Add parenthesis to item “e” on page 8. | Errata |
| 0a | July 30, 2008 | Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees | |
| 0a | October 23, 2008 | Added Appendix 1 – Interpretation of TPL-002-0 Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12 and TPL-003-0 Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12 for Ameren and MISO | Revised |
| 0a | April 23, 2010 | FERC approval of interpretation of TPL-003-0 R1.3.12 | Interpretation |
| 0b | February 7, 2013 | Interpretation adopted by NERC Board of Trustees | |

Standard TPL-003-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of Two or More BES Elements

| | | | |
|-------|---------------|--|--|
| 0b | June 20, 2013 | FERC order issued approving Interpretation | |
| 0b(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

Standard TPL-003-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of Two or More BES Elements

Table I. Transmission System Standards – Normal and Emergency Conditions

| Category | Contingencies | System Limits or Impacts | | |
|--|--|---|--|--------------------------------|
| | Initiating Event(s) and Contingency Element(s) | System Stable and both Thermal and Voltage Limits within Applicable Rating ^a | Loss of Demand or Curtailed Firm Transfers | Cascading ^c Outages |
| A No Contingencies | All Facilities in Service | Yes | No | No |
| B Event resulting in the loss of a single element. | Single Line Ground (SLG) or 3-Phase (3Ø) Fault, with Normal Clearing: 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer Loss of an Element without a Fault. | Yes Yes Yes Yes | No ^b No ^b No ^b No ^b | No No No No |
| | Single Pole Block, Normal Clearing ^e : 4. Single Pole (dc) Line | Yes | No ^b | No |
| C Event(s) resulting in the loss of two or more (multiple) elements. | SLG Fault, with Normal Clearing ^e : 1. Bus Section | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c | No |
| | 2. Breaker (failure or internal Fault) | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c | No |
| | SLG or 3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing ^e , Manual System Adjustments, followed by another SLG or 3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing ^e : 3. Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency, manual system adjustments, followed by another Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c | No |
| | Bipolar Block, with Normal Clearing ^e : 4. Bipolar (dc) Line Fault (non 3Ø), with Normal Clearing ^e : | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c | No |
| | 5. Any two circuits of a multiple circuit towerline ^f | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c | No |
| | SLG Fault, with Delayed Clearing ^e (stuck breaker or protection system failure): 6. Generator | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c | No |
| 7. Transformer | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c | No | |
| 8. Transmission Circuit | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c | No | |
| 9. Bus Section | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c | No | |

Standard TPL-003-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of Two or More BES Elements

| | | | | | | |
|---|--|--------------|----------------|-------------------------|----------------|--|
| <p>D^d</p> <p>Extreme event resulting in two or more (multiple) elements removed or Cascading out of service</p> | <p>3Ø Fault, with Delayed Clearing^e (stuck breaker or protection system failure):</p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>1. Generator</td> <td>3. Transformer</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. Transmission Circuit</td> <td>4. Bus Section</td> </tr> </table> <hr/> <p>3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing^e:</p> <hr/> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Breaker (failure or internal Fault) 6. Loss of towerline with three or more circuits 7. All transmission lines on a common right-of way 8. Loss of a substation (one voltage level plus transformers) 9. Loss of a switching station (one voltage level plus transformers) 10. Loss of all generating units at a station 11. Loss of a large Load or major Load center 12. Failure of a fully redundant Remedial Action Scheme to operate when required 13. Operation, partial operation, or misoperation of a fully redundant Remedial Action Scheme in response to an event or abnormal system condition for which it was not intended to operate 14. Impact of severe power swings or oscillations from Disturbances in another Regional Reliability Organization. | 1. Generator | 3. Transformer | 2. Transmission Circuit | 4. Bus Section | <p>Evaluate for risks and consequences.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ May involve substantial loss of customer Demand and generation in a widespread area or areas. ▪ Portions or all of the interconnected systems may or may not achieve a new, stable operating point. ▪ Evaluation of these events may require joint studies with neighboring systems. |
| 1. Generator | 3. Transformer | | | | | |
| 2. Transmission Circuit | 4. Bus Section | | | | | |

- a) Applicable rating refers to the applicable Normal and Emergency facility thermal Rating or system voltage limit as determined and consistently applied by the system or facility owner. Applicable Ratings may include Emergency Ratings applicable for short durations as required to permit operating steps necessary to maintain system control. All Ratings must be established consistent with applicable NERC Reliability Standards addressing Facility Ratings.
- b) Planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to radial customers or some local Network customers, connected to or supplied by the Faulted element or by the affected area, may occur in certain areas without impacting the overall reliability of the interconnected transmission systems. To prepare for the next contingency, system adjustments are permitted, including curtailments of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power Transfers.
- c) Depending on system design and expected system impacts, the controlled interruption of electric supply to customers (load shedding), the planned removal from service of certain generators, and/or the curtailment of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power transfers may be necessary to maintain the overall reliability of the interconnected transmission systems.
- d) A number of extreme contingencies that are listed under Category D and judged to be critical by the transmission planning entity(ies) will be selected for evaluation. It is not expected that all possible facility outages under each listed contingency of Category D will be evaluated.
- e) Normal clearing is when the protection system operates as designed and the Fault is cleared in the time normally expected with proper functioning of the installed protection systems. Delayed clearing of a Fault is due to failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.
- f) System assessments may exclude these events where multiple circuit towers are used over short distances (e.g., station entrance, river crossings) in accordance with Regional exemption criteria.

Appendix 1

Interpretation of TPL-002-0 Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12 and TPL-003-0 Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12 for Ameren and MISO

NERC received two requests for interpretation of identical requirements (Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12) in TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 from the Midwest ISO and Ameren. These requirements state:

TPL-002-0:

[To be valid, the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner assessments shall:]

- R1.3** Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category B of Table 1 (single contingencies). The specific elements selected (from each of the following categories) for inclusion in these studies and simulations shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).
 - R1.3.2** Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the responsible entity.
 - R1.3.12** Include the planned (including maintenance) outage of any bulk electric equipment (including protection systems or their components) at those demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed.

TPL-003-0:

[To be valid, the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner assessments shall:]

- R1.3** Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category C of Table 1 (multiple contingencies). The specific elements selected (from each of the following categories) for inclusion in these studies and simulations shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).
 - R1.3.2** Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the responsible entity.
 - R1.3.12** Include the planned (including maintenance) outage of any bulk electric equipment (including protection systems or their components) at those demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed.

Requirement R1.3.2

Request for Interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.2 Received from Ameren on July 25, 2007:

Ameren specifically requests clarification on the phrase, 'critical system conditions' in R1.3.2. Ameren asks if compliance with R1.3.2 requires multiple contingent generating unit Outages as part of possible generation dispatch scenarios describing critical system conditions for which the system shall be planned and modeled in accordance with the contingency definitions included in Table 1.

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Request for Interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.2 Received from MISO on August 9, 2007:

MISO asks if the TPL standards require that any specific dispatch be applied, other than one that is representative of supply of firm demand and transmission service commitments, in the modeling of system contingencies specified in Table 1 in the TPL standards.

MISO then asks if a variety of possible dispatch patterns should be included in planning analyses including a probabilistically based dispatch that is representative of generation deficiency scenarios, would it be an appropriate application of the TPL standard to apply the transmission contingency conditions in Category B of Table 1 to these possible dispatch pattern.

The following interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.2 was developed by the NERC Planning Committee on March 13, 2008:

The selection of a credible generation dispatch for the modeling of critical system conditions is within the discretion of the Planning Authority. The Planning Authority was renamed “Planning Coordinator” (PC) in the Functional Model dated February 13, 2007. (TPL -002 and -003 use the former “Planning Authority” name, and the Functional Model terminology was a change in name only and did not affect responsibilities.)

- Under the Functional Model, the Planning Coordinator “Provides and informs Resource Planners, Transmission Planners, and adjacent Planning Coordinators of the methodologies and tools for the simulation of the transmission system” while the Transmission Planner “Receives from the Planning Coordinator methodologies and tools for the analysis and development of transmission expansion plans.” A PC’s selection of “critical system conditions” and its associated generation dispatch falls within the purview of “methodology.”

Furthermore, consistent with this interpretation, a Planning Coordinator would formulate critical system conditions that may involve a range of critical generator unit outages as part of the possible generator dispatch scenarios.

Both TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 have a similar measure M1:

- M1.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall have a valid assessment and corrective plans as specified in Reliability Standard TPL-002-0_R1 [or TPL-003-0_R1] and TPL-002-0_R2 [or TPL-003-0_R2].”

The Regional Reliability Organization (RRO) is named as the Compliance Monitor in both standards. Pursuant to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order 693, FERC eliminated the RRO as the appropriate Compliance Monitor for standards and replaced it with the Regional Entity (RE). See paragraph 157 of Order 693. Although the referenced TPL standards still include the reference to the RRO, to be consistent with Order 693, the RRO is replaced by the RE as the Compliance Monitor for this interpretation. As the Compliance Monitor, the RE determines what a “valid assessment” means when evaluating studies based upon specific sub-requirements in R1.3 selected by the Planning Coordinator and the Transmission Planner. If a PC has Transmission Planners in more than one region, the REs must coordinate among themselves on compliance matters.

Requirement R1.3.12

Request for Interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.12 Received from Ameren on July 25, 2007:

Ameren also asks how the inclusion of planned outages should be interpreted with respect to the contingency definitions specified in Table 1 for Categories B and C. Specifically, Ameren asks if R1.3.12 requires that the system be planned to be operated during those conditions associated with planned outages consistent with the performance requirements described in Table 1 plus any unidentified outage.

Request for Interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.12 Received from MISO on August 9, 2007:

MISO asks if the term “planned outages” means only already known/scheduled planned outages that may continue into the planning horizon, or does it include potential planned outages not yet scheduled that may occur at those demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed?

If the requirement does include not yet scheduled but potential planned outages that could occur in the planning horizon, is the following a proper interpretation of this provision?

The system is adequately planned and in accordance with the standard if, in order for a system operator to potentially schedule such a planned outage on the future planned system, planning studies show that a system adjustment (load shed, re-dispatch of generating units in the interconnection, or system reconfiguration) would be required concurrent with taking such a planned outage in order to prepare for a Category B contingency (single element forced out of service)? In other words, should the system in effect be planned to be operated as for a Category C3 n-2 event, even though the first event is a planned base condition?

If the requirement is intended to mean only known and scheduled planned outages that will occur or may continue into the planning horizon, is this interpretation consistent with the original interpretation by NERC of the standard as provided by NERC in response to industry questions in the Phase I development of this standard?

The following interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.12 was developed by the NERC Planning Committee on March 13, 2008:

This provision was not previously interpreted by NERC since its approval by FERC and other regulatory authorities. TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 explicitly provide that the inclusion of planned (including maintenance) outages of any bulk electric equipment at demand levels for which the planned outages are required. For studies that include planned outages, compliance with the contingency assessment for TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 as outlined in Table 1 would include any necessary system adjustments which might be required to accommodate planned outages since a planned outage is not a “contingency” as defined in the *NERC Glossary of Terms Used in Standards*.

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Appendix 2

Interpretation 2012-INT-02: Response to Request for Interpretation of TPL-003-0a, Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.10 and R1.5 and TPL-004-0, Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.7 and R1.4 for the System Protection and Control Subcommittee

Date submitted: December 12, 2011

The following interpretations of TPL-003-0a, System Performance Following Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category C), Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.10 and R1.5 and TPL-004-0, System Performance Following Extreme Events Resulting in the Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category D), Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.7 and R1.4 were developed by members of the Assess Transmission Future Needs Standard Drafting Team (ATFNSTD), Protection System Misoperations Standard Development Team (PSMSDT), and Protection System Maintenance and Testing Standard Drafting Team (PSMTSDT).

| Standard | Requirement (and text) |
|------------|--|
| TPL-003-0a | R1.3.1 Be performed and evaluated only for those Category C contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. An explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results shall be available as supporting information. |
| TPL-003-0a | R1.3.10. Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems. |
| TPL-003-0a | R1.5. Consider all contingencies applicable to Category C. |
| TPL-004-0 | R1.3.1. Be performed and evaluated only for those Category D contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. An explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results shall be available as supporting information. |
| TPL-004-0 | R1.3.7. Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems. |
| TPL-004-0 | R1.4. Consider all contingencies applicable to Category D. |

Please explain the clarification needed (as submitted).

This interpretation request has been developed to address Commission concerns related to the term “Single Point of Failure” and how it relates to system performance and contingency planning

Standard TPL-003-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of Two or More BES Elements

clarification regarding the following questions about the listed standards, requirements and terms. More specifically, clarification is needed about the comprehensive study of system performance relating to Table 1's, Category C and D contingency of a "protection system failure" and specifically the impact of failed components (i.e., "Single Point of Failure"). It is not entirely clear whether a valid assessment of a protection system failure includes evaluation of shared or non-redundant protection system components. Protection systems that have a shared protection system component are not two independent protection systems, because both protection systems will be mutually impacted for a failure of a single shared component. A protection system component evaluation would include the evaluation of the consequences on system performance for the failure of any protection system component that is integral to the operation of the protection system being evaluated and to the operation of another protection system.

On March 30, 2009, NERC issued an [Industry Advisory — Protection System Single Point of Failure](#)¹ (i.e., NERC Alert) for three significant events. One of which, the Westwing outage (June 14, 2004) was caused by failure of a single auxiliary relay that initiated both breaker tripping and the breaker failure protection. Since breaker tripping and breaker failure protection both shared the same auxiliary relay, there was no independence between breaker tripping and breaker failure protection systems, therefore causing both protection systems to not operate for the single component failure of the auxiliary relay. The failure of this auxiliary relay is known as a "single point of failure." It is not clear whether this situation is comprehensively addressed by the applicable entities when making a valid assessment of system performance for both Category C and D contingencies.

Question 1: For the parenthetical "(stuck breaker or protection system failure)" in TPL-003-0a(X) (Category C contingencies 6-9) and TPL-004-0 (Category D contingencies 1-4), does an entity have the option of evaluating the effects² of either "stuck breaker" or "protection system failure" contingency³, or does an applicable entity have to evaluate the contingency that produces the more severe system results or impacts as identified in R1.3.1 of both standards?

There is a lack of clarity whether R1.3.1⁴ requires an entity to assess which contingency causes the most severe system results or impacts (R1.3.1) and this ambiguity could result in a potential reliability gap. Whether the simulation of a stuck breaker or protection system failure will produce the worst result depends on the protection system design. For example when a protection system is fully redundant, a protection system failure will not affect fault clearing; therefore, a stuck breaker would result in more severe system results or impacts. However, when a protection system failure affects fault clearing, the fault clearing time may be longer than the breaker failure protection clearing time for a stuck breaker contingency and may result in tripping of additional system elements, resulting in a more severe system response.

¹ NERC Website: (<http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/Events%20Analysis/A-2009-03-30-01.pdf>)

² As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.3.10. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.3.7.

³ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

⁴ "Be performed and evaluated only for those Category (TPL-003-0a Category C and TPL-004-0 Category D) contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts."

Question 2: For the phrase “Delayed Clearing⁵” used in Category C⁶ contingencies 6-9 and Category D⁷ contingencies 1-4, to what extent does the description in Table 1, footnote (e)⁸ require an entity to model a single point of failure of a protection system component that may prevent correct operation of a protection system, including other protection systems impacted by that failed component based on the as-built design of that protection system?

There is a lack of clarity whether footnote (e) in Table 1 requires the study and/or simulation of a failure of a protection system component (i.e., single point of failure) that may prevent correct operation of the protection system(s) impacted by the component failure. Protection systems that share a protection system component are fully dependent upon the correct operation of that single shared component and do not perform as two independent protection systems. This lack of clarity may result in a potential reliability gap.

Clarity is necessary as to whether (1) a valid assessment should include evaluation of delayed clearing due to failure of the protection system component (i.e., single point of failure), such as the failure of a shared protection system component, that produces the more severe system results or impacts; and (2) the study and/or simulation of the fault clearing sequence and protection system(s) operation should be based on the protection system(s) as-built design.

The lack of clarity is compounded by the similarity between the phrase “Delayed Clearing” used in TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0, footnote (e), and the NERC glossary term “Delayed Fault Clearing.” While TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0 do not use the glossary term, the similarity may lead to confusion and inconsistency in how entities apply footnote (e) to “stuck breaker” or “protection system failure” contingency assessments.

Question 1

For the parenthetical “(stuck breaker or protection system failure)” in TPL-003-0a (Category C contingencies 6-9) and TPL-004-0 (Category D contingencies 1-4), does an entity have the option of evaluating the effects⁹ of either “stuck breaker” or “protection system failure” contingency¹⁰, or does an applicable entity have to evaluate the contingency that produces the more severe system results or impacts as identified in R1.3.1 of both standards?

⁵ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

⁶ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5.

⁷ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

⁸ Footnote (e) Delayed Clearing: “failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay,”

⁹ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.3.10. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.3.7.

¹⁰ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

Response 1

The interpretation drafting team concludes that the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner must evaluate the situation that produces the more severe system results or impacts (i.e., TPL-003-0a, R1.3.1 and TPL-004-0, R1.3.1) due to a delayed clearing condition regardless of whether the condition resulted from a stuck breaker or protection system failure. The Reliability Standards TPL-003-0a (Table I, Category C contingencies 6-9) and TPL-004-0 (Table I, Category D contingencies 1-4) involve an assessment of the effects of either a stuck breaker or a protection system failure. The single line ground (SLG) (TPL-003-0a, Table I, Category C) Fault and 3-phase (3 ϕ) (TPL-004-0, Table I, Category D) Fault contingencies with delayed clearing are further defined by footnote (e) and the parenthetical phrase “(stuck breaker or protection system failure).” Footnote (e) explains that “Delayed clearing of a Fault is due to failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.” The parenthetical further emphasizes that the failure may be a “stuck breaker or protection system failure” that causes the delayed clearing of the fault. The text in Table 1 in either standard explains that when selecting delayed clearing contingencies to evaluate, both conditions “(stuck breaker or protection system failure)” must be considered.

Question 2

For the phrase “Delayed Clearing¹¹” used in Category C¹² contingencies 6-9 and Category D¹³ contingencies 1-4, to what extent does the description in Table 1, footnote (e)¹⁴ require an entity to model a single point of failure of a protection system component that may prevent correct operation of a protection system, including other protection systems impacted by that failed component based on the as-built design of that protection system?

Response 2

The term “Delayed Clearing” that is described in Table I, footnote (e) refers to fault clearing that results from a failure to achieve the protection system’s normally expected clearing time. For Category C or D contingencies, each Planning Authority and Transmission Planner is permitted engineering judgment in its selection of the protection system component failures for evaluation that would produce the more severe system results or impact (i.e., TPL-003-0a, R1.3.1 and TPL-004-0, R1.3.1). The evaluation would include addressing all protection systems affected by the selected component.

¹¹ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

¹² As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5.

¹³ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

¹⁴ Footnote (e) Delayed Clearing: “failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay,”

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A protection system component failure that impacts one or more protection systems and increases the total fault clearing time requires the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner to simulate the full impact (clearing time and facilities removed) on the Bulk Electric System performance.

The interpretation drafting team bases this conclusion on the footnote (e) example “...any protection system component such as, relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer...” because the component “circuit breaker” is not addressed in the current or previously defined NERC glossary term. The interpretation drafting team initially believed the lowercase usage of “protection system” inferred the NERC glossary term and the components described therein; however, based on the interpretation drafting team’s further assessment of footnote (e), it concludes that the existing TPL standards (TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0) do not implicitly use the NERC glossary term. Without an explicit reference to the NERC glossary term, “Protection System,” the two standards do not prescribe the specific protection system components that must be addressed by the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner in performing the studies required in TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0.

Standard TPL-003-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of Two or More BES Elements

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** System Performance Following Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category C)
2. **Number:** TPL-003-0b(X)
3. **Purpose:** System simulations and associated assessments are needed periodically to ensure that reliable systems are developed that meet specified performance requirements, with sufficient lead time and continue to be modified or upgraded as necessary to meet present and future System needs.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Planning Authority
 - 4.2. Transmission Planner

Effective Date: This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Deleted: April 23, 2010

B. Requirements

- R1. The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall each demonstrate through a valid assessment that its portion of the interconnected transmission systems is planned such that the network can be operated to supply projected customer demands and projected Firm (non-recallable reserved) Transmission Services, at all demand Levels over the range of forecast system demands, under the contingency conditions as defined in Category C of Table I (attached). The controlled interruption of customer Demand, the planned removal of generators, or the Curtailment of firm (non-recallable reserved) power transfers may be necessary to meet this standard. To be valid, the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner assessments shall:
 - R1.1. Be made annually.
 - R1.2. Be conducted for near-term (years one through five) and longer-term (years six through ten) planning horizons.
 - R1.3. Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category C of Table I (multiple contingencies). The specific elements selected (from each of the following categories) for inclusion in these studies and simulations shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).
 - R1.3.1. Be performed and evaluated only for those Category C contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. An explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results shall be available as supporting information.
 - R1.3.2. Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the responsible entity.

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M2. The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall have evidence it reported documentation of results of its reliability assessments and corrective plans per Reliability Standard TPL-003-0b(X)_R3.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Compliance Monitor: Regional Reliability Organizations.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Timeframe

Annually.

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

2.1. Level 1: Not applicable.

2.2. Level 2: A valid assessment and corrective plan for the longer-term planning horizon is not available.

2.3. Level 3: Not applicable.

2.4. Level 4: A valid assessment and corrective plan for the near-term planning horizon is not available.

E. Regional Differences

1. None identified.

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|------------------|--|-----------------|
| 0 | February 8, 2005 | Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees | New |
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Add parenthesis to item “e” on page 8. | Errata |
| 0a | July 30, 2008 | Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees | |
| 0a | October 23, 2008 | Added Appendix 1 – Interpretation of TPL-002-0 Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12 and TPL-003-0 Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12 for Ameren and MISO | Revised |
| 0a | April 23, 2010 | FERC approval of interpretation of TPL-003-0 R1.3.12 | Interpretation |
| 0b | February 7, 2013 | Interpretation adopted by NERC Board of Trustees | |

Standard TPL-003-0b(X) — System Performance Following Loss of Two or More BES Elements

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| 0b | June 20, 2013 | FERC order issued approving Interpretation | |
| 0b(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

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Table I. Transmission System Standards – Normal and Emergency Conditions

| Category | Contingencies | System Limits or Impacts | | |
|---|--|---|--|--------------------------------|
| | | System Stable and both Thermal and Voltage Limits within Applicable Rating ^a | Loss of Demand or Curtailed Firm Transfers | Cascading ^c Outages |
| A No Contingencies | All Facilities in Service | Yes | No | No |
| B Event resulting in the loss of a single element. | Single Line Ground (SLG) or 3-Phase (3Ø) Fault, with Normal Clearing: 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer Loss of an Element without a Fault. | Yes Yes Yes Yes | No ^b No ^b No ^b No ^b | No No No No |
| | Single Pole Block, Normal Clearing ^c : 4. Single Pole (dc) Line | Yes | No ^b | No |
| C Event(s) resulting in the loss of two or more (multiple) elements. | SLG Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c : 1. Bus Section | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| | 2. Breaker (failure or internal Fault) | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| | SLG or 3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c , Manual System Adjustments, followed by another SLG or 3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c : 3. Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency, manual system adjustments, followed by another Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| | Bipolar Block, with Normal Clearing ^c : 4. Bipolar (dc) Line Fault (non 3Ø), with Normal Clearing ^c : | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| | 5. Any two circuits of a multiple circuit towerline ^f | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| SLG Fault, with Delayed Clearing ^c (stuck breaker or protection system failure): | 6. Generator | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| | 7. Transformer | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| | 8. Transmission Circuit | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| | 9. Bus Section | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |

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| <p>D^d</p> <p>Extreme event resulting in two or more (multiple) elements removed or Cascading out of service</p> | <p>3Ø Fault, with Delayed Clearing^e (stuck breaker or protection system failure):</p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>1. Generator</td> <td>3. Transformer</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. Transmission Circuit</td> <td>4. Bus Section</td> </tr> </table> | 1. Generator | 3. Transformer | 2. Transmission Circuit | 4. Bus Section | <p>Evaluate for risks and consequences.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> May involve substantial loss of customer Demand and generation in a widespread area or areas. Portions or all of the interconnected systems may or may not achieve a new, stable operating point. Evaluation of these events may require joint studies with neighboring systems. |
| | 1. Generator | 3. Transformer | | | | |
| 2. Transmission Circuit | 4. Bus Section | | | | | |
| <p>3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing^e:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Breaker (failure or internal Fault) Loss of towerline with three or more circuits All transmission lines on a common right-of way Loss of a substation (one voltage level plus transformers) Loss of a switching station (one voltage level plus transformers) Loss of all generating units at a station Loss of a large Load or major Load center Failure of a fully redundant Remedial Action Scheme to operate when required Operation, partial operation, or misoperation of a fully redundant Remedial Action Scheme in response to an event or abnormal system condition for which it was not intended to operate Impact of severe power swings or oscillations from Disturbances in another Regional Reliability Organization. | | | | | | |

- a) Applicable rating refers to the applicable Normal and Emergency facility thermal Rating or system voltage limit as determined and consistently applied by the system or facility owner. Applicable Ratings may include Emergency Ratings applicable for short durations as required to permit operating steps necessary to maintain system control. All Ratings must be established consistent with applicable NERC Reliability Standards addressing Facility Ratings.
- b) Planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to radial customers or some local Network customers, connected to or supplied by the Faulted element or by the affected area, may occur in certain areas without impacting the overall reliability of the interconnected transmission systems. To prepare for the next contingency, system adjustments are permitted, including curtailments of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power Transfers.
- c) Depending on system design and expected system impacts, the controlled interruption of electric supply to customers (load shedding), the planned removal from service of certain generators, and/or the curtailment of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power transfers may be necessary to maintain the overall reliability of the interconnected transmission systems.
- d) A number of extreme contingencies that are listed under Category D and judged to be critical by the transmission planning entity(ies) will be selected for evaluation. It is not expected that all possible facility outages under each listed contingency of Category D will be evaluated.
- e) Normal clearing is when the protection system operates as designed and the Fault is cleared in the time normally expected with proper functioning of the installed protection systems. Delayed clearing of a Fault is due to failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.
- f) System assessments may exclude these events where multiple circuit towers are used over short distances (e.g., station entrance, river crossings) in accordance with Regional exemption criteria.

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Appendix 1

Interpretation of TPL-002-0 Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12 and TPL-003-0 Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12 for Ameren and MISO

NERC received two requests for interpretation of identical requirements (Requirements R1.3.2 and R1.3.12) in TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 from the Midwest ISO and Ameren. These requirements state:

TPL-002-0:

[To be valid, the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner assessments shall:]

R1.3 Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category B of Table 1 (single contingencies). The specific elements selected (from each of the following categories) for inclusion in these studies and simulations shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).

R1.3.2 Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the responsible entity.

R1.3.12 Include the planned (including maintenance) outage of any bulk electric equipment (including protection systems or their components) at those demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed.

TPL-003-0:

[To be valid, the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner assessments shall:]

R1.3 Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category C of Table 1 (multiple contingencies). The specific elements selected (from each of the following categories) for inclusion in these studies and simulations shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).

R1.3.2 Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the responsible entity.

R1.3.12 Include the planned (including maintenance) outage of any bulk electric equipment (including protection systems or their components) at those demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed.

Requirement R1.3.2

Request for Interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.2 Received from Ameren on July 25, 2007:

Ameren specifically requests clarification on the phrase, ‘critical system conditions’ in R1.3.2. Ameren asks if compliance with R1.3.2 requires multiple contingent generating unit Outages as part of possible generation dispatch scenarios describing critical system conditions for which the system shall be planned and modeled in accordance with the contingency definitions included in Table 1.

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Request for Interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.2 Received from MISO on August 9, 2007:

MISO asks if the TPL standards require that any specific dispatch be applied, other than one that is representative of supply of firm demand and transmission service commitments, in the modeling of system contingencies specified in Table 1 in the TPL standards.

MISO then asks if a variety of possible dispatch patterns should be included in planning analyses including a probabilistically based dispatch that is representative of generation deficiency scenarios, would it be an appropriate application of the TPL standard to apply the transmission contingency conditions in Category B of Table 1 to these possible dispatch pattern.

The following interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.2 was developed by the NERC Planning Committee on March 13, 2008:

The selection of a credible generation dispatch for the modeling of critical system conditions is within the discretion of the Planning Authority. The Planning Authority was renamed “Planning Coordinator” (PC) in the Functional Model dated February 13, 2007. (TPL -002 and -003 use the former “Planning Authority” name, and the Functional Model terminology was a change in name only and did not affect responsibilities.)

- Under the Functional Model, the Planning Coordinator “Provides and informs Resource Planners, Transmission Planners, and adjacent Planning Coordinators of the methodologies and tools for the simulation of the transmission system” while the Transmission Planner “Receives from the Planning Coordinator methodologies and tools for the analysis and development of transmission expansion plans.” A PC’s selection of “critical system conditions” and its associated generation dispatch falls within the purview of “methodology.”

Furthermore, consistent with this interpretation, a Planning Coordinator would formulate critical system conditions that may involve a range of critical generator unit outages as part of the possible generator dispatch scenarios.

Both TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 have a similar measure M1:

- M1.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall have a valid assessment and corrective plans as specified in Reliability Standard TPL-002-0_R1 [or TPL-003-0_R1] and TPL-002-0_R2 [or TPL-003-0_R2].”

The Regional Reliability Organization (RRO) is named as the Compliance Monitor in both standards. Pursuant to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order 693, FERC eliminated the RRO as the appropriate Compliance Monitor for standards and replaced it with the Regional Entity (RE). See paragraph 157 of Order 693. Although the referenced TPL standards still include the reference to the RRO, to be consistent with Order 693, the RRO is replaced by the RE as the Compliance Monitor for this interpretation. As the Compliance Monitor, the RE determines what a “valid assessment” means when evaluating studies based upon specific sub-requirements in R1.3 selected by the Planning Coordinator and the Transmission Planner. If a PC has Transmission Planners in more than one region, the REs must coordinate among themselves on compliance matters.

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Requirement R1.3.12

Request for Interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.12 Received from Ameren on July 25, 2007:

Ameren also asks how the inclusion of planned outages should be interpreted with respect to the contingency definitions specified in Table 1 for Categories B and C. Specifically, Ameren asks if R1.3.12 requires that the system be planned to be operated during those conditions associated with planned outages consistent with the performance requirements described in Table 1 plus any unidentified outage.

Request for Interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.12 Received from MISO on August 9, 2007:

MISO asks if the term “planned outages” means only already known/scheduled planned outages that may continue into the planning horizon, or does it include potential planned outages not yet scheduled that may occur at those demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed?

If the requirement does include not yet scheduled but potential planned outages that could occur in the planning horizon, is the following a proper interpretation of this provision?

The system is adequately planned and in accordance with the standard if, in order for a system operator to potentially schedule such a planned outage on the future planned system, planning studies show that a system adjustment (load shed, re-dispatch of generating units in the interconnection, or system reconfiguration) would be required concurrent with taking such a planned outage in order to prepare for a Category B contingency (single element forced out of service)? In other words, should the system in effect be planned to be operated as for a Category C3 n-2 event, even though the first event is a planned base condition?

If the requirement is intended to mean only known and scheduled planned outages that will occur or may continue into the planning horizon, is this interpretation consistent with the original interpretation by NERC of the standard as provided by NERC in response to industry questions in the Phase I development of this standard?

The following interpretation of TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 Requirement R1.3.12 was developed by the NERC Planning Committee on March 13, 2008:

This provision was not previously interpreted by NERC since its approval by FERC and other regulatory authorities. TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 explicitly provide that the inclusion of planned (including maintenance) outages of any bulk electric equipment at demand levels for which the planned outages are required. For studies that include planned outages, compliance with the contingency assessment for TPL-002-0 and TPL-003-0 as outlined in Table 1 would include any necessary system adjustments which might be required to accommodate planned outages since a planned outage is not a “contingency” as defined in the *NERC Glossary of Terms Used in Standards*.

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Appendix 2

| <p>Interpretation 2012-INT-02: Response to Request for Interpretation of TPL-003-0a, Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.10 and R1.5 and TPL-004-0, Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.7 and R1.4 for the System Protection and Control Subcommittee</p> | |
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| Date submitted: | December 12, 2011 |
| <p>The following interpretations of TPL-003-0a, System Performance Following Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category C), Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.10 and R1.5 and TPL-004-0, System Performance Following Extreme Events Resulting in the Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category D), Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.7 and R1.4 were developed by members of the Assess Transmission Future Needs Standard Drafting Team (ATFNSTD), Protection System Misoperations Standard Development Team (PSMSDT), and Protection System Maintenance and Testing Standard Drafting Team (PSMTSDT).</p> | |
| Standard | Requirement (and text) |
| TPL-003-0a | R1.3.1 Be performed and evaluated only for those Category C contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. An explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results shall be available as supporting information. |
| TPL-003-0a | R1.3.10. Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems. |
| TPL-003-0a | R1.5. Consider all contingencies applicable to Category C. |
| TPL-004-0 | R1.3.1. Be performed and evaluated only for those Category D contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. An explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results shall be available as supporting information. |
| TPL-004-0 | R1.3.7. Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems. |
| TPL-004-0 | R1.4. Consider all contingencies applicable to Category D. |
| <p>Please explain the clarification needed (as submitted).</p> | |
| <p>This interpretation request has been developed to address Commission concerns related to the term “Single Point of Failure” and how it relates to system performance and contingency planning</p> | |

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clarification regarding the following questions about the listed standards, requirements and terms. More specifically, clarification is needed about the comprehensive study of system performance relating to Table 1’s, Category C and D contingency of a “protection system failure” and specifically the impact of failed components (i.e., “Single Point of Failure”). It is not entirely clear whether a valid assessment of a protection system failure includes evaluation of shared or non-redundant protection system components. Protection systems that have a shared protection system component are not two independent protection systems, because both protection systems will be mutually impacted for a failure of a single shared component. A protection system component evaluation would include the evaluation of the consequences on system performance for the failure of any protection system component that is integral to the operation of the protection system being evaluated and to the operation of another protection system.

On March 30, 2009, NERC issued an [Industry Advisory — Protection System Single Point of Failure](#)¹ (i.e., NERC Alert) for three significant events. One of which, the Westwing outage (June 14, 2004) was caused by failure of a single auxiliary relay that initiated both breaker tripping and the breaker failure protection. Since breaker tripping and breaker failure protection both shared the same auxiliary relay, there was no independence between breaker tripping and breaker failure protection systems, therefore causing both protection systems to not operate for the single component failure of the auxiliary relay. The failure of this auxiliary relay is known as a “single point of failure.” It is not clear whether this situation is comprehensively addressed by the applicable entities when making a valid assessment of system performance for both Category C and D contingencies.

Question 1: For the parenthetical “(stuck breaker or protection system failure)” in TPL-003-0a(X) (Category C contingencies 6-9) and TPL-004-0 (Category D contingencies 1-4), does an entity have the option of evaluating the effects² of either “stuck breaker” or “protection system failure” contingency³, or does an applicable entity have to evaluate the contingency that produces the more severe system results or impacts as identified in R1.3.1 of both standards?

There is a lack of clarity whether R1.3.1⁴ requires an entity to assess which contingency causes the most severe system results or impacts (R1.3.1) and this ambiguity could result in a potential reliability gap. Whether the simulation of a stuck breaker or protection system failure will produce the worst result depends on the protection system design. For example when a protection system is fully redundant, a protection system failure will not affect fault clearing; therefore, a stuck breaker would result in more severe system results or impacts. However, when a protection system failure affects fault clearing, the fault clearing time may be longer than the breaker failure protection clearing time for a stuck breaker contingency and may result in tripping of additional system elements, resulting in a more severe system response.

¹ NERC Website: (<http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/Events%20Analysis/A-2009-03-30-01.pdf>)

² As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.3.10. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.3.7.

³ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

⁴ “Be performed and evaluated only for those Category (TPL-003-0a, Category C and TPL-004-0, Category D) contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts.”

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Question 2: For the phrase “Delayed Clearing⁵” used in Category C⁶ contingencies 6-9 and Category D⁷ contingencies 1-4, to what extent does the description in Table 1, footnote (e)⁸ require an entity to model a single point of failure of a protection system component that may prevent correct operation of a protection system, including other protection systems impacted by that failed component based on the as-built design of that protection system?

There is a lack of clarity whether footnote (e) in Table 1 requires the study and/or simulation of a failure of a protection system component (i.e., single point of failure) that may prevent correct operation of the protection system(s) impacted by the component failure. Protection systems that share a protection system component are fully dependent upon the correct operation of that single shared component and do not perform as two independent protection systems. This lack of clarity may result in a potential reliability gap.

Clarity is necessary as to whether (1) a valid assessment should include evaluation of delayed clearing due to failure of the protection system component (i.e., single point of failure), such as the failure of a shared protection system component, that produces the more severe system results or impacts; and (2) the study and/or simulation of the fault clearing sequence and protection system(s) operation should be based on the protection system(s) as-built design.

The lack of clarity is compounded by the similarity between the phrase “Delayed Clearing” used in TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0, footnote (e), and the NERC glossary term “Delayed Fault Clearing.” While TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0 do not use the glossary term, the similarity may lead to confusion and inconsistency in how entities apply footnote (e) to “stuck breaker” or “protection system failure” contingency assessments.

Question 1

For the parenthetical “(stuck breaker or protection system failure)” in TPL-003-0a (Category C contingencies 6-9) and TPL-004-0 (Category D contingencies 1-4), does an entity have the option of evaluating the effects⁹ of either “stuck breaker” or “protection system failure” contingency¹⁰, or does an applicable entity have to evaluate the contingency that produces the more severe system results or impacts as identified in R1.3.1 of both standards?

⁵ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

⁶ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5.

⁷ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

⁸ Footnote (e) Delayed Clearing: “failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay,”

⁹ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.3.10. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.3.7.

¹⁰ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

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Response 1

The interpretation drafting team concludes that the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner must evaluate the situation that produces the more severe system results or impacts (i.e., TPL-003-0a, R1.3.1 and TPL-004-0, R1.3.1) due to a delayed clearing condition regardless of whether the condition resulted from a stuck breaker or protection system failure. The Reliability Standards TPL-003-0a (Table I, Category C contingencies 6-9) and TPL-004-0 (Table I, Category D contingencies 1-4) involve an assessment of the effects of either a stuck breaker or a protection system failure. The single line ground (SLG) (TPL-003-0a, Table I, Category C) Fault and 3-phase (3 ϕ) (TPL-004-0, Table I, Category D) Fault contingencies with delayed clearing are further defined by footnote (e) and the parenthetical phrase “(stuck breaker or protection system failure).” Footnote (e) explains that “Delayed clearing of a Fault is due to failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.” The parenthetical further emphasizes that the failure may be a “stuck breaker or protection system failure” that causes the delayed clearing of the fault. The text in Table 1 in either standard explains that when selecting delayed clearing contingencies to evaluate, both conditions “(stuck breaker or protection system failure)” must be considered.

Question 2

For the phrase “Delayed Clearing¹¹” used in Category C¹² contingencies 6-9 and Category D¹³ contingencies 1-4, to what extent does the description in Table 1, footnote (e)¹⁴ require an entity to model a single point of failure of a protection system component that may prevent correct operation of a protection system, including other protection systems impacted by that failed component based on the as-built design of that protection system?

Response 2

The term “Delayed Clearing” that is described in Table I, footnote (e) refers to fault clearing that results from a failure to achieve the protection system’s normally expected clearing time. For Category C or D contingencies, each Planning Authority and Transmission Planner is permitted engineering judgment in its selection of the protection system component failures for evaluation that would produce the more severe system results or impact (i.e., TPL-003-0a, R1.3.1 and TPL-004-0, R1.3.1). The evaluation would include addressing all protection systems affected by the selected component.

¹¹ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

¹² As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5.

¹³ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

¹⁴ Footnote (e) Delayed Clearing: “failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay,”

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A protection system component failure that impacts one or more protection systems and increases the total fault clearing time requires the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner to simulate the full impact (clearing time and facilities removed) on the Bulk Electric System performance.

The interpretation drafting team bases this conclusion on the footnote (e) example "...any protection system component such as, relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer..." because the component "circuit breaker" is not addressed in the current or previously defined NERC glossary term. The interpretation drafting team initially believed the lowercase usage of "protection system" inferred the NERC glossary term and the components described therein; however, based on the interpretation drafting team's further assessment of footnote (e), it concludes that the existing TPL standards (TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0) do not implicitly use the NERC glossary term. Without an explicit reference to the NERC glossary term, "Protection System," the two standards do not prescribe the specific protection system components that must be addressed by the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner in performing the studies required in TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0.

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** System Performance Following Extreme Events Resulting in the Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category D)
2. **Number:** TPL-004-0a(X)
3. **Purpose:** System simulations and associated assessments are needed periodically to ensure that reliable systems are developed that meet specified performance requirements, with sufficient lead time and continue to be modified or upgraded as necessary to meet present and future System needs.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Planning Authority
 - 4.2. Transmission Planner
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

B. Requirements

- R1. The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall each demonstrate through a valid assessment that its portion of the interconnected transmission system is evaluated for the risks and consequences of a number of each of the extreme contingencies that are listed under Category D of Table I. To be valid, the Planning Authority's and Transmission Planner's assessment shall:
 - R1.1. Be made annually.
 - R1.2. Be conducted for near-term (years one through five).
 - R1.3. Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category D contingencies of Table I. The specific elements selected (from within each of the following categories) for inclusion in these studies and simulations shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).
 - R1.3.1. Be performed and evaluated only for those Category D contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. An explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results shall be available as supporting information.
 - R1.3.2. Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the responsible entity.
 - R1.3.3. Be conducted annually unless changes to system conditions do not warrant such analyses.
 - R1.3.4. Have all projected firm transfers modeled.
 - R1.3.5. Include existing and planned facilities.

- R1.3.6.** Include Reactive Power resources to ensure that adequate reactive resources are available to meet system performance.
- R1.3.7.** Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems.
- R1.3.8.** Include the effects of existing and planned control devices.
- R1.3.9.** Include the planned (including maintenance) outage of any bulk electric equipment (including protection systems or their components) at those demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed.

R1.4. Consider all contingencies applicable to Category D.

R2. The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall each document the results of its reliability assessments and shall annually provide the results to its entities' respective NERC Regional Reliability Organization(s), as required by the Regional Reliability Organization.

C. Measures

- M1.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall have a valid assessment for its system responses as specified in Reliability Standard TPL-004-0a(X)_R1.
- M2.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall provide evidence to its Compliance Monitor that it reported documentation of results of its reliability assessments per Reliability Standard TPL-004-0a(X)_R1.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Compliance Monitor: Regional Reliability Organization.

Each Compliance Monitor shall report compliance and violations to NERC via the NERC Compliance Reporting Process.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Timeframe

Annually.

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

- 2.1. Level 1:** A valid assessment, as defined above, for the near-term planning horizon is not available.
- 2.2. Level 2:** Not applicable.
- 2.3. Level 3:** Not applicable.
- 2.4. Level 4:** Not applicable.

E. Regional Differences

- 1.** None identified.

Standard TPL-004-0a(X) — System Performance Following Extreme BES Events

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|---------|------------------|--|--|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0a | February 7, 2013 | Interpretation adopted by NERC Board of Trustees | |
| 0a | June 20, 2013 | Interpretation approved in FERC order | |
| 0a(X) | TBD | Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees | Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS |

Standard TPL-004-0a(X) — System Performance Following Extreme BES Events

Table I. Transmission System Standards – Normal and Emergency Conditions

| Category | Contingencies | System Limits or Impacts | | |
|--|--|---|---|----------------------|
| | Initiating Event(s) and Contingency Element(s) | System Stable and both Thermal and Voltage Limits within Applicable Rating ^a | Loss of Demand or Curtailed Firm Transfers | Cascading Outages |
| A No Contingencies | All Facilities in Service | Yes | No | No |
| B Event resulting in the loss of a single element. | Single Line Ground (SLG) or 3-Phase (3Ø) Fault, with Normal Clearing: 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer Loss of an Element without a Fault. | Yes Yes Yes Yes | No ^b No ^b No ^b No ^b | No No No No |
| | Single Pole Block, Normal Clearing ^c : 4. Single Pole (dc) Line | Yes | No ^b | No |
| C Event(s) resulting in the loss of two or more (multiple) elements. | SLG Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c : 1. Bus Section 2. Breaker (failure or internal Fault) | Yes Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c Planned/ Controlled ^c | No No |
| | SLG or 3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c , Manual System Adjustments, followed by another SLG or 3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c : 3. Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency, manual system adjustments, followed by another Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c | No |
| | Bipolar Block, with Normal Clearing ^c : 4. Bipolar (dc) Line Fault (non 3Ø), with Normal Clearing ^c : 5. Any two circuits of a multiple circuit towerline ^f | Yes Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c Planned/ Controlled ^c | No No |
| | SLG Fault, with Delayed Clearing ^e (stuck breaker or protection system failure): 6. Generator 7. Transformer 8. Transmission Circuit 9. Bus Section | Yes Yes Yes Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^c Planned/ Controlled ^c Planned/ Controlled ^c | No No No No |

Standard TPL-004-0a(x) — System Performance Following Extreme BES Events

| | | |
|---|---|--|
| <p>D^d</p> <p>Extreme event resulting in two or more (multiple) elements removed or Cascading out of service</p> | <p>3Ø Fault, with Delayed Clearing^e (stuck breaker or protection system failure):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer 4. Bus Section <hr/> <p>3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing^e:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Breaker (failure or internal Fault) 6. Loss of towerline with three or more circuits 7. All transmission lines on a common right-of way 8. Loss of a substation (one voltage level plus transformers) 9. Loss of a switching station (one voltage level plus transformers) 10. Loss of all generating units at a station 11. Loss of a large Load or major Load center 12. Failure of a fully redundant Remedial Action Scheme to operate when required 13. Operation, partial operation, or misoperation of a fully redundant Remedial Action Scheme in response to an event or abnormal system condition for which it was not intended to operate 14. Impact of severe power swings or oscillations from Disturbances in another Regional Reliability Organization. | <p>Evaluate for risks and consequences.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ May involve substantial loss of customer Demand and generation in a widespread area or areas. ▪ Portions or all of the interconnected systems may or may not achieve a new, stable operating point. ▪ Evaluation of these events may require joint studies with neighboring systems. |
|---|---|--|

- a) Applicable rating refers to the applicable Normal and Emergency facility thermal Rating or System Voltage Limit as determined and consistently applied by the system or facility owner. Applicable Ratings may include Emergency Ratings applicable for short durations as required to permit operating steps necessary to maintain system control. All Ratings must be established consistent with applicable NERC Reliability Standards addressing Facility Ratings.
- b) Planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to radial customers or some local network customers, connected to or supplied by the Faulted element or by the affected area, may occur in certain areas without impacting the overall reliability of the interconnected transmission systems. To prepare for the next contingency, system adjustments are permitted, including curtailments of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power Transfers.
- c) Depending on system design and expected system impacts, the controlled interruption of electric supply to customers (load shedding), the planned removal from service of certain generators, and/or the curtailment of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power Transfers may be necessary to maintain the overall reliability of the interconnected transmission systems.
- d) A number of extreme contingencies that are listed under Category D and judged to be critical by the transmission planning entity(ies) will be selected for evaluation. It is not expected that all possible facility outages under each listed contingency of Category D will be evaluated.
- e) Normal clearing is when the protection system operates as designed and the Fault is cleared in the time normally expected with proper functioning of the installed protection systems. Delayed clearing of a Fault is due to failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.
- f) System assessments may exclude these events where multiple circuit towers are used over short distances (e.g., station entrance, river crossings) in accordance with Regional exemption criteria.

Appendix 1

Interpretation 2012-INT-02: Response to Request for Interpretation of TPL-003-0a, Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.10 and R1.5 and TPL-004-0, Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.7 and R1.4 for the System Protection and Control Subcommittee

Date submitted: December 12, 2011

The following interpretations of TPL-003-0a, System Performance Following Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category C), Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.10 and R1.5 and TPL-004-0, System Performance Following Extreme Events Resulting in the Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category D), Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.7 and R1.4 were developed by members of the Assess Transmission Future Needs Standard Drafting Team (ATFNSTD), Protection System Misoperations Standard Development Team (PSMSDT), and Protection System Maintenance and Testing Standard Drafting Team (PSMTSDT).

| Standard | Requirement (and text) |
|------------|--|
| TPL-003-0a | R1.3.1 Be performed and evaluated only for those Category C contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. An explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results shall be available as supporting information. |
| TPL-003-0a | R1.3.10. Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems. |
| TPL-003-0a | R1.5. Consider all contingencies applicable to Category C. |
| TPL-004-0 | R1.3.1. Be performed and evaluated only for those Category D contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. An explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results shall be available as supporting information. |
| TPL-004-0 | R1.3.7. Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems. |
| TPL-004-0 | R1.4. Consider all contingencies applicable to Category D. |

Please explain the clarification needed (as submitted).

This interpretation request has been developed to address Commission concerns related to the term “Single Point of Failure” and how it relates to system performance and contingency planning clarification regarding the following questions about the listed standards, requirements and terms.

More specifically, clarification is needed about the comprehensive study of system performance relating to Table 1's, Category C and D contingency of a "protection system failure" and specifically the impact of failed components (i.e., "Single Point of Failure"). It is not entirely clear whether a valid assessment of a protection system failure includes evaluation of shared or non-redundant protection system components. Protection systems that have a shared protection system component are not two independent protection systems, because both protection systems will be mutually impacted for a failure of a single shared component. A protection system component evaluation would include the evaluation of the consequences on system performance for the failure of any protection system component that is integral to the operation of the protection system being evaluated and to the operation of another protection system.

On March 30, 2009, NERC issued an [Industry Advisory — Protection System Single Point of Failure](#)¹ (i.e., NERC Alert) for three significant events. One of which, the Westwing outage (June 14, 2004) was caused by failure of a single auxiliary relay that initiated both breaker tripping and the breaker failure protection. Since breaker tripping and breaker failure protection both shared the same auxiliary relay, there was no independence between breaker tripping and breaker failure protection systems, therefore causing both protection systems to not operate for the single component failure of the auxiliary relay. The failure of this auxiliary relay is known as a "single point of failure." It is not clear whether this situation is comprehensively addressed by the applicable entities when making a valid assessment of system performance for both Category C and D contingencies.

Question 1: For the parenthetical "(stuck breaker or protection system failure)" in TPL-003-0a (Category C contingencies 6-9) and TPL-004-0 (Category D contingencies 1-4), does an entity have the option of evaluating the effects² of either "stuck breaker" or "protection system failure" contingency³, or does an applicable entity have to evaluate the contingency that produces the more severe system results or impacts as identified in R1.3.1 of both standards?

There is a lack of clarity whether R1.3.1⁴ requires an entity to assess which contingency causes the most severe system results or impacts (R1.3.1) and this ambiguity could result in a potential reliability gap. Whether the simulation of a stuck breaker or protection system failure will produce the worst result depends on the protection system design. For example when a protection system is fully redundant, a protection system failure will not affect fault clearing; therefore, a stuck breaker would result in more severe system results or impacts. However, when a protection system failure affects fault clearing, the fault clearing time may be longer than the breaker failure protection clearing time for a stuck breaker contingency and may result in tripping of additional system elements, resulting in a more severe system response.

¹ NERC Website: (<http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/Events%20Analysis/A-2009-03-30-01.pdf>)

² As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.3.10. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.3.7.

³ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

⁴ "Be performed and evaluated only for those Category (TPL-003-0a Category C and TPL-004-0 Category D) contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts."

Question 2: For the phrase “Delayed Clearing⁵” used in Category C⁶ contingencies 6-9 and Category D⁷ contingencies 1-4, to what extent does the description in Table 1, footnote (e)⁸ require an entity to model a single point of failure of a protection system component that may prevent correct operation of a protection system, including other protection systems impacted by that failed component based on the as-built design of that protection system?

There is a lack of clarity whether footnote (e) in Table 1 requires the study and/or simulation of a failure of a protection system component (i.e., single point of failure) that may prevent correct operation of the protection system(s) impacted by the component failure. Protection systems that share a protection system component are fully dependent upon the correct operation of that single shared component and do not perform as two independent protection systems. This lack of clarity may result in a potential reliability gap.

Clarity is necessary as to whether (1) a valid assessment should include evaluation of delayed clearing due to failure of the protection system component (i.e., single point of failure), such as the failure of a shared protection system component, that produces the more severe system results or impacts; and (2) the study and/or simulation of the fault clearing sequence and protection system(s) operation should be based on the protection system(s) as-built design.

The lack of clarity is compounded by the similarity between the phrase “Delayed Clearing” used in TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0, footnote (e), and the NERC glossary term “Delayed Fault Clearing.” While TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0 do not use the glossary term, the similarity may lead to confusion and inconsistency in how entities apply footnote (e) to “stuck breaker” or “protection system failure” contingency assessments.

Question 1

For the parenthetical “(stuck breaker or protection system failure)” in TPL-003-0a (Category C contingencies 6-9) and TPL-004-0 (Category D contingencies 1-4), does an entity have the option of evaluating the effects⁹ of either “stuck breaker” or “protection system failure” contingency¹⁰, or does an applicable entity have to evaluate the contingency that produces the more severe system results or impacts as identified in R1.3.1 of both standards?

Response 1

⁵ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

⁶ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5.

⁷ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

⁸ Footnote (e) Delayed Clearing: “failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay,”

⁹ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.3.10. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.3.7.

¹⁰ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

The interpretation drafting team concludes that the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner must evaluate the situation that produces the more severe system results or impacts (i.e., TPL-003-0a, R1.3.1 and TPL-004-0, R1.3.1) due to a delayed clearing condition regardless of whether the condition resulted from a stuck breaker or protection system failure. The Reliability Standards TPL-003-0a (Table I, Category C contingencies 6-9) and TPL-004-0 (Table I, Category D contingencies 1-4) involve an assessment of the effects of either a stuck breaker or a protection system failure. The single line ground (SLG) (TPL-003-0a, Table I, Category C) Fault and 3-phase (3 ϕ) (TPL-004-0, Table I, Category D) Fault contingencies with delayed clearing are further defined by footnote (e) and the parenthetical phrase “(stuck breaker or protection system failure).” Footnote (e) explains that “Delayed clearing of a Fault is due to failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.” The parenthetical further emphasizes that the failure may be a “stuck breaker or protection system failure” that causes the delayed clearing of the fault. The text in Table 1 in either standard explains that when selecting delayed clearing contingencies to evaluate, both conditions “(stuck breaker or protection system failure)” must be considered.

Question 2

For the phrase “Delayed Clearing¹¹” used in Category C¹² contingencies 6-9 and Category D¹³ contingencies 1-4, to what extent does the description in Table 1, footnote (e)¹⁴ require an entity to model a single point of failure of a protection system component that may prevent correct operation of a protection system, including other protection systems impacted by that failed component based on the as-built design of that protection system?

Response 2

The term “Delayed Clearing” that is described in Table I, footnote (e) refers to fault clearing that results from a failure to achieve the protection system’s normally expected clearing time. For Category C or D contingencies, each Planning Authority and Transmission Planner is permitted engineering judgment in its selection of the protection system component failures for evaluation that would produce the more severe system results or impact (i.e., TPL-003-0a, R1.3.1 and TPL-004-0, R1.3.1). The evaluation would include addressing all protection systems affected by the selected component.

A protection system component failure that impacts one or more protection systems and increases the total fault clearing time requires the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner to simulate the full impact (clearing time and facilities removed) on the Bulk Electric System performance.

¹¹ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

¹² As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5.

¹³ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

¹⁴ Footnote (e) Delayed Clearing: “failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay,”

Standard TPL-004-0a(x) — System Performance Following Extreme BES Events

The interpretation drafting team bases this conclusion on the footnote (e) example “...any protection system component such as, relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer...” because the component “circuit breaker” is not addressed in the current or previously defined NERC glossary term. The interpretation drafting team initially believed the lowercase usage of “protection system” inferred the NERC glossary term and the components described therein; however, based on the interpretation drafting team’s further assessment of footnote (e), it concludes that the existing TPL standards (TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0) do not implicitly use the NERC glossary term. Without an explicit reference to the NERC glossary term, “Protection System,” the two standards do not prescribe the specific protection system components that must be addressed by the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner in performing the studies required in TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0.

Standard TPL-004-0a(X) — System Performance Following Extreme BES Events

A. Introduction

1. **Title:** System Performance Following Extreme Events Resulting in the Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category D)
2. **Number:** TPL-004-0a(X)
3. **Purpose:** System simulations and associated assessments are needed periodically to ensure that reliable systems are developed that meet specified performance requirements, with sufficient lead time and continue to be modified or upgraded as necessary to meet present and future System needs.
4. **Applicability:**
 - 4.1. Planning Authority
 - 4.2. Transmission Planner
5. **Effective Date:** This standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date that the standard is approved by an applicable governmental authority or as otherwise provided for in a jurisdiction where approval by an applicable governmental authority is required for a standard to go into effect. Where approval by an applicable governmental authority is not required, the standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the date the standard is adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees or as otherwise provided for in that jurisdiction.

Deleted: April 1, 2005

B. Requirements

- R1. The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall each demonstrate through a valid assessment that its portion of the interconnected transmission system is evaluated for the risks and consequences of a number of each of the extreme contingencies that are listed under Category D of Table I. To be valid, the Planning Authority's and Transmission Planner's assessment shall:
 - R1.1. Be made annually.
 - R1.2. Be conducted for near-term (years one through five).
 - R1.3. Be supported by a current or past study and/or system simulation testing that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category D contingencies of Table I. The specific elements selected (from within each of the following categories) for inclusion in these studies and simulations shall be acceptable to the associated Regional Reliability Organization(s).
 - R1.3.1. Be performed and evaluated only for those Category D contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. An explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results shall be available as supporting information.
 - R1.3.2. Cover critical system conditions and study years as deemed appropriate by the responsible entity.
 - R1.3.3. Be conducted annually unless changes to system conditions do not warrant such analyses.
 - R1.3.4. Have all projected firm transfers modeled.
 - R1.3.5. Include existing and planned facilities.

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- R1.3.6.** Include Reactive Power resources to ensure that adequate reactive resources are available to meet system performance.
- R1.3.7.** Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems.
- R1.3.8.** Include the effects of existing and planned control devices.
- R1.3.9.** Include the planned (including maintenance) outage of any bulk electric equipment (including protection systems or their components) at those demand levels for which planned (including maintenance) outages are performed.

R1.4. Consider all contingencies applicable to Category D.

- R2.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall each document the results of its reliability assessments and shall annually provide the results to its entities' respective NERC Regional Reliability Organization(s), as required by the Regional Reliability Organization.

C. Measures

- M1.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall have a valid assessment for its system responses as specified in Reliability Standard TPL-004-0a(X)_R1.
- M2.** The Planning Authority and Transmission Planner shall provide evidence to its Compliance Monitor that it reported documentation of results of its reliability assessments per Reliability Standard TPL-004-0a(X)_R1.

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D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility

Compliance Monitor: Regional Reliability Organization.
Each Compliance Monitor shall report compliance and violations to NERC via the NERC Compliance Reporting Process.

1.2. Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Timeframe

Annually.

1.3. Data Retention

None specified.

1.4. Additional Compliance Information

None.

2. Levels of Non-Compliance

- 2.1. Level 1:** A valid assessment, as defined above, for the near-term planning horizon is not available.
- 2.2. Level 2:** Not applicable.
- 2.3. Level 3:** Not applicable.
- 2.4. Level 4:** Not applicable.

E. Regional Differences

- 1.** None identified.

Standard TPL-004-0a(X) — System Performance Following Extreme BES Events

Version History

| Version | Date | Action | Change Tracking |
|-----------------------|---------------------|---|--|
| 0 | April 1, 2005 | Effective Date | New |
| 0a | February 7, 2013 | Interpretation adopted by NERC Board of Trustees | |
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Standard TPL-004-0a(X) — System Performance Following Extreme BES Events

Table I. Transmission System Standards – Normal and Emergency Conditions

| Category | Contingencies | System Limits or Impacts | | |
|--|--|---|--|----------------------|
| | Initiating Event(s) and Contingency Element(s) | System Stable and both Thermal and Voltage Limits within Applicable Rating ^a | Loss of Demand or Curtailed Firm Transfers | Cascading Outages |
| A No Contingencies | All Facilities in Service | Yes | No | No |
| B Event resulting in the loss of a single element. | Single Line Ground (SLG) or 3-Phase (3Ø) Fault, with Normal Clearing: 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer Loss of an Element without a Fault. | Yes Yes Yes Yes | No ^b No ^b No ^b No ^b | No No No No |
| | Single Pole Block, Normal Clearing ^c : 4. Single Pole (dc) Line | Yes | No ^b | No |
| C Event(s) resulting in the loss of two or more (multiple) elements. | SLG Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c : 1. Bus Section | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| | 2. Breaker (failure or internal Fault) | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| | SLG or 3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing ^e , Manual System Adjustments, followed by another SLG or 3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing ^c : 3. Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency, manual system adjustments, followed by another Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) contingency | Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d | No |
| | Bipolar Block, with Normal Clearing ^c : 4. Bipolar (dc) Line Fault (non 3Ø), with Normal Clearing ^c : 5. Any two circuits of a multiple circuit towerline ^f | Yes Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d Planned/ Controlled ^d | No No |
| | SLG Fault, with Delayed Clearing ^c (stuck breaker or protection system failure): 6. Generator 7. Transformer 8. Transmission Circuit 9. Bus Section | Yes Yes Yes Yes | Planned/ Controlled ^d Planned/ Controlled ^d Planned/ Controlled ^d Planned/ Controlled ^d | No No No No |

Standard TPL-004-0a(x) — System Performance Following Extreme BES Events

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| <p>D^d Extreme event resulting in two or more (multiple) elements removed or Cascading out of service</p> | <p>3Ø Fault, with Delayed Clearing^c (stuck breaker or protection system failure):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Generator 2. Transmission Circuit 3. Transformer 4. Bus Section | <p>Evaluate for risks and consequences.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ May involve substantial loss of customer Demand and generation in a widespread area or areas. ▪ Portions or all of the interconnected systems may or may not achieve a new, stable operating point. |
| | <p>3Ø Fault, with Normal Clearing^c:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Breaker (failure or internal Fault) 6. Loss of towerline with three or more circuits 7. All transmission lines on a common right-of way 8. Loss of a substation (one voltage level plus transformers) 9. Loss of a switching station (one voltage level plus transformers) 10. Loss of all generating units at a station 11. Loss of a large Load or major Load center 12. Failure of a fully redundant Remedial Action Scheme to operate when required 13. Operation, partial operation, or misoperation of a fully redundant Remedial Action Scheme in response to an event or abnormal system condition for which it was not intended to operate 14. Impact of severe power swings or oscillations from Disturbances in another Regional Reliability Organization. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evaluation of these events may require joint studies with neighboring systems. |

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- a) Applicable rating refers to the applicable Normal and Emergency facility thermal Rating or System Voltage Limit as determined and consistently applied by the system or facility owner. Applicable Ratings may include Emergency Ratings applicable for short durations as required to permit operating steps necessary to maintain system control. All Ratings must be established consistent with applicable NERC Reliability Standards addressing Facility Ratings.
- b) Planned or controlled interruption of electric supply to radial customers or some local network customers, connected to or supplied by the Faulted element or by the affected area, may occur in certain areas without impacting the overall reliability of the interconnected transmission systems. To prepare for the next contingency, system adjustments are permitted, including curtailments of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power Transfers.
- c) Depending on system design and expected system impacts, the controlled interruption of electric supply to customers (load shedding), the planned removal from service of certain generators, and/or the curtailment of contracted Firm (non-recallable reserved) electric power Transfers may be necessary to maintain the overall reliability of the interconnected transmission systems.
- d) A number of extreme contingencies that are listed under Category D and judged to be critical by the transmission planning entity(ies) will be selected for evaluation. It is not expected that all possible facility outages under each listed contingency of Category D will be evaluated.
- e) Normal clearing is when the protection system operates as designed and the Fault is cleared in the time normally expected with proper functioning of the installed protection systems. Delayed clearing of a Fault is due to failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.
- f) System assessments may exclude these events where multiple circuit towers are used over short distances (e.g., station entrance, river crossings) in accordance with Regional exemption criteria.

Standard TPL-004-0a(x) — System Performance Following Extreme BES Events

Appendix 1

Interpretation 2012-INT-02: Response to Request for Interpretation of TPL-003-0a, Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.10 and R1.5 and TPL-004-0, Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.7 and R1.4 for the System Protection and Control Subcommittee

Date submitted: December 12, 2011

The following interpretations of TPL-003-0a, System Performance Following Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category C), Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.10 and R1.5 and TPL-004-0, System Performance Following Extreme Events Resulting in the Loss of Two or More Bulk Electric System Elements (Category D), Requirements R1.3.1, R1.3.7 and R1.4 were developed by members of the Assess Transmission Future Needs Standard Drafting Team (ATFNSTD), Protection System Misoperations Standard Development Team (PSMSDT), and Protection System Maintenance and Testing Standard Drafting Team (PSMTSDT).

| Standard | Requirement (and text) |
|------------|--|
| TPL-003-0a | R1.3.1 Be performed and evaluated only for those Category C contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. An explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results shall be available as supporting information. |
| TPL-003-0a | R1.3.10. Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems. |
| TPL-003-0a | R1.5. Consider all contingencies applicable to Category C. |
| TPL-004-0 | R1.3.1. Be performed and evaluated only for those Category D contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. An explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results shall be available as supporting information. |
| TPL-004-0 | R1.3.7. Include the effects of existing and planned protection systems, including any backup or redundant systems. |
| TPL-004-0 | R1.4. Consider all contingencies applicable to Category D. |

Please explain the clarification needed (as submitted).

This interpretation request has been developed to address Commission concerns related to the term “Single Point of Failure” and how it relates to system performance and contingency planning clarification regarding the following questions about the listed standards, requirements and terms.

Standard TPL-004-0a(x) — System Performance Following Extreme BES Events

More specifically, clarification is needed about the comprehensive study of system performance relating to Table 1's, Category C and D contingency of a "protection system failure" and specifically the impact of failed components (i.e., "Single Point of Failure"). It is not entirely clear whether a valid assessment of a protection system failure includes evaluation of shared or non-redundant protection system components. Protection systems that have a shared protection system component are not two independent protection systems, because both protection systems will be mutually impacted for a failure of a single shared component. A protection system component evaluation would include the evaluation of the consequences on system performance for the failure of any protection system component that is integral to the operation of the protection system being evaluated and to the operation of another protection system.

On March 30, 2009, NERC issued an [Industry Advisory — Protection System Single Point of Failure](#)¹ (i.e., NERC Alert) for three significant events. One of which, the Westwing outage (June 14, 2004) was caused by failure of a single auxiliary relay that initiated both breaker tripping and the breaker failure protection. Since breaker tripping and breaker failure protection both shared the same auxiliary relay, there was no independence between breaker tripping and breaker failure protection systems, therefore causing both protection systems to not operate for the single component failure of the auxiliary relay. The failure of this auxiliary relay is known as a "single point of failure." It is not clear whether this situation is comprehensively addressed by the applicable entities when making a valid assessment of system performance for both Category C and D contingencies.

Question 1: For the parenthetical "(stuck breaker or protection system failure)" in TPL-003-0a (Category C contingencies 6-9) and TPL-004-0 (Category D contingencies 1-4), does an entity have the option of evaluating the effects² of either "stuck breaker" or "protection system failure" contingency³, or does an applicable entity have to evaluate the contingency that produces the more severe system results or impacts as identified in R1.3.1 of both standards?

There is a lack of clarity whether R1.3.1⁴ requires an entity to assess which contingency causes the most severe system results or impacts (R1.3.1) and this ambiguity could result in a potential reliability gap. Whether the simulation of a stuck breaker or protection system failure will produce the worst result depends on the protection system design. For example when a protection system is fully redundant, a protection system failure will not affect fault clearing; therefore, a stuck breaker would result in more severe system results or impacts. However, when a protection system failure affects fault clearing, the fault clearing time may be longer than the breaker failure protection clearing time for a stuck breaker contingency and may result in tripping of additional system elements, resulting in a more severe system response.

¹ NERC Website: (<http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/Events%20Analysis/A-2009-03-30-01.pdf>)

² As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.3.10. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.3.7.

³ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

⁴ "Be performed and evaluated only for those Category (TPL-003-0a Category C and TPL-004-0 Category D) contingencies that would produce the more severe system results or impacts."

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Question 2: For the phrase “Delayed Clearing⁵” used in Category C⁶ contingencies 6-9 and Category D⁷ contingencies 1-4, to what extent does the description in Table 1, footnote (e)⁸ require an entity to model a single point of failure of a protection system component that may prevent correct operation of a protection system, including other protection systems impacted by that failed component based on the as-built design of that protection system?

There is a lack of clarity whether footnote (e) in Table 1 requires the study and/or simulation of a failure of a protection system component (i.e., single point of failure) that may prevent correct operation of the protection system(s) impacted by the component failure. Protection systems that share a protection system component are fully dependent upon the correct operation of that single shared component and do not perform as two independent protection systems. This lack of clarity may result in a potential reliability gap.

Clarity is necessary as to whether (1) a valid assessment should include evaluation of delayed clearing due to failure of the protection system component (i.e., single point of failure), such as the failure of a shared protection system component, that produces the more severe system results or impacts; and (2) the study and/or simulation of the fault clearing sequence and protection system(s) operation should be based on the protection system(s) as-built design.

The lack of clarity is compounded by the similarity between the phrase “Delayed Clearing” used in TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0, footnote (e), and the NERC glossary term “Delayed Fault Clearing.” While TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0 do not use the glossary term, the similarity may lead to confusion and inconsistency in how entities apply footnote (e) to “stuck breaker” or “protection system failure” contingency assessments.

Question 1

For the parenthetical “(stuck breaker or protection system failure)” in TPL-003-0a (Category C contingencies 6-9) and TPL-004-0 (Category D contingencies 1-4), does an entity have the option of evaluating the effects⁹ of either “stuck breaker” or “protection system failure” contingency¹⁰, or does an applicable entity have to evaluate the contingency that produces the more severe system results or impacts as identified in R1.3.1 of both standards?

Response 1

⁵ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

⁶ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5.

⁷ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

⁸ Footnote (e) Delayed Clearing: “failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay,”

⁹ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.3.10. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.3.7.

¹⁰ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

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The interpretation drafting team concludes that the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner must evaluate the situation that produces the more severe system results or impacts (i.e., TPL-003-0a, R1.3.1 and TPL-004-0, R1.3.1) due to a delayed clearing condition regardless of whether the condition resulted from a stuck breaker or protection system failure. The Reliability Standards TPL-003-0a (Table I, Category C contingencies 6-9) and TPL-004-0 (Table I, Category D contingencies 1-4) involve an assessment of the effects of either a stuck breaker or a protection system failure. The single line ground (SLG) (TPL-003-0a, Table I, Category C) Fault and 3-phase (3 ϕ) (TPL-004-0, Table I, Category D) Fault contingencies with delayed clearing are further defined by footnote (e) and the parenthetical phrase “(stuck breaker or protection system failure).” Footnote (e) explains that “Delayed clearing of a Fault is due to failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.” The parenthetical further emphasizes that the failure may be a “stuck breaker or protection system failure” that causes the delayed clearing of the fault. The text in Table 1 in either standard explains that when selecting delayed clearing contingencies to evaluate, both conditions “(stuck breaker or protection system failure)” must be considered.

Question 2

For the phrase “Delayed Clearing¹¹” used in Category C¹² contingencies 6-9 and Category D¹³ contingencies 1-4, to what extent does the description in Table 1, footnote (e)¹⁴ require an entity to model a single point of failure of a protection system component that may prevent correct operation of a protection system, including other protection systems impacted by that failed component based on the as-built design of that protection system?

Response 2

The term “Delayed Clearing” that is described in Table I, footnote (e) refers to fault clearing that results from a failure to achieve the protection system’s normally expected clearing time. For Category C or D contingencies, each Planning Authority and Transmission Planner is permitted engineering judgment in its selection of the protection system component failures for evaluation that would produce the more severe system results or impact (i.e., TPL-003-0a, R1.3.1 and TPL-004-0, R1.3.1). The evaluation would include addressing all protection systems affected by the selected component.

A protection system component failure that impacts one or more protection systems and increases the total fault clearing time requires the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner to simulate the full impact (clearing time and facilities removed) on the Bulk Electric System performance.

¹¹ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5. and/or TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

¹² As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-003-0a, Requirement R1.5.

¹³ As required by NERC Reliability Standard TPL-004-0, Requirement R1.4.

¹⁴ Footnote (e) Delayed Clearing: “failure of any protection system component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay,”

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The interpretation drafting team bases this conclusion on the footnote (e) example “...any protection system component such as, relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer...” because the component “circuit breaker” is not addressed in the current or previously defined NERC glossary term. The interpretation drafting team initially believed the lowercase usage of “protection system” inferred the NERC glossary term and the components described therein; however, based on the interpretation drafting team’s further assessment of footnote (e), it concludes that the existing TPL standards (TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0) do not implicitly use the NERC glossary term. Without an explicit reference to the NERC glossary term, “Protection System,” the two standards do not prescribe the specific protection system components that must be addressed by the Planning Authority and Transmission Planner in performing the studies required in TPL-003-0a and TPL-004-0.