

# **TLR General Update Drafting Team**

701 City Center Drive Carmel, Indiana 46032 November 6, 2006

# **Minutes**

#### **Administrative**

Bill Lohrman led the welcome of the ATCT SAR drafting team members and guests (**Exhibit A**). Bill Lohrman reviewed the antitrust guidelines. Bill Lohrman reviewed the objectives of the meeting (**Exhibit B**).

#### **Attendance**

Daryn Barker, E.ON US Frank Koza, PJM Tom Mallinger, Midwest ISO Narinder Saini, Entergy Joel Dison, Southern Company Generation Dave Marton, FirstEnergy Bill Lohrman, Prague Power, LLC

Via phone:

Sue Mangum-Goins, TVA DeDe Kirby, NAESB

Kathy York, TVA Dennis Harrison, Prague Power, LLC

#### TLR SAR Review

Based on a review of comments and industry activity related to the TLR process, the drafting team adopted a phased approach in SAR for standard development. The SAR drafting team will propose that each phase be balloted separately for sake of efficiency and clarity. The SAR drafting team believes that each of the phases is conceptually different and should be developed separately. **The drafting team is recommending that the SAR (Exhibit C) be approved to proceed to the standard drafting phase.** 

The four phases recommended by the SAR drafting team are:

- 1) NERC / NAESB split of reliability standards and business practices
- 2) MISO/SPP/PJM curtailment threshold change to 3% field test
- 3) Completing work needed to make the SPP Urgent Action permanent
- 4) Incorporation of additional changes as suggested by commenters.

Phases 1 and 2 would be worked on concurrently, followed by phases 3 and 4.

For Phase 1, the drafting team completed their review of comments from industry related to the NERC / NAESB split using an updated format (**Exhibit D**).

For Phase 2, Tom Mallinger explained the basis for their request to conduct a Curtailment Threshold Field Test (**Exhibit E**). The MISO/SPP/PJM markets currently report Gen to Load impacts to the IDC down to zero percent. When relief is called for in the IDC the market flow impacts are being called for, and the markets are unable to redispatch generation to accomplish relief due to very small impacts. MISO/PJM/SPP are asking for 3% as recommended by the ORS in the regional differences for a 12

month interim period. The SAR drafting team recommends that the field test be approved by the SC and will send a request to the compliance program for a request to approve the field test.

For Phase 3, Lanny Nickell reviewed the changes needed to make the SPP Urgent Action Regional Difference permanent. The change allows SPP to provide market flow values to the IDC. The regional difference would start when the SPP market begins, now scheduled for February 1, 2007. The TLR drafting team plans to complete the work on this phase by August 2, 2007, the expiration date of the urgent action.

For Phase 4, the SAR drafting team reviewed additional changes for incorporation in the SAR, as appropriate, based on comments (**Exhibit F**) from original posting, and will work on incorporating some of the suggested changes in Phase 4. Also, as part of this phase, the SAR drafting team also reviewed the comments related to the withdrawn market flow TLR SAR, and determined that those comments would be essentially addressed in the work to make the SPP regional difference permanent and that additional changes suggested by those comments would not be necessary.

The meeting was adjourned.

### **Exhibit A**

# Transmission Loading Relief (TLR) Drafting Team November 6, 2006 Meeting Attendance

Daryn Barker

Sr. Analyst - Market Policy E.ON-US Energy Services Inc.

Joel J. Dison

Project Coordinator Southern Company Services, Inc.

Frank J. Koza

Executive Director, System Operations PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

**Dave Marton** 

Senior Engineer FirstEnergy Solutions

Narinder K. Saini

Policy Consultant Entergy Services, Inc.

Tom Mallinger

Interregional Coordinator Midwest ISO

NERC Consultant William W. Lohrman

Managing Director Prague Power, LLC Via Conference Call

**Sue Mangum** 

Tennessee Valley Authority

**Kathy York** 

Tennessee Valley Authority

**DeDe Kirby** 

NAESB

**Dennis Harrison** 

Prague Power, LLC

#### Exhibit B



Princeton Forrestal Village, 116-390 Village Boulevard, Princeton, New Jersey 08540-5721 www.nerc.com • 609-452-8060 (Voice) • 609-452-9550 (Fax)

# **TLR General Update**

November 6, 2006 8:00 am – 5:00 pm Midwest ISO Lakeside Conference Center (LCC), Room 3\* 701 City Center Drive Carmel, Indiana 46032 317-249-5400

Conference Phone Number: 1(732)694-2061. Conference code is 11341106# Webex Meeting Number: 711 201 540 Meeting password: 123456 <a href="https://nerc.webex.com/nerc/j.php?ED=90373427">https://nerc.webex.com/nerc/j.php?ED=90373427</a> <a href="https://nerc.webex.com">https://nerc.webex.com</a>

# Agenda

- 1. Welcome and Introductions
  - a. NERC TLR Drafting Team Roster (Attachment 1a)
     Chairman Zwergel will lead the welcome of the ATCT drafting team members and guests.
  - b. Antitrust Compliance Guidelines Bill Lohrman (Attachment 1b)
    Bill Lohrman will review the NERC Antitrust Compliance Guidelines provided in
    Attachment 1b. It is NERC's policy and practice to obey the antitrust laws and to avoid
    all conduct that unreasonably restrains competition. This policy requires the avoidance
    of any conduct that violates, or that might appear to violate, the antitrust laws. Among
    other things, the antitrust laws forbid any agreement between or among competitors
    regarding prices, availability of service, product design, terms of sale, division of
    markets, allocation of customers or any other activity that unreasonably restrains
    competition. It is the responsibility of every NERC participant and employee who may
    in any way affect NERC's compliance with the antitrust laws to carry out this
    commitment.
  - c. Review of Agenda L. Middleton Chairman Zwergel will review the objectives of the meeting.
- 2. Review Minutes of Last Meeting (Attachment 2)
- 3. Comments from industry.
  - a. Final review of comments in new format (Attachment 3a)
  - b. Phased approach of SAR and standard development
    - i. NERC / NAESB split (Attachment 3bi)
      - 1. completed comments
      - 2. will recommend that this split be voted on separately
    - ii. Request MISO/SPP/PJM Curtailment Threshold Field Test (Attachment 3bii)
      - 1. The MISO/SPP/PJM markets currently report Gen to Load impacts to the IDC down to zero percent.

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<sup>\*</sup> Directions to LCC included in agenda package Page 1 of 2

- 2. When relief is called for in the IDC the market flow impacts are being called for, and the markets are unable to redispatch generation to accomplish relief due to very small impacts.
- 3. MISO/PJM/SPP are asking for 3% as recommended by the ORS in the regional differences for a 12 month interim period.
- 4. SAR drafting team will recommend that the field test be approved by the SC and will send a request to the compliance program for a request to approve the field test.
- iii. Making SPP Urgent Action Regional Difference permanent (Attachment 3biii section E.2 of IRO-006-3)
  - 1. Allows SPP to provide market flow values to the IDC
  - 2. Would start when the SPP market begins, now scheduled for February 1, 2007
  - 3. Need to be completed by August 2, 2007.
- iv. Incorporation of changes, as appropriate, based on comments from original posting (see **Attachment 3a**), (see attached file)
- v. Review of market flow changes from withdrawn SAR to determine whether they should be added as a phase in the development of this standard.
  - 1. The drafting team reviewed the comments from the withdrawn SAR and determined that if the SPP regional difference is made permanent that the additional changes suggested by those comments would not be necessary..
- 4. Complete SAR revisions and request authorization to proceed with standard development (**Attachment 4**)
- 5. Next Meetings
  - a. Dec 5, 2006 Houston 9am 5pm (NAESB offices, NERC schedules Webex and Conference Bridge)
  - b. Jan 10-11, 2006 Houston/Dallas noon to noon
- 6. Adjourn

# When completed, email to: gerry.cauley@nerc.net

# **Standard Authorization Request Form**

Title of Proposed Standard Relief IRO-006-0		Reliability Coordination - Transmission Loading
Request Date I	Revised	11/6/06

SAR Reques	tor Information	<b>SAR Type</b> (Put an 'x' in front of one of these selections)	
Name David	Zwergel		New Standard
Primary Contact David Zwergel			Revision to existing Standard
Telephone	(317) 249-5452		Withdrawal of existing Standard
Fax	(317) 249-5910		
E-mail	dzwergel@midwestiso.org		Urgent Action

## **Purpose/Industry Need** (Provide one or two sentences)

In August 2004, NERC and NAESB agreed to immediately begin a joint effort to update the Eastern Interconnection TLR Procedure, as reflected in Attachment 1 to reliability standard IRO-006-0, to divide the reliability requirements and business practices, and to incorporate other necessary improvements to the TLR procedure.

In December 2004 NERC and NAESB formed the joint TLR Subcommittee to clarify and focus Attachment 1 to NERC reliability standard IRO-006-0 on the TLR requirements that are necessary for reliability, as distinguished from those TLR requirements that are business practices. In August 2006 NERC formed the SAR drafting team for this activity.

As a result of the comments received, the SAR drafting team is recommending that the Standards Drafting effort be divided into four phases and when ready, balloted separately.

Phase I – completing the split between NERC reliability standards and NAESB business practices

Phase II – conducting a field test for changing the TLR Market Flow curtailment threshold in the MISO/PJM/SPP markets from 0% to 3% for a 12 month evaluation period. (Description attached)

Phase III – completing the work required to make the SPP TLR regional difference (E.2) permanent for the Urgent Action that was approved on August 2, 2006.

Phase IV- other suggested incremental changes as determined by the drafting team in response (drafting team replies attached) to the comments

Phase I would be worked on concurrently with Phase II.

# Reliability Functions

	The Standard will Apply to the Following Functions (Check box for each one that applies by double clicking the grey boxes.)				
$\boxtimes$	Reliability Authority	Ensures the reliability of the bulk transmission system within its Reliability Authority area. This is the highest reliability authority.			
	Balancing Authority	Integrates resource plans ahead of time, and maintains load-interchange- resource balance within its metered boundary and supports system frequency in real time			
	Interchange Authority	Authorizes valid and balanced Interchange Schedules			
	Planning Authority	Plans the bulk electric system			
	Resource Planner	Develops a long-term (>1year) plan for the resource adequacy of specific loads within a Planning Authority area.			
	Transmission Planner	Develops a long-term (>1 year) plan for the reliability of transmission systems within its portion of the Planning Authority area.			
	Transmission Service Provider	Provides transmission services to qualified market participants under applicable transmission service agreements			
$\boxtimes$	Transmission Owner	Owns transmission facilities			
$\boxtimes$	Transmission Operator	Operates and maintains the transmission facilities, and executes switching orders			
	Distribution Provider	Provides and operates the "wires" between the transmission system and the customer			
$\boxtimes$	Generator Owner	Owns and maintains generation unit(s)			
$\boxtimes$	Generator Operator	Operates generation unit(s) and performs the functions of supplying energy and Interconnected Operations Services			
	Purchasing- Selling Entity	The function of purchasing or selling energy, capacity and all necessary Interconnected Operations Services as required			
	Market Operator	Integrates energy, capacity, balancing, and transmission resources to achieve an economic, reliability-constrained dispatch.			
$\boxtimes$	Load-Serving Entity	Secures energy and transmission (and related generation services) to serve the end user			

# Reliability and Market Interface Principles

Appl grey		ole Reliability Principles (Check boxes for all that apply by double clicking the es.)	
	1.	Interconnected bulk electric systems shall be planned and operated in a coordinated manner to perform reliably under normal and abnormal conditions as defined in the NERC Standards.	
	2.	The frequency and voltage of interconnected bulk electric systems shall be controlled within defined limits through the balancing of real and reactive power supply and demand.	
	3.	Information necessary for the planning and operation of interconnected bulk electric systems shall be made available to those entities responsible for planning and operating the systems reliably.	
$\boxtimes$	4.	Plans for emergency operation and system restoration of interconnected bulk electric systems shall be developed, coordinated, maintained and implemented.	
$\boxtimes$	5.	Facilities for communication, monitoring and control shall be provided, used and maintained for the reliability of interconnected bulk electric systems.	
	6.	Personnel responsible for planning and operating interconnected bulk electric systems shall be trained, qualified and have the responsibility and authority to implement actions.	
$\boxtimes$	7.	The security of the interconnected bulk electric systems shall be assessed, monitored and maintained on a wide area basis.	
		e proposed Standard comply with all of the following Market Interface es? (Select 'yes' or 'no' from the drop-down box by double clicking the grey area.)	
1.		planning and operation of bulk electric systems shall recognize that reliability is an ential requirement of a robust North American economy. Yes	
2.	<ul> <li>An Organization Standard shall not give any market participant an unfair competitive advantage. Yes</li> </ul>		
3.	. An Organization Standard shall neither mandate nor prohibit any specific market structure. Yes		
4.	. An Organization Standard shall not preclude market solutions to achieving compliance with that Standard. Yes		
5.	5. An Organization Standard shall not require the public disclosure of commercially sensitive information. All market participants shall have equal opportunity to access commercially non-sensitive information that is required for compliance with reliability standards. Yes		

**Detailed Description** (Provide enough detail so that an independent entity familiar with the industry could draft, modify, or withdraw a Standard based on this description.)

### Phase I

NERC and NAESB formed the joint TLR Subommittee with the charge to review Attachment 1 (Transmission Loading Relief Procedure — Eastern Interconnection) of IRO-006-0 (Reliability Coordination — Transmission Loading Relief), and to identify each reliability requirement and business practice embedded within the the TLR procedure. The joint NERC/NAESB TLR Subcommittee completed its charge on June 1, 2005, when the subcommittee approved a Final Consensus Division of TLR for Version 0 Reliability Practices [Standards] and a Final Consensus Division of TLR for Version 0 Business Practices. NAESB subsequently adopted the business practice document as a business practice standard.

This reliability standards development effort will begin by assessing for completeness and accuracy the revised Attachment 1 developed by the TLR Subcommittee using the SAR drafting team's annotated TLR procedure that indicates the agreement for the functional split. The end state of this standard development effort will be a revised Attachment 1 to reliability standard IRO-006-3, and working in coordination with NAESB, a revised NAESB TLR business practice.

When established, it is anticipated that the standard drafting team will work with NAESB to jointly publish the respective NERC and NAESB standards in an integrated document.

#### Phase II

The drafting team has included as an attachment to the Standards Committee and the NERC Compliance Program a request to conduct a field test of the MISO/PJM/SPP change to the Market Flow Threshold Change in the TLR Regional Differences E.1 and E.2 from 0% to 3%.

Phase III The SAR drafting team recommends that the Urgent Action SPP regional difference be submitted through the formal standards drafting process to make the Urgent Action permanent.

### Phase IV

Based on the assumption that the MISO/PJM and SPP regional differences (E.1 and E.2) will remain part of the standard, the drafting team does not see the need for additional work to be performed on the issues raised by the TLR Market Flow SAR that was withdrawn.

The drafting team will work on some additional changes on the standard suggested by the commenters.

- Providing reliability performance specifications, such as X MWs of relief or % of relief in Y minutes needed to maintain the system security in the interconnected environment
- Review removal or change of ramp limits during TLR as an impediment to meeting relief requirements

• Review consistent use of the term Interchange Transactions in the standard.

As suggested by the Joint Interchange Scheduling Working Group

- Review resolving the reloading of curtailed transactions above their reliability limit by an entity other than the initiating entity or above any pre-existing reliability or market profiles.
- Reviewing automatic reloading procedure problems not resolved by CO-148 by specifying requirements and performance measures in the TLR standard (may also be addressed through NAESB business practices and modifications to the e-Tag specification).

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## Related Standards

Standard No.	Explanation
IRO-006-0	Attachment 1 (TLR Procedure) to be replaced by a similar document addressing only the reliability elements of the TLR Procedure.
IRO-006-0	The urgent action revision to Attachment 1 that addressed the holding of dynamic schedules during TLR Level 1-4 will be incorporated into the NAESB TLR business practices.

## Related SARs

SAR ID	Explanation

# Regional Differences

Region	Explanation
ECAR	

FRCC MAAC MAIN MAPP NPCC SERC SPP WECC	ERCOT	
MAIN MAPP NPCC SERC SPP	FRCC	
MAPP NPCC SERC SPP	MAAC	
NPCC SERC SPP	MAIN	
SERC SPP	MAPP	
SPP	NPCC	
	SERC	
WECC	SPP	
	WECC	

# Related NERC Operating Policies or Planning Standards

ID	Explanation

### **Exhibit D**

# Consideration of Comments on Draft 1 of SAR for General Update to IRO-006 Reliability Coordination — Transmission Loading Relief

If you feel that your comment has been overlooked, please let us know immediately. Our goal is to give every comment serious consideration in this process! If you feel there has been an error or omission, you can contact Richard Schneider, Director of Standards Development at 609-452-8060 or at Richard. Schneider@nerc.net. In addition, there is a NERC Reliability Standards Appeals Process. 1

# Index to questions, comments and responses:

1.	Do you believe there is a reliability need for this proposed standard change? If not, please explain in the comment area	2
2.	Do you believe the TLR Subcommittee appropriately divided the elements of TLR business practices vs. TLR reliability requirements? If not, please explain in the comment area	6
3.	Do you believe there are still elements of TLR business practices that remain in the proposed TLR reliability requirements? not, please explain in the comment area.	
4.	Do you believe there are still elements of TLR reliability requirements that remain in the proposed TLR business practices? not, please explain in the comment area.	
5.	Do you have any other comments on these proposed changes?	16

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The appeals process is in the Reliability Standards Process Manual: <a href="http://www.nerc.com/standards/newstandardsprocess.html">http://www.nerc.com/standards/newstandardsprocess.html</a>.

# 1. Do you believe there is a reliability need for this proposed standard change? If not, please explain in the comment area.

# **Summary Consideration:**

Commenter	Yes	No	Comment
CP9 Reliability Standards		Х	This proposed standard change was not initiated due to reliability needs. NPCC Participating members believe
Working Group			that the change is in conflict to very important reliability rules. In order to understand the process the standard
Guy Žito			and the business practice are necessary.
Kathleen Goodman			
Khaqan Khan			
Vinod (Bob) Kotecha			
Response: The SAR team agrees	s that tl	his sta	ndard is very important. It is very important for this work to be done jointly so that both the reliability elements and
			modified as needed going forward. Accomplishing this separation allows both the Standards organizations to focus
			the resulting jointly published standard includes the best of both business and reliability requirements. The NERC
NAESB Template Procedure for S	Joint St	tandar	ds Development and Coordination was developed to ensure proper coordination for standards where there is no
			e industry will benefit from using a joint effort to meet both reliability and business concerns. The approach includes
			esulting standard if required. The joint collaboration ensures during development issues can be addressed jointly so
			lity standards work together. Using this process the result is that the jointly published standard includes the
	ility sta	ndards	s without need for separate documents.
ISO NE		Х	This proposed standard change was not initiated due to reliability needs
Cheryl Mendrala			
Poeponeo: On August 2 2 2004	NEDC	Vorci	on 0 Standards Drafting Team and the NAESB Business Practices Subcommittee (BPS) met to develop a joint
			Operating Policies into NAESB Business Practice Standards and NERC Reliability Standards. The task force
			R procedure document with the "same language and format" in their respective Version 0 standards and
			placement Version 1 standards distinguishing reliability requirements and business practices by the end of 2005.
			ns developed a NERC NAESB Template Procedure for Joint Standards Development and Coordination to ensure
			is no easy separation of business and reliability and the industry would benefit from using a joint effort to meet both
			the includes joint collaboration and joint publication of the resulting standard if required. The joint collaboration
			dressed jointly so that the resulting business practice and reliability standards work together. Using this process
			includes the business practices and the reliability standards without need for separate documents.
Entergy Services,	ileu sta	X	The interplay between the business practices and reliability practices associated with TLR is so intimate that the
Transmission		_ ^	two should not be divided into two standards practices. It would be best for the industry that one TLR standard be
Ed Davis			developed by the two organizations.
Rick Riley			developed by the two diganizations.
Jay Zimmerman			
George Bartlett			
James Case			
Bill Aycock			
Melinda Montgomery			
Narinder Saini			
Maurice Casadaban			

Response: The NERC NAESB Template Procedure for Joint Standards Development and Coordination was developed to ensure proper coordination for				
standards where there is no easy separation of business and reliability. The industry will benefit from using a joint effort to meet both reliability and business				
concerns. The approach includes joint collaboration and joint publication of the resulting standard if required. The joint collaboration ensures during development				
			ulting business practice and reliability standards work together. Using this process the result is that the jointly	
			tices and the reliability standards without need for separate documents.	
AEP		Х	We support the NERC/NAESB initiative to split the TLR document in order extract the business practice aspects.	
Raj Rana			However, there is no reliability need for this proposed standard change. The reliability need in terms by	
			managing power flow relief in a pre-defined time period in order to maintain security of the system did not change.	
			However, this draft does not provide reliability performance specifications, such as X MW or % of relief in Y	
			minutes. The NERC portion of this standard should specify what is needed to maintain the system security in the	
			interconnected environment, while the NAESB portion should specify the road map as to how to do it.	
			ort in this SAR is devoted to correctly separating the business practices. The drafting team will consider the	
modifications suggested as a sep	arate p			
Midwest Reliability		Х	The MRO does not believe there is a reliability need for the proposed standard change. We would contend that	
Organization			the change provides confusion to a very important reliability process. In order to understand the process the	
Alan Boesch			standard and the business practice are necessary.	
Terry Bilke				
Robert Coish				
Dennis Florom				
Todd Gosnell				
Wayne Guttormson				
Jim Maenner				
Tom Mielnik				
Darrick Moe				
Ken Goldsmith				
Joe Knight				
The 31 Additional MRO				
Members				
Response: The SAR team agrees that this standard is very important. It is very important for this work to be done jointly so that both the reliability elements and				
the business elements can be addressed and modified as needed going forward. Accomplishing this separation allows both the Standards organizations to focus				
on improving the parts of the standard so that the resulting jointly published standard includes the best of both business and reliability requirements. The NERC				
NAESB Template Procedure for Joint Standards Development and Coordination was developed to ensure proper coordination for standards where there is no				
easy separation of business and reliability. The industry will benefit from using a joint effort to meet both reliability and business concerns. The approach includes				
joint collaboration and joint publication of the resulting standard if required. The joint collaboration ensures during development issues can be addressed jointly so that the resulting business practice and reliability standards work together. Using this process the result is that the jointly published standard includes the				
business practices and the reliability standards without need for separate documents.				
IESO, Ontario	iity Sta		We do not feel there is a reliability need for the proposed standard "change". We would contend that the change	
Dan Rochester		Х	provides confusion to a very important reliability process. In order to understand the process the standard and	
Dali Modifestel			the business practice are necessary.	
Response: The SAP team carees	that t	hie eta	ndard is very important. It is very important for this work to be done jointly so that both the reliability elements and	
the business elements can be addressed and modified as needed going forward. Accomplishing this separation allows both the Standards organizations to focus				
			the resulting jointly published standard includes the best of both business and reliability requirements. The NERC	
			ds Development and Coordination was developed to ensure proper coordination for standards where there is no	
easy separation of business and reliability. The industry will benefit from using a joint effort to meet both reliability and business concerns. The approach includes				
easy separation of business and reliability. The industry will benefit from using a joint effort to meet both reliability and business concerns. The approach includes				

joint collaboration and joint public	cation o	f the re	sulting standard if required. The joint collaboration ensures during development issues can be addressed jointly so
that the resulting business practi	ice and	reliabilit	ty standards work together. Using this process the result is that the jointly published standard includes the
	oility sta	ndards	without need for separate documents.
Public Service Commission of	Χ		
South Carolina			
Phil Riley			
John E. Howard			
David A. Wright			
Randy Mitchell			
Elizabeth B. Fleming			
G. O'Neal Hamilton			
Mignon L. Clyburn			
C. Robert Moseley			
Ohio Valley Electric Corp.	Х		
Scott R. Cunningham			
Joint Interchange Scheduling	Х		
Working Group			
Bert Gumm			
Troy Simpson			
Marilyn Franz			
Jim Hansen			
Kathee Downing			
Jim Eckelcamp			
Bob Harshbarger			
Paul Sorenson			
Bob Schwermann			
Bonita Smulski			
Taryn McPherson			
Salah Kitali			
Joel Mickey			
Andrew Burke			
Southern Company –	Х		N/A
Transmission			
Jim Busbin			
Marc Butts			
Jim Viikinsalo			
Operating Reliability Working	Х		
Group (ORWG)			
Robert Rhodes			
Dan Boezio			
Bob Cochran			
Mike Crouch			
Todd Fridley			
Mike Gammon			

Serhly Kotsan Robert Rhodes		
Southern Company Generation	Х	
Roman Carter		
Joel Dison		
Clifford Shepard		
Lucius Burris		
Steve Lowe		

# 2. Do you believe the TLR Subcommittee appropriately divided the elements of TLR business practices vs. TLR reliability requirements? If not, please explain in the comment area.

Summary	<b>Consideration:</b>
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Commenter	Yes	No	Comment
IESO, Ontario Dan Rochester		Х	The reliability and business practices within the TLR process are integrated to such an extent that the details need to remain contained within a single document for clarity. Concerns regarding the ability to effectively manage the model and the process with the current proposed split need to be addressed. The ability to follow developing market issues must also be retained. Steps 1.4.1, 1.4.1.1, 1.5, 1.5.1, 1.6, 1.7, 2.1.2, 2.2.2, 2.4.2, 2.5.2, 3.2.1.2, 3.3.1.2, 7.1, are reliability related and should remain in the standard. The dynamic schedule part of 1.6.6 was added to the Standard in June of this year with approval of 100% of the ballot body. It should remain as part of this standard.
has options to address congest	ion and	those o	re performed to achieve expected results. It is only one method to achieve those results. If a Reliability Coordinator options are prioritized in order of economic preference then the RC is making choices that would be appropriate which included members of both reliability and business agreed in an open process that these items were
CP9 Reliability Standards Working Group Guy Zito Kathleen Goodman		Х	- Section 2.6 and 2.7 in the original standard defined step-by-step actions the Operator is to take under TLR Levels 5a and 5b. These actions have been removed and currently reside in the proposed NAESB standard. It is not appropriate for a business practice standard to define actions to be taken by a Reliability Coordinator in real-time operations to resolve a reliability issue.
Khaqan Khan Vinod (Bob) Kotecha			The need for a TLR is in response to a problem with reliability on the system. The Operator must be presented with all the information that is contained in both the proposed NERC and NAESB standards in order to issue that TLR. If the operator does not know what transactions are available in any given category, they do not know what TLR level is needed to resolve the situation. NPCC participating members do not agree with the assertion that the information contained in the NAESB standard does not impact reliability.
			Some aspects of the original IRO-006 are 'business practices,' and that the completed effort generally meets the original intent of splitting the business practice and reliability components. However, seeing the resulting split, it is clear that these business practices have a direct impact on reliability and they should be maintained within one single standard to prevent confusion and conflicts. Also, since the fundamental practice for defining the priorities and treatment of transactions under each TLR level is consistent with the FERC pro-forma tariff, there is minimal subjectivity involved in the business practices that are included in the original NERC standard.
			Steps 1.4.1, 1.4.1.1, 1.5, 1.5.1, 1.6, 1.7, 2.1.2, 2.2.2, 2.4.2, 2.5.2, 3.2.1.2, 3.3.1.2, 7.1, are reliability related and

Response: The Reliability Coordinator makes a selection of what relief is needed and the tool which uses the product type to identify what is available for adjustment then makes the choice and applies the method to provide the relief requested. The TLR Task force which included members of both reliability and business agreed in an open process that these items were business practices.

with 100% of the ballot body approval, it should remain as part of this standard.

should remain in the standard. The dynamic schedule part of 1.6.6 was added to the Standard in June of this year

The TLR procedure is established to manage congestion of the grid it is designed to do so with both reliability and business elements considered. The standard will be jointly published and the operation for the industry will be the same or better than it has been using the joint standards development process. The same information or better will be provided as what is provided today.

The expectation is that this standard will be jointly published so that all entities required to use the standard have one common procedure to use.					
Operating Reliability Working		Х	We feel that the division between business practices and reliability standards may not have gone far enough. The		
Group (ORWG)			reliability standards should focus on establishing the criteria for initiation of different TLR levels and the required		
Robert Rhodes			timeframes for relief. Business practices should focus on how the curtailments are executed to achieve the relief		
Dan Boezio			levels in the timeframes required by the reliability standard.		
Bob Cochran					
Mike Crouch					
Todd Fridley					
Mike Gammon					
Serhly Kotsan					
Robert Rhodes					
	<u> </u>		The state of the s		
			eparating the business practices. The division between NERC reliability standards and NAESB business practices een NERC and NAESB. The drafting team will consider and discuss this comment during Phase I of the drafting		
ISO NE		Х	- Section 2.6 and 2.7 in the original standard defined step-by-step actions the Operator is to take under TLR		
Cheryl Mendrala		^	Levels 5a and 5b. These actions have been removed and currently reside in the proposed NAESB standard. It is		
			not appropriate for a business practice standard to define actions to be taken by a Reliability Coordinator in real-		
			time operations to resolve a reliability issue.		
			The need for a TLR is in response to a problem with reliability on the system. There is no doubt that the Operator		
			must be presented with all the information that is contained in both the proposed NERC and NAESB standards in		
			order to issue that TLR. If the operator does not know what transactions are available in any given category, they		
			do not know what TLR level is needed to resolve the situation. Therefore, we cannot agree with the assertion that the information contained in the NAESB standard does not impact reliability.		
			We agree that some aspects of the original IRO-006 are 'business practices,' and agree that the completed effort		
			generally meets the original intent of splitting the business practice and reliability components. However, seeing		
			the resulting split, it is clear that these business practices have a direct impact on reliability and we believe they		
			should be maintained within one single standard to prevent confusion and conflicts. Also, since the fundamental		
			practice for defining the priorities and treatment of transactions under each TLR level is consistent with the FERC		
			pro-forma tariff, there is minimal subjectivity involved in the business practices that are included in the original		
			NERC standard.		
The Reliability Coordinator make	es a sele	ection	of what relief is needed and the tool which uses the product type to identify what is available for adjustment then		
makes the choice and applies the method to provide the relief requested. The TLR Task force which included members of both reliability and business agreed					
that these items were business practices.					
,					
The TLR procedure is established to manage congestion of the grid it is designed to do so with both reliability and business elements considered. The standard					
	will be jointly published and the operation for the industry will be the same or better than it has been using the joint standards development process. The same				
information or better will be provi					
	dard wil	l be <u>j</u> oi	ntly published so that all entities required to use the standard have one common procedure to use.		
Entergy Services,		Х	A complete response to this question is inappropriate at this time.		
Transmission			It appears that IRO-006 will be divided into 3 major documents: NERC TLR reliability standards, NAESB business		
Ed Davis			practices, and the IDC Reference Documentation. The answer to this question will require a detailed comparison		
Rick Riley			of all three documents with respect to the existing IRO-006. We do not have the NAESB document in front of us		
KICK KIIEY			or all tillee documents with respect to the existing IRO-006. We do not have the INAESB document in front of us		

# Consideration of Comments on Draft 1 of SAR for General Update to IRO-006 Reliability Coordination — Transmission Loading Relief

Jay Zimmerman			in order to make that detailed comparison. In addition, it does not appear that a detailed comparison of the three
George Bartlett			documents has been requested since the SAR request states in the last paragraph that the development effort
James Case			will begin by assessing for completeness and accuracy the revised Attachment 1.
Bill Aycock			
Melinda Montgomery			
Narinder Saini			
Maurice Casadaban			
			C NAESB Template Procedure for Joint Standards Development and Coordination. The joint standards
			of all required documents for industry to comment upon. The NERC NAESB Template Procedure for Joint
			s developed to ensure proper coordination for standards where there is no easy separation of business and
			a joint effort to meet both reliability and business concerns. The approach includes joint collaboration and joint
			I. The joint collaboration ensures during development issues can be addressed jointly so that the resulting business
			r. Using this process the result is that the jointly published standard includes the business practices and the
reliability standards without need	tor sep		
AEP		X	The two documents are overlapping. Same statements in both documents.
Raj Rana			
Response: No response required			
Midwest Reliability		Х	Steps 1.4.1, 1.4.1.1, 1.5, 1.5.1, 1.6, 1.7, 2.1.2, 2.2.2, 2.4.2, 2.5.2, 3.2.1.2, 3.3.1.2, 7.1, are reliability related and
Organization			should remain in the standard. The dynamic schedule part of 1.6.6 was added to the Standard in June of this
Alan Boesch			year with 100% of the ballot body approval, it should remain as part of this standard.
Terry Bilke			
Robert Coish			
Dennis Florom			
Todd Gosnell			
Wayne Guttormson			
Jim Maenner			
Tom Mielnik			
Darrick Moe			
Ken Goldsmith			
Joe Knight			
The 31 Additional MRO			
Members			
			e performed to achieve expected results. It is only one method to achieve those results. If a Reliability Coordinator
			options are prioritized in order of economic preference then the RC is making choices that would be appropriate
	LR Tas	sk force	e which included members of both reliability and business practice sides agreed that these items were business
practices in an open process.			
			of what relief is needed and the tool which uses the product type to identify what is available for adjustment then
makes the choice and applies the	metho	od to p	rovide the relief requested.
Southern Company –	X		N/A
Transmission			
Jim Busbin			
Marc Butts			
Jim Viikinsalo			
Joint Interchange Scheduling	Χ		

# Consideration of Comments on Draft 1 of SAR for General Update to IRO-006 Reliability Coordination — Transmission Loading Relief

Working Croup		I	
Working Group Bert Gumm			
Troy Simpson			
Marilyn Franz			
Jim Hansen			
Kathee Downing			
Jim Eckelcamp			
Bob Harshbarger			
Paul Sorenson			
Bob Schwermann			
Bonita Smulski			
Taryn McPherson			
Salah Kitali			
Joel Mickey			
Andrew Burke			
Public Service Commission of	Х		
South Carolina			
Phil Riley			
John E. Howard			
David A. Wright			
Randy Mitchell			
Elizabeth B. Fleming			
G. O'Neal Hamilton			
Mignon L. Clyburn			
C. Robert Moseley			
Ohio Valley Electric Corp.	Х		
Scott R. Cunningham			
Southern Company Generation	Х		
Roman Carter			
Joel Dison			
Clifford Shepard			
Lucius Burris			
Steve Lowe			

# 3. Do you believe there are still elements of TLR business practices that remain in the proposed TLR reliability requirements? If not, please explain in the comment area.

Commenter	Yes	No	Comment			
Ohio Valley Electric Corp.	Х		At times, RTO ramp limitations are invoked when TLR curtailments occur. This issue is not covered in the			
Scott R. Cunningham			standard, but seems to be related to a business practice, rather than a reliability issue. Perhaps the ramp			
			limitation should be waived or adjusted if the limitation is caused by the curtailments that occur with the TLR.			
Response: The effort in this SAR	is dev	oted to	correctly separating the business practices. The drafting team will consider the modifications suggested in phase			
IV of the SAR.						
Operating Reliability Working	X		Everything in the proposed Attachment 1 - IRO-006-0 from Section 3 to the end of Attachment 1, including			
Group (ORWG)			Appendices A and B, should be removed from the reliability standard and incorporated into the TLR Business			
Robert Rhodes			Practices document. This material gets into the internal workings of the tool itself rather than dealing with the			
Dan Boezio			overall guiding principle of providing, and maintaining, relief within a specific timeframe.			
Bob Cochran						
Mike Crouch						
Todd Fridley						
Mike Gammon						
Serhly Kotsan						
Robert Rhodes						
	Response: The effort in this SAR is devoted to correctly separating the business practices. The drafting team will consider the modifications suggested in phase					
			rocedure have been identified by the TLR Taskforce as having both Reliability and business practices within them.			
As the resulting standard will be	oublish	ed join	tly all items are expected to be retained and the distinction of the items as reliability or as business practices will be			
identified.						
Entergy Services,	Χ		The NERC TLR reliability standard part of this documentation appears to be all reliability related. However, the			
Transmission			IDC Reference Document appears to have significant business practice elements contained in it.			
Ed Davis						
Rick Riley						
Jay Zimmerman						
George Bartlett						
James Case						
Bill Aycock						
Melinda Montgomery						
Narinder Saini						
Maurice Casadaban						
Response: The effort in this SAR	is dev	oted to	correctly separating the business practices. The Attachment 1 steps of the procedure have been identified by the			
	TLR Taskforce as having both Reliability and business practices within them. As the resulting standard will be published jointly all items are expected to be					
retained and the distinction of the items as reliability or as business practices will be identified. The IDC reference document is not part of the standard.						
However, you may wish to contact	ct the II	OC Wo	orking Group to discuss how your suggestions could be included in future changes to the IDC Reference Document.			
AEP	Χ		We believe that items like firm/non-firm transactions types, TLR levels etc. should be taken out of the reliability			
Raj Rana			portion of this standard. These items should be included in the NAESB portion. The reliability portion should only			
			address the needed relief amount on constrained facilities and the time under which the relief should be provided			
			in order to maintain security of the interconnected network.			
Response: The Attachment 1 steps of the procedure have been identified by the TLR Taskforce as having both Reliability and business practices within them. As						

Iso NE
Cheryl Mendrala  Response: See answer to questions to comment.  CP9 Reliability Standards Working Group Guy Zito Kathleen Goodman Khaqan Khan Vinod (Bob) Kotecha  Response: See answer to questions to comment.  Southern Company - Transmission Jim Busbin Marc Butts Jim Viikinsalo  Joint Interchange Scheduling Working Group Bert Gumm
Response: See answer to questions to comment.  CP9 Reliability Standards Working Group Guy Zito Kathleen Goodman Khaqan Khan Vinod (Bob) Kotecha  Response: See answer to questions to comment.  Southern Company – Transmission Jim Busbin Marc Butts Jim Viikinsalo  Joint Interchange Scheduling Working Group Bert Gumm  X See response to question 2.  X N/A  N/A  N/A
CP9 Reliability Standards Working Group Guy Zito Kathleen Goodman Khaqan Khan Vinod (Bob) Kotecha  Response: See answer to questions to comment. Southern Company — Transmission Jim Busbin Marc Butts Jim Viikinsalo  Joint Interchange Scheduling Working Group Bert Gumm  X See response to question 2.  X N/A  Vinod (Bub) Kotecha  X N/A  X N/A  X N/A
Working Group Guy Zito Kathleen Goodman Khaqan Khan Vinod (Bob) Kotecha  Response: See answer to questions to comment. Southern Company - Transmission Jim Busbin Marc Butts Jim Viikinsalo  Joint Interchange Scheduling Working Group Bert Gumm  Working Group Bert Gumm
Guy Zito Kathleen Goodman Khaqan Khan Vinod (Bob) Kotecha  Response: See answer to questions to comment. Southern Company – Transmission Jim Busbin Marc Butts Jim Viikinsalo  Joint Interchange Scheduling Working Group Bert Gumm
Kathleen Goodman Khaqan Khan Vinod (Bob) Kotecha  Response: See answer to questions to comment.  Southern Company –  Transmission Jim Busbin Marc Butts Jim Viikinsalo  Joint Interchange Scheduling Working Group Bert Gumm
Khaqan Khan Vinod (Bob) Kotecha  Response: See answer to questions to comment.  Southern Company — X N/A  Transmission Jim Busbin Marc Butts Jim Viikinsalo  Joint Interchange Scheduling Working Group Bert Gumm  Kansansansansansansansansansansansansansa
Vinod (Bob) Kotecha  Response: See answer to questions to comment.  Southern Company –
Response: See answer to questions to comment.  Southern Company –
Southern Company – X N/A  Transmission Jim Busbin Marc Butts Jim Viikinsalo  Joint Interchange Scheduling Working Group Bert Gumm  X N/A  X N/A  X N/A  X N/A
Transmission Jim Busbin Marc Butts Jim Viikinsalo  Joint Interchange Scheduling Working Group Bert Gumm  X
Jim Busbin Marc Butts Jim Viikinsalo  Joint Interchange Scheduling Working Group Bert Gumm  X
Marc Butts Jim Viikinsalo  Joint Interchange Scheduling Working Group Bert Gumm  X
Jim Viikinsalo  Joint Interchange Scheduling Working Group Bert Gumm  X
Joint Interchange Scheduling Working Group Bert Gumm  X
Working Group  Bert Gumm
Working Group  Bert Gumm
Bert Gumm Bert Gumm
Troy Simpson
Marilyn Franz
Jim Hansen
Kathee Downing
Jim Eckelcamp
Bob Harshbarger
Paul Sorenson Paul Sorenson
Bob Schwermann
Bonita Smulski
Taryn McPherson
Salah Kitali
Joel Mickey
Andrew Burke
Midwest Reliability X
Organization
Alan Boesch
Terry Bilke
Robert Coish
Dennis Florom
Todd Gosnell
Wayne Guttormson
Jim Maenner
Tom Mielnik
Darrick Moe

# Consideration of Comments on Draft 1 of SAR for General Update to IRO-006 Reliability Coordination — Transmission Loading Relief

Ken Goldsmith		
Joe Knight		
The 31 Additional MRO		
Members		
Public Service Commission of	X	
South Carolina		
Phil Riley		
John E. Howard		
David A. Wright		
Randy Mitchell		
Elizabeth B. Fleming		
G. O'Neal Hamilton		
Mignon L. Clyburn		
C. Robert Moseley		
IESO, Ontario	X	
Dan Rochester		
Southern Company Generation	Χ	
Roman Carter		
Joel Dison		
Clifford Shepard		
Lucius Burris		
Steve Lowe		

# 4. Do you believe there are still elements of TLR reliability requirements that remain in the proposed TLR business practices? If not, please explain in the comment area.

Commenter	Yes	No	Comment
AEP			No comments. The TLR business practices document is not available.
Raj Rana		ľ	
Operating Reliability Working	Х		Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.1.1 and 3.2.1.2 should be moved to the reliability standard since they deal more with how and
Group (ORWG)	!	ŀ	why a Level 2 TLR is initiated than with the internal workings of the IDC.
Robert Rhodes	!	ŀ	
Dan Boezio	!	ŀ	
Bob Cochran	,	ŀ	
Mike Crouch	,	ŀ	
Todd Fridley	,	ŀ	
Mike Gammon	,	ŀ	
Serhly Kotsan	,	ŀ	
Robert Rhodes	,	ŀ	
			members of both reliability and business agreed that these items were business practices. This could be modified
through the joint NERC / NAESB	develo	pment	process, which would determine whether a new SAR is needed.
ISO NE	X	ŀ	See response to question 2.
Cheryl Mendrala		ľ	
Response: See answer to question	ons to c	comme	ent.
CP9 Reliability Standards	Х		See response to question 2.
Working Group	!	ŀ	
Guy Zito	,	ŀ	
Kathleen Goodman	,	ŀ	
Khaqan Khan	,	ŀ	
Vinod (Bob) Kotecha		ľ	
Response: See answer to question	ons to c	comme	ent.
Midwest Reliability	Χ		See comments in question 2.
Organization	,	ŀ	
Alan Boesch	,	ŀ	
Terry Bilke	,	ŀ	
Robert Coish	,	ŀ	
Dennis Florom	!	ŀ	
Todd Gosnell	,	ŀ	
Wayne Guttormson	'		
Jim Maenner			
Tom Mielnik	'		
Darrick Moe	'		
Ken Goldsmith	'		
Joe Knight	'		
The 31 Additional MRO	'		
Members		l r	

Response: See answer to questions to comment.									
IESO, Ontario		Х	See comments in question 2.						
Dan Rochester									
Response: See answer to questions to comment.									
Entergy Services,		X	We can not answer this question since we do not have the NAESB proposal TLR business practices in this						
Transmission			package.						
Ed Davis									
Rick Riley									
Jay Zimmerman									
George Bartlett									
James Case									
Bill Aycock									
Melinda Montgomery									
Narinder Saini									
Maurice Casadaban									
Response: Please see http://ww	w.naes	b.org/p	odf2/r06002 revised.doc on the NAESB website.						
Southern Company -		Х	N/A						
Transmission									
Jim Busbin									
Marc Butts									
Jim Viikinsalo									
Joint Interchange Scheduling		Х							
Working Group									
Bert Gumm									
Troy Simpson									
Marilyn Franz									
Jim Hansen									
Kathee Downing									
Jim Eckelcamp									
Bob Harshbarger									
Paul Sorenson									
Bob Schwermann									
Bonita Smulski									
Taryn McPherson									
Salah Kitali									
Joel Mickey									
Andrew Burke									
Public Service Commission of		Х							
South Carolina									
Phil Riley									
John E. Howard									
David A. Wright									
Randy Mitchell									

# Consideration of Comments on Draft 1 of SAR for General Update to IRO-006 Reliability Coordination — Transmission Loading Relief

Elizabeth B. Fleming G. O'Neal Hamilton Mignon L. Clyburn C. Robert Moseley		
Ohio Valley Electric Corp. Scott R. Cunningham	Х	
Southern Company Generation Roman Carter Joel Dison Clifford Shepard Lucius Burris Steve Lowe	X	

# 5. Do you have any other comments on these proposed changes?

Commenter	Yes	No	Comment						
Southern Company –	Х		My only concern with the splitting of reliability requirements and business practices is how they will be managed						
Transmission			and/or coordinated in the future. I'm not sure what value is added to the reliability of the grid by now having our						
Jim Busbin			grid operators manage their respective systems with a NERC manual in one hand and a NAESB manual in the						
Marc Butts			other. Right now the two documents are in synch with one another; however, as we move forward in time, what						
Jim Viikinsalo			will be the process for conflict resolution between the two?						
			correctly separating the business practices. The business practices will be filed by the NAESB organization and						
			rganization. The two will be jointly published so that all entities responsible for complying with the procedure have						
			steps of the procedure have been identified by the TLR Taskforce as having both Reliability and business						
		tandar	d will be published jointly all items are expected to be retained and the distinction of the items as reliability or as						
business practices will be identi		1							
Operating Reliability Working	X		Section 1.5.1 of Attachment 1 refers to treatment of Interchange Transactions not in the IDC in accordance with						
Group (ORWG)			NAESB business practices, but we could not find any reference to this treatment in the TLR business practices.						
Robert Rhodes									
Dan Boezio									
Bob Cochran									
Mike Crouch Todd Fridley									
Mike Gammon									
Sorbly Kotcon									
			misinterpretation of the requirement. The requirement in section 1.51 (now 1.6.1) was intended to require reliability						
Response: This comment appear coordinators to insure all transa			ose not in the IDC, to abide by the NERC and NAESB TLR standard.						
Response: This comment appear									
Response: This comment appear coordinators to insure all transations.  ISO NE	ctions, e		ose not in the IDC, to abide by the NERC and NAESB TLR standard.  Recommend restoring the reference to RCIS tool in 1.4. That reference was eliminated when the old 1.4.1 was						
Response: This comment appear coordinators to insure all transations.  ISO NE	ctions, e		Recommend restoring the reference to RCIS tool in 1.4. That reference was eliminated when the old 1.4.1 was removed.  - The old 1.5.1 was removed. There's a general statement added to 1.2 that says "In addition, a Reliability Coordinator may implement other NERC-approved procedures to request relief to mitigate any other transmission constraints as necessary to preserve the reliability of the system." But, that phrase does not seem to capture the						
Response: This comment appear coordinators to insure all transations.  ISO NE	ctions, e		Recommend restoring the reference to RCIS tool in 1.4. That reference was eliminated when the old 1.4.1 was removed.  - The old 1.5.1 was removed. There's a general statement added to 1.2 that says "In addition, a Reliability Coordinator may implement other NERC-approved procedures to request relief to mitigate any other transmission constraints as necessary to preserve the reliability of the system." But, that phrase does not seem to capture the same intent as the previous 1.5.1 wording.  - Section 1.5.3 the numbering on this section is very confusing. Suggest the following:  1.5.3.1. Causes of questionable IDC results may include: (1) Missing Interchange transactions that are known to contribute to the Constraint, (2) Significant change in transmission system topology, or (3) TDF matrix error.						
Response: This comment appear coordinators to insure all transations.  ISO NE	ctions, e		Recommend restoring the reference to RCIS tool in 1.4. That reference was eliminated when the old 1.4.1 was removed.  - The old 1.5.1 was removed. There's a general statement added to 1.2 that says "In addition, a Reliability Coordinator may implement other NERC-approved procedures to request relief to mitigate any other transmission constraints as necessary to preserve the reliability of the system." But, that phrase does not seem to capture the same intent as the previous 1.5.1 wording.  - Section 1.5.3 the numbering on this section is very confusing. Suggest the following:  1.5.3.1. Causes of questionable IDC results may include: (1) Missing Interchange transactions that are known to contribute to the Constraint, (2) Significant change in transmission system topology, or (3) TDF matrix						
Response: This comment appear coordinators to insure all transations.  ISO NE	ctions, e		Recommend restoring the reference to RCIS tool in 1.4. That reference was eliminated when the old 1.4.1 was removed.  - The old 1.5.1 was removed. There's a general statement added to 1.2 that says "In addition, a Reliability Coordinator may implement other NERC-approved procedures to request relief to mitigate any other transmission constraints as necessary to preserve the reliability of the system." But, that phrase does not seem to capture the same intent as the previous 1.5.1 wording.  - Section 1.5.3 the numbering on this section is very confusing. Suggest the following:  1.5.3.1. Causes of questionable IDC results may include: (1) Missing Interchange transactions that are known to contribute to the Constraint, (2) Significant change in transmission system topology, or (3) TDF matrix error.  1.5.3.2 Impacts of questionable IDC results may include: (1) relief that would have no effect on, or						
Response: This comment appear coordinators to insure all transations.  ISO NE	ctions, e		Recommend restoring the reference to RCIS tool in 1.4. That reference was eliminated when the old 1.4.1 was removed.  - The old 1.5.1 was removed. There's a general statement added to 1.2 that says "In addition, a Reliability Coordinator may implement other NERC-approved procedures to request relief to mitigate any other transmission constraints as necessary to preserve the reliability of the system." But, that phrase does not seem to capture the same intent as the previous 1.5.1 wording.  - Section 1.5.3 the numbering on this section is very confusing. Suggest the following:  1.5.3.1. Causes of questionable IDC results may include: (1) Missing Interchange transactions that are known to contribute to the Constraint, (2) Significant change in transmission system topology, or (3) TDF matrix error.  1.5.3.2 Impacts of questionable IDC results may include: (1) relief that would have no effect on, or aggravate the constraint or (2) that would initiate a constraint elsewhere.  1.5.3.3. If other Reliability Coordinators are involved in the TLR event, all impacted Reliability						

		- Suggest that Section 3.2 include a reference to the fact that transactions submitted after the XX:25 deadline will put on HOLD.
		- Are Section 3.3.3 and Section 3.4.3 referring back to the deadline defined in 3.2? If so, that section should be referenced.
		- Text in 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.2 are referring to the same process for reallocation and should use the same terminology. Suggest 3.3.1.1 text be changed to "At XX:25 a reallocation will be performed for the following hour to maintain the target flow identified for the current hour".
		- Text in 3.4.1.1 and 3.4.2 are referring to the same process for reallocation and should use the same terminology. Suggest 3.4.1.1 text be changed to "At XX:25 a reallocation will be performed for the following hour to maintain the target flow identified for the current hour".
		- The section notation of Appendix B should be modified. The Section numbering shown in the index is not how the headings are titled in the Sections. Also, Section F and Section G should not be 5.1 and 5.2; they should be at the highest index level.
		General Comment: There have been changes to the congestion management process over the last few years that involve the use of Market information by the IDC. Any new standards addressing the TLR process and the IDC, whether in NERC or NAESB, should consider addressing the current information available to the IDC and include some mention of that information in that standard development.
		General Comment: One other practical concern that has not been addressed is the ownership, impact and funding of the IDC tool that automates the 'business practices' of implementing a TLR for the Operator. The split of the original NERC IRO-006 should not be adopted until this issue is addressed and resolved.
		aged from the joint standards development process and there is no anticipated change in the funding or contract e team will review the changes to the standard since version 0 split was determined and make incremental changes as
The reference was moved to NA	ESR RI	P 1.4 and changed to refer to generic tool instead of RCIS specifically. The standard will determine the best way to format
and number the steps in the prod		
Entergy Services, Transmission Ed Davis	Х	The SAR contains the statement that the urgent action revision to Attachment 1 addressing dynamic schedules will be incorporated into the NAESB business practices. We suggest starting with IRO-006-1, rather than with IRO-006-0.
Rick Riley		Please delete all references to IRO-006-0 (and IRO-006-1) in headers, footers, titles, etc. This new document will
Jay Zimmerman		result in a new version of IRO006. This current draft is not version 0 or 1.
George Bartlett		Please delete all references to adoption by the NERC Board of Trustees, Effective Date, and all dates because
James Case		the document we are viewing has not been adopted by the BOT and does not have an Effective Date.
Bill Aycock		Please provide a redline version showing the draft changes to IRO-006-1. This redline would make review and
Melinda Montgomery Narinder Saini		comment much easier for commenters.  We appreciate the development of the matrix and would probably find it useful for keeping track of the disposition
Maurice Casadaban		of each requirement in the original IRO-006. However, in its current form we do not understand which columns
		relate to which documents and the row designations are not clearly understood.
Response: We agree and feel all	chang	ges have been made but will review for any additional changes required.

1. We request that the scope of this SAR be expanded to include resolving the reloading of curtailed transactions above their reliability limit by an entity other than the initiating entity or above any pre-existing reliability or market

Joint Interchange Scheduling Working Group

Χ

Bert Gumm Troy Simpson Marilyn Franz Jim Hansen Kathee Downing Jim Eckelcamp Bob Harshbarger Paul Sorenson Bob Schwermann Bonita Smulski Taryn McPherson Salah Kitali Joel Mickey Andrew Burke		profiles. 2. We also request that the scope of the SAR be expanded to include standards for when curtailments may be denied and when curtailments may be issued. 1 - There have been several instances where a curtailment has been issued and then been automatically or manually reloaded above the reliability limit. The automatic reload problem created by the IDC has been resolved by CO-148, automatic reload by other back office applications has not been corrected, nor have manual adjustments. There are several options available for correcting this problem. This should be addressed by specifying requirements and performance measures in the TLR standard and may also be addressed through NAESB business practices and modifications to the e-Tag specification. Also, any pre-existing curtailment levels are lost. JISWG recommends that the entity who has issued the curtailment be the only entity able to authorize the reload. When the reload occurs the energy profile should be limited to the next lowest reliability limit or market adjustment profile. 2- Under normal circumstances, a curtailment (issued for reliability reasons) should not be denied. However, there are some limited circumstances where a curtailment should be denied. For example, if a curtailment comes in and the generator cannot meet the ramp requirements, then the curtailment could be denied and would be reissued for the next scheduling interval. This ensures that the tags reflect actual conditions. In other cases, curtailments are sometimes issued when PSE's cannot make their market level adjustments prior to cutoff. The TLR standard should address those specific reasons for denying a curtailment. Reliability is compromised when curtailments are denied for non-reliability reasons. Reliability may also be compromised when curtailments are issued for non-reliability reasons. Reliability may also be compromised when curtailments are issued for non-reliability reasons.
		the TLR standard addressing these issues. the modifications suggested in phase IV of the SAR and coordinated with NAESB, where appropriate. JISWG may be
asked to provide assistance . AEP Raj Rana	X	Use of proxy flowgates by the reliability coordinators must be prohibited. This practice must be explicitly addressed in this standard because, the use of proxy flowgates not only will result in mis-allocation of corrective actions, but at worst could even result in actions being taken that actually increase flows on the limiting element, instead of decreasing them.
Response:		
consideration of this topic to	the SAR.	evaluation of this topic. The drafting team suggests waiting for the results of the ORS review before adding
Midwest Reliability Organization Alan Boesch Terry Bilke Robert Coish Dennis Florom Todd Gosnell Wayne Guttormson Jim Maenner	X	It was very difficult to review the changes to the standard without a redline copy. In order to perform our review we made a redline of the original standard. The MRO does not support this modification. The proposed change provides confusion to a very important reliability process. Also the proposed standard references a NAESB standard which is inconsistent with the NERC Standards Process Manual which says "All mandatory requirements of a reliability standard shall be within an element of the standard. Supporting documents to aid in the implementation of a standard may be referenced by the standard but are not part of the standard itself."  There are mandatory parts of the proposed standard in the NAESB business practice and are necessary for the successful implementation of this reliability standard. With the two documents being modified by separate entities there is a good chance that the documents will not be coordinated and kept in synchronization when changes are

Joe Knight										
The 31 Additional MRO										
Members										
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	development process will require publication of all required documents for industry to comment upon.									
There will be one jointly publish	here will be one jointly published document which covers both the standards and the joint standards development process will address the synchronization									
issues mentioned.										
The NERC NAESB Template F	The NERC NAESB Template Procedure for Joint Standards Development and Coordination was developed to ensure proper coordination for standards where									
there is no easy separation of I	ousiness	and reliability. The industry will benefit from using a joint effort to meet both reliability and business concerns. The								
approach includes joint collabo	ration an	d joint publication of the resulting standard if required. The joint collaboration ensures during development issues can be								
addressed jointly so that the re	sulting b	usiness practice and reliability standards work together. Using this process the result is that the jointly published standard								
includes the business practices	s and the	reliability standards without need for separate documents.								
Ohio Valley Electric Corp.	Х	The use of proxy flowgates is not mentioned at all in the proposed standard. The use of proxy flowgates should								
Scott R. Cunningham		not be allowed, except in very unusual circumstances. If use of a proxy flowgate is necessary, such use should								
		be justified and approval from all affected parties should be obtained.								
Response:										
A NERC ORS task force is con	ducting a	an evaluation of this topic. The drafting team suggests waiting for the results of the ORS review before adding								
		or an analysis of the terminal section of the secti								
	consideration of this topic to the SAR.									
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Response: This has been corrected by adopting the NERC NAESB Template Procedure for Joint Standards Development and Coordination. The joint standards development process will require publication of all required documents for industry to comment upon. There will be one jointly published document which covers both the standards and the joint standards development process will address the synchronization issues

mentioned. The NERC NAESB Template Procedure for Joint Standards Development and Coordination was developed to ensure proper coordination for standards where there is no easy separation of business and reliability. The industry will benefit from using a joint effort to meet both reliability and business concerns. The approach includes joint collaboration and joint publication of the resulting standard if required. The joint collaboration ensures during development issues can be addressed jointly so that the resulting business practice and reliability standards work together. Using this process the result is that the jointly published standard includes the business practices and the reliability standards without need for separate documents.

The IDC is the tool that specifies how the Business Practice and the Reliability adjustments are made. The RC specifies how much relief is required and the tool combines the logic based on business practice rules to identify how much relief in each transaction should be distributed. NERC will work jointly to provide training when needed by using the committees and then by providing the necessary materials so the industry can train their staff on

Southern Company Generation	Χ	As NAESB and NERC standards are approved and implemented which require close coordination between the
Roman Carter		two organizations, the need for a common "Operations Manual" may become necessary for System Operators.
Joel Dison		
Clifford Shepard		
Lucius Burris		
Steve Lowe		

Response: The effort in this SAR is devoted to correctly separating the business practices. The scope will not be to modify the recently approved TLR standard. The business practices will be filed by the NAESB organization and the reliability items will be filed by the NERC organization. The two will be jointly published so that all entities responsible for complying with the procedure have both parts in one document. The Attachment 1 steps of the procedure have been identified by the TLR Taskforce as having both Reliability and business practices within them. As the resulting standard will be published jointly all items are expected to be retained and the distinction of the items as reliability or as business practices will be identified.

retained and the distinction of th	retained and the distinction of the items as reliability or as business practices will be identified.							
CP9 Reliability Standards Working Group Guy Zito	X	This is an important process that requires a complete understanding of the impact of separating the business practice from the reliability concepts. It is not clear that the current proposed document split will retain the integrity of the TLR process. The potential negative impact of degrading the RC's ability to manage loop flow						
Kathleen Goodman Khaqan Khan Vinod (Bob) Kotecha		dictates that any change in documentation and responsibility must proceed carefully. NPCC participating Members believe the proposed change provides confusion to a very important reliability process. There are mandatory parts of the proposed standard in the NAESB business practice that are necessary for the successful implementation of this reliability standard. With the two documents being modified by separate entities there is a good chance that the documents will not be coordinated and kept in synchronization when changes are made.						
		Recommend restoring the reference to RCIS tool in 1.4. That reference was eliminated when the old 1.4.1 was removed.						
		- The old 1.5.1 was removed. There's a general statement added to 1.2 that says "In addition, a Reliability Coordinator may implement other NERC-approved procedures to request relief to mitigate any other transmission constraints as necessary to preserve the reliability of the system." But, that phrase does not seem to capture the same intent as the previous 1.5.1 wording.						
		- Section 1.5.3 the numbering on this section is very confusing. Suggest the following:						
		1.5.3.1. Causes of questionable IDC results may include: (1) Missing Interchange transactions that are known to contribute to the Constraint, (2) Significant change in transmission system topology, or (3) TDF matrix error.						
		1.5.3.2 Impacts of questionable IDC results may include: (1) relief that would have no effect on, or aggravate the constraint or (2) that would initiate a constraint elsewhere.						
		1.5.3.3. If other Reliability Coordinators are involved in the TLR event, all impacted Reliability Coordinators shall						

be in agreement before any adjustments to the relief request list are made. - Title of Section 2 should be changed to be only "Transmission Loading Relief (TLR) Levels." - Section 3 is missing section 3.1. - Suggest that Section 3.2 include a reference to the fact that transactions submitted after the XX:25 deadline will put on HOLD. - Are Section 3.3.3 and Section 3.4.3 referring back to the deadline defined in 3.2? If so, that section should be referenced. - Text in 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.2 are referring to the same process for reallocation and should use the same terminology. Suggest 3.3.1.1 text be changed to "At XX:25 a reallocation will be performed for the following hour to maintain the target flow identified for the current hour". - Text in 3.4.1.1 and 3.4.2 are referring to the same process for reallocation and should use the same terminology. Suggest 3.4.1.1 text be changed to "At XX:25 a reallocation will be performed for the following hour to maintain the target flow identified for the current hour". - The section notation of Appendix B should be modified. The Section numbering shown in the index is not how the headings are titled in the Sections. Also, Section F and Section G should not be 5.1 and 5.2; they should be at the highest index level. General Comment: There have been changes to the congestion management process over the last few years that involve the use of Market information by the IDC. Any new standards addressing the TLR process and the IDC, whether in NERC or NAESB, should consider addressing the current information available to the IDC and include some mention of that information in that standard development. In addition, Operator training issues, as well as the ownership and funding of the IDC tool should be considered in this evaluation before such a significant step is taken on a standard that is fundamental to the reliability of the Eastern Interconnection. General Comment: One other practical concern that has not been addressed is the ownership, impact and funding of the IDC tool that automates the 'business practices' of implementing a TLR for the Operator. The split of the original NERC IRO-006 should not be adopted until this issue is addressed and resolved. Response: The NERC NAESB Template Procedure for Joint Standards Development and Coordination was developed to ensure proper coordination for standards where there is no easy separation of business and reliability. The industry will benefit from using a joint effort to meet both reliability and business concerns. The approach includes joint collaboration and joint publication of the resulting standard if required. The joint collaboration ensures during development issues can be addressed jointly so that the resulting business practice and reliability standards work together. Using this process the result is that the jointly published standard includes the business practices and the reliability standards without need for separate documents. Going forward the changes will be managed from the joint standards development process and there is no anticipated change in the funding or contract agreements to modify the software. The team will review the changes to the standard since version 0 split was determined and make incremental changes as appropriate. The reference was moved to NAESB BP 1.4 and changed to refer to generic tool instead of RCIS specifically. The standard will determine the best way to format and number the steps in the procedure jointly. Public Service Commission of Χ South Carolina Phil Riley John E. Howard David A. Wright

Consideration of Comm	nents on C	Oraft 1 of SA	R for Genera	al Update to	RO-006 Relia	bility Coordina	ition — Trans	mission Loadin	g Relief
Randy Mitchell									
Elizabeth B. Fleming									
G. O'Neal Hamilton									
Mignon L. Clyburn									
C. Robert Moselev									

# MISO/PJM/SPP Proposal

### **Purpose**

Modify the market flow calculation as specified in MISO, PJM and SPP regional differences E.1 and E.2 in Standard IRO-006 to address a reliability issue when MISO, PJM and SPP are unable to meet their relief obligations during TLR. MISO and PJM currently calculate market flow impacts on coordinated flowgates using no threshold. Both forward impacts down to 0% and reverse impacts down to 0% are reported to the IDC and are used to determine relief assignments during TLR. On some flowgates, MISO and PJM either have no generation they can redispatch within their respective markets or it is cost prohibitive to redispatch large amounts of generation to achieve small amounts of relief. When this occurs, it results in MISO and PJM failing to meet their relief obligations, it extends the time period of the TLR and it may ultimately elevate the TLR level as the RC must make additional calls for relief. This proposed revision to the regional differences in Standard IRO-006 addresses the reliability issue by changing the market flow threshold from 0% to 3%. The proposed threshold change only affects the MISO, PJM and SPP regional differences that appear in Standard IRO-006. There is a separate equity issue that MISO and PJM are currently given relief assignments based on their market flow impacts down to 0% while PTP tagged transactions, network service tagged transactions and native and network load (NNL) are given relief assignments using a 5% threshold. With this proposed change to the market flow threshold from 0% to 3%; MISO, PJM and SPP are not seeking to address the equity issue at this time.

# **Industry Need**

MISO and PJM raised the market flow threshold issue at the May 3-4, 2006, NERC ORS meeting. A white paper describing the market flow issue was sent to the ORS exploder prior to the meeting and a PowerPoint presentation was given during the meeting. MISO's and PJM's position at the meeting was that both the reliability issue and the equity issue needed to be addressed by raising the market flow threshold from 0% to 5%. MISO and PJM did not ask for an ORS vote to support changing the market flow threshold at the May 3-4, 2006, meeting. Instead, MISO and PJM stated that a task force had been formed under the CMPWG to investigate the impacts of changing the market flow threshold and to investigate how this would affect relief assignments during TLR. The ORS members were asked to participate in the Task Force.

The CMPWG/ORS TF had three face-to-face meeting and two phone calls during the May-August 2006 time period. It reviewed actual examples when MISO failed to meet its relief obligation on flowgates. It also reviewed the contributing factors to TLR events. It did a detailed analysis of 20 flowgates that shows how the market flows reported to the IDC change as the market flow threshold is increased from 0% to 5% in 1% increments, how the market flow impacts are affected by using a net of the forward and reverse impacts, and how much generation redispatch is required (on a gen-to-load basis and on a gen-to-gen basis) in order to accomplish 10 MW of relief on a flowgate.

The CMPWG/ORS TF approved a recommendation at its August 23, 2006, meeting to change the market flow threshold from 0% to 3% on a temporary basis (for a period of 12 months). During the temporary period, all TLR events in both market and non-market areas that failed to provide expected relief will be investigated. At the end of 12 months, a decision will be made whether to retain the 3% or change the threshold to some other percentage. This recommendation was presented as a mechanism to address the reliability concerns raised by MISO and PJM not meeting their relief obligation but does not address the equity concerns. The CMPWG/ORS TF felt they were not the proper group to address equity issues.

While a majority of the CMPWG/ORS TF members supported the recommendation on a one company/one vote basis (5 support, 3 oppose and 1 abstain), there was not unanimous support by the CMPWG members. Unanimous approval is required by voting members of the CMPWG and CMP Council before they can support an issue. The CMPWG and CMP Council do not support the recommendation. However, the recommendation is supported by MISO, PJM, SPP and TVA.

A CMPWG/ORS TF report was given at the September 19-20, 2006, ORS meeting. MISO and PJM said they supported the recommendation with the understanding the change to a 3% threshold on an interim basis only addresses the reliability issue. MISO and PJM retain the right to seek further changes with NERC, NAESB and FERC for equity reasons. Because there has been some debate on what are the reliability impacts versus the economic impacts of changing the market flow threshold, MISO and PJM produced a matrix of operating issues and what are the reliability impacts versus the economic impacts. MISO and PJM reviewed the matrix with the ORS. Please note that of the 10 operating issues in the matrix, the last three involve netting impacts in the IDC. This is a separate issue from the market flow threshold issue that is being investigated by the CMPWG/ORS TF.

The ORS approved a motion at their September 19-20, 2006, meeting to change the market flow threshold to 3% for an interim period of 12 months. During the 12 months, the CMPWG/ORS TF will investigate TLR events where either MISO or PJM failed to meet its relief obligation and will periodically report their findings to the ORS during the year. At the end of year, the ORS will decide whether the 3% threshold should be retained or it be changed to another threshold. Based on the approvals received from both the CMPWG/ORS TF and the ORS, and based on the support they have received from MISO, PJM, SPP and TVA; MISO and PJM indicated they would request a SAR to field test the market flow threshold change from 0% to 3% for a 12 month period. At the end of the field test, a decision will be made whether the regional differences in the TLR standard IRO-006 should be submitted for ballot using a 3% market flow threshold or some other threshold.

### **Brief Description**

MISO and PJM currently report market flows to the IDC using a 0% threshold. Once the SPP market starts, they will also report their market flows down to 0%. The IDC uses these market flows to make relief assignments during TLR. On some flowgates, MISO

and PJM have small market flow impacts they are directed to remove during TLR but either have no generation available within the market to redispatch or it is cost prohibitive to redispatch large amounts of generation for small amounts of relief. This request for a field test proposes to change the market flow calculation in the MISO, PJM and SPP regional differences in Standard IRO-006 from 0% to 3%. MISO has a contractual obligation under the MAPP SOA to continue using a 0% market flow threshold for assignment of TLR relief until the MAPP SOA is modified. In order to meet its contractual obligation, MISO asks for the flexibility to continue to receive relief assignments during TLR based on market flows down to 0% for all RCFs between MISO and MAPP until the MAPP SOA is modified (now expected to be spring 2008). All other MISO coordinated flowgates will receive relief assignments during TLR based on a 3% threshold as soon as the field test has been approved and software modifications have been implemented. PJM and SPP have no similar contractual obligations.

The CMPWG and the ORS indicated a preference that the market flows down to 0% still be reported to the IDC for information purposes even though the relief assignment will be based on a 3% threshold. It will require two sets of market flows be reported to the IDC. One set will be used in the assignment of relief and the other set will be available for information purposes. It will require software changes at the three RTOs and to the IDC to accommodate this request. If there was not a desire to see market flows down to 0% for information purposes, there would be no need for changes to the IDC. There is a second software change that will be made by the RTOs. The flowgate allocations will continue to consider impacts down to 0%. These allocations between the entities that have signed seams agreements are used to set the MISO and PJM firm flow limits reported to the IDC are used by MISO and PJM in the market-to-market settlement process and are used by all of the reciprocal entities to sell firm transmission service. In order to have comparable market flows and firm flow limits reported to the IDC, the three RTOs will remove all impacts below 3% that were used to develop the firm flow limit. It is anticipated the RTO software changes and the IDC software changes can be ready by spring 2007 for implementation before summer 2007.

Exhibit F

# Additional potential TLR Procedure changes for Phase IV

#### **Comment:**

We support the NERC/NAESB initiative to split the TLR document in order extract the business practice aspects. However, there is no reliability need for this proposed standard change. The reliability need in terms by managing power flow relief in a pre-defined time period in order to maintain security of the system did not change. However, this draft does not provide reliability performance specifications, such as X MW or % of relief in Y minutes. The NERC portion of this standard should specify what is needed to maintain the system security in the interconnected environment, while the NAESB portion should specify the road map as to how to do it.

### **DT** Answer

The drafting team will have to develop compliance measures so this is an appropriate addition.

#### **Comment**

Request to evaluate the extent of NERC / NAESB split

#### **DT** Answer

DT will review and discuss during phase I of the drafting process.

#### Comment

Considerations of ramp limits during TLR

#### **DT** Answer

DT will review and discuss during phase IV of the drafting process.

#### Comment

We request that the scope of this SAR be expanded to include resolving the reloading of curtailed transactions above their reliability limit by an entity other than the initiating entity or above any pre-existing reliability or market profiles. We also request that the scope of the SAR be expanded to include standards for when curtailments may be denied and when curtailments may be issued.

- 1 There have been several instances where a curtailment has been issued and then been automatically or manually reloaded above the reliability limit. The automatic reload problem created by the IDC has been resolved by CO-148, automatic reload by other back office applications has not been corrected, nor have manual adjustments. There are several options available for correcting this problem. This should be addressed by specifying requirements and performance measures in the TLR standard and may also be addressed through NAESB business practices and modifications to the e-Tag specification. Also, any pre-existing curtailment levels are lost. JISWG recommends that the entity who has issued the curtailment be the only entity able to authorize the reload. When the reload occurs the energy profile should be limited to the next lowest reliability limit or market adjustment profile.
- 2- Under normal circumstances, a curtailment (issued for reliability reasons) should not be denied. However, there are some limited circumstances where a curtailment should be denied. For example, if a curtailment comes in and the generator cannot meet the ramp requirements, then the curtailment could be denied and would be reissued for the next scheduling interval. This ensures that the tags reflect actual conditions. In other cases, curtailments are sometimes issued when PSE's cannot make their market level adjustments prior to cutoff. The TLR standard should address those specific reasons for denying a curtailment. Reliability is compromised when curtailments are denied for non-reliability reasons. Reliability may also be compromised when curtailments are issued for non-reliability reasons. If scope of

the SAR is adjusted, JISWG volunteers to assist the drafting team with providing specific language for the TLR standard addressing these issues.

### **DT** Answer

The drafting team will consider the modifications suggested in phase IV of the SAR and coordinated with NAESB, where appropriate. JISWG may be asked to provide assistance at that time.

## **FERC NOPR Paragraph 567**

Additionally, the drafting team will consider direction from paragraph 567 of the FERC NOPR indicating the inclusion of modifications to 1) include a clear warning that the TLR is an inappropriate and ineffective tool to mitigate IROL violations, 2) identifies in a requirement the available alternatives to the use of the TLR procedure to mitigate an IROL violation, and 3) includes measures and levels of non-compliance that address each requirement.